[Congressional Bills 116th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 4272 Introduced in Senate (IS)]
<DOC>
116th CONGRESS
2d Session
S. 4272
To advance a policy for managed strategic competition with the People's
Republic of China.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
July 22, 2020
Mr. Risch (for himself, Mr. Gardner, Mr. Romney, and Mr. Young)
introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the
Committee on Foreign Relations
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To advance a policy for managed strategic competition with the People's
Republic of China.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLES.
This Act may be cited as the ``Strengthening Trade, Regional
Alliances, Technology, and Economic and Geopolitical Initiatives
concerning China Act'' or the ``STRATEGIC Act''.
SEC. 2. TABLE OF CONTENTS.
The table of contents for this Act is as follows:
Sec. 1. Short titles.
Sec. 2. Table of contents.
Sec. 3. Definitions.
TITLE I--A COMPREHENSIVE CHINA POLICY
Sec. 101. Findings.
Sec. 102. Statement of policy.
Sec. 103. Sense of Congress.
TITLE II--PROTECTING THE UNITED STATES FROM CHINA'S DISCRIMINATORY
ECONOMIC PRACTICES
Sec. 201. Findings and sense of Congress regarding the PRC's industrial
policy.
Sec. 202. Intellectual property violators list.
Sec. 203. Government of the People's Republic of China subsidies list.
Sec. 204. Review of petitions related to intellectual property theft
and forced technology transfer.
Sec. 205. Predatory pricing by entities owned, controlled, or directed
by a foreign state.
Sec. 206. Reporting on requests to comply with the corporate social
credit system in the People's Republic of
China.
Sec. 207. Annual review on the presence of Chinese companies in United
States capital markets.
TITLE III--REINVESTING IN AMERICAN AND ALLIED TECHNOLOGICAL
COMPETITIVENESS
Sec. 301. Regulatory exchanges with allies and partners.
Sec. 302. Authorization to assist United States companies with supply
chain diversification and management.
Sec. 303. Scientific and private sector advisory panel on protection of
critical technologies.
Sec. 304. Establishment of a tech coalition.
Sec. 305. United States representation in standards-setting bodies.
TITLE IV--SAFEGUARDING AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS
Sec. 401. Amendments to Higher Education Act of 1965.
Sec. 402. Amendment to Foreign Agent Registration Act regarding gifts
made to universities.
Sec. 403. Designation of a country of national security concern in the
Foreign Agent Registration Act.
Sec. 404. Ban on Senate-confirmed Department of State officials
representing countries of national security
concern.
Sec. 405. Amendment to the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange
Act.
TITLE V--MAINTAINING THE INTEGRITY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
Sec. 501. Office of Integrity in the United Nations System.
TITLE VI--BOLSTERING UNITED STATES AND ALLIED DEFENSE AND SECURITY
Sec. 601. Findings.
Sec. 602. Statement of policy expressing the political will of the
United States to defend its interests in
the Indo-Pacific and pursue expanded
political-military cooperation with allies
and partners.
Sec. 603. Sense of Congress regarding bolstering security partnerships
in the Indo-Pacific.
Sec. 604. Report on capability development of Indo-Pacific allies and
partners.
Sec. 605. Statement of policy on unmanned aerial systems and the
Missile Technology Control Regime.
Sec. 606. Report on national technology and industrial base.
Sec. 607. Authorization of appropriations for Southeast Asia maritime
security programs and diplomatic outreach
activities.
Sec. 608. Report on China Coast Guard.
Sec. 609. Report on Chinese military activity in Djibouti.
TITLE VII--FOSTERING COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
Sec. 701. Sense of Congress regarding United States-People's Republic
of China cooperation on conservation and a
healthy environment.
Sec. 702. Strategy on cooperation on wildlife and related trafficking.
Sec. 703. Statement of policy regarding universal implementation of
United Nations sanctions on North Korea.
Sec. 704. Government Accountability Office report on United States-PRC
technical research cooperation.
Sec. 705. Findings on strategic stability and arms control.
Sec. 706. Cooperation on a strategic nuclear dialogue.
Sec. 707. Agreements.
SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) CCP.--The term ``CCP'' means the Chinese Communist
Party.
(2) Centrally administered, state-owned enterprise.--The
term ``centrally administered, state-owned enterprise'' means
any company that previously was or currently is--
(A)(i) incorporated in the PRC; and
(ii) supervised and managed by the State-owned
Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the
State Council of the PRC; or
(B) an owned or controlled subsidiary of an
enterprise meeting the requirements under subparagraph
(A).
(3) People's liberation army; pla.--The terms ``People's
Liberation Army'' and ``PLA'' mean the armed forces of the
People's Republic of China.
(4) PRC; china.--The terms ``PRC'' and ``China'' mean the
People's Republic of China.
TITLE I--A COMPREHENSIVE CHINA POLICY
SEC. 101. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The People's Republic of China has increased its
political, diplomatic, economic, military, technological, and
ideological power to become a strategic, near-peer, global
competitor of the United States. The policies increasingly
pursued by the PRC in each of these domains are contrary to the
interests and values of the United States, its partners, and
much of the rest of the world.
(2) The current competition between the United States and
the PRC--
(A) is taking place over the future character of
the international order;
(B) will shape the rules, norms, and institutions
that govern relations among states in the coming
decades;
(C) will determine the ability of the United States
to secure its national interests; and
(D) will determine future levels of peace,
prosperity, and freedom for the United States and the
international community in the coming decades.
(3) After normalizing diplomatic relations with the PRC in
1979, the United States actively worked to advance the PRC's
economic and social development to ensure that it participated
in, and benefitted from, the free and open international order.
The United States pursued these goals and contributed to the
welfare of the Chinese people by--
(A) increasing the PRC's trade relations and access
to global capital markets;
(B) promoting the PRC's accession to the World
Trade Organization;
(C) providing development finance and technical
assistance;
(D) promoting research collaboration;
(E) educating the PRC's top students;
(F) permitting transfers of cutting-edge
technologies and scientific knowledge; and
(G) providing intelligence and military assistance.
(4) It is now clear that the PRC has no intention of
reforming politically or economically. Instead, it is pursuing
state-led, mercantilist economic policies, increasing
restrictions on personal freedoms, and implementing an
aggressive and assertive foreign policy. These policies
frequently and deliberately undermine United States interests
and are contrary to core United States values and the values of
other nations, both in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. In response
to this strategic decision of the PRC, the United States was
compelled to reexamine and revise its strategy towards the PRC.
(5) The General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party
and the President of the People's Republic of China, Xi
Jinping, has elevated the ``Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese
Nation'' as central to the domestic and foreign policy of the
PRC. His program demands--
(A) strong, centralized CCP leadership;
(B) concentration of military power;
(C) a strong role for the CCP in the state and the
economy;
(D) an aggressive foreign policy seeking control
over broadly asserted territorial claims; and
(E) the denial of any universal values and
individual rights that are deemed to threaten the CCP.
(6) The PRC views its Leninist model of governance,
``socialism with Chinese characteristics'', as superior to, and
at odds with, the constitutional models of the United States
and other democracies. This approach to governance is lauded by
the CCP as essential to securing the PRC's status as a global
leader, and to shaping the future of the world. In a 2013
speech, President Xi said, ``We firmly believe that as
socialism with Chinese characteristics develops further . . .
it is . . . inevitable that the superiority of our socialist
system will be increasingly apparent . . . [and] our country's
road of development will have increasingly greater influence on
the world.''.
(7) The PRC's objectives are to first establish regional
hegemony over the Indo-Pacific and then to use that dominant
position to propel the PRC to become the ``leading world
power''. The PRC seeks to shape an international order that is
conducive to the interests of authoritarian and autocratic
regimes. Achieving these objectives requires turning the PRC
into a wealthy nation under strict CCP rule by using a strong
military and advanced technological capability to pursue the
PRC's objectives, regardless of other countries' interests.
(8) The PRC is reshaping the current international order,
which was built upon free and open ideals and principles, by
conducting global information and influence operations,
redefining international laws and norms to align with the
objectives of the CCP, rejecting the legitimacy of
internationally recognized human rights, and securing
leadership positions in multinational organizations to alter
their agendas. In December 2018, President Xi suggested that
the CCP views its ``historic mission'' as not only to govern
China, but also to profoundly influence global governance to
benefit the CCP.
(9) The PRC is encouraging other countries to follow its
model of ``socialism with Chinese characteristics''. During the
19th Party Congress in 2017, President Xi said that the PRC
could serve as a model of development for other countries by
utilizing ``Chinese wisdom'' and a ``Chinese approach to
solving problems''.
(10) The PRC is promoting its governance model and
attempting to weaken other models of governance by--
(A) undermining democratic institutions;
(B) subverting financial institutions;
(C) coercing businesses to accommodate the policies
of the CCP; and
(D) using disinformation to disguise the nature of
the actions described in subparagraphs (A) through (C).
(11) The PRC is making great strides toward its goal of
becoming the global leader in science and technology. In May
2018, President Xi said that for the PRC to reach ``prosperity
and rejuvenation'', it needs to ``endeavor to be a major world
center for science and innovation''. The PRC has invested the
equivalent of billions of dollars into education and research
and development and established joint scientific research
centers and science universities. Scientists and scholars from
the PRC have made numerous contributions to a wide array of
fields, including through international partnerships.
(12) The PRC's drive, however, to become a ``manufacturing
and technological superpower'' and to promote ``innovation with
Chinese characteristics'' is coming at the expense of human
rights, national security, and longstanding international rules
and norms about economic competition. In particular, the PRC
advances its illiberal political and social policies through
mass surveillance, social credit systems, and a significant
role of the state in internet governance. Through these means,
the PRC increases direct and indirect government control over
its citizens' everyday lives. Its national strategy of ``civil-
military fusion'' mandates that civil and commercial research,
which increasingly drives global innovation, is leveraged to
develop new military capabilities.
(13) The PRC is using legal and illegal means to achieve
its objective of becoming a manufacturing and technological
superpower. The PRC uses state-directed industrial policies in
anticompetitive ways to ensure the dominance of PRC companies.
The CCP engages in and encourages actions that actively
undermine a free and open international market, such as
intellectual property theft, forced technology transfers,
regulatory and financial subsidies, and mandatory CCP access to
proprietary data as part of business and commercial agreements
between Chinese and foreign companies.
(14) The policies referred to in paragraph (13) freeze
United States and other foreign firms out of the PRC market,
while eroding competition in other important markets. The heavy
subsidization of Chinese companies includes potential violation
of its World Trade Organization commitments. In May 2018,
President Xi said that the PRC aims to keep the ``initiatives
of innovation and development security . . . in [China's] own
hands''.
(15) The PRC advances its global objectives through a
variety of avenues, including its signature initiative, the
Belt and Road Initiative (referred to in this section as
``BRI''), which is enshrined in the Chinese Constitution and
includes the Digital Silk Road and Health Silk Road. The PRC
describes BRI as a straightforward and wholly beneficial plan
for all countries. In practice, it seeks to advance an economic
system with the PRC at its center, making it the most concrete
geographical representation of the PRC's global ambitions. BRI
increases the economic influence of state-owned Chinese firms
in global markets, enhances the PRC's political leverage with
government leaders around the world, and provides greater
access to strategic nodes such as ports and railways. Through
BRI, the PRC seeks political deference through economic
dependence.
(16) The PRC is executing a plan to establish regional
hegemony over the Indo-Pacific and displace the United States
from the region. As a Pacific power, the United States has
built and supported enduring alliances and economic
partnerships that secure peace and prosperity and promote the
rule of law and political pluralism in the Pacific. In
contrast, the PRC uses economic and military coercion in the
region to secure the interests of the CCP.
(17) The PRC's military strategy seeks to keep the United
States military from operating in the Western Pacific and
erodes United States security guarantees.
(18) The PRC is aggressively pursuing exclusive control of
critical land routes, sea lanes, and air space in the Indo-
Pacific in the hopes of eventually exercising greater influence
beyond the region. This includes lanes crucial to commercial
activity, energy exploration, transport, and the exercise of
security operations in areas permitted under international law.
(19) The PRC seeks unification with Taiwan through whatever
means may ultimately be required. The CCP's insistence that
``reunification'' is Taiwan's only option makes this goal
inherently coercive. In January 2019, President Xi stated that
the PRC ``make[s] no promise to renounce the use of force and
reserve[s] the option of taking all necessary means''. Taiwan's
embodiment of democratic values and economic liberalism
challenges President Xi's goal of achieving national
rejuvenation. The PRC plans to exploit Taiwan's dominant
strategic position in the First Island Chain and to project
power into the Second Island Chain and beyond.
(20) In the South China Sea, the PRC has executed an
illegal island-building campaign that interferes with freedom
of navigation, damages the environment, bolsters the PLA power
projection capabilities, and coerces and intimidates other
regional claimants in an effort to advance its unlawful claims
and control the waters around neighboring countries. Despite
President Xi's September 2015 speech, in which he said the PRC
was not militarizing the South China Sea, during the 2017 19th
Party Congress, President Xi announced that ``construction on
islands and reefs in the South China Sea have seen steady
progress''.
(21) The PRC is rapidly modernizing the PLA to attain a
level of capacity and capability superior to the United States
in terms of equipment and conduct of modern military operations
by shifting its military doctrine from having a force
``adequate [for] China's defensive needs'' to having a force
``commensurate with China's international status''. Ultimately,
this transformation will enable China to impose its will in the
Indo-Pacific region through the threat of military force. In
2017, President Xi established the following developmental
benchmarks for the advancement of the PLA:
(A) A mechanized force with increased informatized
and strategic capabilities by 2020.
(B) The complete modernization of China's national
defense by 2035.
(C) The full transformation of the PLA into a
world-class force by 2050.
(22) The PRC's strategy and supporting policies described
in this section undermine United States interests, such as--
(A) upholding a free and open international order;
(B) maintaining the integrity of international
institutions with liberal norms and values;
(C) preserving a favorable balance of power in the
Indo-Pacific;
(D) ensuring the defense of its allies;
(E) preserving open sea and air lanes;
(F) fostering the free flow of commerce through
open and transparent markets; and
(G) promoting individual freedom and human rights.
(23) The global COVID-19 pandemic has intensified and
accelerated these trends in the PRC's behavior and therefore
increased the need for United States global leadership and a
competitive posture. The PRC has capitalized on the world's
focus on the COVID-19 pandemic by--
(A) moving rapidly to undermine Hong Kong's
autonomy, including imposing a so-called ``national
security law'' on Hong Kong;
(B) aggressively imposing its will in the East and
South China Seas;
(C) contributing to increased tensions with India;
and
(D) engaging in a widespread and government-
directed disinformation campaign to obscure the PRC
Government's efforts to cover up the seriousness of
COVID-19, sow confusion about the origination of the
outbreak, and discredit the United States, its allies,
and global health efforts.
(24) In response to the PRC's strategy and policies, the
United States must--
(A) adopt a strategy of managed strategic
competition with the PRC to protect our vital
interests; and
(B) seek opportunities to cooperate with the PRC
when such cooperation is in the United States national
interests.
SEC. 102. STATEMENT OF POLICY.
(a) Objectives.--It is the policy of the United States, in pursuing
managed strategic competition with the PRC, to pursue the following
objectives:
(1) The United States global leadership role is sustained
and its political system and major foundations of national
power are postured for long-term political, economic,
technological, and military competition with the PRC.
(2) The balance of power in the Indo-Pacific remains
favorable to the United States and its allies. The United
States and its allies maintain unfettered access to the region
and the PRC neither dominates the region nor coerces its
neighbors.
(3) The allies and partners of the United States--
(A) maintain confidence in United States leadership
and its commitment to the Indo-Pacific region;
(B) can withstand and combat subversion and undue
influence by the PRC; and
(C) align themselves with the United States in
setting global rules, norms, and standards.
(4) The combined weight of the United States and its allies
and partners is strong enough to demonstrate to the PRC that
the risks of attempts to dominate other states outweigh the
potential benefits.
