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To amend the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 to ensure that politically derived information is not used in an application to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court for an order under title I or III of such Act.
HR #5488 | Last Action: 12/18/2019This bill requires an application under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 for electronic surveillance or a physical search to include a certification by a designated executive branch official that none of the facts or circumstances included in the application's statement of facts were solely produced by, derived from, or collected using funds of, a political organization for gaining an advantage against an opposing political candidate.Restrictions on Intelligence Assets in Protests Act
HR #7910 | Last Action: 7/31/2020Restrictions on Intelligence Assets in Protests Act This bill limits when the intelligence community or federal law enforcement may conduct surveillance of protesters in the United States and requires a report on surveillance conducted in relation to protests after the death of George Floyd. (George Floyd was a Black man who died while restrained by a police officer in Minneapolis, Minnesota.) In general, no intelligence community element may investigate or conduct surveillance of individuals in the United States involved in First Amendment-protected protest activities. However, this prohibition shall not apply to (1) an investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation that is not solely based on the protected protest activity; (2) a National Guard member's active service while assigned to a unit with an intelligence community element; or (3) an activity in support of the Armed Forces pursuant to the Insurrection Act, if the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) notifies Congress no later than one year after the start of such support activities. (The Insurrection Act authorizes the President to call upon the Armed Forces during an insurrection.) No federal law enforcement agency may support any other law enforcement agency in investigating or conducting surveillance of individuals involved in such protest activities if such support is beyond the mission, scope, or purpose of the supporting agency. The ODNI shall report to Congress on any intelligence community asset used to support any law enforcement agency or the National Guard during the U.S. protests occurring after the death of George Floyd.Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021
S #3905 | Last Action: 6/17/2020Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 This bill authorizes various intelligence-related activities for FY2021 and contains other related provisions. The bill's provisions include * requiring the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and other intelligence agencies to establish continuity of operations plans; * requiring the ODNI to establish the Social Media Data and Threat Analysis Center; * establishing that disclosure of a whistleblower's personally identifiable information may constitute a personnel action and giving the whistleblower a right to sue if such a personnel action was a reprisal against whistleblowing activity; * establishing that it is unlawful for a federal government employee to share a whistleblower complaint submitted to the intelligence community inspector general with the subject of the complaint, with limited exceptions; * establishing that a qualifying individual shall have a statutory right to appeal a decision related to that individual's access to classified information; * establishing funds for grants to promote U.S. competitiveness in fifth-generation wireless technology supply chains and to support the adoption of secure and trusted telecommunications technologies in key markets globally; and * requiring a presidential campaign to notify the Federal Bureau of Investigation of certain foreign contacts. The bill also requires reports on topics including (1) signals intelligence collection priorities, (2) use of student loan repayment benefits by intelligence community personnel, (3) a plan for establishing an intelligence community element in the U.S. Space Force, (4) the corrupt activities of Chinese Communist Party officials and Eastern European oligarchs, and (5) the effect of lifting the United Nations arms embargo on Iran.CBRN Intelligence and Information Sharing Act of 2019
HR #1589 | Last Action: 3/7/2019CBRN Intelligence and Information Sharing Act of 2019 This bill expands the functions of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of Homeland Security related to homeland-security focused intelligence and information sharing. The office shall * coordinate the analysis of the intentions, capabilities, and plans of individuals or organizations threatening or preparing to conduct attacks against the homeland (including key resources and critical infrastructure) involving the use of chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) materials; * coordinate the analysis of threats to homeland security from global infectious disease and other food, agricultural, or veterinary threats to public health; * ensure the integration of such analysis with assessments of the vulnerability of and risks to the people, territory, key resources, and critical infrastructure of the United States from CBRN materials; * leverage existing and emerging homeland security intelligence capabilities and structures to plan for, detect, and protect against the importation, possession, storage, transportation, development, or use of unauthorized CBRN materials, and protect against an attack using such materials; and * share information and provide tailored analytical support on these threats to state, local, tribal authorities, and other federal agencies.Fourth Amendment Restoration Act
HR #6804 | Last Action: 5/12/2020Fourth Amendment Restoration Act This bill limits surveillance conducted for foreign intelligence purposes. Specifically, the bill repeals provisions authorizing without a court order various types of searches and surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes, including electronic surveillance and access to business records. An officer of the U.S. government must obtain a warrant for certain search and surveillance activities against a U.S. citizen, including (1) conducting electronic surveillance, (2) conducting physical searches of property under a U.S. citizen's exclusive control, or (3) targeting a U.S. citizen to acquire foreign intelligence information. The bill provides for criminal penalties for a person who knowingly violates these requirements or otherwise obtains such information under color of law without statutory authorization. Information about a U.S. citizen acquired underExecutive Order 12333(relating to intelligence gathering) or during surveillance of a non-U.S. citizen shall not be used against the U.S. citizen in any civil, criminal, or administrative proceeding or investigation.Prevention and Oversight of Intelligence Sharing with Enemies Act
