[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 4509 Reported in Senate (RS)]
<DOC>
Calendar No. 605
117th CONGRESS
2d Session
S. 4509
To provide for security in the Black Sea region, and for other
purposes.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
July 12, 2022
Mrs. Shaheen (for herself, Mr. Romney, Mr. Coons, Mr. Tillis, Mr.
Cardin, Mr. Wicker, Mr. Portman, Mr. Blumenthal, Mr. Cornyn, Mr.
Durbin, Mr. King, and Ms. Klobuchar) introduced the following bill;
which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations
December 7, 2022
Reported by Mr. Menendez, with an amendment
[Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert the part printed
in italic]
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To provide for security in the Black Sea region, and for other
purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
<DELETED>SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.</DELETED>
<DELETED> This Act may be cited as the ``Black Sea Security Act of
2022''.</DELETED>
<DELETED>SEC. 2. FINDINGS.</DELETED>
<DELETED> Congress makes the following findings:</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) The Black Sea region is of critical importance
to the national security of six nations: Ukraine, Georgia,
Moldova, Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) The Black Sea region has been a zone of
increasing tension and conflict on the eastern border of the
European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) following President Vladimir Putin's 2014 and 2022
invasions of Ukraine and 2008 invasion of Georgia, which still
has territories illegally occupied by the Russian
Federation.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (3) Since the illegal attempted annexation of
Ukraine's Crimea region in 2014, the Russian Federation has
enhanced the Black Sea Fleet to increase its presence in the
region, enhanced its air and coastal defenses, disregarded
international law regarding freedom of navigation to interrupt
in regular shipping routes, and threatened freedom of
navigation exercises in the Black Sea.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (4) Since its military interventions in the Black
Sea region starting in 2008, the Russian Federation has
undertaken persistent hybrid measures to further destabilize
the region through malign influence campaigns.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (5) Since the 2022 invasion of Ukraine by the
Russian Federation, the unity among Black Sea countries has
strengthened, particularly among NATO member countries Romania,
Bulgaria, and Turkey.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (6) The Russian Federation is leveraging its
illegal claim over Black Sea waters and the territories of
Black Sea region states to execute military exercises to
threaten the territorial sovereignty of Ukraine and kill
innocent civilians.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (7) Russia has a long history of using its
position in the Black Sea and Crimea to threaten NATO allies,
including the HMS Defender incident of June 2021, when a
British ship was harassed by Russian ships while undertaking a
freedom of navigation patrol in waters near the Crimean
Peninsula.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (8) While NATO has conducted routine exercises in
the region, the United States presence in the Black Sea has
decreased since Russia's annexation of Crimea due to competing
security priorities among allies, a lack of available ships and
resources, and a lack of a clearly defined regional
strategy.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (9) While, in February 2022, Turkey blocked the
entry of Russian warships into the Black Sea pursuant to the
Convention regarding the Regime of the Straits, signed at
Montreux, Switzerland July 20, 1936 (commonly known as the
``Montreux Convention''), the Montreux Convention does not
account for the increase in size, weight, and capabilities of
modern warships, and Russia does not have the same limits on
tonnage as non-littoral states.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (10) Turkey has resisted attempts to change its
interpretation of the Montreux Convention to avoid weakening
their position in the region.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (11) While NATO has long recognized the strategic
importance of the Black Sea, Russia has sought to capitalize on
at times divergent priorities among NATO members in the region
to advance expansionist claims.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (12) On February 24, 2022, Russian Federation
President Vladimir Putin instigated an unprovoked, unjustified,
and unlawful war violating the territorial integrity of the
sovereign country of Ukraine and is using the Russian
Federation's military presence on the Black Sea to kill
innocent Ukrainian civilians.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (13) The Russian Federation's unprovoked war on
Ukraine has underscored the importance of the Black Sea region
to United States national security interests.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (14) The Russian Federation's unprovoked war has
caused a food security crisis as 20,000,000-30,000,000 tons of
Ukrainian grain remain unable to leave Ukraine in an efficient
and secure manner. The war has also impeded Ukraine's ability
to produce and transport next year's harvest.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (15) The Russian Federation's actions in and
around the Black Sea have also disrupted secure, reliable
access to energy resources throughout Europe. Notably, Gazprom
suspended natural gas supplies to Poland and Bulgaria on April
27, 2022, after the two countries refused to abide by a March
31, 2022, Russian decree that all payments be made in rubles,