(5) The United States leads the free and open international
order, which is comprised of resilient states and institutions
that uphold and defend principles, including sovereignty, rule
of law, individual freedom, and human rights. The international
order is strengthened to defeat attempts at destabilization by
illiberal and authoritarian actors.
(6) The key rules, norms, and standards of international
engagement in the 21st century--
(A) protect human rights, commercial engagement and
investment, and technology; and
(B) are in alignment with the values and interests
of the United States, its allies and partners, and the
free world.
(7) The CCP cannot and does not--
(A) subvert open and democratic societies;
(B) distort global markets;
(C) manipulate the international trade system;
(D) coerce other nations via economic and military
means; or
(E) use its technological advantages to undermine
individual freedoms or other states' national security
interests.
(8) The United States deters military confrontation with
the PRC and both nations establish structured dialogue and
negotiation mechanisms to reduce the risk of conflict. The
United States has a mutually respectful relationship with the
PRC, and the American people maintain friendly relations with
the Chinese people.
(b) Policy.--It is the policy of the United States, in pursuit of
the objectives set forth in subsection (a)--
(1) to strengthen the United States domestic foundation by
reinvesting in market-based economic growth, education,
scientific and technological innovation, democratic
institutions, and other areas that improve the United States
ability to pursue its vital economic, foreign policy, and
national security interests;
(2) to pursue a strategy of managed strategic competition
with the PRC in the political, diplomatic, economic,
development, military, informational, and technological realms
that maximizes United States strengths and increases the costs
for the PRC of harming United States interests;
(3) to lead a free, open, and secure international system
characterized by respect for sovereignty, rule of law, open
markets and the free flow of commerce, and a shared commitment
to security and peaceful resolution of disputes, human rights,
and transparent and citizen-centric governance;
(4) to strengthen and deepen United States alliances and
partnerships, prioritizing the Indo-Pacific and Europe, by
pursuing greater bilateral and multilateral cooperative
initiatives that advance shared interests and bolster partner
countries' confidence that the United States is and will remain
a strong, committed, and constant partner;
(5) to encourage and aid United States allies and partners
in boosting their own capabilities and resiliency to pursue,
defend, and protect shared interests and values, free from
coercion and external pressure;
(6) to pursue fair, reciprocal treatment and healthy
competition in United States-China economic relations by--
(A) advancing policies that harden the United
States economy against unfair and illegal commercial or
trading practices and the coercion of United States
businesses; and
(B) tightening United States laws and regulations
as necessary to prevent the PRC's attempts to harm
United States economic competitiveness;
(7) to demonstrate the value of private sector-led growth
in emerging markets around the world, including through the use
of United States Government tools that--
(A) support greater private sector investment and
advance capacity-building initiatives that are grounded
in the rule of law;
(B) promote open markets;
(C) establish clear policy and regulatory
frameworks;
(D) improve the management of key economic sectors;
(E) reduce corruption; and
(F) foster collaboration with partner countries and
the United States private sector to develop secure and
sustainable infrastructure;
(8) to lead in the advancement of international rules and
norms that foster free and reciprocal trade and open and
integrated markets;
(9) to conduct vigorous commercial diplomacy in support of
United States companies and businesses in partner countries
that seek fair competition;
(10) to support greater private sector cooperation between
the United States and its partners;
(11) to ensure that the United States leads in the
innovation of critical and emerging technologies, such as next-
generation telecommunications, artificial intelligence, quantum
computing, semiconductors, and biotechnology, by--
(A) providing concrete incentives for the private
sector to accelerate development of such technologies;
(B) improving contracting processes to enable the
United States Government--
(i) to allocate capital and work with
start-up companies more efficiently; and
(ii) to increase investment in experimental
technologies;
(C) modernizing export controls and investment
restrictions to place a ``high fence around a small
yard'' of critical technologies;
(D) enhancing United States leadership in technical
standards-setting bodies and avenues for developing
norms regarding the use of emerging critical
technologies;
(E) reducing United States barriers and increasing
incentives for collaboration with allies and partners
on the research and codevelopment of critical
technologies;
(F) collaborating with allies and partners to
protect critical technologies by--
(i) crafting multilateral export control
measures;
(ii) building capacity for defense
technology security;
(iii) safeguarding chokepoints in the
supply chains; and
(iv) ensuring diversification; and
(G) designing major defense capabilities for export
to allies and partners;
(12) to enable the people of the United States, including
the private sector, civil society, universities and other
academic institutions, State and local legislators, and other
relevant actors to identify and remain vigilant to the risks
posed by undue influence of the CCP in the United States;
(13) to enact legislation, regulations, and other measures
to mitigate the risks referred to in paragraph (12), while
still preserving opportunities for economic engagement,
academic research, and cooperation in other areas where the
United States and the PRC share interests;
(14) to collaborate with advanced democracies and other
willing partners to promote ideals and principles that--
(A) advance a free and open order;
(B) strengthen democratic institutions;
(C) protect and promote human rights; and
(D) uphold a free press and fact-based reporting;
(15) to demonstrate effective leadership at the United
Nations, its associated agencies, and other multilateral
organizations and defend the integrity of these organizations
against co-optation by illiberal and authoritarian nations;
(16) to prioritize the defense of fundamental freedoms and
human rights in the United States relationship with the PRC;
(17) to cooperate with allies, partners, and multilateral
organizations to hold the Government of the PRC accountable
for--
(A) violations and abuses of human rights;
(B) restrictions on religious practices;
(C) abrogation of treaties and other international
agreements related to human rights; and
(D) other affronts to the freedom and individual
liberty of the citizens of the PRC;
(18) to expose the PRC's use of corruption, repression,
coercion, and other malign behavior to attain unfair economic
advantage and deference of other nations to its political and
strategic objectives;
(19) to maintain United States access to the Western
Pacific, including by--
(A) increasing the qualitative advantage of United
States forward-deployed forces in the Indo-Pacific
region;
(B) modernizing the United States military through
investments in existing and new major platforms,
emerging technologies, critical in-theater force
structure and enabling capabilities, operational
concepts, and access agreements; and
(C) operating and conducting exercises with allies
and partners--
(i) to prevent the PLA from gaining the
ability to project power and establish
contested zones within the First and Second
Island Chains;
(ii) to diminish the ability of the PLA to
coerce its neighbors; and
(iii) to maintain open sea and air lanes,
particularly in the Taiwan Strait, the East
China Sea, and the South China Sea;
(20) to deter the PRC from--
(A) coercing Indo-Pacific nations, including by
developing more combat-credible forces that are
integrated with allies and partners in contact, blunt,
and surge layers and able to defeat any PRC theory of
victory in the First or Second Island Chains of the
Western Pacific and beyond, as called for in the 2018
National Defense Strategy; or
(B) using gray-zone tactics below the level of
armed conflict and initiating armed conflict;
(21) to strengthen United States-PRC military-to-military
communication and improve de-escalation procedures to
deconflict operations and reduce the risk of unwanted conflict;
and
(22) to cooperate with the PRC if interests align, conduct
persistent and determined diplomacy that clarifies United
States interests and values to Chinese officials, and pursue
confidence-building measures in areas particularly susceptible
to escalation.
SEC. 103. SENSE OF CONGRESS.
It is the sense of Congress that the execution of the policy
described in section 102(b) requires the following actions:
(1) Managed strategic competition with the PRC will require
the United States--
(A) to marshal sustained political will to protect
its vital interests and advance its economic and
national security objectives for decades to come; and
(B) to achieve this sustained political will,
persuade the American people and United States allies
and partners of--
(i) the challenges posed by the PRC; and
(ii) the need for long-term competition to
defend shared interests and values.
(2) The United States must--
(A) coordinate closely with allies and partners to
compete effectively with the PRC;
(B) cooperate with the PRC where our interests
align; and
(C) pursue its interests, while still accounting
for partner country viewpoints on how to best approach
the challenges posed by the PRC.
(3) At the same time, other countries must step up to
assume greater roles in balancing and checking the aggressive
and assertive behavior of the PRC than the roles they have
assumed in the past.
(4) The President of the United States must lead and direct
the entire executive branch to make the People's Republic of
China the top priority in United States foreign policy. At
present, the United States identifies it as such in the
National Security Strategy and the National Defense Strategy,
but must further increase the prioritization of managed
strategic competition with the PRC and broader United States
interests in the Indo-Pacific region in the conduct of foreign
policy to implement the strategic imperatives outlined in those
documents.
(5) The President should appoint a senior official in the
Executive Office of the President with the authority and
resources to coordinate the United States strategy of managed
strategic competition with the PRC across the entire United
States Government.
(6) The head of every Federal department and agency should
designate a senior official at the level of Under Secretary or
above to coordinate the department's or agency's policies with
respect to managed strategic competition with the PRC.
(7) The ability of the United States to execute a strategy
of managed strategic competition with the PRC will be
undermined if our attention is repeatedly diverted to
challenges that are not vital to United States economic and
national security interests.
(8) In the coming decades, the United States must prevent
the PRC from--
(A) establishing regional hegemony in the Indo-
Pacific; and
(B) using that position to advance its assertive
political, economic, and foreign policy goals around
the world.
(9) The United States must ensure that the Federal budget
is properly aligned with the strategic imperative to compete
with the PRC by--
(A) authorizing sufficient levels of funding to
resource all instruments of United States national
power; and
(B) coherently prioritizing how such funds are
used.
(10) Sustained prioritization of the challenge posed by the
PRC requires--
(A) bipartisan cooperation within Congress; and
(B) frequent, sustained, and meaningful
collaboration and consultation between the executive
and legislative branches.
(11) The United States must ensure close integration among
economic and foreign policymakers, the private sector, civil
society, universities and academic institutions, and other
relevant actors in free and open societies affected by the
challenges posed by the PRC to enable such actors--
(A) to collaborate to advance common interests; and
(B) to identify appropriate policies--
(i) to strengthen the United States and its
allies;
(ii) to promote a compelling vision of a
free and open order; and
(iii) to push back against detrimental
policies pursued by the CCP.
(12) The United States must ensure that all Federal
departments and agencies are organized to reflect the fact that
competing with the PRC is the United States top foreign policy
priority, including through the assigned missions and location
of United States Government personnel, by--
(A) dedicating more personnel in the Indo-Pacific
region, at posts around the world, and in Washington
DC, with priorities directly relevant to advancing
competition with the People's Republic of China;
(B) placing greater numbers of foreign service
officers, international development professionals,
members of the foreign commercial service, intelligence
professionals, and other United States Government
personnel in the Indo-Pacific region; and
(C) ensuring that this workforce, both civilian and
military, has the training in language, technical
skills, and other competencies required to advance a
successful competitive strategy with the PRC.
(13) The United States must place renewed emphasis on
strengthening the nonmilitary instruments of national power,
including diplomacy, information, technology, economics,
foreign assistance and development finance, commerce,
intelligence, and law enforcement, which are crucial for
addressing the unique economic, political, and ideological
challenges posed by the PRC.
(14) The United States should create a Pacific Deterrence
Initiative, which shall be aligned with the overarching
political and diplomatic objectives articulated in the Asia
Reassurance Initiative Act (Public Law 115-409), and that
prioritizes the military investments necessary to achieve
United States political objectives in the Indo-Pacific,
including--
(A) promoting regional security in the Indo-
Pacific;
(B) reassuring allies and partners while protecting
them from coercion; and
(C) deterring conflict with the PRC.
(15) Competition with the PRC requires the United States
skillful adaptation to the information environment of the 21st
century. United States public diplomacy and messaging efforts
must effectively--
(A) promote the value of partnership with the
United States;
(B) highlight the risks and costs of enmeshment
with the PRC; and
(C) counter CCP propaganda and disinformation.
TITLE II--PROTECTING THE UNITED STATES FROM CHINA'S DISCRIMINATORY
ECONOMIC PRACTICES
SEC. 201. FINDINGS AND SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING THE PRC'S INDUSTRIAL
POLICY.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The People's Republic of China, at the direction of the
Chinese Communist Party, is advancing an ecosystem of
anticompetitive economic and industrial policies that--
(A) distort global markets;
(B) limit innovation;
(C) unfairly advantage PRC firms at the expense of
the United States and other foreign firms; and
(D) unfairly and harmfully prejudice consumer
choice.
(2) Of the extensive and systemic economic and industrial
policies pursued by the PRC, the mass subsidization of Chinese
firms, intellectual property theft, and forced technology
transfer are among the most damaging to the global economy.
(3) Through regulatory interventions and direct financial
subsidies, the CCP, for the purposes of advancing national
political and economic objectives, directs, coerces, and
influences in anti-competitive ways the commercial activities
of firms that are directed, financed, influenced, or otherwise
controlled by the state, including state-owned enterprises, and
ostensibly independent and private Chinese companies, such as
technology firms in strategic sectors.
(4) The PRC Government, at the national and subnational
levels, grants special privileges or status to certain PRC
firms in key sectors designated as strategic, such as
telecommunications, oil, power, aviation, banking, and
semiconductors. Enterprises receive special state preferences
in the form of favorable loans, tax exemptions, and
preferential land access from the CCP.
(5) The subsidization of PRC companies, as described in
paragraphs (3) and (4)--
(A) enables these companies to sell goods below
market prices, allowing them to outbid and crowd out
market-based competitors and thereby pursue global
dominance of key sectors;
(B) distorts the global market economy by
undermining longstanding and generally accepted market-
based principles of fair competition, leading to
barriers to entry and forced exit from the market for
foreign or private firms, not only in the PRC, but in
markets around the world;
(C) creates government-sponsored or supported de
facto monopolies, cartels, and other anti-market
arrangements in key sectors, limiting or removing
opportunities for other firms; and
(D) leads to, as a result of the issues described
in paragraphs (A) through (C), declines in profits and
revenue needed by foreign and private firms for
research and development.
(6) The CCP incentivizes and empowers Chinese actors to
steal critical technologies and trade secrets from private and
foreign competitors operating in the PRC and around the world,
particularly in areas that the CCP has identified as critical
to advancing PRC objectives. The PRC, as directed by the CCP,
also continues to implement anti-competitive regulations,
policies, and practices that coerce the handover of technology
and other propriety or sensitive data from foreign enterprises
to domestic firms in exchange for access to the PRC market.
(7) Companies in the United States and in foreign countries
compete with state-subsidized PRC companies that enjoy the
protection and power of the state in third-country markets
around the world. The advantages granted to PRC firms, combined
with significant restrictions to accessing the PRC market
itself, severely hamper the ability of United States and
foreign firms to compete, innovate, and pursue the provision of
best value to customers. The result is an unbalanced playing
field. Such an unsustainable course, if not checked, will over
time lead to depressed competition around the world, reduced
opportunity, and harm to both producers and consumers.
(8) As stated in the United States Trade Representative's
investigation of the PRC's trade practices under section 301 of
the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2411), conducted in March
2018, ``When U.S. companies are deprived of fair returns on
their investment in IP, they are unable to achieve the growth
necessary to reinvest in innovation. In this sense, China's
technology transfer regime directly burdens the innovation
ecosystem that is an engine of economic growth in the United
States and similarly-situated economies.''.
(9) In addition to forced technology described in this
subsection, the United States Trade Representative's
investigation of the PRC under section 301 of the Trade Act of
1974 (19 U.S.C. 2411) also identified requirements that foreign
firms license products at less than market value, government-
directed and government-subsidized acquisition of sensitive
technology for strategic purposes, and cyber theft as other key
PRC technology and industrial policies that are unreasonable
and discriminatory. These policies place at risk United States
intellectual property rights, innovation and technological
development, and jobs in dozens of industries.
(10) Other elements of the PRC's ecosystem of industrial
policies that harm innovation and distort global markets
include--
(A) advancement of policies that encourage local
production over imports;
(B) continuation of policies that favor unique
technical standards in use by Chinese firms rather than
globally accepted standards, which often force foreign
firms to alter their products and manufacturing chains
to compete;
(C) requirements that foreign companies disclose
proprietary information to qualify for the adoption of
their standards for use in the PRC domestic market; and
(D) maintenance of closed procurement processes,
which limit participation by foreign firms, including
by setting terms that require such firms to use
domestic suppliers, transfer know-how to firms in the
PRC, and disclose proprietary information.