HR #3476 | Last Action: 6/25/2019Prevention and Oversight of Intelligence Sharing with Enemies Act or the POISE Act This bill expresses the sense of Congress that elements of the intelligence community are obligated to notify Congress upon discovering that an individual in the executive branch has disclosed, outside established intelligence channels, certain classified information to specified adversary foreign governments (North Korea, Iran, China, Russia, and Cuba).Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018 and 2019
S #245 | Last Action: 1/28/2019Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018 and 2019 This bill addresses various intelligence issues, including by reauthorizing intelligence-related activities, establishing certain bodies, and directing the intelligence community to report on topics such as election infrastructure security and Russian interference in the 2016 election. The bill reauthorizes through FY2019 various intelligence-related activities in specified government bodies, including the Department of Defense, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Agency. It also reauthorizes for FY2019 the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund. In addition, the bill authorizes higher pay scales for positions requiring expertise in areas such as science, technology, and mathematics. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) shall establish a task force to standardize information sharing between the intelligence and government acquisition communities. The President shall establish an Energy Infrastructure Security Center to analyze and disseminate intelligence related to energy infrastructure. The ODNI shall develop a security plan and long-term roadmap for the information technology environment for the intelligence community. The Department of Homeland Security's Office of Intelligence and Analysis shall report to Congress about cyberattacks on U.S. election infrastructure during the 2016 presidential election. The ODNI shall report on the intelligence community's efforts to analyze Russian attempts to influence the 2016 election. The ODNI shall also develop a whole-of-government strategy to counter the threat of Russian cyberattacks on election infrastructure, including voter registration databases and voting equipment.Protect Our Civil Liberties Act
HR #8970 | Last Action: 12/15/2020Protect Our Civil Liberties Act This bill limits government surveillance, including by repealing the USA PATRIOT Act and certain provisions of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008, and contains other intelligence-related provisions. Specifically, the bill repeals all provisions of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 except for a provision requiring certain Department of Justice reports to Congress and another provision authorizing the acquisition of foreign intelligence from certain entities engaged in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Information that concerns a U.S. person must be destroyed if it was previously collected under the laws repealed by the bill. The bill also prohibits the federal government from (1) acquiring information relating to a U.S. person by using certain foreign intelligence gathering authority without a warrant, (2) requiring electronics or software manufacturers to install a mechanism for the government to bypass encryption or privacy technology, or (3) retaliating against intelligence community whistleblowers. The bill also extends the terms of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court judges from 7 to 10 years and makes such judges eligible for reappointment. Such judges may also appoint special masters to advise the court on technical issues. The Government Accountability Office must annually evaluate the federal government's compliance with certain laws concerning the collection of foreign intelligence.Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021
HR #7856 | Last Action: 7/31/2020Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 This bill authorizes various intelligence-related activities for FY2021 and contains other related provisions. The bill's provisions include those * requiring each intelligence community element to notify Congress before conducting certain activities, including providing support to a government response to a domestic civil disturbance, with some exceptions, or engaging in an activity pursuant to a presidential emergency action document; * generally prohibiting the intelligence community from awarding a contract for a national security satellite that uses a star tracker not produced in the United States; * providing for paid leave for a civilian intelligence community employee to address a serious health condition; * establishing the Office of the Ombudsman for Analytic Objectivity; * requiring the Department of Homeland Security to establish an intelligence and cybersecurity diversity fellowship program, which may provide an eligible individual with a paid internship or employment offer upon graduation; * imposing certain protections related to intelligence community inspectors general, such as by limiting when the President may remove such an inspector general and limiting who may serve as an acting inspector general; * providing for criminal penalties in certain instances for a federal government employee or officer who knowingly and willfully discloses the identity of an intelligence community whistleblower; * requiring a political committee to report certain foreign contacts and establishing criminal penalties for violations of such requirements in certain instances; and * prohibiting the use of funds made available to the intelligence community for FY2021 to enable or assist air strikes in Yemen by the Saudi Arabia-led coalition.A bill to protect integrity, fairness, and objectivity in decisions regarding access to classified information, and for other purposes.
