[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 804 Introduced in Senate (IS)]
<DOC>
118th CONGRESS
1st Session
S. 804
To provide for security in the Black Sea region, and for other
purposes.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
March 15, 2023
Mrs. Shaheen (for herself, Mr. Romney, Mr. Tillis, Mr. Durbin, Mr.
Wicker, Mr. Cardin, Mr. King, Ms. Klobuchar, and Mr. Cornyn) introduced
the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee
on Foreign Relations
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To provide for security in the Black Sea region, and for other
purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Black Sea Security Act of 2023''.
SEC. 2. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON BLACK SEA SECURITY.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) it is in the interest of the United States to support
efforts to prevent the spread of further armed conflict in
Europe by recognizing the Black Sea region as an arena of
Russian aggression;
(2) littoral states of the Black Sea are critical in
countering aggression by the Government of the Russian
Federation and contributing to the collective security of NATO;
(3) the repeated, illegal, unprovoked, and violent attempts
of the Russian Federation to expand its territory and control
access to the Mediterranean Sea through the Black Sea
constitutes a threat to the national security of the United
States and NATO;
(4) the United States condemns attempts by the Russian
Federation to change or alter boundaries in the Black Sea
region by force or any means contrary to international law and
to impose a sphere of influence across the region;
(5) the United States and its allies should robustly
counter Russia's illegitimate territorial claims on the Crimean
Peninsula, along Ukraine's territorial waters in the Black Sea
and the Sea of Azov, in the Black Sea's international waters,
and in the territories it is illegally occupying in Ukraine;
(6) the United States should continue to work within NATO
and with NATO Allies to develop a long-term strategy to enhance
security, establish a permanent, sustainable presence along
NATO's eastern flank, and bolster the democratic resilience of
its allies and partners in the region;
(7) the United States should work within NATO and with NATO
Allies to develop a regular, rotational maritime presence in
the Black Sea;
(8) the United States should also work with the European
Union on coordinating a strategy to support democratic
initiatives and economic prosperity in the region, which
includes two European Union members and four European Union
aspirant nations;
(9) Turkey's behavior towards some regional allies and
democratic states has been counterproductive and has
contributed to increased tensions in the region, and Turkey
should avoid any actions to further escalate regional tensions;
(10) the United States should work to foster dialogue among
countries within the Black Sea region to improve communication
and intelligence sharing and increase cyber defense
capabilities;
(11) countries with historic and economic ties to Russia
are looking to the United States and Europe to provide a
positive economic presence in the broader region as a
counterbalance to the Russian Federation's malign influence in
the region;
(12) it is in the interest of the United States to support
and bolster the economic ties between the United States and
Black Sea states;
(13) the United States should support the initiative
undertaken by central and eastern European states to advance
the Three Seas Initiative Fund to strengthen transport, energy,
and digital infrastructure connectivity in the region between
the Adriatic Sea, Baltic Sea, and Black Sea;
(14) there are mutually beneficial opportunities for
increased investment and economic expansion, particularly on
energy, climate, and transport infrastructure initiatives,
between the United States and Black Sea states and the broader
region;
(15) improved economic ties between the United States and
the Black Sea states and the broader region can lead to a
strengthened strategic partnership;
(16) the United States must seek to address the food
security challenges arising from disruption of Ukraine's Black
Sea and Azov Sea ports, as this global challenge will have
critical national security implications for the United States,
our partners, and allies;
(17) Turkey, in coordination with the United Nations, has
played an important role in alleviating global food insecurity
by negotiating two agreements to allow grain exports from
Ukrainian ports through a safe corridor in the Black Sea;
(18) Russia has a brutal history of using hunger as a
weapon and must be stopped;
(19) countering the PRC's coercive economic pursuits
remains an important policy imperative in order to further
integrate the Black Sea states into western economies and
improve regional stability; and
(20) Turkey's continued delay in ratifying Sweden and
Finland's accession to NATO undermines the strength of the
alliance and inhibits the united international response to
Russia's unprovoked war in Ukraine.
SEC. 3. UNITED STATES POLICY.
It is the policy of the United States to--
(1) actively deter the threat of Russia's further
escalation in the Black Sea region and defend freedom of
navigation in the Black Sea to prevent the spread of further
armed conflict in Europe;
(2) advocate within NATO, among NATO Allies, and within the
European Union to develop a long-term coordinated strategy to
enhance security, establish a permanent, sustainable presence
in the eastern flank, and bolster the democratic resilience of
United States allies and partners in the region;
(3) advocate within NATO and among NATO Allies to develop a
regular, rotational maritime presence in the Black Sea;
(4) support and bolster the economic ties between the
United States and Black Sea partners and mobilize the
Department of State, the Department of Defense, and other
relevant Federal departments and agencies by enhancing the
United States presence and investment in Black Sea states;
(5) provide economic alternatives to the PRC's coercive
economic options that destabilize and further erode economic
integration of the Black Sea states;
(6) ensure that the United States continues to support
Black Sea states' efforts to strengthen their democratic
institutions to prevent corruption and accelerate their
advancement into the Euroatlantic community; and
(7) encourage the initiative undertaken by central and
eastern European states to advance the Three Seas Initiative to
strengthen transport, energy, and digital infrastructure
connectivity in the region between the Adriatic Sea, Baltic
Sea, and Black Sea.
SEC. 4. BLACK SEA SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY.