(11) The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and associated
industry-specific efforts under this initiative, such as the
Digital Silk Road, are key vectors to advance the PRC's
mercantilist policies and practices globally. The resulting
challenges do not only affect United States firms. As the
European Chamber of Commerce reported in a January 2020 report,
the combination of concessional lending to Chinese state-owned
enterprises, nontransparent procurement and bidding processes,
closed digital standards, and other factors severely limit
European and other participation in BRI and make ``competition
[with Chinese companies] in third-country markets extremely
challenging''. This underscores a key objective of BRI, which
is to ensure the reliance of infrastructure, digital
technologies, and other important goods on PRC supply chains
and technical standards.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the challenges presented by a nonmarket economy like
the PRC's economy, which has captured such a large share of
global economic exchange, are in many ways unprecedented and
require sufficiently elevated and sustained long-term focus and
engagement;
(2) while the Economic and Trade Agreement Between the
Government of the United States and the Government of the
People's Republic of China, done at Washington January 15,
2020, makes initial progress in several areas, including
intellectual property and trade secret protection, significant
further steps are still required to address some of the more
difficult economic and industrial policies issues in the PRC,
which affect the United States and other nations;
(3) in order to truly address the most detrimental aspects
of CCP-directed mercantilist economic strategy, the United
States must adopt policies that--
(A) expose the full scope and scale of intellectual
property theft and mass subsidization of Chinese firms,
and the resulting harm to the United States, foreign
markets, and the global economy;
(B) ensure that PRC companies face costs and
consequences for anticompetitive behavior;
(C) provide options for affected United States
persons to address and respond to unreasonable and
discriminatory CCP-directed industrial policies; and
(D) strengthen the protection of critical
technology and sensitive data, while still fostering an
environment that provides incentives for innovation and
competition;
(4) the United States must work with its allies and
partners through the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD), the World Trade Organization, and other
venues and fora--
(A) to reinforce long-standing generally accepted
principles of fair competition and market behavior and
address the PRC's anticompetitive economic and
industrial policies that undermine decades of global
growth and innovation;
(B) to ensure that the PRC is not granted the same
treatment as that of a free-market economy until it
ceases the implementation of laws, regulations,
policies, and practices that provide unfair advantage
on PRC firms in furtherance of national objectives and
impose unreasonable, discriminatory, and illegal
burdens on market-based international commerce; and
(C) to align policies with respect to curbing
state-directed subsidization of the private sector,
such as advocating for global rules related to
transparency and adherence to notification
requirements, including through the efforts currently
being advanced by the United States, Japan, and the
European Union; and
(5) the United States and its allies and partners must
collaborate to provide incentives to their respective companies
to cooperate in areas such as--
(A) advocating for protection of intellectual
property rights in markets around the world;
(B) fostering open technical standards; and
(C) increasing joint investments in overseas
markets.
SEC. 202. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY VIOLATORS LIST.
(a) In General.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the
enactment of this Act, and not less frequently than annually
thereafter, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary
of Commerce, the United States Trade Representative, and the Director
of National Intelligence, shall create a list (referred to in this
section as the ``intellectual property violators list''), which
identifies all centrally administered, state-owned enterprises that
have benefitted from--
(1) a significant act or series of acts of intellectual
property theft that subjected a United States economic sector
or particular company incorporated in the United States to
harm; or
(2) an act or government policy of involuntary or coerced
technology transfer of intellectual property ultimately owned
by a company incorporated in the United States.
(b) Rules for Identification.--To determine whether there is a
credible basis for determining that a company should be included on the
intellectual property violators list, the Secretary of State, in
coordination with the Secretary of Commerce, the United States Trade
Representative, and the Director of National Intelligence, shall
consider--
(1) any finding by a United States court that the company
has violated relevant United States laws intended to protect
intellectual property rights;
(2) a decision by the President to impose sanctions
authorized under section 204(e); or
(3) substantial and credible information received from any
entity described in subsection (c) or other interested persons.
(c) Consultation.--In carrying out this section, the Secretary of
State, in coordination with the Secretary of Commerce, the United
States Trade Representative, and the Director of National Intelligence,
may consult, as necessary and appropriate, with--
(1) other Federal agencies, including independent agencies;
(2) the private sector; and
(3) civil society organizations with relevant expertise.
(d) Report.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary of State shall publish, in
the Federal Register, an annual report that--
(A) lists the companies engaged in the activities
described in subsection (a)(1); and
(B) describes the circumstances surrounding actions
described in subsection (a)(2), including any role of
the Government of the PRC; and
(C) assesses, to the extent practicable, the
economic advantage derived by the companies engaged in
the activities described in subsection (a)(1).
(2) Form.--The report published under paragraph (1) shall
be unclassified, but may include a classified annex.
(e) Declassification and Release.--The Director of National
Intelligence may authorize the declassification of information, as
appropriate, to inform the contents of the report published pursuant to
subsection (d).
(f) Requirement To Protect Business-Confidential Information.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary of State and the heads of
all other Federal agencies involved in the production of the
intellectual property violators list shall protect from
disclosure any proprietary information submitted by a private
sector participant and marked as business-confidential
information, unless the party submitting the confidential
business information--
(A) had notice, at the time of submission, that
such information would be released by the Secretary; or
(B) subsequently consents to the release of such
information.
(2) Nonconfidential version of report.--If confidential
business information is provided by a private sector
participant, a nonconfidential version of the report under
subsection (d) shall be published in the Federal Register that
summarizes or deletes, if necessary, the confidential business
information.
(3) Treatment as trade secrets.--Proprietary information
submitted by a private party under this section--
(A) shall be considered to be trade secrets and
commercial or financial information (as defined under
section 552(b)(4) of title 5, United States Code); and
(B) shall be exempt from disclosure without the
express approval of the private party.
SEC. 203. GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA SUBSIDIES LIST.
(a) Report.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment
of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State, in
coordination with the United States Trade Representative and the
Secretary of Commerce, shall publish an unclassified report in the
Federal Register that comprehensively identifies and measures--
(1) subsidies provided by the Government of the PRC to
enterprises in the PRC in contravention of agreed trade and
other rules; and
(2) discriminatory treatment favoring enterprises in the
PRC over foreign market participants.
(b) Subsidies Described.--In compiling the report under subsection
(a), the Secretary of State shall consider--
(1) regulatory and other policies enacted or promoted by
the Government of the PRC that--
(A) discriminate in favor of enterprises in the PRC
at the expense of foreign market participants;
(B) shield centrally administered, state-owned
enterprises from competition; or
(C) otherwise suppress market-based competition;
(2) financial subsidies, including favorable lending terms,
from or promoted by the Government of the PRC or centrally
administered, state-owned enterprises that materially benefit
PRC enterprises over foreign market participants in
contravention of generally accepted market principles; and
(3) any subsidy that violates the agreement referred to in
section 101(d)(12) of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (19
U.S.C. 3511(d)(12)) (commonly known as the World Trade
Organization's Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures).
(c) Consultation.--The Secretary of State, in coordination with the
Secretary of Commerce and the United States Trade Representative, may,
as necessary and appropriate, consult with--
(1) other Federal agencies, including independent agencies;
(2) the private sector; and
(3) civil society organizations with relevant expertise.
SEC. 204. REVIEW OF PETITIONS RELATED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY THEFT
AND FORCED TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate;
(B) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs of the Senate;
(C) the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation of the Senate;
(D) the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate;
(E) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House
of Representatives;
(F) the Committee on Financial Services of the
House of Representatives;
(G) the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the
House of Representatives; and
(H) the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of
Representatives.
(2) Committee.--The term ``Committee'' means the committee
established or designated under subsection (b).
(3) Foreign person.--The term ``foreign person'' means a
person that is not a United States person.
(4) Intellectual property.--The term ``intellectual
property'' means--
(A) any work protected by a copyright under title
17, United States Code;
(B) any property protected by a patent granted by
the United States Patent and Trademark Office under
title 35, United States Code;
(C) any word, name, symbol, or device, or any
combination thereof, that is registered as a trademark
with the United States Patent and Trademark Office
under the Act entitled ``An Act to provide for the
registration and protection of trademarks used in
commerce, to carry out the provisions of certain
international conventions, and for other purposes'',
approved July 5, 1946 (commonly known as the ``Lanham
Act'' or the ``Trademark Act of 1946'') (15 U.S.C. 1051
et seq.);
(D) a trade secret (as defined in section 1839 of
title 18, United States Code); or
(E) any other form of intellectual property.
(5) United states person.--The term ``United States
person'' means--
(A) a United States citizen or an alien lawfully
admitted for permanent residence to the United States;
or
(B) an entity organized under the laws of the
United States or any jurisdiction within the United
States, including a foreign branch of such an entity.
(b) Establishment of a Committee.--
(1) In general.--The President shall--
(A) establish a multi-agency committee to carry out
this section; or
(B) designate an existing multi-agency committee
within the executive branch to carry out this section
if the President determines that the existing committee
has the relevant expertise and personnel to carry out
this section.
(2) Membership.--The Committee shall be comprised of the
following officials (or, subject to paragraph (3), a designee
of any such official):
(A) The Secretary of the Treasury.
(B) The Secretary of Commerce.
(C) The Secretary of State.
(D) The Attorney General.
(E) The Director of National Intelligence.
(F) The heads of such other agencies as the
President determines appropriate, generally or on a
case-by-case basis.
(3) Designee.--An official specified in paragraph (2) may
select a designee to serve on the Committee from among
individuals serving in positions appointed by the President by
and with the advice and consent of the Senate.
(4) Chair and vice chair.--The President shall appoint a
chairperson and a vice chairperson of the Committee from among
the members of the Committee.
(c) Submission of Petitions.--
(1) In general.--A United States person described in
paragraph (3) may submit a petition to the Committee requesting
that the Committee--
(A) review, under subsection (d), a significant act
or series of acts described in paragraph (2) committed
by a foreign person; and
(B) refer the matter to the President with a
recommendation to impose sanctions under subsection (e)
to address any threat to the national security of the
United States posed by the significant act or series of
acts.
(2) Significant act or series of acts described.--A
significant act or series of acts described in this paragraph
is a significant act or series of acts of--
(A) theft of intellectual property of a United
States person; or
(B) forced transfer of technology that is the
intellectual property of a United States person.
(3) United states person described.--A United States person
is described in this paragraph if--
(A) a court of competent jurisdiction in the United
States has rendered a final judgment in favor of the
United States person that--
(i) the foreign person identified in the
petition submitted under paragraph (1)
committed the significant act or series of acts
identified in the petition;
(ii) the United States person is the owner
of the intellectual property identified in the
petition; and
(iii) the foreign person is using that
intellectual property without the permission of
the United States person; and
(B) the United States person can provide clear and
convincing evidence to the Committee that the value of
the economic loss to the United States person resulting
from the significant act or series of acts exceeds
$10,000,000.
(d) Review and Action by the Committee.--
(1) Review.--Upon receiving a petition under subsection
(c), the Committee shall conduct a review of the petition in
order to determine whether the imposition of sanctions under
subsection (e) is necessary and appropriate to address any
threat to the national security of the United States posed by
the significant act or series of acts identified in the
petition.
(2) Action.--After conducting a review under paragraph (1)
of a petition submitted under subsection (c), the Committee may
take no action, dismiss the petition, or refer the petition to
the President with a recommendation with respect to whether to
impose sanctions under subsection (e).
(e) Imposition of Sanctions.--
(1) In general.--The President may impose the sanctions
described in paragraph (3) with respect to a foreign person
identified in a petition submitted under subsection (c) if the
President determines that imposing such sanctions is necessary
and appropriate to address any threat to the national security
of the United States posed by the significant act or series of
acts identified in the petition.
(2) Notice to congress.--Not later than 30 days after the
Committee refers a petition to the President with a
recommendation under subsection (d)(2), the President shall
submit to the appropriate congressional committees a notice of
the determination of the President under paragraph (1) with
respect to whether or not to impose sanctions described in
paragraph (3) with respect to each foreign person identified in
the petition. Each notice required under this paragraph shall
be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified
annex.
(3) Sanctions described.--The sanctions that may be imposed
under paragraph (1) with respect to a foreign person identified
in a petition submitted under subsection (c) are the following:
(A) Export sanction.--The President may order the
United States Government not to issue any specific
license and not to grant any other specific permission
or authority to export any goods or technology to the
person under--
(i) the Export Control Reform Act of 2018
(50 U.S.C. 4801 et seq.);
(ii) the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C.
2751 et seq.);
(iii) the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42
U.S.C. 2011 et seq.); or
(iv) any other statute that requires the
prior review and approval of the United States
Government as a condition for the export or
reexport of goods or services.
(B) Loans from united states financial
institutions.--The President may prohibit any United
States financial institution from making loans or
providing credits to the person totaling more than
$10,000,000 in any 12-month period unless the person is
engaged in activities to relieve human suffering and
the loans or credits are provided for such activities.
(C) Loans from international financial
institutions.--The President may direct the United
States executive director to each international
financial institution to use the voice and vote of the
United States to oppose any loan from the international
financial institution that would benefit the person.
(D) Prohibitions on financial institutions.--The
following prohibitions may be imposed against the
person if the person is a financial institution:
(i) Prohibition on designation as primary
dealer.--Neither the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System nor the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York may designate, or permit the
continuation of any prior designation of, the
financial institution as a primary dealer in
United States Government debt instruments.
(ii) Prohibition on service as a repository
of government funds.--The financial institution
may not serve as agent of the United States
Government or serve as repository for United
States Government funds.
(E) Procurement sanction.--The President may
prohibit the United States Government from procuring,
or entering into any contract for the procurement of,
any goods or services from the person.
(F) Foreign exchange.--The President may, pursuant
to such regulations as the President may prescribe,
prohibit any transactions in foreign exchange that are
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and in
which the person has any interest.
(G) Banking transactions.--The President may,
pursuant to such regulations as the President may
prescribe, prohibit any transfers of credit or payments
between financial institutions or by, through, or to
any financial institution, to the extent that such
transfers or payments are subject to the jurisdiction
of the United States and involve any interest of the
person.
(H) Property transactions.--The President may,
pursuant to such regulations as the President may
prescribe, prohibit any person from--
(i) acquiring, holding, withholding, using,
transferring, withdrawing, transporting,
importing, or exporting any property that is
subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States and with respect to which the person
identified in the petition has any interest;
(ii) dealing in or exercising any right,
power, or privilege with respect to such
property; or
(iii) conducting any transaction involving
such property.
(I) Ban on investment in equity or debt of
sanctioned person.--The President may, pursuant to such
regulations or guidelines as the President may
prescribe, prohibit any United States person from
investing in or purchasing significant amounts of
equity or debt instruments of the person.
(J) Exclusion of corporate officers.--The President
may direct the Secretary of State to deny a visa to,
and the Secretary of Homeland Security to exclude from
the United States, any alien that the President
determines is a corporate officer or principal of, or a
shareholder with a controlling interest in, the person.
(K) Sanctions on principal executive officers.--The
President may impose on the principal executive officer
or officers of the person, or on individuals performing
similar functions and with similar authorities as such
officer or officers, any of the sanctions described in
this paragraph.
(f) Implementation; Penalties.--
(1) Implementation.--The President may exercise all
authorities provided to the President under sections 203 and
205 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50
U.S.C. 1702 and 1704) to carry out this section.
(2) Penalties.--A person that violates, attempts to
violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of this
section or any regulation, license, or order issued to carry
out this section shall be subject to the penalties set forth in
subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) to the same
extent as a person that commits an unlawful act described in
subsection (a) of that section.
(g) Confidentiality of Information.--
(1) In general.--The Committee shall protect from
disclosure any proprietary information submitted by a United
States person and marked as business confidential information,
unless the person submitting the information--
(A) had notice, at the time of submission, that the
information would be released by the Committee; or
(B) subsequently consents to the release of the
information.
