[Congressional Bills 119th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 2222 Reported in Senate (RS)]
<DOC>
Calendar No. 323
119th CONGRESS
2d Session
S. 2222
To enhance the security, resilience, and protection of undersea
communication cables vital to Taiwan's national security, economic
stability, and defense, particularly in countering gray zone tactics
employed by the People's Republic of China, and for other purposes.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
July 9, 2025
Mr. Curtis (for himself and Ms. Rosen) introduced the following bill;
which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations
February 10, 2026
Reported by Mr. Risch, with an amendment and an amendment to the title
[Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert the part printed
in italic]
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To enhance the security, resilience, and protection of undersea
communication cables vital to Taiwan's national security, economic
stability, and defense, particularly in countering gray zone tactics
employed by the People's Republic of China, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
<DELETED>SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.</DELETED>
<DELETED> This Act may be cited as the ``Taiwan Undersea Cable
Resilience Initiative Act''.</DELETED>
<DELETED>SEC. 2. FINDINGS.</DELETED>
<DELETED> Congress finds the following:</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) Undersea communication cables (in this Act
referred to as ``undersea cables'') are critical infrastructure
essential for global communication, commerce, and national
security, particularly for Taiwan, whose economic and security
stability relies heavily on undersea cable
connectivity.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) The Government of the People's Republic of
China has increasingly used gray zone tactics to undermine the
security and sovereignty of Taiwan, including suspected
sabotage of undersea cables in and around Taiwan, such as the
incidents involving the severing of cables around the Matsu
Islands of Taiwan and other key regions in 2023 and
2025.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (3) Undersea cables are a primary target in the
strategy of the Government of the People's Republic of China to
cripple the communication capabilities of Taiwan in the event
of a military conflict, as part of broader hybrid warfare
tactics. Disruption of undersea cables would significantly
impact the ability of Taiwan to communicate both domestically
and internationally, leading to a breakdown in military,
economic, and social functions.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (4) The vulnerability of Taiwan to attacks on
undersea cables has been compounded by an increasing number of
foreign vessels suspected of involvement in sabotage, including
Chinese-linked vessels, which are perceived as direct threats
to Taiwan's critical infrastructure.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (5) The ability of the Government of the People's
Republic of China to disrupt or sever undersea cables is a
critical element of its military strategy aimed at softening
Taiwan's defenses and isolating Taiwan from international
support in the event of an invasion or military
confrontation.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (6) Recent activities by foreign adversaries,
particularly the People's Republic of China, have increased the
risk of sabotage and disruption to undersea cables serving
Taiwan and other nations. Notably, in February 2023, the Matsu
Islands of Taiwan experienced major internet disruptions due to
two undersea cables being severed, with suspicions pointing
toward deliberate external interference. Furthermore, in
January 2025, Chunghwa Telecom reported damage to an
international undersea cable and identified a ``suspicious
vessel''--the Chinese-linked cargo ship Shunxin39--near the
affected area. The Coast Guard of Taiwan has indicated concerns
that that vessel may have been involved in deliberately cutting
the cable. In a subsequent incident, Taiwan seized the Togo-
flagged Hong Tai 58, suspected of deliberately severing an
undersea cable. The Coast Guard of Taiwan acknowledged the
possibility of China's involvement as part of a ``grey area
intrusion''.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (7) Since 2023, there have been at least 11 cases
of damage to undersea cables around Taiwan and a similar number
in the Baltic Sea, with authorities in Taiwan and Europe
suspecting Chinese and Russian involvement in several
incidents, although some damages have been attributed to
natural causes. Those incidents highlight the vulnerability of
those critical systems to gray zone tactics and the difficulty
of proving sabotage or holding perpetrators
accountable.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (8) The sabotage of undersea cables constitutes
gray zone tactics designed to destabilize and undermine
international security without direct military
confrontation.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (9) Several regional mechanisms have been
established to bolster the security of undersea cables,
including the Nordic Warden initiative for maritime domain
awareness and the Quad Partnership for Cable Connectivity and
Resilience, aimed at enhancing the security and resilience of
undersea cables in the Indo-Pacific.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (10) To counter the threats described in this
section and safeguard the resilience of Taiwan, it is
imperative for the United States and its allies to take
decisive action to bolster Taiwan's defenses for undersea
cables and foster international cooperation to protect those
critical assets.</DELETED>
<DELETED>SEC. 3. TAIWAN UNDERSEA CABLE RESILIENCE INITIATIVE.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (a) Establishment.--Not later than 360 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination
with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the
Commandant of the Coast Guard, and such other heads of agencies as the