in violation of the terms of their contracts with
Gazprom.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (16) The People's Republic of China (PRC)'s
coercive economic policies also threaten the economic stability
of the Black Sea region.</DELETED>
<DELETED>SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON BLACK SEA SECURITY.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) it is in the interest of the United States to
prevent the spread of further armed conflict in Europe by
recognizing the Black Sea region as an arena of Russian
aggression;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) the littoral members of the Black Sea are
critical in countering aggression by the Government of the
Russian Federation and maintaining the collective security of
the NATO alliance;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (3) the repeated, illegal, unprovoked, and violent
attempts of the Russian Federation to expand its territory and
control access to the Mediterranean through the Black Sea
constitutes a threat to the national security of the United
States and the NATO alliance;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (4) the United States condemns attempts by the
Russian Federation to change or alter boundaries in the Black
Sea region by any means contrary to international
law;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (5) the United States and its allies should
robustly counter Russia's illegal territorial claims on the
Crimean Peninsula, along Ukraine's territorial waters in the
Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, in the Black Sea's international
waters, and in the territories it is illegally occupying in
Ukraine;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (6) the United States should continue to work
within NATO and with NATO allies to develop a long-term
strategy to enhance security, establish a permanent,
sustainable presence in the eastern flank, and bolster the
democratic resilience of its allies and partners in the
region;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (7) the United States should also work with the
European Union in coordinating a strategy to support democratic
initiatives and economic prosperity in the region, which
includes two European Union members and four aspirant
nations;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (8) the United States should explore efforts to
rebuild trust and bilateral relations with Turkey, a key ally
in the Black Sea region and a bulwark against Iran;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (9) it is in the interest of the United States
that NATO adopt a robust strategy toward the Black Sea,
including by working with interested partner countries in the
region to advance common security objectives;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (10) the United States should work to foster
dialogue among countries within the Black Sea region to improve
communication and intelligence sharing and increase cyber
defense capabilities;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (11) countries with historic and economic ties to
Russia are looking to the United States and Europe to provide a
positive economic presence in the broader region as a
counterbalance to the Russian Federation's malign influence in
the region;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (12) it is in the interest of the United States to
support and bolster the economic ties between the United States
and Black Sea partners;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (13) the United States should support the
initiative undertaken by central and eastern European states to
advance the Three Seas Initiative Fund to strengthen transport,
energy, and digital infrastructure connectivity in the region
between the Adriatic Sea, Baltic Sea, and Black Sea;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (14) there are mutually beneficial opportunities
for increased investment and economic expansion, particularly
on energy, climate, and transport infrastructure initiatives,
between the United States and Black Sea states and the broader
region;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (15) improved economic ties between the United
States and the Black Sea states and the broader region can lead
to a strengthened strategic partnership;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (16) the United States must address the food
security challenges arising from closure of Ukraine's Black Sea
ports, as this global challenge will have critical national
security implications for the United States, our partners, and
allies;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (17) Russia has a brutal history of using hunger
as a weapon and must be stopped; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (18) countering the PRC's coercive economic
pursuits remains an important policy imperative in order to
further integrate the Black Sea countries into western
economies and improve regional stability.</DELETED>
<DELETED>SEC. 4. REPORT ON UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD THE BLACK SEA
REGION.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (a) In General.--Not later than 120 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the National Security Council, in
coordination with the Department of State, Department of Defense, the
Department of the Treasury, the Department of Commerce, the Department
of Energy, the United States Agency for International Development, the
Trade and Development Agency, the United States Export-Import Bank, the
Department of Agriculture, and the United States International
Development Finance Corporation, shall deliver to the appropriate
congressional committees an interagency report that outlines current