(2) Treatment as trade secrets.--Proprietary information
submitted by a United States person under this section shall
be--
(A) considered to be trade secrets and commercial
or financial information (as defined under section
552(b)(4) of title 5, United States Code);
(B) exempt from disclosure without the express
approval of the person.
(h) Rulemaking.--The President may prescribe such licenses, orders,
and regulations as are necessary to carry out this section, including
with respect to the process by which United States persons may submit
petitions under subsection (c).
SEC. 205. PREDATORY PRICING BY ENTITIES OWNED, CONTROLLED, OR DIRECTED
BY A FOREIGN STATE.
(a) Prohibited Acts.--
(1) In general.--It is contrary to public policy, illegal,
and void for a combination, conspiracy, trust, agreement, or
contract executed by an entity owned, controlled, or directed
by a foreign state or an agent or instrumentality of a foreign
state (as defined in section 1603 of title 28, United States
Code) and participating in international commerce to engage in
acts to establish or set prices below the average variable cost
in a manner that may foreseeably eliminate market competitors.
(2) Economic support.--In determining the average variable
cost under paragraph (1), the court may take into account the
effects of economic support provided by the owning or
controlling foreign state to the entity on a discriminatory
basis that may allow the entity to unfairly price at or below
marginal cost.
(3) Government subsidies.--In determining the
foreseeability of the elimination of market competitors under
paragraph (1), the court may take into account the aggravating
factor of the actions of the foreign state owning or
controlling the entity referred to in such paragraph to use
government resources to subsidize or underwrite the losses of
the entity in a manner that allows the entity to sustain the
predatory period and recoup its losses.
(b) Recovery of Damages by Claimant for Violations of This
Section.--Any person (as defined in section 1(a) of the Clayton Act (15
U.S.C. 12) whose business or property is injured as a result of the
actions of an entity described in subsection (a) shall be entitled to
recovery from the defendant for damages and other related costs under
section 4 of such Act (15 U.S.C. 15).
(c) Elements of Prima Facie Case.--A plaintiff may initiate a claim
against a defendant in an appropriate Federal court for a violation of
subsection (a) in order to recover damages under subsection (b) by--
(1) establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
the defendant--
(A) is a foreign state or an agency or
instrumentality of a foreign state (as defined in
section 1603 of title 28, United States Code); and
(B) is not immune from the jurisdiction of the
Federal court pursuant to section 1605(a)(2) of title
28, United States Code; and
(2) setting forth sufficient evidence to establish a
reasonable inference that the defendant has violated subsection
(a).
(d) Court Determination Leading to Evidentiary Burden Shifting to
Defendant.--If a Federal court finds that a plaintiff has met its
burden of proof under subsection (c), the court may determine that--
(1) the plaintiff has established a prima facie case that
the conduct of the defendant is in violation of subsection (a);
and
(2) the defendant has the burden of rebutting such case by
establishing that the defendant is not in violation of
subsection (a).
(e) Filing of Amicus Briefs by the Department of State Regarding
International Comity.--
(1) In general.--For the purposes of considering questions
of international comity with respect to making decisions
regarding commercial activity and the scope of applicable
sovereign immunity, the Federal court may receive and consider
relevant amicus briefs filed by the Secretary of State.
(2) Savings provision.--Nothing in paragraph (1) may be
construed to limit the ability of the Federal court to receive
and consider any other amicus briefs.
SEC. 206. REPORTING ON REQUESTS TO COMPLY WITH THE CORPORATE SOCIAL
CREDIT SYSTEM IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.
(a) Defined Term.--In this section, the term ``corporate social
credit system,'' as established by the ``Planning Outline for the
Construction of a Social Credit System'' released by the State Council
of the Government of the People's Republic of China in 2014, means a
nationwide network of systems operated by private and state actors,
that--
(1) use existing financial credit systems, public records,
online activity, government licenses and registrations, and
other information to collect, aggregate, and integrate data
regarding corporate entities that come within the jurisdiction
of the PRC, including United States companies operating in the
PRC;
(2) use the data referred to in paragraph (1)--
(A) to monitor a corporate entity's activities; and
(B) to evaluate and rate certain financial, social,
religious, or political behaviors of the entity and its
key personnel;
(3) rates such corporate entities according to their
trustworthiness (as defined by the CCP and the Government of
the PRC); and
(4) implements punishments and rewards based on such
ratings that have a direct bearing on a corporate entity's
activities within the PRC.
(b) Reporting Requirement.--The President, acting through the
Secretary of Commerce, and in consultation with the Secretary of State
and any other individuals the President determines should be consulted,
shall issue regulations requiring United States entities with at least
$100,000,000 of assets or other investment in the PRC to submit a
semiannual report regarding the impact of the corporate social credit
system on the ability of such United States companies to conduct
business or otherwise operate in the PRC.
(c) Matters To Be Included.--The regulations issued pursuant to
subsection (b) shall require each entity described in such subsection
to report information regarding--
(1) the positive and negative impacts of the corporate
social credit system on the ability of the entity to conduct
business in the PRC;
(2) major disruptions to the business operations of the
entity that are directly linked to the corporate social credit
system, including in hiring, making contracts, implementing
partnerships with other entities, and other appropriate
matters;
(3) whether the entity has been placed on or removed from a
blacklist, untrustworthy entities list, priority key watchlist,
or a redlist within the corporate social credit system;
(4) whether the Government of the PRC took any actions
directed at the entity as a result of a list described in
paragraph (3), including any specific punishments or rewards;
(5) any instances in which an agent of the Government of
the PRC has asked for the resignation of key leadership within
the company due to their individual social credit scores;
(6) any instances in which an entity within the Government
of PRC at the national, local, or municipal level informed the
entity that it will face a negative impact on its rating within
the corporate social credit system unless the entity takes a
certain course of action or refrains from taking a certain
course of action;
(7) any instances in which the entity was asked by an agent
of the Government of the PRC to take an action to accommodate a
political position of the CCP or the Government of the PRC for
the purposes of complying with the corporate social credit
system; and
(8) any instances in which the entity was required to
provide sensitive proprietary business information to comply
with the corporate social credit system.
(d) Consultation With the Private Sector.--In developing the
regulations required under subsection (b), the Secretary of Commerce,
in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall consult with United
States entities with significant business operations in the PRC.
(e) Willful Failure To Report.--Not later than 180 days after the
issuance of regulations pursuant to subsection (b), any United States
entity required to report under such subsection who knowingly and
willfully fails to make such report may, in addition to other penalties
provided by law, be fined not more than $25,000.
SEC. 207. ANNUAL REVIEW ON THE PRESENCE OF CHINESE COMPANIES IN UNITED
STATES CAPITAL MARKETS.
(a) Appropriate Congressional Committees.--In this section, the
term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
(2) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate;
(3) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of
the Senate;
(4) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives;
(5) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the
House of Representatives; and
(6) the Committee on Financial Services of the House of
Representatives.
(b) Report.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for the
following 5 years, the Secretary of State, in consultation with
the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of the
Treasury, shall submit an unclassified report to the
appropriate congressional committees that describes the risks
posed to the United States by the presence in United States
capital markets of companies incorporated in the PRC.
(2) Matters to be included.--The report required under
paragraph (1) shall--
(A) identify companies incorporated in the PRC
that--
(i) are listed or traded on one or several
stock exchanges within the United States,
including over-the-counter market and ``A
Shares'' added to indexes and exchange-traded
funds out of mainland exchanges in the PRC; and
(ii) based on the factors for consideration
described in paragraph (3), have knowingly and
materially contributed to--
(I) activities that undermine
United States national security;
(II) serious abuses of
internationally recognized human
rights; or
(III) a substantially increased
financial risk exposure for United
States-based investors;
(B) describe the activities of the companies
identified pursuant to subparagraph (A), and their
implications for the United States; and
(C) develop policy recommendations for the United
States Government, State governments, United States
financial institutions, United States equity and debt
exchanges, and other relevant stakeholders to address
the risks posed by the presence in United States
capital markets of the companies identified pursuant to
subparagraph (A).
(3) Factors for consideration.--In completing the report
under paragraph (1), the President shall consider whether a
company identified pursuant to paragraph (2)(A)--
(A) has materially contributed to the development
or manufacture, or sold or facilitated procurement by
the PLA, of lethal military equipment or component
parts of such equipment;
(B) has contributed to the construction and
militarization of features in the South China Sea;
(C) has been sanctioned by the United States or has
been determined to have conducted business with
sanctioned entities;
(D) has engaged in an act or a series of acts of
intellectual property theft;
(E) has engaged in corporate or economic espionage;
(F) has contributed to the proliferation of nuclear
or missile technology in violation of United Nations
Security Council resolutions or United States
sanctions;
(G) has contributed to the repression of religious
and ethnic minorities within the PRC, including in
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region or Tibet Autonomous
Region;
(H) has contributed to the development of
technologies that enable censorship directed or
directly supported by the Government of the PRC;
(I) has failed to comply fully with Federal
securities laws (including required audits by the
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board) and
``material risk'' disclosure requirements of the
Securities and Exchange Commission; or
(J) has contributed to other activities or behavior
determined to be relevant by the President.
(c) Report Form.--The report required under subsection (b)(1) shall
be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
(d) Publication.--The unclassified portion of the report under
subsection (b)(1) shall be made accessible to the public online through
relevant United States Government websites.
TITLE III--REINVESTING IN AMERICAN AND ALLIED TECHNOLOGICAL
COMPETITIVENESS
SEC. 301. REGULATORY EXCHANGES WITH ALLIES AND PARTNERS.
(a) In General.--The Secretary of State, in coordination with the
heads of other participating executive branch agencies, shall establish
and develop a program to facilitate and encourage regular dialogues
between United States Government regulatory and technical agencies and
their counterpart organizations in allied and partner countries, both
bilaterally and in relevant multilateral institutions and
organizations--
(1) to promote best practices in regulatory formation and
implementation;
(2) to collaborate to achieve optimal regulatory outcomes
based on scientific, technical, and other relevant principles;
(3) to seek better harmonization and alignment of
regulations and regulatory practices;
(4) to build consensus around industry and technical
standards in emerging sectors that will drive future global
economic growth and commerce; and
(5) to promote United States standards regarding
environmental, labor, and other relevant protections in
regulatory formation and implementation, in keeping with the
values of free and open societies, including the rule of law.
(b) Prioritization of Activities.--In facilitating expert exchanges
under subsection (a), the Secretary shall prioritize--
(1) bilateral coordination and collaboration with countries
where greater regulatory coherence, harmonization of standards,
or communication and dialogue between technical agencies is
achievable and best advances the economic and national security
interests of the United States;
(2) multilateral coordination and coordination where
greater regulatory coherence, harmonization of standards, or
dialogue on other relevant regulatory matters is achievable and
best advances the economic and national security interests of
the United States, including with--
(A) the European Union;
(B) the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation;
(C) the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN);
(D) the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD); and
(E) multilateral development banks; and
(3) regulatory practices and standards setting bodies
focused on key economic sectors and emerging technologies.
(c) Participation by Nongovernmental Entities.--With regard to the
program described in subsection (a), the Secretary may facilitate,
including through the use of amounts appropriated pursuant to
subsection (e), the participation of private sector representatives and
other relevant organizations and individuals with relevant expertise,
as appropriate and to the extent that such participation advances the
goals of such program.
(d) Delegation of Authority by the Secretary.--The Secretary of
State is authorized to delegate the responsibilities described in this
section to the Under Secretary of State for Economic Growth, Energy,
and the Environment.
(e) Authorization of Appropriations.--
(1) In general.--There is authorized to be appropriated
$2,500,000 for each of the fiscal years 2021 through 2025 to
carry out this section.
(2) Use of funds.--The Secretary may obligate amounts
appropriated pursuant to paragraph (1) in a manner that--
(A) facilities participation by representatives
from technical agencies within the United States
Government and their counterparts; and
(B) complies with applicable procedural
requirements under the State Department Basic
Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2651a et seq.) and
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et
seq.).
(f) Agreements.--
(1) Submission.--The text of any agreement concluded under
the authorities provided under this section shall be submitted
to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the
Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives
not later than 60 days after any notice of intent to be
formally bound by the terms of such agreement.
(2) Effective date.--Each agreement described in paragraph
(1) shall be legally effective and binding upon the United
States, in accordance with the terms provided in the agreement,
beginning on--
(A) the date on which appropriate implementing
legislation is enacted into law, which shall provide
for the approval of the specific agreement or
agreements, including attachments, annexes, and
supporting documentation; or
(B) if the agreement is concluded and submitted as
a treaty, the date on which such treaty is ratified by
the Senate.
SEC. 302. AUTHORIZATION TO ASSIST UNITED STATES COMPANIES WITH SUPPLY
CHAIN DIVERSIFICATION AND MANAGEMENT.
(a) Authorization To Contract Services.--The Secretary of State, in
coordination with the Secretary of Commerce, is authorized to establish
a program to facilitate the contracting by United States embassies for
the professional services of qualified experts, on a reimbursable fee
for service basis, to assist interested United States persons and
business entities with supply chain management issues related to the
PRC, including--
(1) exiting from the PRC market or relocating certain
production facilities to locations outside the PRC;
(2) diversifying sources of inputs, and other efforts to
diversify supply chains to locations outside of the PRC;
(3) navigating legal, regulatory, or other challenges in
the course of the activities described in paragraphs (1) and
(2); and
(4) identifying alternative markets for production or
sourcing outside of the PRC, including through providing market
intelligence, facilitating contact with reliable local partners
as appropriate, and other services.
(b) Chief of Mission Oversight.--The persons hired to perform the
services described in subsection (a) shall--
(1) be under the authority of the United States Chief of
Mission in the country in which they are hired, in accordance
with existing United States laws;
(2) coordinate with Department of State and Department of
Commerce officers; and
(3) coordinate with United States missions and relevant
local partners in other countries as needed to carry out the
services described in subsection (a).
(c) Prioritization of Micro-, Small-, and Medium-Sized
Enterprises.--The services described in subsection (a) shall be
prioritized to assisting micro-, small-, and medium-sized enterprises.
(d) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be
appropriated $15,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2021 through 2025
for the purposes of carrying out this section.
SEC. 303. SCIENTIFIC AND PRIVATE SECTOR ADVISORY PANEL ON PROTECTION OF
CRITICAL TECHNOLOGIES.
(a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the President shall establish an advisory panel
comprised of representatives of the United States private sector, and
other members of the scientific and technology community--
(1) to advise the President on regulatory and policy
matters related to critical infrastructure and critical
technologies (as such terms are defined in paragraphs (5) and
(6) of section 721(a) of the Defense Production Act of 1950 (50
U.S.C. 4565(a)); and
(2) to ensure regular consultation and engagement by the
Federal Government with the United States private sector and
scientific and technology community with respect to the matters
described in paragraph (1).
(b) Duties.--In addition to other topics considered relevant by the
President, the National Security Advisor, the Director of the National
Economic Council, or the advisory panel established pursuant to
subsection (a), the advisory panel shall provide information, analysis,
and recommendations to the President, including--
(1) assessing key developments in the economic and
industrial sectors relevant to critical technologies and
critical infrastructure;
(2) safeguarding critical technologies and critical
infrastructure, including the Federal Government's role and the
role of the United States private sector;
(3) developing regulations and policies to contribute to
and sustain the United States technology base;
(4) developing partnerships with United States allies and
partners in scientific and technological development, including
changes to existing regulations and policies to better
facilitate the development of such partnerships;
(5) providing assessments of the impact on the United
States private sector and United States economic
competitiveness of current and planned regulations and policies
related to critical technologies and critical infrastructure;
(6) engaging in consistent consultations with the United
States private sector during regulatory and policy formation;
and
(7) making available to the United States private sector an
accurate understanding of new regulations and policies.
(c) Membership.--Members of the advisory panel--
(1) shall be appointed by the President, based on
recommendations of the National Security Advisor, the Director
of the National Economic Council, and the heads of executive
agencies designated by the President;
(2) shall be broadly representative of the key industries
and sectors relevant to the duties and functions of the panel;
(3) shall consist of not more than 10 private sector
corporate members or executives of industry and trade
associations representing critical technology sectors; and
(4) shall consist of not more than 10 members with
distinguished backgrounds in relevant scientific and
technological fields or with substantial expertise in the
direct management and oversight of United States critical
infrastructure, including at least 2 members from the National
Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine.