Secretary of State considers relevant, shall establish an initiative to
be known as the ``Taiwan Undersea Cable Resilience Initiative'' (in
this section referred to as the ``Initiative'').</DELETED>
<DELETED> (b) Priority.--The Initiative shall prioritize the
protection and resilience of undersea cables near Taiwan, with a focus
on countering threats from the People's Republic of China to the
critical infrastructure of Taiwan.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (c) Key Focus Areas.--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) Advanced monitoring and detection
capabilities.--In carrying out the Initiative, the Secretary of
State, in coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security
and the Secretary of Defense, shall develop and deploy advanced
undersea cable monitoring systems for Taiwan capable of
detecting disruptions or potential sabotage in real-time,
including by informing Taiwan, as appropriate, of early
warnings from global intelligence networks.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) Rapid response protocols.--In carrying out the
Initiative, the Secretary of State shall--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) establish rapid response protocols for
repairing severed undersea cables or mitigating
disruptions; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) work with allies of the United States
to help Taiwan develop the logistical capacity to
respond quickly to attacks on undersea cables and
minimize downtime.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (3) Enhancing maritime domain awareness.--In
carrying out the Initiative--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) the Secretary of the Navy and the
Commandant of the Coast Guard, in collaboration with
the Coast Guard of Taiwan and regional allies, shall
enhance maritime domain awareness around Taiwan,
focusing on the detection of suspicious vessels or
activities near critical undersea cable routes;
and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) the Commandant of the Coast Guard
shall assist in joint patrols and surveillance,
particularly in the Taiwan Strait and surrounding
maritime zones, to monitor potential threats and
prevent sabotage.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (4) International frameworks for protection.--
</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) In general.--In carrying out the
Initiative, the Secretary of State shall seek to
establish cooperative frameworks with regional allies
and global partners to protect the undersea cable
networks near Taiwan.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) Elements.--The frameworks established
under subparagraph (A) shall provide for participation
by the United States in joint drills, intelligence-
sharing platforms, and collaborative surveillance
operations to enhance collective security against
sabotage.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (5) Taiwan-specific cable hardening.--In carrying
out the Initiative, the Secretary of State shall encourage and
support the hardening of critical undersea cables near Taiwan,
including reinforcing cables, improving burial depths, and
using more resilient materials to reduce vulnerability to
natural disasters and deliberate interference.</DELETED>
<DELETED>SEC. 4. COUNTERING CHINA'S GRAY ZONE TACTICS.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (a) Working With Partners To Counter Chinese Sabotage.--
The President shall work with Taiwan and like-minded international
partners to implement strategies that directly counter the use by the
Government of the People's Republic of China of undersea cable sabotage
as part of its gray zone warfare, including by increasing diplomatic
pressure on that Government to adhere to international norms regarding
the protection of undersea infrastructure.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (b) Raising Awareness.--The President shall work with
Taiwan to raise global awareness of the risks posed by interference by
the Government of the People's Republic of China in undersea cables,
including through public diplomacy efforts, information sharing, and
international forums that address gray zone tactics and the protection
of critical infrastructure.</DELETED>
<DELETED>SEC. 5. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO SABOTAGE OF
UNDERSEA CABLES.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (a) In General.--The President shall impose the sanctions
described in subsection (b) with respect to any person of the People's
Republic of China that the President determines is responsible for or
complicit in damaging undersea cables critical to the national security
of Taiwan.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (b) Sanctions Described.--The sanctions described in this
subsection are the following:</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) Blocking of property.--The President shall
exercise all of the powers granted by the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to the
extent necessary to block and prohibit all transactions in all
property and interests in property of a person described in
subsection (a), if such property and interests in property are
in the United States, come within the United States, or are or
come within the possession or control of a United States
person.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) Ineligibility for visas, admission, or
parole.--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) Visas, admission, or parole.--An alien
described in subsection (a) shall be--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (i) inadmissible to the United
States;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (ii) ineligible to receive a visa
or other documentation to enter the United
States; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (iii) otherwise ineligible to be
admitted or paroled into the United States or
to receive any other benefit under the
Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101
