[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 2912 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

<DOC>






117th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 2912

    To strengthen United States oversight of the Biological Weapons 
   Convention and to advance non-proliferation objectives related to 
biological weapons, dual-use technologies, and life sciences research, 
                        and for other purposes.


_______________________________________________________________________


                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                           September 30, 2021

   Mr. Risch introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
             referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL


 
    To strengthen United States oversight of the Biological Weapons 
   Convention and to advance non-proliferation objectives related to 
biological weapons, dual-use technologies, and life sciences research, 
                        and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Biological Weapons Policy Act of 
2021''.

SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

    In this Act:
            (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
        ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
                    (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the 
                Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
                    (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the 
                Committee on Appropriations Armed Services of the House 
                of Representatives.
            (2) Biological weapons convention.--The term ``Biological 
        Weapons Convention'' means the Convention on the Prohibition of 
        the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological 
        and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, done at Washington, 
        London, and Moscow, April 10, 1972.
            (3) Life sciences research.--The term ``life sciences 
        research''--
                    (A) means research that pertains to living 
                organisms, including microbes, human beings, animals, 
                and plants, and their products, including all 
                disciplines and methodologies of biology such as 
                aerobiology, agricultural science, plant science, 
                animal science, bioinformatics, genomics, proteomics, 
                synthetic biology, environmental science, public 
                health, modeling, engineering of living systems, and 
                all applications of the biological sciences; and
                    (B) is meant to encompass the diverse approaches 
                for understanding life at the level of ecosystems, 
                organisms, organs, tissues, cells, and molecules.

SEC. 3. FINDINGS.

    Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) According to the Department of State, ``promoting 
        global health security is a core tenant of the U.S. biodefense 
        strategy because infectious disease threats, whether naturally 
        occurring, deliberate, or accidental, have the potential to 
        spread globally and affect the American people and interests''.
            (2) Several countries around the world have known or 
        suspected chemical and biological weapons capability or are 
        undertaking research that poses concerns about such nations' 
        compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention, as 
        documented by the United States Department of State and the 
        United Nations.
            (3) With respect to the Russian Federation, the Department 
        of State, in its 2021 report on Adherence to and Compliance 
        With Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements 
        and Commitments, assessed that ``the Russian Federation 
        (Russia) maintains an offensive BW [biological weapons] program 
        and is in violation of its obligation under Articles I and II 
        of the BWC [Biological Weapons Convention]''.
            (4) With respect to the People's Republic of China, the 
        Department of State, also in its 2021 report on Adherence to 
        and Compliance With Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and 
        Disarmament Agreements and Commitments, assessed that it 
        ``engaged in activities with dual-use applications, which raise 
        concerns regarding its compliance with Article I of the BWC. In 
        addition, the United States does not have sufficient 
        information to determine whether China eliminated its assessed 
        historical biological warfare (BW) program, as required under 
        Article II of the Convention.''
            (5) The People's Republic of China's engagement in 
        biological research that presents dual use concerns, its 
        professed prioritization of biotechnology and synthetic biology 
        in relevant national strategies, and evidence that emerged in 
        the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic of collaboration between 
        ostensibly civilian research laboratories in the People's 
        Republic of China and the People's Liberation Army, has 
        highlighted the imperative of the United States to monitor 
        closely and conduct diligent oversight of biological research 
        collaboration with the People's Republic of China.
            (6) Another consideration in the imperative for closer 
        oversight is the People's Republic of China's prioritization of 
        military-civil fusion, which systematically harnesses all civil 
        and commercial research and technology for potential weapons 
        use.
            (7) A potential bioweapons attack or accidental leak of 
        biological research, especially biological research that could 
        be militarized, would have devastating human health, economic, 
        and geopolitical consequences. While the origins of COVID-19 
        remain under investigation, the current pandemic serves as a 
        sobering example of vulnerability and could inspire malign 
        actors.
            (8) The Department of State, particularly the Under 
        Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, 
        is responsible for ``developing measures to prevent misuse of 
        advances in the life sciences'' (1 FAM 457.3). These challenges 
        require that the Department of State have the lead role in 
        preventing the proliferation of bioweapons and in strengthening 
        relevant oversight mechanisms to mitigate the potential risk of 
        a deliberate or accidental bioweapons event.