(d) Participation by Executive Agencies.--The President shall
direct--
(1) the Council of Economic Advisors and the Office of
Science and Technology Policy to appoint personnel to
participate in the activities of the advisory panel; and
(2) the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Commerce, the
Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Homeland Security,
the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy, and the head
of any other relevant Federal agency to provide personnel to
participate in the task force.
(e) Designated Federal Officer.--The President shall appoint a
full-time or permanent part-time Federal officer or employee to manage
the activities of the advisory panel.
(f) Authorities.--The advisory panel shall be governed by the
Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.).
SEC. 304. ESTABLISHMENT OF A TECH COALITION.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the United States and its allies and partners should
collaborate to advance and encourage the use of international
technical standards for new and emerging technologies;
(2) widespread acceptance of international standards--
(A) improves the quality of technologies;
(B) reduces barriers to market access for
technology companies; and
(C) ensures the global interoperability of products
and services;
(3) the United States and its allies and partners should
lead in defining and upholding norms for the responsible and
ethical development and use of new and emerging technologies,
including--
(A) cybersecurity technologies;
(B) artificial intelligence;
(C) next-generation telecommunications;
(D) semiconductors;
(E) quantum computing;
(F) biotechnology;
(G) the internet; and
(H) the Internet of Things;
(4) the United States should collaborate with allies and
partners to ``work internationally to promote an open,
interoperable, secure, and reliable information and
communications infrastructure that supports international trade
and commerce, strengthens international security, and fosters
free expression and innovation in which norms of responsible
behavior guide states' actions, sustain partnerships, and
support the rule of law in cyberspace,'' as stated in the
United States International Strategy for Cyberspace, which was
issued in May 2011;
(5) as stated in the National Cyber Strategy of the United
States of America, issued in September 2018, ``[i]nternational
law and voluntary non-binding norms of responsible state
behavior in cyberspace provide stabilizing, security-enhancing
standards that define acceptable behavior to all states and
promote greater predictability and stability in cyberspace. . .
. Increased public affirmation by the United States and other
governments will lead to accepted expectations of state
behavior and thus contribute to greater predictability and
stability in cyberspace.'';
(6) the United States and its allies and partners--
(A) should be at the forefront of--
(i) promoting and sustaining a multi-
stakeholder model for internet governance; and
(ii) defining standards and norms in the
use of emerging technologies;
(B) should develop norms for the responsible and
ethical development and use of technology, in
consultation with the private sectors, academic
institutions, international organizations, and other
relevant experts; and
(C) must collaborate to advance appropriate
confidence-building measures between states regarding
the development of new and emerging technologies, which
will create a framework for cooperation and promote
greater stability in cyberspace;
(7) the private sector must continue to play the leading
role in--
(A) developing and deploying new and emerging
technologies;
(B) advancing international technical standards in
appropriate standards-setting institutions; and
(C) sharing responsibility for implementing norms
and standards;
(8) the United States should ensure a coordinated approach
across the entire Federal Government for advocating for
international standards and norms relevant to new and emerging
technologies;
(9) the United States Government should review how it can
best support private sector-led initiatives to set new
international standards and norms; and
(10) the establishment of a technology coalition between
the United States and interested, like-minded partners is
necessary to uphold existing, and to establish new, standards
and norms that will sustain an open internet, safeguard free
and open societies, and set the standards for new and emerging
technologies.
(b) Appropriate Congressional Committees.--In this section, the
term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and
(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives.
(c) Tech Coalition.--The President should seek to establish a
coalition of countries that are committed to--
(1) the safe and responsible development and use of new and
emerging technologies and the establishment of related norms
and standards;
(2) a secure internet architecture governed by a multi-
stakeholder model instead of centralized government control;
(3) robust international cooperation to promote an open
internet and interoperable technological products and services
that are necessary to freedom, innovation, transparency, and
privacy; and
(4) multilateral coordination, including through diplomatic
initiatives, information sharing, and other activities, to
defend the principles described in paragraphs (1) through (3)
against efforts by state and non-state actors to undermine
them.
(d) Functions.--The President, acting through the Secretary of
State, should undertake regular efforts to coordinate with other
members of the coalition established pursuant to subsection (c)--
(1) to establish and advocate for norms, standards, and
regulations to ensure that the development and application of
new and emerging technologies uphold the goals of shared
prosperity, security, and commitment to human rights, including
through engagement in international organizations and
standards-setting bodies, such as--
(A) the International Organization for
Standardization;
(B) the Internet Engineering Task Force;
(C) the Internet Electrotechnical Commission;
(D) the United Nations International
Telecommunication Union;
(E) the United Nations Internet Governance Forum;
(F) the United Nations Group of Governmental
Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and
Telecommunications in the Context of International
Security (UN CGE);
(G) the United Nations Open-Ended Working Group on
Developments in the Field of Information and
Telecommunications in the Context of International
Security;
(H) the United Nations Commission on Science and
Technology for Development (CSTD);
(I) the Directorate for Science, Technology and
Innovation of the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development; and
(J) other international standards organizations and
multilateral norm-setting bodies, as appropriate;
(2) to support and expand adherence to international
treaties and frameworks governing responsible behavior in
cyberspace and the use of new and emerging technologies,
including--
(A) the Council of Europe's Convention on
Cybercrime, done at Budapest November 23, 2001;
(B) the Organization for Security and Co-operation
in Europe Decision 1202 on Confidence-Building Measures
to Reduce the Risks of Conflict Stemming from the Use
of Information and Communication Technologies, decided
in Vienna March 10, 2016;
(C) the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Cyber
Defense Pledge, done in Warsaw July 8, 2016;
(D) the G7 Declaration of Responsible States
Behavior in Cyberspace, done in Lucca, Italy, April 11,
2017;
(E) the Prague Proposals, done in Prague May 3,
2019; and
(F) other relevant international frameworks, as
appropriate;
(3) to support and expand adherence to international
frameworks governing responsible regulation of new and emerging
technologies to support international trade and economic
development, including through World Trade Organization
agreements, such as--
(A) the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade,
done at Geneva April 12, 1979;
(B) the General Agreement on Trade in Services
(entered in force January 1, 1995); and
(C) agreements by the United Nations Working Group
on Electronic Commerce;
(4) to coordinate export control policies, including
through the Wassenaar Arrangement On Export Controls for
Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, done at
The Hague December 1995, supply chain security, and investment
in or licensing of critical infrastructure and dual-use
technologies;
(5) to coordinate basic and pre-competitive research and
development initiatives and to pool resources and talent to
pursue opportunities in artificial intelligence,
semiconductors, quantum computing, and other industries;
(6) to coordinate, as appropriate, dialogues and other
initiatives between United States domestic regulatory agencies,
States, local governments, private sector entities, and
nongovernmental organizations, with their counterpart
organizations in other countries that are members of the
coalition established pursuant to subsection (c), on best
practices in developing and upholding standards and norms for
emerging technologies, including through the program
established under section 301; and
(7) to deter state and non-state actors from engaging in
malicious and illegal activities in cyberspace and from using
new and emerging technologies in violation of the norms and
standards described in this subsection.
(e) Briefing.--The Secretary of State, or the Secretary's designee,
shall semiannually brief the appropriate congressional committees
regarding the activities described in subsection (d). Such briefings
shall include representatives from other Federal agencies who
participate in such activities, as appropriate.
(f) Agreements.--
(1) Submission.--The text of any agreement concluded under
the authorities provided under this section shall be submitted
to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the
Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives
not later than 60 days after any notice of intent to be
formally bound by the terms of such agreement.
(2) Effective date.--Each agreement described in paragraph
(1) shall be legally effective and binding upon the United
States, in accordance with the terms provided in the agreement,
beginning on--
(A) the date on which appropriate implementing
legislation is enacted into law, which shall provide
for the approval of the specific agreement or
agreements, including attachments, annexes, and
supporting documentation; or
(B) if the agreement is concluded and submitted as
a treaty, the date on which such treaty is ratified by
the Senate.
SEC. 305. UNITED STATES REPRESENTATION IN STANDARDS-SETTING BODIES.
(a) Short Title.--This section may be cited as the ``Promoting
United States International Leadership in 5G Act of 2020''.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the United States and its allies and partners should
maintain participation and leadership at international
standards-setting bodies for 5th and future generation mobile
telecommunications systems and infrastructure;
(2) the United States should work with its allies and
partners to encourage and facilitate the development of secure
supply chains and networks for 5th and future generation mobile
telecommunications systems and infrastructure; and
(3) the maintenance of a high standard of security in
telecommunications and cyberspace between the United States and
its allies and partners is a national security interest of the
United States.
(c) Enhancing Representation and Leadership of United States at
International Standards-Setting Bodies.--
(1) In general.--The President shall--
(A) establish an interagency working group to
provide assistance and technical expertise to enhance
the representation and leadership of the United States
at international bodies that set standards for
equipment, systems, software, and virtually defined
networks that support 5th and future generation mobile
telecommunications systems and infrastructure, such as
the International Telecommunication Union and the 3rd
Generation Partnership Project; and
(B) work with allies, partners, and the private
sector to increase productive engagement.
(2) Interagency working group.--The interagency working
group described in paragraph (1)--
(A) shall be chaired by the Secretary of State or a
designee of the Secretary of State; and
(B) shall consist of the head (or designee) of each
Federal department or agency the President determines
appropriate.
(3) Briefing.--
(A) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, and subsequently
thereafter as provided in subparagraph (A), the
interagency working group described in paragraph (1)
shall provide a briefing to the Committee on Foreign
Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign
Affairs of the House of Representatives that includes--
(i) a strategy to promote United States
leadership at international standards-setting
bodies for equipment, systems, software, and
virtually defined networks relevant to 5th and
future generation mobile telecommunications
systems and infrastructure, taking into account
the different processes followed by the various
international standard-setting bodies;
(ii) a strategy for diplomatic engagement
with allies and partners to share security risk
information and findings pertaining to
equipment that supports or is used in 5th and
future generation mobile telecommunications
systems and infrastructure and cooperation on
mitigating such risks;
(iii) a discussion of China's presence and
activities at international standards-setting
bodies relevant to 5th and future generation
mobile telecommunications systems and
infrastructure, including information on the
differences in the scope and scale of China's
engagement at such bodies compared to
engagement by the United States or its allies
and partners and the security risks raised by
Chinese proposals in such standards-setting
bodies; and
(iv) a strategy for engagement with private
sector communications and information service
providers, equipment developers, academia,
federally funded research and development
centers, and other private-sector stakeholders
to propose and develop secure standards for
equipment, systems, software, and virtually
defined networks that support 5th and future
generation mobile telecommunications systems
and infrastructure.
(B) Subsequent briefings.--Upon receiving a request
from the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate
and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives, or as determined appropriate by the
chair of the interagency working group established
pursuant to paragraph (1), the interagency working
group shall provide the requesting committee an updated
briefing that covers the matters described in clauses
(i) through (iv) of subparagraph (A).
TITLE IV--SAFEGUARDING AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS
SEC. 401. AMENDMENTS TO HIGHER EDUCATION ACT OF 1965.
(a) Prompt Disclosures; Designated Point of Contact Responsible for
Reporting Qualifying Gifts to a University; Compliance Plans.--Section
117 of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1011f) is amended--
(1) in subsection (a)--
(A) by striking ``or enters into a contract with''
and inserting ``, or enters into a contract, agreement,
affiliation, or similar transaction (not including
tuition payments) conferring value upon the recipient
institution with,''; and
(B) by striking ``January 31 or July 31, whichever
is sooner'' and inserting ``not later than 90 days
after the receipt of such gift or the execution of such
contract, agreement, affiliation, or transaction'';
(2) by redesignating subsections (g) and (h) as subsections
(i) and (j), respectively and
(3) by inserting after subsection (f) the following:
``(g) Chief Compliance Officer.--Each institution subject to the
provisions of this title that receives a gift from, or enters into a
contract, agreement, affiliation, or similar transaction (not including
tuition payments) with, a foreign source conferring value equal to not
less than $250,000 during a calendar year upon the recipient
institution, shall designate a chief compliance officer, who--
``(1) shall be a current employee or legally authorized
agent of such institution; and
``(2) shall be directly responsible, on behalf of the
institution, for full and timely compliance with the foreign
gift reporting requirements under this section.
``(h) Reporting of Foreign Gift Disclosure Compliance Plans to the
Department of Education.--
``(1) In general.--Any institution that received any gift
from, or entered into any contract, agreement, affiliation, or
similar transaction (excluding tuition payments) with, a
foreign source, as described in subsection (a), during the 15-
year period ending on the date of the enactment of the
Strengthening Trade, Regional Alliances, Technology, and
Economic and Geopolitical Initiatives concerning China Act,
shall, not later than 120 days after such date of enactment,
submit to the Secretary of Education a comprehensive plan of
compliance for the reporting of foreign source contracts,
agreements, affiliations, or similar transactions in accordance
with this section.
``(2) Changes to compliance plan.--Not later than 90 days
after an institution makes any change to a compliance plan
described in paragraph (1) or designates a new chief compliance
officer pursuant to subsection (g), the institution shall
notify the Secretary of Education of such change or
designation.''.
(b) Require All Institutions Reporting Foreign Gifts To Establish
Public Notification of Receipt of Certain Foreign Gifts.--Section
117(c) of such Act (22 U.S.C. 1011f(c)) is amended--
(1) in the matter preceding paragraph (1)--
(A) by striking ``or contract'' and inserting ``,
or enters into a contract, agreement, affiliation, or
similar transaction (not including tuition payments)
conferring value upon the institution''; and
(B) by striking ``disclose the following:'' and
inserting an em dash;
(2) in paragraph (1)--
(A) by striking ``For'' and inserting ``disclose,
for'';
(B) by inserting ``, agreements, affiliations, or
similar transactions (not including tuition payments)''
after ``contracts''; and
(C) by striking the period at the end and inserting
a semicolon;
(3) in paragraph (2)--
(A) by striking ``For'' and inserting ``disclose,
for'';
(B) by inserting ``, agreements, affiliations, or
similar transactions (not including tuition payments)''
after ``contracts''; and
(C) by striking the period at the end and inserting
``; and''; and
(4) by adding at the end the following:
``(3) publish the name of the institution, along with a
summary of the terms and conditions associated with such gift,
contract, agreement, affiliation or similar transaction, on a
publicly available internet website.''.
(c) Gifts, Contracts, Agreements, Affiliations, or Similar
Transactions That Violate Public Policy.--Section 117(f) of such Act
(22 U.S.C. 1011f(f)) is amended by adding at the end the following:
``(3) Assessment and recommendation regarding foreign
source gift, contract, agreement, affiliation, or similar
transaction.--The Secretary of Education and the Secretary of
State may submit a joint recommendation to the President
regarding a foreign source gift to, or a contract, agreement,
affiliation or similar transaction with, an institution after
considering--
``(A) whether such gift, contract, agreement,
affiliation, or similar transaction contains conditions
or places restrictions upon the recipient that
constrain free speech in a manner inconsistent with
United States law;
``(B) whether such gift, contract, agreement,
affiliation, or similar transaction requires the
recipient comply with the laws and regulations of a
foreign jurisdiction in a manner inconsistent with
United States law;
``(C) whether the institution failed to disclose
the gift, contract, agreement, affiliation, or similar
transaction in accordance with subsection (a); and
``(D) any other factors that the President, with
the advice of the Secretary of Education and the
Secretary of State, determines to be appropriate to
upholding academic integrity or national security.
``(4) Presidential authority.--The President, after
considering an assessment and recommendation received under
paragraph (3), may determine that the receipt by an institution
from a foreign source of a gift, or the entering into a
contract, agreement, affiliation, or similar transaction (not
including tuition payments) with a foreign source undermines
national security or academic freedom.