et seq.).</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) Current visas revoked.--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (i) In general.--The visa or other
entry documentation of an alien described in
subsection (a) shall be revoked, regardless of
when such visa or other entry documentation is
or was issued.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (ii) Immediate effect.--A
revocation under clause (i) shall--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (I) take effect
immediately; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (II) automatically cancel
any other valid visa or entry
documentation that is in the possession
of the alien.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (c) Implementation; Penalties.--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) Implementation.--The President may exercise
all authorities provided under sections 203 and 205 of the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 and
1704) to carry out this section.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) Penalties.--A person that violates, attempts
to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of this
section or any regulation, license, or order issued to carry
out this section shall be subject to the penalties set forth in
subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) to the same
extent as a person that commits an unlawful act described in
subsection (a) of that section.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (d) Exceptions.--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) Exception for intelligence activities.--This
section shall not apply with respect to activities subject to
the reporting requirements under title V of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.) or any authorized
intelligence activities of the United States.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) Exception to comply with international
agreements.--Sanctions under subsection (b)(2) shall not apply
with respect to the admission of an alien to the United States
if such admission is necessary to comply with the obligations
of the United States under the Agreement regarding the
Headquarters of the United Nations, signed at Lake Success on
June 26, 1947, and entered into force on November 21, 1947,
between the United Nations and the United States, or the
Convention on Consular Relations, done at Vienna on April 24,
1963, and entered into force on March 19, 1967, or other
international obligations of the United States.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (3) Exception relating to importation of goods.--
</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) In general.--The authorities and
requirements to impose sanctions under this section
shall not include the authority or requirement to
impose sanctions on the importation of goods.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) Good defined.--In this paragraph, the
term ``good'' means any article, natural or manmade
substance, material, supply or manufactured product,
including inspection and test equipment, and excluding
technical data.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (e) Definitions.--In this section:</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) Admission; admitted; alien.--The terms
``admission'', ``admitted'', and ``alien'' have the meanings
given those terms in section 101 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101).</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) Person of the people's republic of china.--The
term ``person of the People's Republic of China'' means--
</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) an individual who is a citizen or
national of the People's Republic of China;
and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) an entity owned or controlled by the
Government of the People's Republic of China, organized
under the laws of the People's Republic of China, or
otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the Government
of the People's Republic of China.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (3) United states person.--The term ``United
States person'' means--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) any United States citizen or an alien
lawfully admitted for permanent residence to the United
States;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) an entity organized under the laws of
the United States or of any jurisdiction within the
United States, including any foreign branch of such an
entity; or</DELETED>
<DELETED> (C) any person in the United
States.</DELETED>
<DELETED>SEC. 6. SEMIANNUAL REPORT.</DELETED>
<DELETED> Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, the President shall submit to
Congress a report detailing--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) any incidents of interference in undersea
cables near Taiwan; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) any actions taken in response to such
incidents.</DELETED>
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Critical Undersea Infrastructure
Resilience Initiative Act''.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
Congress finds the following:
(1) The Government of the People's Republic of China (PRC)
has increasingly used gray zone tactics to undermine the
security of Taiwan and change the status quo in the Taiwan
Strait, including suspected sabotage of undersea cables in and
around Taiwan, such as the incidents involving the severing of
cables around the Matsu Islands of Taiwan and other key regions
in 2023 and 2025.
(2) Undersea cables and other critical undersea
infrastructure are a primary vulnerability for Taiwan that
could be targeted by the PRC to cripple the communication
capabilities of Taiwan in the event of a conflict in the Taiwan
Strait and of broader hybrid warfare tactics. Disruption of
critical undersea infrastructure would significantly impact the
ability of Taiwan to communicate both domestically and
internationally, leading to a breakdown in military, economic,
and social functions.