SEC. 4. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

    It shall be the policy of the United States to--
            (1) conduct rigorous oversight of public health research 
        and innovation that could be weaponized or serve a dual-use 
        function, and incorporate national security and 
        nonproliferation considerations and country-specific conditions 
        into decisions regarding international biological, 
        bacteriological, virological, and other relevant research 
        collaboration;
            (2) ensure that United States Government support for public 
        health research and other actions are not inadvertently 
        contributing to the proliferation of biological weapons and 
        dual use technologies in the search for solutions to pressing 
        global health challenges; and
            (3) declassify, to the maximum extent possible, all 
        intelligence relevant to the People's Republic of China's (PRC) 
        compliance or lack of compliance with its obligations under the 
        Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), and other national 
        security concerns regarding PRC life sciences research that 
        falls outside the scope of the BWC.

SEC. 5. AMENDMENTS TO SECRETARY OF STATE AUTHORITIES.

    (a) Research, Development, and Other Studies.--Section 301(a) of 
the Arms Control and Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C. 2571(a)) is amended by 
inserting ``biological, virological,'' after ``bacteriological''.
    (b) Oversight of Dual-Use Research.--Title III of the Arms Control 
and Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C. 2571 et seq.) is amended by inserting 
after section 301 (22 U.S.C. 2571) the following new section:

``SEC. 301A. AUTHORITIES WITH RESPECT TO BIOLOGICAL DUAL-USE RESEARCH 
              OF CONCERN.

    ``(a) Oversight of Dual-Use Research.--
            ``(1) In general.--The Secretary of State, working through 
        Chiefs of Mission in each country listed in paragraph (2), as 
        applicable, shall lead the conduct and completion of a Country 
        Team Assessment to evaluate and determine whether, for each 
        discrete proposed research project or other collaboration 
        funded or otherwise supported by the United States Government 
        that involves life sciences dual-use research of concern, 
        including research related to biological agents, toxins, and 
        pathogens, aligns with the national interests of the United 
        States. The Country Team Assessment shall be submitted to the 
        Secretary of State and the head of the Federal department or 
        agency sponsoring the proposed research or collaboration.
            ``(2) List of countries specified.--The countries for which 
        a Country Team Assessment, as described in paragraph (1), must 
        be completed are as follows:
                    ``(A) The People's Republic of China.
                    ``(B) The Russian Federation.
                    ``(C) The Islamic Republic of Iran.
                    ``(D) The Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
                    ``(E) The Syrian Arab Republic.
                    ``(F) Any other country specified in the report 
                assessing compliance with the Biological Weapons 
                Convention, as required by section 403(a) of the Arms 
                Control and Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C. 2593a(a)) in the 
                relevant calendar year.
    ``(b) Report on Approvals of Collaboration.--Not later than 
September 30, 2022, and annually thereafter for a period of three 
years, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the heads of other 
relevant Federal departments and agencies as appropriate, shall submit 
to the appropriate committees of Congress a report describing any 
research or collaboration described in subsection (a) that was approved 
and the justification for such approval.
    ``(c) Report on Efficacy of Country Team Assessment.--Not later 
than September 30, 2025, the Secretary of State, in coordination with 
the heads of other relevant Federal departments and agencies, shall 
submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report that includes 
the following elements:
            ``(1) A summary of the work of the relevant country teams 
        over the previous three years.
            ``(2) An assessment of whether the country team assessment 
        process described in subsection (a) is effective in advancing 
        relevant national interests of the United States, and any 
        associated recommendations.
            ``(3) Any other key findings and recommendations, including 
        for conducting oversight of and improving interagency 
        coordination on the review and monitoring of collaboration with 
        other countries on life sciences research.
    ``(d) Definitions.--In this section:
            ``(1) Appropriate committees of congress.--the term 
        `appropriate committees of Congress' means--
                    ``(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the 
                Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions of 