``(5) Impact on federal funding.--If the President
determines, after considering a recommendation under paragraph
(3), that a gift, contract, agreement, affiliation, or similar
transaction undermines national security or academic freedom,
the President may direct the reduction or suspension of Federal
funding until the recipient institution--
``(A) returns the gift to the foreign source; or
``(B) cancels the offending contract, agreement,
affiliation, or similar transaction.''.
SEC. 402. AMENDMENT TO FOREIGN AGENT REGISTRATION ACT REGARDING GIFTS
MADE TO UNIVERSITIES.
Section 3(e) of the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938 (22
U.S.C. 613(e)) is amended--
(1) by striking ``Any person'' and inserting the following:
``(1) In general.--Any person''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following:
``(2) Waiver of exemption recommendation.--The Secretary of
Education, the Secretary of State, and the Attorney General may
jointly submit a recommendation to the President to waive the
exception under this subsection for an institution of higher
education (as defined in section 101 of the Higher Education
Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1001)) that has accepted a gift from, or
has entered into a contract, agreement, affiliation, or similar
transaction (not including tuition payments) with, a foreign
government that requires a disclosure under section 117 of such
Act (20 U.S.C. 1011f).
``(3) Presidential determination.--The President, after
consideration of a joint recommendation submitted pursuant to
paragraph (2), may determine that a foreign source gift,
contract, agreement or similar transaction required to be
disclosed under section 117 of the Higher Education Act of 1965
(20 U.S.C. 1011f) that has been accepted by an institution of
higher education has created a relationship of foreign agency
with a foreign source that requires registration of the
appropriate representatives of the institution as a foreign
agent or agents under section 2(a).''.
SEC. 403. DESIGNATION OF A COUNTRY OF NATIONAL SECURITY CONCERN IN THE
FOREIGN AGENT REGISTRATION ACT.
(a) In General.--Section 3 of the Foreign Agents Registration Act
of 1938 (22 U.S.C. 613) is amended by adding at the end the following:
``(i) Countries of National Security Concern.--The President may
issue a finding that a country constitutes a significant threat to the
national security of the United States and should be designated a
`country of national security concern' after--
``(1) considering a joint recommendation submitted pursuant
to section 403(c) of the Strengthening Trade, Regional
Alliances, Technology, and Economic and Geopolitical
Initiatives concerning China Act;
``(2) consulting with the Committee on Foreign Relations of
the Senate, the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate, the
Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives,
and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of
Representatives; and
``(3) providing a written detailed justification for such
designation to the appropriate congressional committees.''.
(b) Waiver of Exemptions.--
(1) In general.--Upon designating a country as a ``country
of national security concern'' under section 3(i) of the
Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as added by subsection
(a), the President may waive any of the exemptions for agents
of foreign principals set forth in subsections (d), (e), and
(h) of section 3 of such Act (22 U.S.C. 613) for up to 1 year.
(2) Renewals.--The President may renew waivers under this
subsection for additional 1-year periods, in accordance with
paragraph (1), while the country in question continues to
present a threat to the national security of the United States.
(3) Rule of construction.--For purposes of this section, a
waiver under paragraph (1) shall not apply to bona fide
religious pursuits referred to in section 3(e) of the Foreign
Agents Registration Act of 1938 (22 U.S.C. 613(e)).
(c) Recommendation.--The Secretary of State, in coordination with
the Attorney General, may jointly submit a recommendation to the
President that a country constitutes a significant national security
threat to the United States of such nature that one or more of the
exemptions set forth in subsections (d), (e), and (h), of section 3 of
the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938 (22 U.S.C. 613) should be
waived for up to 1 year.
(d) Termination by the President.--The President may suspend or
terminate the designation of a country as a country of national
security concern under section 3(i) of such Act, as added by subsection
(a), and any associated reporting requirements, if the President
determines such country no longer presents a threat to the national
security of the United States.
(e) Additional Disclosure Measures.--The Attorney General, in
coordination with the Secretary of State, may establish enhanced
reporting requirements under the Foreign Agents Registration Act of
1938 (22 U.S.C. 611 et seq.) for agents representing foreign principals
of a designated ``country of national security concern'' under section
613(i) of such Act, as added by subsection (a), including enhanced
transparency and reporting requirements, as appropriate.
SEC. 404. BAN ON SENATE-CONFIRMED DEPARTMENT OF STATE OFFICIALS
REPRESENTING COUNTRIES OF NATIONAL SECURITY CONCERN.
(a) Defined Term.--Section 1 of the Foreign Agents Registration Act
of 1938 (22 U.S.C. 611) is amended by inserting after subsection (i)
the following:
``(j) The term `country of national security concern' means a
country designated under section 3(i).''.
(b) Representation After Service.--Section 207(f) of title 18,
United States Code, is amended--
(1) by redesignating paragraph (3) as paragraph (4); and
(2) by inserting after paragraph (2) the following:
``(3) Special rule for senior officials of the department
of state.--With respect to a person serving as a senior
official at the Department of State who was appointed by the
President and confirmed by the Senate, the restrictions
described in paragraph (1) shall apply to representing the
government of a country of national security concern (as
defined in section 1(j) of the Foreign Agents Registration Act
of 1938 (22 U.S.C. 611(j))) at any time--
``(A) after the termination of such service; and
``(B) during the period that such country is
designated a country of national security concern.''.
(c) Limitation on Appointment as a Senate-Confirmed Department of
State Official.--Section 841 of the State Department Basic Authorities
Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2651a) is amended by adding at the end the
following:
``(h) Limitation on Appointments.--A person who has directly
represented the government of a country of national security concern
(as defined in section 1(j) of the Foreign Agents Registration Act of
1938 (22 U.S.C. 611(j))) may not be appointed by the President to serve
in a position within the Department of State that requires Senate
confirmation.''.
SEC. 405. AMENDMENT TO THE MUTUAL EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL EXCHANGE
ACT.
The Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C.
2451 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 108A the following:
``SEC. 108B. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS WITH RESPECT TO PARTICIPATION BY
FEDERAL EMPLOYEES IN CULTURAL EXCHANGE PROGRAMS INVOLVING
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.
``(a) In General.--In applying section 108A of the Mutual
Educational and Cultural Exchange Act (22 U.S.C. 2458a) with respect to
any cultural exchange program that involves the Government of the
People's Republic of China, the Secretary of State shall require a
report to be submitted to the Department of State, not later than
January 31, 2021, and annually thereafter through 2026, by--
``(1) any element within the Government of the People's
Republic of China that has an agreement currently in force with
the Department of State pursuant to section 108A; and
``(2) any United States entity that carries out a program
pursuant to an agreement described in paragraph (1).
``(b) Matters To Be Included.--Each report submitted under
subsection (a) shall include, for the relevant reporting period--
``(1) the total number of cultural exchange programs
conducted by the reporting entity;
``(2) a description of each program referred to in
paragraph (1), including--
``(A) the purpose of each such program; and
``(B) an agenda or itinerary that describes the
activities engaged in by program participants; and
``(3) a list of participants in each such program,
including the names and professional affiliation of the
participants during such program.
``(c) Failure To Report by the Government of the People's Republic
of China.--If any entity described in subsection (a)(1) fails to submit
the report required under subsection (a), the Secretary of State shall
suspend the agreement between the entity and the Department of State
until the entity within the Government of the People's Republic of
China has submitted such report.
``(d) Failure To Report by a United States Entity.--Any United
States entity described in subsection (a)(2) that fails to submit the
report required under subsection (a) shall be ineligible to receive any
funds, in the form of grants or otherwise, from the Department of State
until such entity has submitted such report.
``(e) Rulemaking.--The Secretary of State shall promulgate
regulations to carry out this section.
``(f) Summary Report.--
``(1) Submission to congress.--Not later than July 30,
2021, and annually thereafter through 2026, the Secretary of
State shall submit a summary of the reports received from the
entities described in subsection (a) to the appropriate
congressional committees.
``(2) Matters to be included.--The summary required under
paragraph (1) shall include, for the reporting period--
``(A) the total number of cultural exchange
programs conducted;
``(B) the total number of participants in such
cultural exchange programs;
``(C) a list of the professional affiliations of
such participants;
``(D) an overview of the cultural exchange
programs, including illustrative examples of activities
in which participants engaged;
``(E) an assessment of whether the cultural
programs conducted during the reporting period adhere
to purposes set forth in section 101, including a
description of any noticeable deviations from such
purposes; and
``(F) a description of all actions by the
Department of State to remediate deviations from such
purposes.
``(3) Form of report.--The summary required under paragraph
(1) shall be submitted in unclassified form.''.
TITLE V--MAINTAINING THE INTEGRITY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
SEC. 501. OFFICE OF INTEGRITY IN THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM.
(a) Establishment.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary of State shall establish,
within the Bureau of International Organization Affairs of the
Department of State, the Office of Integrity in the United
Nations System (referred to in this section as the ``UN
Integrity Office'').
(2) Office leadership.--
(A) Head of office.--The Secretary of State shall
appoint a career member of the Senior Foreign Service
to head the UN Integrity Office.
(B) Special envoy.--The Secretary of State may
appoint a Special Envoy for Integrity in the United
Nations System.
(b) Purpose of Office.--The UN Integrity Office shall assume the
primary responsibility for--
(1) promoting United States participation in the United
Nations System;
(2) ensuring that United Nations employees uphold the
principals of impartiality enshrined in the United Nations
charter, rules, and regulations;
(3) monitoring and countering undue influence, especially
by authoritarian nations, within the United Nations System;
(4) promoting participation and inclusion of Taiwan in the
United Nations System; and
(5) advancing other priorities deemed relevant by the
Secretary of State to ensuring the integrity of the United
Nations System.
(c) Authorization of Appropriations.--Of the amounts authorized to
be appropriated to the Department of State for administration of
foreign affairs, not less than $1,000,000 is authorized to be
appropriated for fiscal year 2021 and for each subsequent fiscal year
for the UN Integrity Office.
TITLE VI--BOLSTERING UNITED STATES AND ALLIED DEFENSE AND SECURITY
SEC. 601. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The People's Republic of China aims to use its growing
military might in concert with other instruments of its
national power to displace the United States in the Indo-
Pacific and establish hegemony over the region.
(2) The military balance in the Indo-Pacific region is
increasingly unfavorable to the United States because--
(A) the PRC is rapidly modernizing and expanding
the capabilities of the PLA to project power and create
contested areas across the entire Indo-Pacific region;
(B) PLA modernization has largely focused on areas
where it possesses operational advantages and can
exploit weaknesses in the United States suite of
capabilities; and
(C) current United States force structure and
presence do not sufficiently counter threats in the
Indo-Pacific, as United States allies, bases, and
forces at sea in the Indo-Pacific region are
concentrated in large, close-in bases that are highly
vulnerable to the PRC's strike capabilities.
(3) This shift in the regional military balance and erosion
of conventional deterrence in the Indo-Pacific region--
(A) presents a substantial and imminent risk to the
security of the United States; and
(B) left unchecked, could embolden the PRC to take
actions to change the status quo before the United
States can mount an effective response.
(4) The PRC believes the political bonds between the United
States and its Indo-Pacific allies are weakening. The PRC sees
an opportunity to diminish confidence among United States
allies and partners in the strength of United States
commitments, even to the extent that these nations feel
compelled to bandwagon with the PRC to protect their interests.
The PRC is closely monitoring the United States reaction to PRC
pressure and coercion of United States allies, searching for
indicators of United States resolve.
(5) Achieving so-called ``reunification'' of Taiwan to
mainland China is a key step for the PRC to achieve its
regional hegemonic ambitions. The PRC has increased the
frequency and scope of its exercises and operations targeting
Taiwan, such as amphibious assault and live-fire exercises in
the Taiwan Strait, PLA Air Force flights that encircle Taiwan,
and flights across the unofficial median line in the Taiwan
Strait. The Government of the PRC's full submission of Hong
Kong potentially accelerates the timeline of a Taiwan scenario,
and makes the defense of Taiwan an even more urgent priority.
(6) The defense of Taiwan is critical to--
(A) retaining the United States credibility as a
defender of the democratic values and free-market
principles embodied by Taiwan's people and government;
(B) limiting the PLA's ability to project power
beyond the First Island Chain, including to United
States territory, such as Guam and Hawaii;
(C) defending the territorial integrity of Japan;
and
(D) preventing the PLA from diverting military
planning, resources, and personnel to broader military
ambitions.
(7) The PRC has capitalized on the world's attention to
COVID-19 to advance its military objectives in the South China
Sea, intensifying and accelerating trends already underway. The
PRC has sent militarized survey vessels into the Malaysian
Exclusive Economic Zone, announced the establishment of an
administrative district in the Spratly and Paracel Islands
under the Chinese local government of Sansha, aimed a fire
control radar at a Philippine navy ship, encroached on
Indonesia's fishing grounds, sunk a Vietnamese fishing boat,
announced new ``research stations'' on Fiery Cross Reef and
Subi Reef, and landed special military aircraft on Fiery Cross
Reef to routinize such deployments.
(8) On July 13, 2020, Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo
clarified United States policy on the South China Sea and
stated, ``Beijing's claims to offshore resources across most of
the South China Sea are completely unlawful, as is its campaign
of bullying to control them.''.
(9) These actions enable the PLA to exert influence and
project power deeper into Oceania and the Indian Ocean. As
Admiral Phil Davidson, Commander of Indo-Pacific Command,
testified in 2019, ``In short, China is now capable of
controlling the South China Sea in all scenarios short of war
with the United States.''.
(10) The PLA also continues to advance its claims in the
East China Sea, including through a high number of surface
combatant patrols and frequent entry into the territorial
waters of the Senkaku Islands, over which the United States
recognizes Japan's administrative control. In April 2014,
President Barack Obama stated, ``Our commitment to Japan's
security is absolute and article five [of the U.S.-Japan
security treaty] covers all territory under Japan's
administration, including the Senkaku islands.''.
(11) On March 1, 2019, Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo
stated, ``As the South China Sea is part of the Pacific, any
armed attack on Philippine forces, aircraft, or public vessels
in the South China Sea will trigger mutual defense obligations
under Article 4 of our Mutual Defense Treaty.''.
(12) The PLA is modernizing and gaining critical capability
in every branch and every domain, including--
(A) positioning the PLA Navy to become a great
maritime power or ``blue-water'' navy that can
completely control all activity within the First Island
Chain and project power beyond it with a massive fleet
of 425 battle force ships by 2030;
(B) increasing the size and range of its strike
capabilities, including approximately 1,900 ground-
launched short- and intermediate-range missiles capable
of targeting United States allies and partners in the
First and Second Island chains, United States bases in
the Indo-Pacific, and United States forces at sea;
(C) boosting capabilities for air warfare,
including with Russian-origin Su-35 fighters and S-400
air defense systems, new J-20 5th generation stealth
fighters, and Y-20 heavy lift aircraft; and
(D) making critical investments in new domains of
warfare, such as cyber warfare, electronic warfare, and
space warfare.
(13) The PRC is pursuing this modernization through all
means at its disposal, including its Military-Civil Fusion
initiative, which, as United States Assistant Secretary of
State Christopher Ford said in March 2020, ``aims to make any
technology accessible to anyone under the PRC's jurisdiction
available to support the Chinese Communist Party's
ambitions.''. It enlists the whole of PRC society in developing
and acquiring technology with military applications to pursue
technological advantage over the United States in artificial
intelligence, hypersonic glide vehicles, directed energy
weapons, electromagnetic railguns, counter-space weapons, and
other emerging capabilities.
(14) The United States lead in the development of science
and technology relevant to defense is eroding in the face of
competition from the PRC. United States research and
development spending on defense capabilities has declined
sharply as a share of global research and development. The
commercial sector's leading role in innovation presents certain
unique challenges to the Department of Defense's reliance on
technology for battlefield advantage.
(15) The PRC has vastly increased domestic research and
development expenditures, supported the growth of new cutting-
edge industries and tapped into a large workforce to invest in
fostering science and engineering talent.