(3) The vulnerability of Taiwan to attacks on critical
undersea infrastructure has been compounded by an increasing
number of foreign vessels suspected of involvement in sabotage,
including PRC-linked vessels, which pose direct threats to
Taiwan's critical infrastructure.
(4) The ability of the PRC to disrupt or damage critical
undersea infrastructure is a critical element of its strategy
aimed at disrupting Taiwan's military and civil communications
and isolating Taiwan in the event of a blockade, quarantine, or
other attempt to force unification with the PRC.
(5) Recent activities by foreign adversaries, particularly
the PRC, have increased the risk of sabotage and disruption to
critical undersea infrastructure serving Taiwan and other
nations, including--
(A) in February 2023, two vessels registered to the
PRC severed two undersea cables that effectively cut
internet access to the 13,000 residents of Taiwan's
Matsu Islands, who had to rely on microwave radio
transmissions to provide limited internet access for 50
days until a cable ship was able to complete repairs;
(B) in January 2025, Taiwan's Chunghwa Telecom
reported damage to an undersea cable north of Taipei
and identified a ``suspicious vessel'' registered as
the Shunxin-39 and the Xin Shun-39, which had traveled
in a criss-cross pattern while dragging its anchor near
where the cable was damaged;
(C) in January 2025, a Mongolia-flagged vessel
named the Baoshun was driven away by Taiwan's coast
guard after suspicious movements off the coast of New
Taipei; and
(D) in February 2025, Taiwan's coast guard detained
the Togo-flagged Hong Tai 58 near Taiwan's Penghu
Islands after an undersea cable in the area was
severed, with the captain later admitting to dropping
the ship's anchor in the area and that he ``might have
broken the cable''.
(6) Since 2023, there have been at least 11 cases of damage
to undersea cables around Taiwan and a similar number in the
Baltic Sea, with authorities in Taiwan and Europe suspecting
PRC and Russian involvement and possible coordination in
several incidents. Those incidents highlight the vulnerability
of critical undersea infrastructure, as well as the difficulty
of proving sabotage or holding perpetrators accountable.
(7) The sabotage of critical undersea infrastructure
constitutes gray zone tactics designed to destabilize and
undermine international security while falling short of direct
military confrontation.
(8) Several regional mechanisms have been established to
bolster the security of undersea cables, including the Nordic
Warden initiative for maritime domain awareness and the Quad
Partnership for Cable Connectivity and Resilience, aimed at
enhancing the security and resilience of undersea cables in the
Indo-Pacific.
(9) Taiwan is the world's 21st largest economy by
purchasing power parity and deeply integrated in the global
information and communications technology supply chain. Any
restrictions to its internet connectivity or energy security
would have a direct impact on the world's economy.
(10) To counter the threats described in this section and
safeguard the resilience of Taiwan, it is imperative for the
United States and its allies to take decisive action to bolster
Taiwan's defenses for critical undersea infrastructure and
foster international cooperation to protect those critical
assets.
SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.
In this section:
(1) Critical undersea infrastructure.--The term ``critical
undersea infrastructure'' means--
(A) subsea energy infrastructure, including a
subsea cable, pipeline, or other equipment installed
on, beneath, or within the seabed, to transmit
electricity (including via subsea electricity cables,
subsea electricity transformers, or equipment related
to the support of offshore energy production
installations) or to transport natural gas, oil, or
hydrogen between land-based or off-shore
infrastructure, as well as associated landing stations
and facilities; or
(B) subsea telecommunications infrastructure,
including subsea fiber-optic cables and related
equipment installed on, beneath, or within the seabed,
and used to transmit communications, data, voice,
video, or other electronic signals, as well as
associated landing stations and facilities.
(2) Sabotage.--The term ``sabotage'' means actions, or
preparations for future actions, taken with the intent to cause
defective production of, operation of, or damage to critical
undersea infrastructure, including the integrity of data
transmitted via subsea telecommunications infrastructure.
SEC. 4. TAIWAN CRITICAL UNDERSEA INFRASTRUCTURE RESILIENCE INITIATIVE.