S #838 | Last Action: 3/14/2019This bill directs each executive agency to establish an appeals process for persons whose eligibility for access to classified information has been denied or revoked. Each agency shall establish an independent panel to hear such appeals, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) shall establish a panel to review agency appeal decisions. To a person whose access to classified information has been denied or revoked, the relevant agency shall provide a written explanation of the basis of the decision. The agency shall provide such a person a copy of the documents that formed the basis of the decision upon request. The bill establishes various requirements for agency appeals, including (1) an opportunity for the person to be represented by counsel at the person's own expense; (2) the ability to review classified information that is essential to the case; and (3) the opportunity to provide evidence, including calling and cross-examining witnesses. The agency panel may take various corrective actions, including compensation for lost wages or benefits due to an improper denial or revocation of access to classified information. The review panel shall explain its decisions in writing, and the decision shall be publicly available. Such agency appeal decisions may be appealed to the review panel established by the ODNI, which may vacate and remand incorrect decisions back to the agency panel. The Director of National Intelligence may overturn an ODNI panel decision. Decisions by the director or by the ODNI panel shall be explained in writing and be publicly available.Unifying DHS Intelligence Components Act
HR #2589 | Last Action: 9/26/2019Unifying DHS Intelligence Components Act This bill directs the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to develop and disseminate written DHS-wide intelligence doctrine for the intelligence components of DHS and develop specified DHS-wide policies, standards, and programs. Specifically, DHS must develop department-wide (1) policies, standards, and programs for training regarding the collection, processing, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence information, intelligence-related information, and terrorism information by personnel within the DHS intelligence components; and (2) policies for gathering and developing lessons learned, disseminating the lessons learned to personnel within the intelligence components, and using the lessons learned to inform the further development of the intelligence doctrine. The intelligence doctrine, policies, standards, and programs must include, among other things (1) a description of the fundamental principles guiding the collection, processing, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence information by, and oversight of the intelligence activities of, the intelligence components; and (2) a standardized terminology. The Government Accountability Office must submit a report to the congressional intelligence and homeland security committees that * assesses the degree to which the DHS intelligence doctrine, policies, standards, and programs are implemented across DHS; * evaluates the extent to which such intelligence doctrine, policies, standards, and programs are carried out to protect privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties; and * incorporates an in-depth analysis, including an assessment of the effectiveness and possible areas for improvement, of specified DHS intelligence-related training programs. DHS must provide a staff with appropriate expertise and experience to the Office of the Chief Intelligence Officer to assist the office.FISA Improvements Act of 2019
HR #5396 | Last Action: 12/11/2019FISA Improvements Act of 2019 This bill makes various changes to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, such as by requiring amicus curiae (i.e., outside parties that assist in consideration of a case) involvement in certain matters. An amicus curiae shall assist the court when it is considering an initial application seeking permission to target an identifiable U.S. person for certain types of foreign intelligence investigative activities (such as electronic surveillance or a physical search). An application to the court for an order for electronic surveillance shall include a statement fully disclosing any information used in the application that the government cannot substantiate. The bill also requires transcriptions of proceedings before the court. The Department of Justice shall maintain all written communications with the court and written summaries of oral communications with the court.USA FREEDOM Reauthorization Act of 2020