                the Senate; and
                    ``(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the 
                Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of 
                Representatives.
            ``(2) Life sciences dual-use research of concern defined.--
        The term `life sciences dual-use research of concern' means 
        life sciences research that can be reasonably anticipated to 
        provide knowledge, information, products, or technologies that 
        could be directly misapplied to pose a significant threat with 
        broad potential consequences to public health and safety, 
        national security, or agricultural crops and other plants, 
        animals, the environment, or materiel.''.
    (c) Enhancements to the Annual Compliance Report.--Section 403(a) 
of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C. 2593a(a)) is 
amended--
            (1) in paragraph (5)--
                    (A) by inserting ``or the conduct of life sciences 
                research of dual-use concern (as defined in section 
                301A),'' before ``including--''; and
                    (B) in subparagraph (C), by striking ``; and'' and 
                inserting a semicolon;
            (2) by redesignating paragraph (6) as paragraph (7); and
            (3) by inserting after paragraph (5) the following new 
        paragraph:
            ``(6) a detailed assessment of the national security and 
        proliferation risk of life science research of dual-use concern 
        conducted by the other nations including--
                    ``(A) a review of major issues the Department of 
                State is prioritizing with respect to the misuse or 
                potential misuse of life sciences research;
                    ``(B) a description of all efforts by the 
                Department of State and other relevant departments and 
                agencies to develop and promote measures to prevent 
                misuse or proliferation of advances in the life 
                sciences;
                    ``(C) an assessment of national level policies, 
                research initiatives, or other relevant efforts focused 
                on increasing the pathogenicity, contagiousness, or 
                transmissibility of viruses or bacteria, including 
                initiatives involving or anticipated to involve 
                enhanced potential pandemic pathogens of other nations, 
                including--
                            ``(i) the People's Republic of China;
                            ``(ii) the Russian Federation;
                            ``(iii) the Islamic Republic of Iran;
                            ``(iv) the Democratic People's Republic of 
                        Korea;
                            ``(v) the Syrian Arab Republic;
                            ``(vi) any other nation identified in 
                        paragraphs (4) and (5); and
                            ``(vii) any terrorist group or malign non-
                        state actor;
                    ``(D) an assessment of whether any of the 
                activities described in subparagraph (C) constitute 
                violations of Biological Weapons Convention or pose 
                related national security concerns;
                    ``(E) a description of collaboration between 
                ostensibly civilian entities, including research 
                laboratories, and military entities on life sciences 
                research;
                    ``(F) a description of the confidence-building 
                measures or other attempts by the countries described 
                in subparagraph (C) to justify, clarify, or explain the 
                activities described in such subparagraph;
                    ``(G) an assessment of risks to United States 
                national security and proliferation risks presented by 
                the initiatives described in subparagraph (C);
                    ``(H) a description of all involvement by the 
                Department of State to review United States Government 
                funding or other support, including subgrants, for life 
                sciences research in other countries that qualifies as 
                dual-use research of concern, including research 
                related to biological agents, toxins, and pathogens; 
                and
                    ``(I) a description of all participation in any 
                other United States Government and international groups 
                on biosecurity and dual-use research;'';
            (4) in paragraph (7), as redesignated by paragraph (2) of 
        this subsection, by striking the period at the end and 
        inserting ``; and''; and
            (5) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
            ``(8) a description of any obstacles or challenges to the 
        ability of United States Government to address the requirements 
        specified in this section, including a description of gaps in 
        authorities, intelligence collection and analysis, 
        organizational responsibilities, and resources.''.