(16) The PRC is increasing exports of defense and security
capabilities to build its defense technology and industrial
base and improve its own military capabilities. For example,
the PRC has enjoyed particular success in exporting numerous
unmanned aerial systems (UAS). Such exports have helped it
establish new defense relationships, test its systems under
operational conditions, and refine its designs for its own
forces. The PRC has exploited an available gap in the global
market, as the PRC does not subject itself to the limitations
of the Missile Technology Control Regime, which is a voluntary
protocol under which the United States and other members
restrict their own UAS exports. PLA military analyst Song
Zhongping has noted that ``the Chinese [defense] product now
doesn't lack technology, it only lacks market share, and the
United States restricting its arms exports is precisely what
gives China a great opportunity.''.
SEC. 602. STATEMENT OF POLICY EXPRESSING THE POLITICAL WILL OF THE
UNITED STATES TO DEFEND ITS INTERESTS IN THE INDO-PACIFIC
AND PURSUE EXPANDED POLITICAL-MILITARY COOPERATION WITH
ALLIES AND PARTNERS.
It is the policy of the United States--
(1) to prioritize the Indo-Pacific region as the most
important political-military theater for United States foreign
policy;
(2) to prioritize resources for achieving United States
political and military objectives in this most critical region,
while still balancing resources for other lower-priority
security challenges across the globe;
(3) to reaffirm and strengthen United States commitments to
treaty allies in the Indo-Pacific region, as articulated by
successive United States administrations and in the Asia
Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018 (Public Law 115-409; 132
Stat. 5387), including--
(A) with respect to Japan--
(i) upholding the Treaty of Mutual
Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the
United States of America, done at Washington
January 19, 1960, and all related and
subsequent security agreements;
(ii) recognizing Japan's administrative
control over the Senkaku Islands and maritime
exclusive economic zones in the East China Sea;
and
(iii) further advancing defense cooperation
in priority areas, such as long-range precision
fires, missile defense, maritime security,
space, cyberspace, and the electromagnetic
spectrum;
(B) with respect to the Republic of Korea--
(i) upholding the Mutual Defense Treaty
Between the United States and the Republic of
Korea, done at Washington October 1, 1953, and
all related and subsequent security agreements;
and
(ii) strengthening alliance defense and
deterrence capabilities;
(C) with respect to Australia and New Zealand--
(i) upholding the Security Treaty Between
the United States, Australia, and New Zealand,
done at San Francisco September 1, 1951, and
all related and subsequent security agreements;
(ii) increasing collaboration to address
shared security challenges; and
(iii) providing mutual support in the face
of coercion;
(D) with respect to the Philippines--
(i) upholding the Mutual Defense Treaty
Between the United States and the Republic of
the Philippines, done at Washington August 30,
1951, including commitments relevant to the
South China Sea, and all related and subsequent
security arrangements; and
(ii) cooperating with the Philippines to
build and maintain defense capabilities,
particularly in the maritime domain, that
enable the Philippines to protect its
sovereignty and resist external coercion; and
(E) with respect to Thailand--
(i) upholding the security treaties and all
related and subsequent security arrangements
that underpin the United States-Thailand
alliance; and
(ii) reinvigorating defense cooperation and
partnership through exercises, training, and
interoperability that enable it to protect its
sovereignty and resist external coercion;
(4) to collaborate with United States treaty allies in the
Indo-Pacific to foster greater multilateral security and
defense cooperation with other regional partners;
(5) to sustain the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96-8;
22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.) and the ``Six Assurances'' provided by
the United States to Taiwan in July 1982 as the foundations for
United States-Taiwan relations, and to deepen, to the fullest
extent possible, the extensive, close, and friendly relations
of the United States and Taiwan, including cooperation to
support the development of capable, ready, and modern forces
necessary for the defense of Taiwan;
(6) to enhance security partnerships with India, across
Southeast Asia, and with other nations of the Indo-Pacific,
including as described in sections 204, 205, and 208 of the
Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018 (Public Law 115-409);
(7) to deter, in the shorter term, the PRC from
capitalizing on the world's focus on the COVID-19 pandemic to
advance its military objectives in the Western Pacific,
including deterring more aggressive behavior towards Taiwan and
in the South China Sea;
(8) to deter, over the longer term, acts of aggression or
coercion by the PRC against United States and allies' interests
along the First Island Chain and in the Western Pacific by
showing PRC leaders that the United States can and is willing
to deny them the ability to achieve their objectives, including
by--
(A) consistently demonstrating the political will
of the United States to deepening existing treaty
alliances and growing new partnerships as a durable,
asymmetric, and unmatched strategic advantage to the
PRC's growing military capabilities and reach;
(B) maintaining a system of forward-deployed bases
in the Indo-Pacific region as the most visible sign of
United States resolve and commitment to the region, and
as platforms to ensure United States operational
readiness and advance interoperability with allies and
partners;
(C) adopting a more dispersed force posture
throughout the region, particularly the Western
Pacific, and pursuing maximum access for United States
mobile and relocatable launchers for long-range cruise,
ballistic, and hypersonic weapons throughout the Indo-
Pacific region;
(D) fielding long-range, precision-strike networks
to United States and allied forces, including ground-
launched cruise missiles, undersea and naval
capabilities, and integrated air and missile defense in
the First Island Chain and the Second Island Chain, in
order to impose high risks on the PRC for operating in
these zones, and maximize the United States ability to
operate;
(E) strengthening extended deterrence to
demonstrate that escalation against key United States
interests would be costly, risky, and self-defeating;
and
(F) collaborating with allies and partners to
accelerate their roles in more equitably sharing the
burdens of mutual defense, including through the
acquisition and fielding of advanced capabilities and
training that will better enable them to repel PRC
aggression or coercion; and
(9) to convey to the PRC that, in the event that deterrence
by denial fails, the United States, if necessary--
(A) will impose prohibitive diplomatic, economic,
financial, reputational, and military costs on the PRC
for its aggression; and
(B) will defend itself and its allies regardless of
the point of origin of attacks against them.
SEC. 603. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING BOLSTERING SECURITY PARTNERSHIPS
IN THE INDO-PACIFIC.
It is the Sense of Congress that steps to bolster United States
security partnership in the Indo-Pacific must include--
(1) supporting Japan in its development of long-range
precision fires, air and missile defense capacity,
interoperability across all domains, maritime security, and
intelligence, and surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities;
(2) launching a United States-Japan national security
innovation fund to solicit and support private sector
cooperation for new technologies that could benefit the United
States and Japan's mutual security objectives;
(3) promoting a deeper defense relationship between Japan
and Australia, including supporting reciprocal access
agreements and trilateral United States-Japan-Australia
intelligence sharing;
(4) encouraging and facilitating Taiwan's accelerated
acquisition of asymmetric defense capabilities, which are
crucial to defending the islands of Taiwan from invasion,
including long-range precision fires, anti-ship missiles,
coastal defense, anti-armor, air defense, undersea warfare,
advanced command, control, communications, computers,
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR), and
resilient command and control capabilities, and increasing the
conduct of relevant and practical training and exercises with
Taiwan's defense forces; and
(5) prioritizing building the capacity of United States
allies and partners to protect defense technology.
SEC. 604. REPORT ON CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT OF INDO-PACIFIC ALLIES AND
PARTNERS.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the Secretary of State should expand and strengthen
existing measures under the United States Conventional Arms
Transfer Policy to provide capabilities to allies and partners,
prioritizing allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region in
accordance with United States strategic imperatives;
(2) the United States should design for export to Indo-
Pacific allies and partners capabilities critical to
maintaining a favorable military balance in the region,
including long-range precision fires, air and missile defense
systems, anti-ship cruise missiles, land attack cruise
missiles, conventional hypersonic systems, intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities, and command and
control systems;
(3) the United States should pursue, to the maximum extent
possible, anticipatory technology security and foreign
disclosure policy on the systems described in paragraph (2);
and
(4) the Secretary of State should--
(A) urge allies and partners to invest in
sufficient quantities of munitions to meet contingency
requirements and avoid the need for accessing United
States stocks in wartime; and
(B) cooperate with allies to deliver such
munitions, or when necessary, to increase allies'
capacity to produce such munitions.
(b) Defined Term.--In this section, the term ``appropriate
congressional committees'' means--
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
(2) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate;
(3) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives; and
(4) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of
Representatives.
(c) Report.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in
coordination with the Secretary of Defense, shall submit a
report to the appropriate congressional committees that--
(A) describes United States priorities for building
more capable security partners in the Indo-Pacific
region; and
(B) identifies legal, regulatory, or other
obstacles to advancing such priorities.
(2) Matters to be included.--The report required under
paragraph (1) shall--
(A) provide a priority list of defense and military
capabilities that Indo-Pacific allies and partners must
possess for the United States to be able to achieve its
military objectives in the Indo-Pacific region;
(B) identify, from the list referred to in
subparagraph (A), the capabilities that are best
provided, or can only be provided, by the United
States;
(C) identify--
(i) actions required to prioritize United
States Government resources and personnel to
expedite fielding the capabilities identified
in subparagraph (B); and
(ii) steps needed to fully account for and
a plan to integrate all means of United States
foreign military sales, direct commercial
sales, security assistance, and all applicable
authorities of the Department of State and the
Department of Defense;
(D) assess the requirements for United States
security assistance, including International Military
Education and Training, in the Indo-Pacific region, as
a part of the means to deliver critical partner
capability requirements identified in subparagraph (B);
(E) assess the resources necessary to meet the
requirements for United States security assistance, and
identify resource gaps;
(F) assess the major obstacles to fulfilling
requirements for United States security assistance in
the Indo-Pacific region, including resources and
personnel limits, legislative and policy barriers, and
factors related to specific partner countries;
(G) identify limitations on the United States
ability to provide such capabilities, including those
identified under subparagraph (B), because of existing
United States treaty obligations, or United States law,
policies, or other regulations;
(H) recommend changes to existing laws,
regulations, or other policies that would reduce or
eliminate limitations on providing critical
capabilities to allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific
region;
(I) identify requirements to streamline the
International Trafficking in Arms Regulations (22
C.F.R. 120 et seq.) that would enable more effective
delivery of capabilities to allies and partners in the
Indo-Pacific region;
(J) recommend improvements to the process for
developing requirements for partners capabilities; and
(K) recommend other legal, regulatory, or policy
changes that would improve delivery timelines.
(3) Form.--The report required under this subsection shall
be unclassified, but may include a classified annex.
SEC. 605. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS AND THE
MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME.
It is the policy of the United States--
(1) to maintain its commitment to nonproliferation through
voluntary adherence to the Missile Technology Control Regime
(referred to in this section as ``MTCR'');
(2) to exercise its sovereign right within that regime to
define unmanned aerial systems (referred to in this section as
``UAS'') as aircraft rather than as cruise missiles;
(3) to consider UAS as not subject to MTCR guidelines,
annexes, or any other United States policy subject to the MTCR;
(4) to ensure that exports of military UAS remain subject
to the same export considerations as military aircraft; and
(5) to ensure that military UAS share the same co-
development, co-production, and any other privilege or
consideration afforded to military aircraft for the purposes of
direct commercial sale or foreign military sale.
SEC. 606. REPORT ON NATIONAL TECHNOLOGY AND INDUSTRIAL BASE.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the Sense of Congress that--
(1) a more streamlined, shared, and coordinated approach,
which leverages economies of scale with major allies, is
necessary for the United States to retain its lead in defense
technology;
(2) allowing for the export, re-export, or transfer of
defense-related technologies and services to members of the
national technology and industrial base (as defined in section
2500 of title 10, United States Code) would advance United
States security interests by helping to leverage the defense-
related technologies and skilled workforces of trusted allies
to reduce the dependence on other countries, including
countries that pose challenges to United States interests
around the world, for defense-related innovation and
investment; and
(3) it is in the interest of the United States to continue
to increase cooperation with close allies to protect critical
defense-related technology and services and leverage the
investments of like-minded, major ally nations in order to
maximize the strategic edge afforded by defense technology
innovation.
(b) Defined Term.--In this section, the term ``appropriate
congressional committees'' means--
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
(2) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate;
(3) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives; and
(4) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of
Representatives.
(c) Report.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit
a report to the appropriate congressional committees that--
(A) describes the Department of State's efforts to
facilitate access among the national technology and
industrial base to defense articles and services
subject to the United States Munitions List under
section 38(a)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act (22
U.S.C. 2778(a)(1)); and
(B) identifies legal, regulatory, foreign policy,
or other challenges or considerations that prevent or
frustrate these efforts, to include any gaps in the
respective export control regimes implemented by United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
Australia, or Canada.
(2) Form.--This report required under paragraph (1) shall
be unclassified, but may include a classified annex.
SEC. 607. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR SOUTHEAST ASIA MARITIME
SECURITY PROGRAMS AND DIPLOMATIC OUTREACH ACTIVITIES.
(a) Southeast Asia Maritime Security Programs.--There are
authorized to be appropriated to the Department of State for the
Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative, the Southeast Asia
Maritime Law Enforcement Initiative, and other related regional
programs--
(1) $50,000,000 for fiscal year 2021;
(2) $60,000,000 for fiscal year 2022;
(3) $75,000,000 for fiscal year 2023;
(4) $90,000,000 for fiscal year 2024; and
(5) $100,000,000 for fiscal year 2025.
(b) Diplomatic Outreach Activities.--There is authorized to be
appropriated to the Department of State, $1,000,000 for each of the
fiscal years 2021 through 2025, which shall be used--
(1) to conduct, in coordination with the Department of
Defense, outreach activities, including conferences and
symposia, to familiarize partner countries, particularly in the
Indo-Pacific region, with the United States interpretation of
international law relating to freedom of the seas; and
(2) to work with allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific
region to better align respective interpretations of
international law relating to freedom of the seas, including on
the matters of operations by military ships in exclusive
economic zones, innocent passage through territorial seas, and
transits through international straits.
SEC. 608. REPORT ON CHINA COAST GUARD.
(a) Defined Term.--In this section, the term ``appropriate
congressional committees'' means--
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
(2) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate;
(3) the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs of the Senate;
(4) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives;
(5) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of
Representatives; and
(6) the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of
Representatives.
(b) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the
Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall
submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the
China Coast Guard (referred to in this section as the ``CCG'').
(c) Matters To Be Included.--The report required under subsection
(b) shall--
(1) describe recent changes in the CCG's command structure,
including--
(A) its control under the Central Military
Commission's chain of command; and
(B) whether such changes undermine the CCG's claim
that it should be treated as a law enforcement entity;
(2) assess the implications of the new command structure of
the CCG with respect to its role as a coercive tool in ``gray
zone'' activity in the East China Sea and in the South China
Sea;
(3) assess how changes in the command structure of the CCG
may affect interactions between the United States Navy and the
United States Coast Guard with the CCG; and
(4) assess whether the CCG should be considered a military
force rather than a civilian law enforcement entity, and the
implications of such an assessment on United States policy.
(d) Form of Report.--The report required under subsection (b) shall
be unclassified, but may include a classified annex.
SEC. 609. REPORT ON CHINESE MILITARY ACTIVITY IN DJIBOUTI.
(a) Defined Term.--In this section, the term ``appropriate
congressional committees'' means--
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
(2) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate;
(3) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives; and
(4) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of
Representatives.
(b) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with
the Secretary of State, shall submit a report to Congress regarding
Chinese military activity in Djibouti.
(c) Matters To Be Included.--The report required under subsection
(b) shall include--
(1) a summary of any incidents of harassment of United
States military and embassy personnel by any element within the
Government of the PRC; and
(2) an evaluation of the extent to which the presence of
the PLA in Djibouti affects the United States military's
ability to operate in the region.
(d) Form of Report.--The report required under subsection (b) shall
be unclassified, but may include a classified annex.