United States efforts and policy options toward Black Sea countries and
the broader region and addresses the matters addressed in section 3,
including NATO engagement in the region.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (b) Elements.--The report required under subsection (a)
shall include the following elements:</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) An overview of ongoing efforts by relevant
United States Government agencies toward the Black Sea region,
both through bilateral initiatives with Black Sea countries and
any regional initiatives toward the region, to provide military
and security assistance, economic support, and good governance
initiatives.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) A description of current efforts and policy
options that can be undertaken by the Department of State, the
United States International Development Finance Corporation,
the United States Export-Import Bank, the Trade and Development
Agency, the Department of Energy, the Department of the
Treasury, the Department of Commerce, and the Department of
Agriculture to promote economic growth, integration, and
quality infrastructure (including for energy integration and
independence) in the Black Sea littoral states and the broader
region.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (3) A breakdown of initiatives to provide the
following types of support, together with a breakdown of
funding to support these efforts:</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) Military assistance, including
infrastructure in support of enhanced deployments and
supply logistics in the region.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) Economic assistance, including support
for the food security crisis.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (C) Countering Russian disinformation and
propaganda in the Black Sea region.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (D) Energy diversification and regional
market integration and supply to reduce dependence on
energy from the Russian Federation and promote clean
energy initiatives.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (E) Using economic statecraft tools, such
as trade and monetary policy, equity investments and
debt financing and political risk insurance, to
increase the United States bilateral trade and
investment in the region and opportunities for near-
shoring production in the broader region for the
European market.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (F) Fostering greater regional
cooperation.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (G) Increasing access to global capital
markets and enhancement of local and regional sources
of capital for critical infrastructure and other
investments.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (H) A plan for helping United States
allies in the region to accelerate their transitions
from legacy Russian military equipment and promote NATO
interoperability.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (I) Strengthening rule-of-law and anti-
corruption efforts.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (J) Addressing the PRC's coercive economic
actions.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (4) An assessment of NATO engagement in the region
and policy options to address the changed regional security
environment, including NATO's presence in the region and an
outline of NATO's planned and recent military exercises in the
region, in particular those under Headquarters Multinational
Division Southeast (in Romania) and the four new battle groups
in Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Slovakia.</DELETED>
<DELETED>SEC. 5. UNITED STATES POLICY.</DELETED>
<DELETED> It is the policy of the United States to--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) actively deter the threat of further Russian
escalation in the Black Sea region and defend freedom of
navigation in the Black Sea to prevent the spread of further
armed conflict in Europe;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) advocate within NATO, among NATO allies, and
within the European Union to develop a long-term coordinated
strategy to enhance security, establish a permanent,
sustainable presence in the eastern flank, and bolster the
democratic resilience of United States allies and partners in
the region;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (3) support and bolster the economic ties between
the United States and Black Sea partners, and mobilize the
United States International Development Finance Corporation,
the Export-Import Bank, the Trade and Development Agency, the
Department of State, the United States Agency for International
Development, the Department of Agriculture, and the Department
of Commerce to increase United States presence and investment
in Black Sea countries;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (4) provide economic alternatives to the PRC's
coercive economic options that destabilize and further erode
economic integration of the Black Sea littoral
states;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (5) ensure that the United States continues to
support Black Sea countries to strengthen their democratic
institutions to prevent corruption and accelerate their
advancement into the Euroatlantic community; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (6) encourage the initiative undertaken by central
and eastern European states to advance the Three Seas
Initiative to strengthen transport, energy, and digital
infrastructure connectivity in the region between the Adriatic
Sea, Baltic Sea, and Black Sea.</DELETED>
<DELETED>SEC. 6. BLACK SEA SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (a) Black Sea Development and Security Strategy.--No later
than 360 days after the enactment of this Act, drawing from the policy