HR #6172 | Last Action: 3/16/2020USA FREEDOM Reauthorization Act of 2020 This bill reauthorizes through December 1, 2023, provisions related to intelligence gathering under the Foreign Intelligence and Surveillance Act (FISA) and amends FISA-related provisions. The Federal Bureau of Investigation may not seek certain FISA-authorized orders to obtain (1) call detail records on an ongoing basis, (2) a tangible thing where a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would typically be required, or (3) cellular or GPS location information. A tangible thing obtained under FISA may be retained for no longer than five years except in certain instances, such as when a tangible thing is reasonably believed to be evidence of a crime. If the government intends to use information from a tangible thing obtained under FISA in a trial or other proceeding, it shall be treated as information obtained through electronic surveillance, unless a U.S. authority finds that notifying the person targeted would harm national security. (There are existing protections related to electronic surveillance, such as allowing the targeted person to move to suppress the disclosure of the obtained information in court.) In applications for certain FISA-authorized orders to obtain information or conduct surveillance, the applicant must certify that the Department of Justice (DOJ) has received any information that might raise doubts about the application. The bill imposes additional requirements on FISA-authorized orders targeting (1) a U.S. person, or (2) a federal elected official or candidate. The bill increases criminal penalties for violations related to electronic surveillance conducted under color of law or false statements made to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISA court). A U.S. government employee, officer, or contractor who engages in deliberate misconduct before a FISA court shall be subject to adverse actions, such as removal from the individual's position. The bill broadens the criteria for when a FISA court decision shall be declassified and requires the declassification review and release of such opinions within 180 days of an opinion being issued. The bill broadens the FISA court's authority to appoint an amicus curiae (an outside party that assists in consideration of a case) and expands such amici's powers, such as the power to ask the court to review a decision. An amicus may also seek the court's permission to address any novel or significant privacy or civil liberties issues arising in a case, even if the court did not ask for assistance on that issue. The FISA court may employ legal advisors to assist in considering any matter. Each agency that submits applications to the FISA court shall appoint an officer responsible for compliance with FISA requirements. An application for a FISA court order shall include all information in the government's possession that (1) is material to a ruling on the application, including any exculpatory information; or (2) calls into question the accuracy of the application or the accuracy of an assessment in the application, or otherwise raises doubts about a finding that is a required part of the application. An application for a FISA court order shall include (1) a description of the procedures in place to ensure the accuracy and completeness of the application, and (2) a certification by the applying officer (or designee) that the officer or designee has reviewed the application and accompanying documentation for accuracy and completeness. A judge may not enter a FISA court order unless the described accuracy and completeness procedures comply with requirements prescribed by this bill.Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020
HR #3494 | Last Action: 7/16/2019Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 This bill reauthorizes for FY2018-FY2020 intelligence activities in various U.S. government departments and agencies. It also establishes several intelligence-related programs and calls for reports on various topics. The bill establishes a paid parental leave program for intelligence community employees. The program provides 12 weeks of leave in the 12-month period following the birth or adoption of a child. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) shall report on intelligence community policies for awarding contracts, including research and development contracts, involving certain foreign countries. The report shall assess whether security and counterintelligence risks are being properly considered in such policies. The bill establishes the Climate Security Advisory Council within the ODNI to assist the intelligence community in the analysis of climate security issues. The bill transfers the National Intelligence University from the Defense Intelligence Agency to the ODNI. The bill requires reports on various issues, including (1) Russia's political leaders; (2) the death of journalist Jamal Khashoggi; (3) China's influence operations in the United States and Taiwan and its repression of ethnic Muslim minorities in the Xinjiang region; (4) domestic terrorism in the United States; (5) a plan to reduce the background investigation backlog to 200,000 by the end of 2020; (6) reforms to the security clearance process to reduce decision pendency times; (7) the suitability of the information currently requested for security