(a) Establishment.--Not later than 360 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the
Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the
Commandant of the Coast Guard, and such other heads of agencies as the
Secretary of State considers relevant, shall establish an initiative to
be known as the ``Taiwan Critical Undersea Infrastructure Initiative''
(in this section referred to as the ``Initiative'').
(b) Priority.--The Initiative shall prioritize the protection and
resilience of critical undersea infrastructure near Taiwan, with a
focus on countering threats from the PRC.
(c) Key Focus Areas.--
(1) Advanced monitoring and detection capabilities.--In
carrying out the Initiative, the Secretary of State, in
coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security and the
Secretary of Defense, shall develop and deploy advanced
critical undersea infrastructure monitoring systems capable of
detecting disruptions or potential sabotage in real-time,
including by informing Taiwan, as appropriate, of early
warnings about risks to Taiwan's critical undersea
infrastructure from global intelligence networks.
(2) Rapid response protocols.--
(A) In general.--In carrying out the Initiative,
the Secretary of State shall--
(i) in cooperation with regional partners,
establish rapid response protocols for damaged
critical undersea infrastructure or mitigating
disruptions; and
(ii) work with allies and partners of the
United States to help Taiwan and regional
partners develop the logistical capacity to
respond quickly to attacks on critical undersea
infrastructure and minimize downtime.
(B) Authorization of appropriations.--There is
authorized to be appropriated $20,000,000 for each of
fiscal years 2027 through 2032 to carry out
subparagraph (A).
(3) Enhancing maritime domain awareness.--In carrying out
the Initiative--
(A) the Secretary of the Navy and the Commandant of
the Coast Guard, in collaboration with the Coast Guard
of Taiwan and regional partners, shall enhance maritime
domain awareness around Taiwan, focusing on the ability
to detect and interdict suspicious vessels or
activities near critical undersea infrastructure; and
(B) the Commandant of the Coast Guard shall assist
in joint patrols and surveillance, particularly in the
Taiwan Strait and surrounding maritime zones, to
monitor potential threats and prevent sabotage.
(4) International frameworks for protection.--
(A) In general.--In carrying out the Initiative,
the Secretary of State shall seek to establish
cooperative frameworks with regional and global
partners to protect undersea cable networks near
Taiwan.
(B) Elements.--The frameworks established under
subparagraph (A) shall provide for participation by the
United States in joint drills, intelligence-sharing
platforms, and collaborative surveillance operations to
enhance collective security against sabotage.
(5) Taiwan-specific cable hardening.--In carrying out the
Initiative, the Secretary of State shall encourage and support
the hardening of critical undersea infrastructure near Taiwan,
including reinforcing cables, improving burial depths, and
using more resilient materials to reduce vulnerability to
natural disasters and sabotage.
SEC. 5. COUNTERING PRC GRAY ZONE TACTICS.
(a) Working With Partners To Counter PRC Sabotage.--The President
shall work with like-minded international partners to implement
strategies that directly counter the Government of the PRC's critical
undersea infrastructure sabotage activities as part of its gray zone
warfare, including by increasing diplomatic pressure on the PRC to
adhere to international norms regarding the protection of critical
undersea infrastructure.
(b) Raising Awareness.--The President shall work with like-minded
international partners to raise global awareness of the risks posed by
the PRC's sabotage of critical undersea infrastructure, including
through public diplomacy efforts, information sharing, and
participation in international forums that address gray zone tactics
and the protection of critical undersea infrastructure.
SEC. 6. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO CRITICAL UNDERSEA
INFRASTRUCTURE SABOTAGE.