(a) Black Sea Security and Development Strategy.--Not later than
180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the National
Security Council, in coordination with the Department of State, the
Department of Defense, and other relevant Federal departments and
agencies, is authorized to direct an interagency strategy to increase
coordination with NATO and the European Union, deepen economic ties,
strengthen energy security, support efforts to bolster their democratic
resilience, and enhance security assistance with our regional partners
in accordance with the values and interests of the United States.
(b) Purpose and Objectives.--The initiative established under
subsection (a) shall have the following goals and objectives:
(1) Ensuring the efficient and effective delivery of
security assistance to regional partners in accordance with the
values and interests of the United States, prioritizing
assistance that will bolster defenses against hybrid warfare
and improve interoperability with NATO forces.
(2) Bolstering United States support for the region's
energy security and integration with Europe and reducing their
dependence on Russia while supporting energy diversification.
(3) Mitigating the impact of economic coercion by the
Russian Federation and the PRC on Black Sea states and
identifying new opportunities for foreign direct investment
from the United States and cooperating countries and the
enhancement of United States business ties with regional
partners in accordance with the values and interests of the
United States.
(4) Increasing high-level engagement between the United
States and regional partners, and reinforcing economic growth,
financing quality infrastructure, and reinforcing trade with a
focus on improving high-level economic cooperation.
(5) Increasing United States coordination with the European
Union and NATO to maximize effectiveness and minimize
duplication.
(c) Activities.--
(1) Security.--The strategy established under subsection
(a) should include the following elements related to security:
(A) A plan to increase interagency coordination on
the Black Sea region.
(B) An assessment of whether a United States-led
initiative with NATO allies to increase coordination,
presence, and regional engagement among Black Sea
states is advisable.
(C) A strategy to increase security assistance
toward Black Sea states, focused on Ukraine, Romania,
Bulgaria, Moldova, and Georgia.
(D) Prioritization of intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance systems to monitor Russia's
operations in the Black Sea region.
(E) An assessment of the value of establishing a
joint, multinational three-star headquarters on the
Black Sea, responsible for planning, readiness,
exercises, and coordination of all Allied and partner
military activity in the greater Black Sea region.
(F) An assessment of the challenges and
opportunities of establishing a regular, rotational
NATO maritime presence in the Black Sea, including an
analysis of the capacity, capabilities, and commitment
of NATO members to create this type of mission.
(G) An overview of Foreign Military Financing,
International Military Education and Training, and
other United States security assistance to the region.
(H) A plan for communicating the changes to NATO
posture to the public in allied and partner countries,
as well as to publics in the Russian Federation and
Belarus.
(I) A plan for combating Russian disinformation and
propaganda in the Black Sea region, utilizing the
resources of the United States Government, including
the Global Engagement Center.
(J) A plan to promote greater freedom of navigation
to allow for greater security and economic Black Sea
access.
(2) Economic prosperity.--The strategy established under
subsection (a) shall include the following elements related to
economic prosperity:
(A) A strategy to foster dialogue between experts
from the United States and from the Black Sea states on
economic expansion, foreign direct investment,
strengthening rule of law initiatives, and mitigating
economic coercion by Russia and the PRC.
(B) A strategy for all the relevant Federal
departments and agencies that contribute to United
States economic statecraft to expand their presence and
identify new opportunities for private investment with
regional partners in accordance with the values and
interests of the United States.
(C) Assessments on energy diversification, focusing
on the immediate need to replace energy supplies from
Russia, and recognizing the long-term importance of
broader energy diversification, including clean energy
initiatives.
(D) Assessments of potential food security
solutions, including sustainable, long-term
arrangements beyond the Black Sea Grain Initiative.
(3) Democratic resilience.--The strategy established under
subsection (a) shall include the following elements related to
democratic resilience:
(A) A strategy to increase independent media and
United States-supported media initiatives to combat
foreign malign influence in the Black Sea region.
(B) Greater mobilization of initiatives spearheaded
by the Global Engagement Center and the United States
Agency for International Development to counter Russian
propaganda and disinformation in the Black Sea region.
(4) Regional connectivity.--The strategy established under
subsection (a) shall promote regional connectivity by sending
high-level representatives of the Department of State or other
agency partners to--
(A) the Black Sea region not less frequently than
twice a year; and
(B) major regional fora on infrastructure and
energy security, including the Three Seas Initiative
Summit.
(d) Identification of Necessary Programs and Resources.--Not later
than 360 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
interagency shall identify any necessary program, policy, or budgetary
resources required, by agency, to support implementation of the Black
Sea Security Strategy for fiscal years 2024, 2025, and 2026.
(e) Responsibilities of Federal Departments and Agencies.--Nothing
under this section shall be deemed to authorize the National Security
Council to assume any of the responsibilities or authorities of the
head of any Federal department, agency, or office, including the
foreign affairs responsibilities and authorities of the Secretary of
State, to oversee the implementation of programs and policies under
this section.
SEC. 5. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the
Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on
Appropriations of the Senate; and
(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee
on Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations
of the House of Representatives.
(2) Black sea states.--The term ``Black Sea states'' means
Turkey, Romania, Bulgaria, Moldova, Ukraine, and Georgia.
<all>
Black Sea Security Act of 2023
#804 | S Congress #118
Policy Area: International Affairs
Subjects: AlliancesBulgariaCollective securityCongressional oversightDiplomacy, foreign officials, Americans abroadEuropeGeorgiaGovernment ethics and transparency, public corruptionIntelligence activities, surveillance, classified informationMoldovaPolitical movements and philosophiesRomaniaRule of law and government transparencyRussiaTurkeyUkraine
Last Action: Read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations. (3/15/2023)
Bill Text Source: Congress.gov
Summary and Impacts
Original Text