clearances and recommendations for improving the process; (4) the advisability of having at most three tiers of trust and security clearances; (8) the advisability of aclearance in personconcept, under which an individual is allowed to maintain a security clearance or eligibility for such regardless of employment status; and (9) the advisability of establishing the Foreign Malign Influence Response Center. The bill also establishes (1) a task force to study the illicit finance of espionage and foreign influence operations in the United States, (2) a prize to stimulate research in technology to detect fake video or audio created using machine-learning techniques, (3) the Energy Infrastructure Center in the Department of Energy to analyze intelligence related to U.S. energy infrastructure security, (4) a board to advise the National Reconnaissance Office, (5) a program for sharing among government agencies and industry partners background information of individuals in or applying for national security positions and positions of trust, and (6) an intelligence community working group to periodically report to Congress on foreign investment-related threats to national security. The National Security Agency may establish a special rate of pay for certain positions that perform certain cyber-related functions. The ODNI shall establish a Supply Chain and Counterintelligence Risk Management Task Force to standardize information sharing between the intelligence community and government acquisition community with respect to supply chain and counterintelligence issues. An intelligence community officer nominated by the President for a position requiring the Senate's advice and consent may not make a classification decision with information related to such officer's nomination. The bill (1) authorizes the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to provide subsistence to personnel assigned to an austere overseas location, (2) authorizes the CIA to increase compensation to qualified employees (or individuals otherwise affiliated with the CIA) who sustained certain injuries while on foreign assignment, (3) expands CIA security personnel jurisdiction to within 500 yards of any CIA installation or property, and (4) repeals language requirements for certain senior intelligence CIA positions. The bill (1) prohibits the federal government, except for the Department of Defense, from entering into a bilateral agreement with Russia regarding cybersecurity unless the ODNI reports to Congress on the agreement, including actions to address expected counterintelligence concerns; and (2) expands an existing committee tasked with countering Russian covert influence to cover similar activities by any other country.Espionage Act Reform Act of 2020
S #3402 | Last Action: 3/5/2020Espionage Act Reform Act of 2020 This bill limits the scope of certain criminal offenses relating to classified information. Under the bill, the offense of disclosing classified information to an unauthorized person may be committed only by an individual who is authorized to receive the classified information and has signed a nondisclosure agreement regarding such classified information (i.e., a covered person), whereas under current law any individual may be charged with this offense. Under the bill, this offense shall not apply to disclosures of information to any Member of Congress, a federal court, an inspector general in the intelligence community, or certain bodies such as the Federal Trade Commission. Similarly, under the bill, certain offenses related to gathering, transmitting, or losing defense information may be committed only by a covered person or a foreign agent, whereas currently such offenses may be committed by any person. Under the bill, an individual who is not a foreign agent may not be criminally charged for such offenses unless the individual meets certain requirements, such as having committed a felony under federal law in the course of committing the offense. An offense related to obtaining and copying a document connected with the national defense shall apply only to an unlawfully obtained nonpublic document, whereas the current statute does not limit the scope of this offense to such documents. An offense related to dispensing certain public property of value shall apply only to tangible things, whereas the current statute does not limit the scope of this offense to tangible things.Espionage Act Reform Act of 2020
