[Congressional Bills 116th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 3314 Introduced in Senate (IS)]
<DOC>
116th CONGRESS
2d Session
S. 3314
To seek a diplomatic resolution to Iran's nuclear program, and for
other purposes.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
February 13, 2020
Mr. Markey (for himself, Mrs. Feinstein, Mr. Van Hollen, Ms. Duckworth,
and Mr. Sanders) introduced the following bill; which was read twice
and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To seek a diplomatic resolution to Iran's nuclear program, and for
other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Iran Diplomacy Act of 2020''.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was
agreed to on July 14, 2015, by China, France, Germany, Russia,
the United Kingdom, the United States, the European Union, and
Iran.
(2) When it was fully implemented by all parties, the JCPOA
had increased the amount of time it would take Iran to acquire
enough fissile material for one nuclear weapon, provided a
political decision to do so, from approximately two to three
months to at least one year.
(3) The JCPOA blocked Iran's uranium, plutonium, and covert
pathways to a nuclear weapon, in the period when all sides had
fully implemented their commitments, in part by--
(A) imposing verifiable limits on Iran's uranium
enrichment and plutonium production capabilities;
(B) reducing the number of Iran's installed
centrifuges by two-thirds; and
(C) permitting the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) to monitor and verify of all stages of
Iran's nuclear fuel cycle to include requesting short-
notice access to ``verify the non-diversion of declared
material'' and ``absence of undeclared nuclear material
and activities'' in Iran, consistent with its
provisional implementation of the Additional Protocol
to its IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement.
(4) The 2018 Department of State Compliance Report
concluded, ``Tehran's adherence to these commitments will
hinder its ability to produce a nuclear weapon even after the
time-bound provisions of the deal expire, helping to ensure
that its nuclear program remains exclusively peaceful in
nature''.
(5) On January 29, 2019, Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) Gina Haspel, testified before the
Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate that ``at the
moment, technically they [Iran] are in compliance,'' with the
JCPOA.
(6) On January 29, 2019, a worldwide threat assessment
issued by Director of National Intelligence Dan Coats, observed
that the United States ``[does] not believe that Iran is
currently undertaking the key activities we judge necessary to
produce a nuclear device'' and ``Iran's continued
implementation of the JCPOA has extended the amount of time
Iran would need to produce enough fissile material for a
nuclear weapon from a few months to about one year''.
(7) On May 8, 2018, President Donald J. Trump announced the
unilateral abrogation of the United States from the JCPOA, and
announced that the United States would re-impose all United
States sanctions that had been lifted after Iran verifiably met
its nuclear-related commitments under the agreement on the
agreement's implementation day of January 16, 2016.
(8) Whereas the United States move to abrogate the JCPOA is
a violation of its commitments under the agreement and is
inconsistent with the United States reputation of honoring
agreements to which it is a party, making the future conclusion
of such agreements more difficult.
(9) Prior to Iran's first breach of the JCPOA on May 8,
2019, quarterly reports from the IAEA Board of Governors
Reports found that since ``implementation day,'' on January 16,
2016, Iran's nuclear program was consistent with the
restrictions under the JCPOA.
(10) Following the removal of nearly all remaining waivers
to United States nuclear-related sanctions on May 2, 2019, the
Government of Iran has committed a series of reversible but
concerning breaches of the JCPOA, including by exceeding: the
allowable stock of low-enriched uranium and heavy water; the
number of installed centrifuges at its pilot enrichment
facility; and the permitted Low Enriched Uranium (LEU)
enrichment level of 3.67 percent of the Uranium U-235 isotope.
(11) Since the full re-imposition of United States nuclear-
related sanctions, the Government of Iran has also engaged in a
series of escalatory actions outside its nuclear program that
have put the United States Armed Forces, diplomats, and
strategic partners at risk and have heightened the threat of an
armed conflict with Iran, including the following events:
(A) May 12-13, 2019, the Department of Defense
faulted Iran for an attack on four oil tankers
belonging to Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates,
and Norway.
(B) On June 13, 2019, Secretary Mike Pompeo stated
that it was the United States assessment that Iran was
responsible for the attack on two Saudi oil tankers.
(C) On June 20, 2019, the Government of Iran shot
down a United States Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV).
Reportedly, President Trump authorized retaliatory
strikes against targets in Iran before rescinding the
order for fear that the Iranian loss of life in such a
strike would be ``disproportionate''.
(D) On July 24, 2019, the Government of Iran
announced the seizure of a British-flagged tanker in
the Strait of Hormuz.
(E) On September 14, 2019, the United States
Government concluded that the Government of Iran was
responsible for UAV and cruise missile strikes at Saudi
Arabia's energy infrastructure at Khurais and Abqaiq,
which caused significant damage to Saudi Arabia's oil
energy production.