(a) In General.--The President, in coordination with the Secretary
of State and the Secretary of the Treasury, shall impose the sanctions
described in subsection (c) with respect to any foreign person that the
President determines, on or after the date of the enactment of this
Act, is responsible for acts of sabotage, or facilitates acts of
sabotage, against undersea infrastructure critical to the security of
Taiwan or other United States allies or partners, including--
(1) any foreign vessel or entity the owner or operator of
which knowingly--
(A) commits acts of sabotage; or
(B) conducts preparatory surveillance, logistical
support, security, or other services that facilitate or
enable an act of sabotage; and
(2) any foreign person that knowingly--
(A) owns, operates, or manages a vessel or entity
described in paragraph (1);
(B) provides underwriting services or insurance or
reinsurance necessary for such a vessel or entity;
(C) facilitates deceptive or structured
transactions to support such a vessel or entity;
(D) provides port or logistics services or
facilities for technology upgrades or installation of
equipment for, or retrofitting or tethering of, such a
vessel for the purpose of evading sanctions;
(E) provides documentation, registration, or
flagging services for such a vessel for the purpose of
evading sanctions; or
(F) serves as a captain, principal officer, or
senior leader of such a vessel or entity.
(b) Report Required.--Not later than 15 days after imposing
sanctions with respect to a foreign person under subsection (a), the
President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a
report that includes a detailed justification for the imposition of the
sanctions.
(c) Sanctions Described.--The sanctions described in this
subsection are the following:
(1) Blocking of property.--The President shall exercise all
of the powers granted by the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to the extent necessary to
block and prohibit all transactions in all property and
interests in property of a foreign person described in
subsection (a), if such property and interests in property are
in the United States, come within the United States, or are or
come within the possession or control of a United States
person.
(2) Ineligibility for visas, admission, or parole.--
(A) Visas, admission, or parole.--An alien
described in subsection (a) shall be--
(i) inadmissible to the United States;
(ii) ineligible to receive a visa or other
documentation to enter the United States; and
(iii) otherwise ineligible to be admitted
or paroled into the United States or to receive
any other benefit under the Immigration and
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.).
(B) Current visas revoked.--
(i) In general.--The visa or other entry
documentation of an alien described in
subsection (a) shall be revoked, regardless of
when such visa or other entry documentation is
or was issued.
(ii) Immediate effect.--A revocation under
clause (i) shall--
(I) take effect immediately; and
(II) automatically cancel any other
valid visa or entry documentation that
is in the possession of the alien.
(d) Implementation; Penalties.--
(1) Implementation.--The President may exercise all
authorities provided under sections 203 and 205 of the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 and
1704) to carry out this section.
(2) Penalties.--A person that violates, attempts to
violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of this
section or any regulation, license, or order issued to carry
out this section shall be subject to the penalties set forth in
subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) to the same
extent as a person that commits an unlawful act described in
subsection (a) of that section.
(e) Exceptions.--
(1) Exception to comply with united nations headquarters
agreement and law enforcement activities.--Sanctions under this
section shall not apply with respect to the admission or parole
of an alien into the United States if admitting or paroling the
alien is necessary--
(A) to permit the United States to comply with the
Agreement regarding the Headquarters of the United
Nations, signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947, and
entered into force November 21, 1947, between the
United Nations and the United States, or other
applicable international obligations of the United
States; or
(B) to carry out or assist authorized law
enforcement activity in the United States.
(2) Exception to comply with intelligence activities.--
Sanctions under this section shall not apply to any activity
subject to the reporting requirements under title V of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.) or any
authorized intelligence activities of the United States.
(3) Exception relating to importation of goods.--
(A) In general.--A requirement to block and
prohibit all transactions in all property and interests
in property under this section shall not include the
authority or requirement to impose sanctions on the
importation of goods.
(B) Good defined.--In this paragraph, the term
``good'' means any article, natural or manmade
substance, material, supply or manufactured product,
including inspection and test equipment, and excluding
technical data.
(f) National Security Interests Waiver.--The President may waive
the application of sanctions under this section if, before issuing the
waiver, the President submits to the appropriate congressional
committees--
(1) a certification in writing that the issuance of the
waiver is in the national security interests of the United
States; and
(2) a report explaining the basis for the certification.
(g) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Admission; admitted; alien; etc.--The terms
``admission'', ``admitted'', ``alien'', and ``lawfully admitted
for permanent residence'' have the meanings given those terms
in section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C.
1101).
(2) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the
Senate; and
(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the
Committee on Financial Services of the House of
Representatives.
(3) Foreign person.--The term ``foreign person'' means an
individual or entity that is not a United States person.