HR #6114 | Last Action: 3/5/2020Espionage Act Reform Act of 2020 This bill limits the scope of certain criminal offenses relating to classified information. Under the bill, the offense of disclosing classified information to an unauthorized person may be committed only by an individual who is authorized to receive the classified information and has signed a nondisclosure agreement regarding such classified information (i.e., a covered person), whereas under current law any individual may be charged with this offense. Under the bill, this offense shall not apply to disclosures of information to any Member of Congress, a federal court, an inspector general in the intelligence community, or certain bodies such as the Federal Trade Commission. Similarly, under the bill, certain offenses related to gathering, transmitting, or losing defense information may be committed only by a covered person or a foreign agent, whereas currently such offenses may be committed by any person. Under the bill, an individual who is not a foreign agent may not be criminally charged for such offenses unless the individual meets certain requirements, such as having committed a felony under federal law in the course of committing the offense. An offense related to obtaining and copying a document connected with the national defense shall apply only to an unlawfully obtained nonpublic document, whereas the current statute does not limit the scope of this offense to such documents. An offense related to dispensing certain public property of value shall apply only to tangible things, whereas the current statute does not limit the scope of this offense to tangible things.Trafficking and Smuggling Intelligence Act of 2019
HR #3720 | Last Action: 7/11/2019Trafficking and Smuggling Intelligence Act of 2019 This bill directs the Office of the Director of National Intelligence to report on issues pertaining to the Northern Triangle countries (El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras) and Mexico. Specifically, the office shall report on (1) the activities of drug-trafficking organizations in such countries, (2) the human-trafficking activities of individuals and organizations, and (3) an assessment of current intelligence-collection priorities in such countries.USA FREEDOM Extension and Amici Curiae Reform Act of 2020
S #3420 | Last Action: 3/9/2020USA FREEDOM Extension and Amici Curiae Reform Act of 2020 This bill expands the role and authority of amici curiae (outside parties appointed to assist courts in deciding certain cases) in proceedings before courts established under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA). The bill also extends certain FISA-authorized investigative powers, including the power to access certain business records for foreign intelligence and international terrorism investigations, to June 19, 2020. The bill expands the circumstances under which a FISA court shall appoint an amicus, such as when a case involves (1) a significant First Amendment issue, or (2) a request for approval of a new program or technology. Currently, the statute directs a FISA court to appoint an amicus only when a case involves a novel or significant interpretation of the law. Under the bill, an amicus may (1) raise any issue at any time even if the court did not request assistance on that issue, (2) access un-redacted copies of relevant FISA court documents and related information, and (3) petition the FISA Court of Review or the Supreme Court to review a decision by a FISA-authorized court.Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020
S #1589 | Last Action: 5/22/2019Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 This bill authorizes various intelligence-related activities for FY2018-FY2020 and contains other intelligence-related provisions. The bill's provisions include * increasing the maximum amount of voluntary separation pay for Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) employees; * providing 12 weeks of paid parental leave for civilian intelligence community employees for the birth or adoption of a child, subject to various limitations; * allowing an intelligence community employee who has been subjected to a possible prohibited personnel action to submit a claim to the inspector general of the intelligence community and authorizing the inspector general to convene an external review panel to review the claim; * allowing a married, retiring CIA employee to elect to receive a reduced annuity in exchange for the employee's surviving spouse to continue receiving payments after the employee's death; * authorizing each intelligence community element to establish higher pay rates for certain positions that require expertise in science, technology, engineering, or mathematics; * requiring the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) to establish the Supply Chain and Counterintelligence Risk Management Task Force; * removing the foreign language requirement for certain senior CIA positions; * establishing the Energy Infrastructure Security Center in the Department of Energy; * requiring the ODNI to assess security vulnerabilities in state election systems before any regularly scheduled federal election and to brief Congress about detected foreign attempts to influence an upcoming federal election; and * requiring reports on various topics, such as Iranian support for proxy forces in Syria and Lebanon and Russian financing for global influence campaigns.To prohibit the retention of incidentally acquired communications in the course of intelligence collection activities.