options developed in the report in section 4, the National Security
Council, in coordination with the Department of State, the Department
of Defense, the United States International Development Finance
Corporation, the United States Agency for International Development,
the United States Export-Import Bank, the Trade and Development Agency
the Department of Commerce, the Department of Energy, the Department of
Agriculture, and the Department of the Treasury, shall direct an
interagency strategy, based on the findings of the report under section
4, to increase military assistance and coordination with NATO and the
European Union, deepen economic ties, strengthen economic and energy
security and enhance security assistance with Black Sea countries, and
support efforts to bolster their democratic resilience.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (b) Purpose and Objectives.--The initiative established
under subsection (a) shall have the following goals and
objectives:</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) Ensuring the efficient and effective delivery
of security assistance to the Black Sea states, prioritizing
assistance that will bolster defenses against hybrid warfare
and improve interoperability with NATO forces.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) Bolstering United States support for the
region's energy security and integration with Europe and
reducing their dependence on Russia while supporting energy
diversification.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (3) Mitigating the impact of economic coercion by
the Russian Federation and the PRC on Black Sea states and
identifying new opportunities for foreign direct investment
from the United States and cooperating countries and the
enhancement of United States business ties.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (4) Increasing high-level engagement between the
United States and the Black Sea states, and reinforcing
economic growth, financing quality infrastructure, and
reinforcing trade with a focus on improving high-level economic
cooperation.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (5) Increasing coordination with the European
Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to maximize
effectiveness and minimize duplication.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (c) Activities.--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) Security.--The strategy established under
subsection (a) shall include the following elements related to
security:</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) A plan to increase interagency
coordination toward the Black Sea region.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) A strategy for--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (i) the United States to increase
NATO's presence and capabilities in the Black
Sea region, including land and air forces;
or</DELETED>
<DELETED> (ii) a United States-led
initiative with NATO member countries to
increase coordination, presence, and regional
engagement among Black Sea countries.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (C) A strategy to increase military
assistance toward Black Sea countries, particularly
Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria, and Georgia.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (D) Prioritization of intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance systems to monitor
Russian operations in the Black Sea region, as well as
upgrading from air policing to air defense
missions.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (E) An assessment of the value of
establishing a joint, multinational three-star
headquarters on the Black Sea, responsible for
planning, readiness, exercises, and coordination of all
military activity in the greater Black Sea
region.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (F) An overview of Foreign Military
Financing, International Military Education and
Training, and other United States security assistance
to the region.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (G) A plan for communicating the changes
to NATO posture to the public in allied and partner
countries, as well as in the Russian Federation and
Belarus.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (H) A plan for combating Russian
disinformation and propaganda in the Black Sea region,
utilizing the resources of the United States
Government, including the Global Engagement
Center.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (I) A plan to promote greater freedom of
navigation, working primarily with Turkey, Ukraine,
Romania, and Bulgaria to allow for greater security and
economic Black Sea access.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) Economic prosperity.--The strategy established
under subsection (a) shall include the following elements
related to economic prosperity:</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) A strategy to foster dialogue between
experts from the United States and from the Black Sea
states on economic expansion, foreign direct
investment, strengthening rule of law initiatives, and
mitigating economic coercion by Russia and the
PRC.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) A strategy for the United States
International Development Finance Corporation and all
Federal departments and agencies that contribute to
United States economic statecraft to identify new
opportunities for private investment in Black Sea
states.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (C) An evaluation undertaken by United
States International Development Finance Corporation to
establish regional offices in Georgia, Ukraine, or
Romania.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (D) Assessments on energy diversification.