SEC. 6. REPORT ON UNITED STATES FUNDING FOR LIFE SCIENCE RESEARCH IN 
              THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

    (a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the President shall conduct a formal review, and 
produce a written report, of all United States Government grants or 
funding awarded in the past ten years for research collaboration with 
the People's Republic of China related to life sciences, gain-of-
function, synthetic biology, biotechnology, or other research areas 
that pose potential biological weapons proliferation or dual-use 
concerns.
    (b) Elements.--The review required under subsection (a) shall 
analyze--
            (1) all such grants and funding requests that were awarded 
        and a detailed project description, the awardee, the amount 
        awarded, any resulting sub-grants to entities under the 
        jurisdiction of the People's Republic of China, and the 
        criteria met for granting approval of funding;
            (2) the exact procedures used to approve or deny such 
        grants or other funding, including coordination, if any, 
        between agencies responsible for public health preparedness and 
        biomedical research, including the Department of Health and 
        Human Services, and national security agencies, including the 
        Department of State;
            (3) an assessment of any gaps in United States Government 
        procedures and safeguards to prevent any such research intended 
        for civilian purposes from being diverted for military research 
        in the People's Republic of China;
            (4) an assessment of how to best address any such gaps in 
        procedures and safeguards, especially regarding greater 
        interagency input from national security agencies, particularly 
        the Department of State;
            (5) how the research conducted with the grants and funding 
        requests listed pursuant to paragraph (1) may have contributed 
        to the development of biological weapons in the People's 
        Republic of China;
            (6) how the United States Government's understanding of the 
        People's Republic of China's ``military-civil fusion'' national 
        strategy informed and impacted funding decisions, and how it 
        will inform future funding decisions in research related to 
        gain-of-function, synthetic biology, biotechnology, or other 
        research areas that pose biological weapons proliferation or 
        dual-use concerns;
            (7) whether any United States Government funding, including 
        subgrants, was used to support gain-of-function research in the 
        People's Republic of China during the United States moratorium 
        on such research from 2014 to 2017;
            (8) steps taken the by United States Government, if any, to 
        apply additional scrutiny to United States Government funding, 
        including subgrants, to support gain-of-function research in 
        the People's Republic of China after the United States 
        Government lifted the moratorium on gain-of-function research 
        in 2017; and
            (9) any other relevant matter discovered during the course 
        of the review.
    (c) Report Submission.--Within 15 days of the completion of the 
report required under subsection (a), the President shall submit the 
report to--
            (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
            (2) the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions 
        of the Senate;
            (3) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate;
            (4) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
        Representatives;
            (5) the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of 
        Representatives; and
            (6) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of 
        Representatives.
    (d) Form of Report.--The report shall be unclassified, but may 
include a classified annex.

SEC. 7. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE REPORT ON OVERSIGHT OF 
              INTERNATIONAL LIFE SCIENCES RESEARCH COLLABORATION.

    (a) In General.--Not later than one year after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Comptroller General of the United States 
shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees on 
the following matters:
            (1) An audit of United States Government authorities, 
        policies, and processes governing cooperation with other 
        nations as relates to life sciences research that could be 
        weaponized or pose dual-use concerns, such as pathogens or 
        toxins, synthetic biology, and related emerging technologies, 
        and the degree to which these authorities, policies, and 
        processes account for national security, proliferation, and 
        country-specific considerations in decisions on whether to 
        pursue such collaboration.
            (2) An assessment of the degree of coordination between 
        Federal departments and agencies responsible for public health 
        preparedness and the governance of biomedical research and 
        Federal departments and agencies responsible for national 
        security, especially the United States Department of State, to 
        assess and account for security implications of cooperation 
        with other nations on life sciences research.
    (b) Elements.--The review required under subsection (a) shall 
address the following elements:
            (1) The Federal department or agencies or other 
        governmental entities that provide funding or other material 
        support for life sciences research, especially biological 
        research, with other nations.
            (2) The authorities, policies, and processes that currently 
        exist for reviewing, approving, and monitoring grant funding or 
        other material support for biological research with other 
        nations, including a description of all the steps involved 
        reviewing, approving, and monitoring such funding or other 
        support.
            (3) Which Federal departments and agencies, including 
        specific bureaus and offices, are involved in the authorities, 
        policies, and processes described in paragraph (2).
            (4) The circumstances under which Federal departments and 
        agencies apply enhanced review, monitoring, and coordination to 
        proposed collaboration, as well as an analysis of the extent to 
        which and how national security, proliferation, or country-
        specific considerations, such as a nation's adherence to the 
        Biological Weapons Convention, are among the circumstances that 
        trigger enhanced scrutiny of whether the United States 
        Government should fund a particular research program.
            (5) The information required to be included in an 
        application for United States Government funding of life 
        sciences research to address potential national security, 
        proliferation, or country-specific concerns, and whether the 
        information required varies across departments and agencies.
            (6) The extent to which Federal departments and agencies 
        with national security responsibilities have visibility into 
        the information described in paragraph (5) prior to an award 
        being made, even if grantees are applying to funding from 
        another Federal department or agency.
            (7) The processes and timeline by which funds are issued to 
        the awardee or awardees after a grant or other funding award is 
        made, and to what extent these funds are monitored for national 
        security implications thereafter, including how Federal 
        departments and agencies with national security 
        responsibilities are involved in monitoring such research after 
        funds are awarded.
    (c) Report Submission.--Within 15 days of the completion of the 
report required under subsection (a), the President shall submit the 
report to--
            (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on 
        Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, and the Committee on 
        Armed Services of the Senate; and
            (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on 
        Energy and Commerce, and the Committee on Armed Services of the 
        House of Representatives.
    (d) Form of Report.--The report required under subsection (a) shall 
be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

SEC. 8. PROHIBITION WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN TYPES OF LIFE SCIENCES 
              RESEARCH.