HR #8549 | Last Action: 10/9/2020This bill modifies statutory requirements related to certain procedures limiting the retention of communications incidentally acquired during an intelligence activity. Specifically, the bill removes a requirement that such procedures must permit the acquisition, retention, and dissemination of such communications. (An existing executive order authorizes intelligence community agencies to collect, retain, and disseminate incidentally obtained information that may indicate involvement in activities that may violate federal, state, local or foreign laws.)Safeguarding Americans' Private Records Act of 2020
HR #5675 | Last Action: 1/24/2020Safeguarding Americans' Private Records Act of 2020 This bill imposes limitations on investigative powers provided under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA), reauthorizes certain FISA programs, and makes related changes. Provisions include * reauthorizing to December 15, 2023, FISA authority to obtain business records, but also repealing the power to use such authority to obtain records on an ongoing basis; * excluding certain data, such as cell phone location, from FISA authority to access business records; * establishing that nonpublic information collected under FISA authority may not be retained for more than three years unless the information includes foreign intelligence information; * disallowing the use of FISA-collected business records for criminal, civil, or administrative proceedings except in certain instances, such as cases involving a specific cybersecurity threat from a foreign country; * requiring a government entity to notify a targeted person that the entity intends to use in court business records collected under FISA; * excluding cell site location and global positioning system information from FISA authority for using a pen register or trap and trace device to collect evidence; * reauthorizing to December 15, 2023, the power to treat individual terrorists as foreign agents; * expanding the powers of FISA court amicus curiae (outside parties appointed to assist in a case), such as by authorizing the amicus to refer a FISA court decision to the FISA Court of Review; and * repealing the government's authority to use National Security Letters to obtain financial or communications records without a court order.Safeguarding Americans' Private Records Act of 2020
S #3242 | Last Action: 1/28/2020Safeguarding Americans' Private Records Act of 2020 This bill imposes limitations on investigative powers provided under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA), reauthorizes certain FISA programs, and makes related changes. Provisions include * reauthorizing to December 15, 2023, FISA authority to obtain business records, but also repealing the power to use such authority to obtain records on an ongoing basis; * excluding certain data, such as cell phone location, from FISA authority to access business records; * establishing that nonpublic information collected under FISA authority may not be retained for more than three years unless the information includes foreign intelligence information; * disallowing the use of FISA-collected business records for criminal, civil, or administrative proceedings except in certain instances, such as cases involving a specific cybersecurity threat from a foreign country; * requiring a government entity to notify a targeted person that the entity intends to use in court business records collected under FISA; * excluding cell site location and global positioning system information from FISA authority for using a pen register or trap and trace device to collect evidence; * reauthorizing to December 15, 2023, the power to treat individual terrorists as foreign agents; * expanding the powers of FISA court amicus curiae (outside parties appointed to assist in a case), such as by authorizing the amicus to refer a FISA court decision to the FISA Court of Review; and * repealing the government's authority to use National Security Letters to obtain financial or communications records without a court order.Terror Intelligence Improvement Act of 2019
S #1778 | Last Action: 6/11/2019Terror Intelligence Improvement Act of 2019 This bill requires each federal department or agency to provide to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) information about a person who is or has been under a federal terrorism investigation. The FBI and its Joint Terrorism Task Forces must immediately be notified of a request to transfer a firearm or explosive to a person who is, or was within the previous 10 years, under a federal terrorism investigation. The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community must audit the terrorism-related screening and watch list procedures of the federal government. The bill directs the Department of Justice to establish a process to delay and prevent the transfer of a firearm or explosive to a person who is, or was within the previous 10 years, under a federal terrorism investigation.Ending Mass Collection of Americans’ Phone Records Act of 2019
S #936 | Last Action: 3/28/2019Ending Mass Collection of Americans' Phone Records Act of 2019 This bill repeals the authority of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to obtain business records, such as phone records, on an ongoing basis under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). FISA warrants shall only be for items specifically identified in the FBI's application to access the records. FISA currently allows the FBI to apply for a warrant to access records and other documents to obtain foreign intelligence information or to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities. The application for such a warrant is ex parte before courts designated under FISA, meaning that the government is the only party present in the proceedings.Ending Mass Collection of Americans' Phone Records Act
HR #1942 | Last Action: 3/28/2019Ending Mass Collection of Americans' Phone Records Act This bill repeals the authority of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to obtain business records, such as phone records, on an ongoing basis under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). FISA warrants shall only be for items specifically identified in the FBI's application to access the records. FISA currently allows the FBI to apply for a warrant to access records and other documents to obtain foreign intelligence information or to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities. The application for such a warrant is ex parte before courts designated under FISA, meaning that the government is the only party present in the proceedings.