The assessment should focus on the immediate need to
replace energy supplies from Russia, and recognize the
long-term importance of broader energy diversification,
including clean energy initiatives.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (E) Assessments of potential food security
solutions.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (3) Democratic resilience.--The strategy
established under subsection (a) shall include the following
elements related to democratic resilience:</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) A strategy to increase independent
media and United States-supported media initiatives to
combat foreign malign influence in the Black Sea
region.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) Greater mobilization of initiatives
spearheaded by the Global Engagement Center and the
United States Agency for International Development to
counter Russian propaganda and disinformation in the
Black Sea region.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (4) Regional connectivity.--The strategy
established under subsection (a) shall promote regional
connectivity by sending high-level representatives of the
Department of State or other agency partners to--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) the Black Sea region not less
frequently than twice a year; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) major regional fora on infrastructure
and energy security, including the Three Seas
Initiative Summit.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (d) Identification of Necessary Programs and Resources.--
No later than 360 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
interagency shall identify any necessary program, policy, or budgetary
resources required, by agency, to support implementation of the Black
Sea Security Strategy for fiscal years 2024, 2025, and 2026.</DELETED>
<DELETED>SEC. 7. DEFINITIONS.</DELETED>
<DELETED> In this Act:</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The
term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations,
the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on
Appropriations of the Senate; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the
Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of
Representatives.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) Black sea states.--The term ``Black Sea
states'' means Turkey, Romania, Bulgaria, Moldova, Ukraine, and
Georgia.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (3) Three seas initiative investment fund
countries.-- The term ``Three Seas Initiative Investment Fund
countries'' means Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech
Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Austria, Croatia,
Romania, and Bulgaria.</DELETED>
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Black Sea Security Act of 2022''.
SEC. 2. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON BLACK SEA SECURITY.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) it is in the interest of the United States to support
efforts to prevent the spread of further armed conflict in
Europe by recognizing the Black Sea region as an arena of
Russian aggression;
(2) littoral states of the Black Sea are critical in
countering aggression by the Government of the Russian
Federation and contributing to the collective security of NATO;
(3) the repeated, illegal, unprovoked, and violent attempts
of the Russian Federation to expand its territory and control
access to the Mediterranean Sea through the Black Sea
constitutes a threat to the national security of the United
States and NATO;
(4) the United States condemns attempts by the Russian
Federation to change or alter boundaries in the Black Sea
region by force or any means contrary to international law and
to impose a sphere of influence across the region;
(5) the United States and its allies should robustly
counter Russia's illegitimate territorial claims on the Crimean
Peninsula, along Ukraine's territorial waters in the Black Sea
and the Sea of Azov, in the Black Sea's international waters,
and in the territories it is illegally occupying in Ukraine;
(6) the United States should continue to work within NATO
and with NATO Allies to develop a long-term strategy to enhance
security, establish a permanent, sustainable presence along
NATO's eastern flank, and bolster the democratic resilience of
its allies and partners in the region;
(7) the United States should work within NATO and with NATO
Allies to develop a regular, rotational maritime presence in
the Black Sea;
(8) the United States should also work with the European
Union in coordinating a strategy to support democratic
initiatives and economic prosperity in the region, which
includes two European Union members and four European Union
aspirant nations;
(9) Turkey's behavior towards some regional allies and
democratic states has been counterproductive and has
contributed to increased tensions in the region, and Turkey
should avoid any actions to further escalate regional tensions;
(10) the United States should work to foster dialogue among
countries within the Black Sea region to improve communication
and intelligence sharing and increase cyber defense
capabilities;
(11) countries with historic and economic ties to Russia
are looking to the United States and Europe to provide a
positive economic presence in the broader region as a
counterbalance to the Russian Federation's malign influence in
the region;
(12) it is in the interest of the United States to support
and bolster the economic ties between the United States and
Black Sea states;
(13) the United States should support the initiative
undertaken by central and eastern European states to advance
the Three Seas Initiative Fund to strengthen transport, energy,
and digital infrastructure connectivity in the region between
the Adriatic Sea, Baltic Sea, and Black Sea;
(14) there are mutually beneficial opportunities for
increased investment and economic expansion, particularly on
energy, climate, and transport infrastructure initiatives,
between the United States and Black Sea states and the broader
region;
(15) improved economic ties between the United States and
the Black Sea states and the broader region can lead to a
strengthened strategic partnership;
(16) the United States must seek to address the food
security challenges arising from disruption of Ukraine's Black
Sea ports, as this global challenge will have critical national
security implications for the United States, our partners, and
allies;
(17) Turkey, in coordination with the United Nations, has
played an important role in alleviating global food insecurity
by negotiating two agreements to allow grain exports from
Ukrainian ports through a safe corridor in the Black Sea;
(18) Russia has a brutal history of using hunger as a
weapon and must be stopped;
(19) countering the PRC's coercive economic pursuits
remains an important policy imperative in order to further
integrate the Black Sea states into western economies and
improve regional stability; and
(20) Turkey's continued delay in ratifying Sweden and
Finland's accession to NATO undermines the strength of the
alliance and inhibits the united international response to
Russia's unprovoked war in Ukraine.
