[Congressional Bills 116th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1273 Introduced in House (IH)]

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116th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 1273

To direct the Director of National Intelligence to submit an assessment 
     of the intentions of the political leadership of the Russian 
                  Federation, and for other purposes.


_______________________________________________________________________


                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           February 14, 2019

    Mr. Krishnamoorthi (for himself and Mr. Stewart) introduced the 
following bill; which was referred to the Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence, and in addition to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, for 
a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for 
consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the 
                          committee concerned

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL


 
To direct the Director of National Intelligence to submit an assessment 
     of the intentions of the political leadership of the Russian 
                  Federation, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Keeping Russian Entrapments Minimal 
and Limiting Intelligence Networks Act'' or the ``KREMLIN Act''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    Congress finds the following:
            (1) Russia continues to engage in information warfare and 
        political interference in the West, including by undermining 
        democratic systems and exploiting economic and ethnic tensions 
        within member countries of the North Atlantic Treaty 
        Organization.
            (2) Such activities constitute a threat to the United 
        States and to its allies.

SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

    It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions 
        Act (Public Law 115-44) was an appropriate response to 
        Russia's--
                    (A) meddling in the 2016 United States presidential 
                election;
                    (B) continued aggression in the Ukraine and the 
                Crimea region; and
                    (C) support for the Assad regime in Syria;
            (2) the United States should sustain its newly deployed 
        enhanced forward presence in Poland, Lithuania, and Estonia and 
        urge Canada, the United Kingdom, and Germany to quickly deploy 
        and sustain parallel commitments in those countries;
            (3) the United States has defensive intentions in pursuing 
        such sanctions and such enhanced military posture in Europe, 
        and does not seek to threaten Russian territory; and
            (4) the United States does not seek to be an enemy of the 
        Russian people and propaganda directed against the United 
        States by President Vladimir Putin misrepresents the intentions 
        of the United States for the purposes of preserving his power.

SEC. 4. REQUIREMENT FOR INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT.

    Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, 
the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the House 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence an assessment, which may be submitted in 
classified form, based on intelligence obtained from all sources 
regarding the current intentions of the political leadership of the 
Russian Federation, with respect to the following:
            (1) Russian leadership intentions in pursuing military 
        scenarios against members of the North Atlantic Treaty 
        Organization, including conduct of an exercise on the border 
        with Moldova of more than 100,000 Russian forces in August 
        2017.
            (2) Russian leadership reactions to the European 
        Reassurance Initiative.
            (3) Potential areas of cooperation between the Government 
        of the Russian Federation and the governments of its Western 
        adversaries.
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