TITLE VII--FOSTERING COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
SEC. 701. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING UNITED STATES-PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC
OF CHINA COOPERATION ON CONSERVATION AND A HEALTHY
ENVIRONMENT.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) a healthy environment is an integral element of
development and economic growth;
(2) the United States and the PRC have successfully
collaborated in the past to achieve positive outcomes for the
global environment, including joint efforts to protect elephant
populations by enacting nearly complete bans on the import and
export of elephant ivory;
(3) the United States--
(A) should encourage the PRC to adhere to policies
and goals established under preexisting agreements,
such as--
(i) the Convention on International Trade
in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora,
done at Washington March 3, 1973 (27 UST 1087;
TIAS 8249), including effectively implementing
resolutions and decisions on Asian big cats;
and
(ii) the G20 Osaka Blue Ocean Vision, done
at Osaka June 29, 2019; and
(B) should encourage the PRC to improve
transparency and engage in information sharing with
other governments and nongovernmental organizations
regarding preexisting agreements on environmental and
natural resource matters;
(4) the United States and the PRC should increase
cooperation to protect and conserve the environment and the
sustainable use and management of natural resources by--
(A) combating vulnerability to natural disasters,
biodiversity loss, desertification, and environmental
degradation;
(B) promoting mutually supportive environmental
policies and practices;
(C) promoting high levels of environmental
protection and effective enforcement of environmental
laws;
(D) building capacity to address environmental
issues, including through cooperative initiatives; and
(E) strengthening environmental governance; and
(5) the United States should engage with the PRC to develop
policies that--
(A) reduce illegal timber harvesting;
(B) reduce illegal, unregulated, and unreported
fishing;
(C) reduce pollution and marine debris, including
abandoned, lost, or discarded fishing gear;
(D) reduce illegal wildlife trade, including by--
(i) building capacity to prosecute illegal
wildlife trade through existing laws against
money laundering, in accordance with the rule
of law;
(ii) eliminating wildlife trade that poses
a risk to public health; and
(iii) reducing demand for illegal wildlife
products, including products used for food or
medicine, through consumer education;
(E) reduce corruption related to environmental
issues, particularly regarding customs enforcement
along border areas; and
(F) encourage collaboration between health and
environmental agencies related to wildlife consumption
and trade, using a One Health approach.
SEC. 702. STRATEGY ON COOPERATION ON WILDLIFE AND RELATED TRAFFICKING.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The illegal trade in wildlife and wildlife products,
timber, fish, and other natural resources is one of the most
lucrative criminal activities globally, dominated by
sophisticated networks that are linked to other transnational
organized criminal activities and pose a threat to United
States economic and security interests.
(2) In addition to disrupting ecosystems and threatening
the survival of imperiled species, poachers and traffickers
frequently--
(A) kill park rangers devoted to protecting their
countries' wildlife;
(B) destabilize communities through violence and
corruption of local law enforcement officials and
others; and
(C) threaten tourism industries.
(3) The actions described in paragraph (2) have a
significant and negative impact on the local and national
economies of many countries.
(4) Well-managed natural resources, by communities or in
partnership with others, can provide a significant and
sustainable source of economic activity, particularly in
impoverished rural areas. Allowing communities to share in the
revenues generated by sustainable fishing or environment-based
economic development can greatly reduce incentives to engage in
illegal activities, while greatly increasing incentives to
protect wildlife, timber, fish, and other natural resources.
(5) At the 18th meeting of the Conference of the Parties to
the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of
Wild Fauna and Flora (referred to in this section as
``CITES''), held in Geneva, Switzerland, in August 2019, all
parties to CITES agreed that poaching and illegal trade
``required global responses and international cooperation to
resolve.''.
(6) The United States and the PRC can play a pivotal role
in cooperating to end trafficking in wildlife, timber, fish,
and other natural resources and in ensuring that countries meet
their international obligations under CITES by partnering to
reduce demand for trafficked products, including through
sustained diplomatic engagement and trade agreements.
(b) Policy of the United States.--It is the policy of the United
States, pursuant to United States law--
(1) to take immediate action to stop global illegal
wildlife and related trade and associated transnational
organized crime through a collaborative international approach;
(2) to disrupt regional and global transnational organized
criminal networks;
(3) to prevent the illegal wildlife and related trade from
being used as a source of financing for criminal groups that
undermine United States and global security interests;
(4) to reduce the global demand for wildlife and wildlife
products, timber, fish, and other relevant products or
materials taken and traded illegally;
(5) to support the efforts of, and to collaborate with,
individuals, communities, local organizations, and national
governments to combat poaching and wildlife trafficking,
illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing, illegal timber
harvesting, and other related forms of trafficking, including
by providing technical and other forms of assistance and
assisting with development and implementation of national anti-
trafficking and poaching laws; and
(6) to encourage cooperation with the PRC to stem the
demand factors that contribute to wildlife and related
trafficking.
(c) Strategy.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the
Secretary of Agriculture, the Administrator of the United States Agency
for International Development, the Director of the United States Fish
and Wildlife Service, the Administrator of the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration, and the heads of other relevant Federal
agencies, as appropriate, shall develop a strategy for cooperation with
the PRC to combat wildlife and related trafficking that focuses on--
(1) wildlife protection and management of wildlife
populations, including fish;
(2) illegal harvesting of timber;
(3) strategies to reduce demand for illegal wildlife
products, fish, and timber;
(4) management and tracking of confiscated natural resource
contraband; and
(5) trade networks of such products.
SEC. 703. STATEMENT OF POLICY REGARDING UNIVERSAL IMPLEMENTATION OF
UNITED NATIONS SANCTIONS ON NORTH KOREA.
It is the policy of the United States to sustain maximum economic
pressure on the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
(referred to in this section as the ``DPRK'') until the regime
undertakes complete, verifiable, and irreversible actions toward
denuclearization, including by--
(1) encouraging all nations, including the PRC, to
implement and enforce existing United Nations sanctions with
regard to the DPRK;
(2) encouraging all nations, including the PRC, and in
accordance with United Nations Security Council resolutions, to
end the practice of hosting DPRK citizens as guest workers,
recognizing that such workers are demonstrated to constitute an
illicit source of revenue for the DPRK regime and its nuclear
ambitions;
(3) working with the PRC and the international community on
rigorous interdiction of shipments to and from the DPRK,
including ship-to-ship transfers, consistent with United
Nations Security Council resolutions; and
(4) enforcing United Nations Security Council Resolutions
with respect to the DPRK and United States sanctions, including
those pursuant to the North Korea Sanctions and Policy
Enhancement Act 2016 (Public Law 114-122), the Countering
America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (Public Law 115-
44), the Otto Warmbier North Korea Nuclear Sanctions and
Enforcement Act of 2019 (title LXXI of division F of Public Law
116-92), and relevant United States executive orders.
SEC. 704. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE REPORT ON UNITED STATES-PRC
TECHNICAL RESEARCH COOPERATION.
(a) Assessment.--The Comptroller General of the United States shall
conduct an assessment of scientific and technical cooperation
initiatives between the United States and the PRC that receive official
financial assistance from the United States Government.
(b) Report Required.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Comptroller General shall submit a report to
Congress that describes the results of the assessment required under
subsection (a), including the matters described in subsection (c).
(c) Matters To Be Included.--The report required under subsection
(b) shall--
(1) describe the nature of technical cooperation between
the United States and the PRC, including examples of current
initiatives, their sources of funding, participation, and any
requirements for reporting;
(2) detail the licensing and regulatory regime under which
the collaborative initiatives described in paragraph (1) occur;
(3) indicate whether the intellectual property rights of
researchers and entities of the United States are being
adequately protected;
(4) examine whether state-owned enterprises or the PLA are
benefitting from research funded by the taxpayers of the United
States;
(5) indicate whether any researchers from the PRC who are
participating in collaborative initiatives referred to in
paragraph (1) have ties to the PRC Government or the PLA;
(6) indicate whether any institutions of higher education,
laboratories, or other entities of the United States
participating in collaboration led by the Government of the
United States with the PRC have been subject to cyber attacks
or other intrusions originating in the PRC;
(7) evaluate the benefits to the United States of the
collaboration with the PRC;
(8) examine redundancies, if any, among various government-
led collaborative programs between the United States and the
PRC; and
(9) recommend measures to facilitate scientific and
technical collaboration with the PRC in areas that advance the
interests of the United States.
SEC. 705. FINDINGS ON STRATEGIC STABILITY AND ARMS CONTROL.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The United States and the PRC have a shared interest in
strategic stability through enforceable arms control and non-
proliferation agreements.
(2) The United States has long pursued and continues to
seek effective, verifiable, and enforceable arms control and
nonproliferation agreements that support United States and
allied security by--
(A) controlling the spread of nuclear materials and
technology;
(B) placing limits on the production, stockpiling
and deployment of nuclear weapons;
(C) decreasing misperception and miscalculation;
and
(D) avoiding destabilizing nuclear arms
competition.
(3) The PRC has long alleged that it does not seek to
compete in an arms race with nuclear superpowers. Its 2019
Defense White Paper states, ``China does not engage in any
nuclear arms race with any other country and keeps its nuclear
capabilities at the minimum level required for national
security.''. Yet, the behavior of the PRC suggests otherwise.
(4) The PRC is pushing the boundaries of its traditional
posture of minimum deterrence as it expands and improves its
nuclear forces. The PRC's ``No First Use'' policy--which has
always been highly contingent and ambiguous--is increasingly in
doubt. The PRC's traditional goal of maintaining only a ``lean
and effective'' deterrent is called into question by the rapid
expansion of its forces.
(5) In May 2019, Director of the Defense Intelligence
Agency Lieutenant General Robert Ashley stated, ``China is
likely to at least double the size of its nuclear stockpile in
the course of implementing the most rapid expansion and
diversification of its nuclear arsenal in China's history.''.
The PLA is building a full triad of modernized fixed and mobile
ground-based launchers, and new capabilities for nuclear-armed
bombers and submarine-launched ballistic missiles.
(6) In April 2020, the Department of State raised concerns
that the PRC is not complying with the ``zero-yield'' nuclear
testing ban and accused it of ``blocking the flow of data from
the monitoring stations'' in China.
(7) The PRC is conducting research on its first potential
early warning radar, with technical cooperation from Russia.
This radar could indicate that the PRC is moving to a launch-on
warning posture.
(8) The PRC plans to use its increasingly capable space,
cyber, and electronic warfare capabilities against United
States early warning systems and critical infrastructure in a
crisis scenario. This poses great risk to strategic stability,
as it could lead to inadvertent escalation.
(9) The PRC's nuclear expansion comes as a part of a
massive modernization of the PLA which, combined with the PLA's
aggressive actions, has increasingly destabilized the Indo-
Pacific region.
(10) The PLA Rocket Force (PLARF), which was elevated in
2015 to become a separate branch within the PLA, has formed 11
new missile brigades since May 2017, some of which are capable
of both conventional and nuclear strikes. Unlike the United
States, which separates its conventional strike and nuclear
capabilities, the PLARF appears to not only co-locate
conventional and nuclear forces, including dual-use missiles
like the DF-26, but to task the same unit with both nuclear and
conventional missions. Such intermingling could lead to
inadvertent escalation in a crisis. The United States Defense
Intelligence Agency determined in March 2020 that the PLA
tested more ballistic missiles than the rest of the world
combined in 2019.
(11) Planned United States nuclear modernization efforts
will not expand the United States nuclear deterrent and the
United States Program of Record remains within the limits set
by the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, done at Prague
April 8, 2010 (commonly known as the ``New START Treaty'').
(12) The United States extended nuclear deterrence--
(A) provides critical strategic stability around
the world;
(B) is an essential element of United States
military alliances; and
(C) serves a vital nonproliferation function.
(13) United States declaratory policy has profound
implications for extended deterrence and alliance management.
Since the PRC has no formal treaty allies, the PLA has no
similar requirement for extended deterrence.
(14) While the United States has concluded numerous arms
control agreements with Russia and has reduced its nuclear
stockpile by 85 percent, the PRC has repeatedly refused to
conduct arms control negotiations.
(15) As a signatory to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, London, and Moscow July
1, 1968, the PRC is obligated under Article Six of the treaty
to pursue arms control negotiations in good faith.
(16) In May and July 2019, President Trump called on the
PRC to participate in arms control negotiations, but the PRC
Foreign Ministry indicated that China would not participate in
such talks without further reductions by the United States and
Russia. In December 2019, the United States formally invited
the PRC to begin arms control negotiations, but the PRC also
rejected this invitation. In June 2020, the United States once
again invited the PRC to join talks with the Russian Federation
in Vienna, but the PRC declined.
(17) The governments of Poland, Slovenia, Denmark, Norway,
Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, the Netherlands, Romania, Austria,
Albania, and the Deputy Secretary General of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization have all encouraged the PRC to join arms
control discussions.
SEC. 706. COOPERATION ON A STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DIALOGUE.
(a) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States--
(1) to pursue, in coordination with United States allies,
arms control negotiations and sustained and regular engagement
with the PRC--
(A) to enhance understanding of each other's
respective nuclear policies, doctrine, and
capabilities;
(B) to improve transparency; and
(C) to help manage the risks of miscalculation and
misperception;
(2) to pursue relevant capabilities in coordination with
our allies and partners to ensure the security of United States
and allied interests in the face of the PRC's military
modernization and expansion, including--
(A) ground-launched cruise and ballistic missiles;
(B) integrated air and missile defense;
(C) hypersonic missiles;
(D) intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance;
(E) space-based capabilities;
(F) cyber capabilities; and
(G) command, control, and communications;
(3) to maintain sufficient force structure, posture, and
capabilities to provide extended nuclear deterrence to United
States allies and partners;
(4) to maintain appropriate missile defense capabilities to
protect threats to the United States homeland from rogue
intercontinental ballistic missiles from the Indo-Pacific
region; and
(5) to ensure that the United States declaratory policy
reflects the requirements of extended deterrence, to both
assure allies and to preserve its nonproliferation benefits.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) in the midst of growing competition between the United
States and the PRC, it is in the interest of both nations to
cooperate in insulating their nuclear forces from such
dynamics, and thereby reduce risks of escalation;
(2) a physical, cyber, electronic, or any other PLA attack
on United States early warning satellites, other portions of
the nuclear command and control enterprise, or critical
infrastructure poses a high risk to inadvertent but rapid
escalation;
(3) no PRC territory used to stage attacks on the United
States or its allies should be considered safe from potential
retaliation;
(4) PRC leaders are unlikely to view any United States ``no
first use'' or ``sole purpose'' doctrine as credible, and are
thus unlikely to change their behavior in a crisis if the
United States adopted such a policy;
(5) the United States and its allies should promote
international norms on military operations in space, the
employment of cyber capabilities, and the military use of
artificial intelligence, as an element of risk reduction
regarding nuclear command and control; and
(6) United States allies and partners should share the
burden of promoting and protecting such norms by voting against
the PRC's proposals regarding the weaponization of space,
highlighting unsafe behavior by the PRC that violates
international norms, such as in rendezvous and proximity
operations, and promoting responsible behavior in space and all
other domains.
SEC. 707. AGREEMENTS.
(a) Submission.--The text of any agreement concluded under the
authorities provided under this title shall be submitted to the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on
Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives not later than 60 days
after any notice of intent to be formally bound by the terms of such
agreement.
(b) Effective Date.--Each agreement described in subsection (a)
shall be legally effective and binding upon the United States, in
accordance with the terms provided in the agreement, beginning on--
(1) the date on which appropriate implementing legislation
is enacted into law, which shall provide for the approval of
the specific agreement or agreements, including attachments,
annexes, and supporting documentation; or
(2) if the agreement is concluded and submitted as a
treaty, the date on which such treaty is ratified by the
Senate.
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STRATEGIC Act
#4272 | S Congress #116
Policy Area: International Affairs
Subjects: Administrative law and regulatory proceduresAdvanced technology and technological innovationsAdvisory bodiesAfricaAlliancesAnimal and plant healthArms control and nonproliferationAsiaAustraliaAviation and airportsCardiovascular and respiratory healthChinaCivil actions and liabilityCompetitiveness, trade promotion, trade deficitsComputer security and identity theftComputers and information technologyConflicts and warsCongressional oversightConsumer affairs
Last Action: Read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations. (7/22/2020)
Bill Text Source: Congress.gov
Summary and Impacts
Original Text