SEC. 3. UNITED STATES POLICY.
It is the policy of the United States to--
(1) actively deter the threat of Russia's further
escalation in the Black Sea region and defend freedom of
navigation in the Black Sea to prevent the spread of further
armed conflict in Europe;
(2) advocate within NATO, among NATO Allies, and within the
European Union to develop a long-term coordinated strategy to
enhance security, establish a permanent, sustainable presence
in the eastern flank, and bolster the democratic resilience of
United States allies and partners in the region;
(3) advocate within NATO and among NATO Allies to develop a
regular, rotational maritime presence in the Black Sea;
(4) support and bolster the economic ties between the
United States and Black Sea partners and mobilize the
Department of State, the Department of Defense, and other
relevant Federal departments and agencies by enhancing the
United States presence and investment in Black Sea states;
(5) provide economic alternatives to the PRC's coercive
economic options that destabilize and further erode economic
integration of the Black Sea states;
(6) ensure that the United States continues to support
Black Sea states' efforts to strengthen their democratic
institutions to prevent corruption and accelerate their
advancement into the Euroatlantic community; and
(7) encourage the initiative undertaken by central and
eastern European states to advance the Three Seas Initiative to
strengthen transport, energy, and digital infrastructure
connectivity in the region between the Adriatic Sea, Baltic
Sea, and Black Sea.
SEC. 4. BLACK SEA SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY.
(a) Black Sea Security and Development Strategy.--Not later than
180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the National
Security Council, in coordination with the Department of State, the
Department of Defense, and other relevant Federal departments and
agencies, is authorized to direct an interagency strategy to increase
coordination with NATO and the European Union, deepen economic ties,
strengthen energy security, support efforts to bolster their democratic
resilience, and enhance security assistance with our regional partners
in accordance with the values and interests of the United States.
(b) Purpose and Objectives.--The initiative established under
subsection (a) shall have the following goals and objectives:
(1) Ensuring the efficient and effective delivery of
security assistance to regional partners in accordance with the
values and interests of the United States, prioritizing
assistance that will bolster defenses against hybrid warfare
and improve interoperability with NATO forces.
(2) Bolstering United States support for the region's
energy security and integration with Europe and reducing their
dependence on Russia while supporting energy diversification.
(3) Mitigating the impact of economic coercion by the
Russian Federation and the PRC on Black Sea states and
identifying new opportunities for foreign direct investment
from the United States and cooperating countries and the
enhancement of United States business ties with regional
partners in accordance with the values and interests of the
United States.
(4) Increasing high-level engagement between the United
States and regional partners, and reinforcing economic growth,
financing quality infrastructure, and reinforcing trade with a
focus on improving high-level economic cooperation.
(5) Increasing United States coordination with the European
Union and NATO to maximize effectiveness and minimize
duplication.
(c) Activities.--
(1) Security.--The strategy established under subsection
(a) should include the following elements related to security:
(A) A plan to increase interagency coordination on
the Black Sea region.
(B) An assessment of whether a United States-led
initiative with NATO allies to increase coordination,
presence, and regional engagement among Black Sea
states is advisable.
(C) A strategy to increase security assistance
toward Black Sea states, focused on Ukraine, Romania,
Bulgaria, Moldova, and Georgia.
(D) Prioritization of intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance systems to monitor Russia's
operations in the Black Sea region.