(F) On November 19, 2019, the Government of Israel
concluded that Iranian forces in Syria fired four
rockets intended for the Golan Heights.
(12) Following the unauthorized United States strike
resulting in the death of General Qassem Soleimani on January
3, 2020, Iran announced as was anticipated that it would no
longer be bound by the limits of the JCPOA, while also noting
that it would remain as a party to the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, London,
and Moscow July 1, 1968 (NPT), and would fully cooperate with
IAEA monitoring and verification activities.
(13) Iran has made no meaningful progress on the 12
conditions Secretary of State Pompeo outlined as preconditions
for the United States to enter into an agreement with Iran,
clearly demonstrating that the administration's policy of
``maximum pressure'' has not favorably changed Iran's behavior.
Further, Department of Defense officials have been warning for
more than a year that the Trump Administration's ``maximum
pressure'' campaign raised the risk of retaliation against
United States troops and diplomatic personnel.
(14) On January 14, 2020, the foreign ministers of France,
Germany, and the United Kingdom issued a joint statement that
refers the issue of Iran's non-compliance to the Dispute
Resolution Mechanism of the Joint Commission, while noting both
their ``determination to work with all participants to preserve
(the agreement)'' and ``and that they remain convinced that
this landmark multilateral international agreement and its
nonproliferation benefits enhance our shared security interests
and strengthen the rules-based international order''.
(15) On February 13, 2020, a bipartisan majority in the
United States Senate directed the President to remove United
States Armed Forces from hostilities against Iran or any part
of its government or military, unless otherwise explicitly
authorized by Congress. This direction, which followed passage
of a similar measure in the House of Representatives on January
9, 2020, provides an opportunity for de-escalation of tensions
and renewed diplomatic engagement between the United States and
Iran.
SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY.
It is the policy of the United States as follows:
(1) Achieving a diplomatic resolution to Iran's nuclear
program, one that the United States had in place prior to
President Trump's unilateral abrogation from the JCPOA, would
represent a meaningful step to preventing a future armed
conflict between the United States and Iran, one which would
result in the untold loss of life and treasure.
(2) While the United States no longer has standing in the
Joint Commission or the Dispute Resolution mechanism triggered
by France, Germany, and the United Kingdom on January 14, 2020,
it should support good-faith efforts to achieve one or both of
the following:
(A) Returning all sides to not less than full
compliance with its commitments under the JCPOA and
refraining from imposing or threatening to impose
economic penalties on France, Germany, or the United
Kingdom.
(B) Negotiating an interim agreement that provides
Iran with tailored, temporary economic relief in
exchange for verifiable measures by Iran that reverses
steps taken since May 2019 with respect to its nuclear
program.
(3) Provided that all sides verifiably return to compliance
with no less than its commitments under the JCPOA, or to build
upon the progress of an interim agreement described in
paragraph (2)(B), the United States and the other P5+1 parties
should seek out negotiations with Iran, prior to 2023, towards
a new comprehensive agreement that closes off all Iranian paths
to a nuclear weapon by--
(A) addressing the sunset of certain provisions of
the JCPOA in 2026; and
(B) advancing any other measures that advance
United States and international security.
(4) Parallel to one or more of the actions described in
paragraph (2), the United States and its international partners
should seek to address other aspects of Iran's destabilizing
actions in the region and work to bring Iran back to compliance
with its human rights obligations.
(5) No JCPOA Participating State should issue a claim of
``significant nonperformance'' by Iran to the United Nations
Security Council outside of the Dispute Resolution mechanism
detailed in paragraphs 36 and 37 of the JCPOA.
(6) The United States should, consistent with its JCPOA
commitments, issue waivers for cooperative projects specified
in the JCPOA, all of which make it more difficult for Iran to
reconstitute activities that pose a proliferation risk, thereby
advancing United States and international security.
(7) The United States should create an environment in which
financial institutions and entities can make practical use of
existing exemptions and mechanisms ``allowing for the sale of
agricultural commodities, food, medicine, and medical devices
to Iran,'' as well as other humanitarian trade.
<all>
Iran Diplomacy Act of 2020
#3314 | S Congress #116
Policy Area: International Affairs
Subjects: Arms control and nonproliferationDiplomacy, foreign officials, Americans abroadEuropeForeign aid and international reliefFranceGermanyHuman rightsInternational law and treatiesInternational organizations and cooperationIranMiddle EastMultilateral development programsNuclear weaponsSanctionsTrade restrictionsUnited KingdomUnited Nations
Last Action: Read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations. (2/13/2020)
Bill Text Source: Congress.gov
Summary and Impacts
Original Text