    No Federal funds may be obligated or expended for the purpose of 
conducting research that increases the pathogenicity, contagiousness, 
or transmissibility of viruses or bacteria, including any research 
anticipated to involve enhanced potential pandemic pathogens, if such 
research involves a foreign entity that is subject to the jurisdiction 
of any of the following countries:
            (1) The People's Republic of China.
            (2) The Russian Federation.
            (3) The Islamic Republic of Iran.
            (4) The Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
            (5) The Syrian Arab Republic.
            (6) Any other country specified in the report assessing 
        compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention, as required 
        by section 403(a) of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act (22 
        U.S.C. 2593a(a)) in the relevant calendar year.

SEC. 9. BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN WEAPONS REVIEW CONFERENCE.

    (a) Statement of Policy.--In order to promote international peace, 
and security, it is the policy of the United States to pursue adherence 
to the Biological Weapons Convention and accountability for violations 
thereof, including as described in subsections (b) and (c).
    (b) Activities in Advance of the Ninth Review Conference of the 
Biological Weapons Convention.--Before the Ninth Review Conference of 
the 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production 
and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and 
on their Destruction (in this subsection referred to as ``the 
Conference''), the President shall carry out the following activities:
            (1) Demand greater transparency from the Government of the 
        People's Republic of China regarding the dual-use applications 
        of its life science research, which raise concerns regarding 
        its compliance with Article I of the Biological Weapons 
        Convention.
            (2) Engage with other governments, the private sector 
        (including in relevant life sciences and technology fields), 
        and other stakeholders, as appropriate, on United States 
        concerns about the People's Republic of China's compliance with 
        the Biological Weapons Convention, and the national security, 
        public health, and non-proliferation implications of these 
        concerns.
            (3) Emphasize that the People's Republic of China's 
        national strategy of ``military-civil fusion'' undermines the 
        underlying utility, purposes, and enforceability of the 
        Biological Weapons Convention, which may not adequately capture 
        the full range of dual-use biotechnologies being pursued by the 
        People's Republic of China.
    (c) Security Council Complaint.--If the questions and concerns 
raised in subsection (b) are not adequately addressed, the President 
should consider lodging a complaint to the Security Council pursuant to 
Article VI of the Convention.

SEC. 10. ANNUAL REPORT BY THE UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL 
              DEVELOPMENT.

    (a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for seven years, the 
Administrator of the United States International Development shall 
submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report describing 
all engagements and funding, including subgrants, for life sciences 
research involving or related to the study of pathogens, viruses, and 
toxins provided to entities subject to the jurisdiction of countries 
listed in subsection (b), to include a national security justification 
for such engagements and funding.
    (b) List of Countries Specified.--The countries to be covered by 
the report required in subsection (a) are as follows:
            (1) The People's Republic of China.
            (2) The Russian Federation.
            (3) The Islamic Republic of Iran.
            (4) The Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
            (5) The Syrian Arab Republic.
            (6) Any other country specified in the report assessing 
        compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention, as required 
        by section 403(a) of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act (22 
        U.S.C. 2593a(a)) in the relevant calendar year.
    (c) Form.--The report required under subsection (a) shall be 
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

SEC. 11. UNITED NATIONS AGENCIES, PROGRAMS, AND FUNDS.

    (a) Prohibition.--The Permanent Representative of the United States 
to the United Nations, in coordination with the United States 
Representative to the World Health Assembly, shall use the voice, vote, 
and influence of the United States at the United Nations to bar 
representatives from countries listed in subsection (b) from serving in 
leadership positions within any United Nations specialized agency, 
program, fund, or treaty organization with a nexus to global health 
(including animal health), biosecurity, atomic, biological or chemical 
weapons, or food security and agricultural development.
    (b) List of Countries Specified.--The countries to be covered by 
the report required in subsection (a) are as follows:
            (1) The People's Republic of China.
            (2) The Russian Federation.
            (3) The Islamic Republic of Iran.
            (4) The Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
            (5) The Syrian Arab Republic.
            (6) Any other country specified in the report assessing 
        compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention, as required 
        by section 403(a) of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act (22 
        U.S.C. 2593a(a)) in the relevant calendar year.
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