(E) An assessment of the value of establishing a
joint, multinational three-star headquarters on the
Black Sea, responsible for planning, readiness,
exercises, and coordination of all Allied and partner
military activity in the greater Black Sea region.
(F) An assessment of the challenges and
opportunities of establishing a regular, rotational
NATO maritime presence in the Black Sea, including an
analysis of the capacity, capabilities, and commitment
of NATO members to create this type of mission.
(G) An overview of Foreign Military Financing,
International Military Education and Training, and
other United States security assistance to the region.
(H) A plan for communicating the changes to NATO
posture to the public in allied and partner countries,
as well as to publics in the Russian Federation and
Belarus.
(I) A plan for combating Russian disinformation and
propaganda in the Black Sea region, utilizing the
resources of the United States Government, including
the Global Engagement Center.
(J) A plan to promote greater freedom of navigation
to allow for greater security and economic Black Sea
access.
(2) Economic prosperity.--The strategy established under
subsection (a) shall include the following elements related to
economic prosperity:
(A) A strategy to foster dialogue between experts
from the United States and from the Black Sea states on
economic expansion, foreign direct investment,
strengthening rule of law initiatives, and mitigating
economic coercion by Russia and the PRC.
(B) A strategy for all the relevant Federal
departments and agencies that contribute to United
States economic statecraft to expand their presence and
identify new opportunities for private investment with
regional partners in accordance with the values and
interests of the United States.
(C) Assessments on energy diversification, focusing
on the immediate need to replace energy supplies from
Russia, and recognizing the long-term importance of
broader energy diversification, including clean energy
initiatives.
(D) Assessments of potential food security
solutions, including sustainable, long-term
arrangements beyond the Black Sea Grain Initiative.
(3) Democratic resilience.--The strategy established under
subsection (a) shall include the following elements related to
democratic resilience:
(A) A strategy to increase independent media and
United States-supported media initiatives to combat
foreign malign influence in the Black Sea region.
(B) Greater mobilization of initiatives spearheaded
by the Global Engagement Center and the United States
Agency for International Development to counter Russian
propaganda and disinformation in the Black Sea region.
(4) Regional connectivity.--The strategy established under
subsection (a) shall promote regional connectivity by sending
high-level representatives of the Department of State or other
agency partners to--
(A) the Black Sea region not less frequently than
twice a year; and
(B) major regional fora on infrastructure and
energy security, including the Three Seas Initiative
Summit.
(d) Identification of Necessary Programs and Resources.--Not later
than 360 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
interagency shall identify any necessary program, policy, or budgetary
resources required, by agency, to support implementation of the Black
Sea Security Strategy for fiscal years 2024, 2025, and 2026.
(e) Responsibilities of Federal Departments and Agencies.--Nothing
under this section shall be deemed to authorize the National Security
Council to assume any of the responsibilities or authorities of the
head of any Federal department, agency, or office, including the
foreign affairs responsibilities and authorities of the Secretary of
State, to oversee the implementation of programs and policies under
this section.
SEC. 5. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the
Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on
Appropriations of the Senate; and
(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee
on Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations
of the House of Representatives.
(2) Black sea states.--The term ``Black Sea states'' means
Turkey, Romania, Bulgaria, Moldova, Ukraine, and Georgia.
Calendar No. 605
117th CONGRESS
2d Session
S. 4509
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To provide for security in the Black Sea region, and for other
purposes.
_______________________________________________________________________
December 7, 2022
Reported with an amendment
Black Sea Security Act of 2022
#4509 | S Congress #117
Policy Area: International Affairs
Subjects: AlliancesBulgariaCollective securityCongressional oversightDiplomacy, foreign officials, Americans abroadEuropeGeorgiaGovernment ethics and transparency, public corruptionIntelligence activities, surveillance, classified informationMoldovaPolitical movements and philosophiesRomaniaRule of law and government transparencyRussiaTurkeyUkraine
Last Action: Placed on Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders. Calendar No. 605. (12/7/2022)
Bill Text Source: Congress.gov
Summary and Impacts
Original Text