(4) United states person.--The term ``United States
person'' means--
(A) any United States citizen or an alien lawfully
admitted for permanent residence to the United States;
(B) an entity organized under the laws of the
United States or of any jurisdiction within the United
States, including any foreign branch of such an entity;
or
(C) any person in the United States.
SEC. 7. SEMIANNUAL REPORT.
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this
Act, and every 180 days thereafter through 2032, the President shall
submit to Congress a report detailing--
(1) any incidents of interference or sabotage related to
critical undersea infrastructure near Taiwan; and
(2) any actions taken in response to such incidents.
SEC. 8. INTERAGENCY CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR CROSS-STRAIT CRISIS.
(a) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States to
be prepared for potential crises involving Taiwan, including an attempt
by the People's Republic of China (PRC) to change the status quo by
force, through comprehensive interagency contingency planning that
addresses the catastrophic risks such crises would pose to the national
security of the United States.
(b) Cross-Strait Contingency Planning Group.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the President shall establish a
Cross-Strait Contingency Planning Group--
(A) to be chaired by the National Security Council;
and
(B) consisting of senior officials from the
Department of State, the Department of Defense, the
United States intelligence community, and such other
Federal agencies as may be appropriate.
(2) Functions.--The Cross-Strait Contingency Planning Group
shall--
(A) conduct scenario-based planning exercises to
prepare for potential crises involving Taiwan,
including blockade or quarantine scenarios, the seizure
of an outlying island, military contingencies, economic
coercion, cyber attacks, and hybrid threats;
(B) identify critical vulnerabilities in supply
chains, financial systems, critical infrastructure, and
security posture of the United States and allies and
partners of the United States that would be affected by
a crisis involving Taiwan;
(C) develop integrated contingency plans that
coordinate diplomatic, military, economic, cyber, and
homeland security responses across the Group;
(D) assess the adequacy of existing authorities,
resources, and decision-making processes to execute
such contingency plans;
(E) identify gaps in capabilities, authorities, or
coordination mechanisms and recommend solutions;
(F) share risk assessments with allies and partners
of the United States, as appropriate; and
(G) regularly test and refine contingency plans.
(3) Report required.--Not later than 180 days after the
establishment of the Cross-Strait Contingency Planning Group
under paragraph (1), and annually thereafter for 10 years, the
Cross-Strait Contingency Planning Group shall submit to
Congress a classified report that includes--
(A) a description of contingency scenarios assessed
and planning activities conducted by the Group;
(B) an assessment of the preparedness of the United
States and allies and partners of the United States to
respond to a crisis involving Taiwan, including
identification of capability gaps and resource
requirements;
(C) recommendations for legislative action, policy
changes, or resource allocation to enhance such
preparedness; and
(D) a description of exercises conducted and
lessons learned by the Group.
Amend the title so as to read: ``A bill to enhance the
security, resilience, and protection of critical undersea
infrastructure vital to Taiwan's national security, economic
stability, and defense, particularly in countering gray zone
tactics employed by the People's Republic of China, and for
other purposes.''.
Calendar No. 323
119th CONGRESS
2d Session
S. 2222
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To enhance the security, resilience, and protection of undersea
communication cables vital to Taiwan's national security, economic
stability, and defense, particularly in countering gray zone tactics
employed by the People's Republic of China, and for other purposes.
_______________________________________________________________________
February 10, 2026
Reported with an amendment and an amendment to the title
Critical Undersea Infrastructure Resilience Initiative Act
#2222 | S Congress #119
Policy Area: International Affairs
Subjects: Administrative law and regulatory proceduresAdvisory bodiesAsiaBroadcasting, cable, digital technologiesChinaCongressional oversightElectric power generation and transmissionForeign propertyIntelligence activities, surveillance, classified informationInternet, web applications, social mediaMarine and inland water transportationMilitary assistance, sales, and agreementsMilitary operations and strategyPipelinesPresidents and presidential powers, Vice PresidentsSanctionsTaiwanTelephone and wireless communicationVisas and passports
Last Action: Placed on Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders. Calendar No. 323. (2/10/2026)
Bill Text Source: Congress.gov
Summary and Impacts
Original Text