Bill Summary
This legislation, titled "A BILL to close high risk wildlife markets and prevent wildlife disease transmission globally, and for other purposes," aims to address the issue of emerging infectious diseases that originate in wildlife and can spread to humans. The bill defines key terms, including "emerging infectious disease," "high risk wildlife markets," "One Health," "spillover event," and "zoonotic disease." It also outlines findings that support the need for action in this area, such as the fact that the majority of emerging infectious diseases in recent years have originated in wildlife. The bill emphasizes the importance of taking a One Health approach, which recognizes the interconnectedness between people, animals, plants, and their shared environment, in preventing and responding to these diseases. The bill proposes measures to close high risk wildlife markets globally, including providing support to other governments, working with multilateral organizations, and coordinating with existing efforts to combat wildlife trafficking. It also calls for the development of policies and mechanisms to support the closure of these markets and associated activities. The bill includes exceptions for indigenous communities that rely on wildlife for food security. Additionally, the bill outlines actions to prevent outbreaks of diseases of wildlife origin, such as strengthening global capacity for disease detection, investing in food security efforts, and minimizing the human-wildlife interface in the wild. Finally, the bill authorizes appropriations for various agencies to carry out the proposed activities.
Possible Impacts
1. People who rely on consuming wildlife as a source of protein may be affected by the closure of high risk wildlife markets. They may need to find alternative sources of protein, which could be more expensive or less accessible.
2. Communities that rely on the trade and sale of wildlife for economic purposes may be affected by the closure of high risk wildlife markets. They may lose a significant source of income and may need to find alternative means of supporting themselves.
3. Indigenous communities who have cultural traditions and practices that involve the use of wildlife may be affected by the closure of high risk wildlife markets. They may need to find alternative ways to continue their traditions and may face challenges in doing so.
[Congressional Bills 116th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 3759 Introduced in Senate (IS)]
<DOC>
116th CONGRESS
2d Session
S. 3759
To close high risk wildlife markets and prevent wildlife disease
transmission globally, and for other purposes.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
May 19, 2020
Mr. Coons (for himself and Mr. Graham) introduced the following bill;
which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To close high risk wildlife markets and prevent wildlife disease
transmission globally, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Global Wildlife
Health and Pandemic Prevention Act''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as
follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.
Sec. 3. Findings.
Sec. 4. Sense of Congress.
Sec. 5. Closing high risk wildlife markets.
Sec. 6. Preventing outbreaks of diseases of wildlife origin.
Sec. 7. Authorization of appropriations.
SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) Emerging infectious disease.--The term ``emerging
infectious disease'' means an infectious disease whose
incidence in humans has increased in the past two decades or
threatens to increase in the near future.
(2) High risk wildlife markets.--The term ``high risk
wildlife markets'' means any commercial market that sells or
processes wildlife for human consumption, whether the animals
originated in the wild or in a captive situation, and where--
(A) the species of wildlife or regulation of the
market is determined under section 6(a)(1) to be a risk
factor for zoonotic disease spread to humans or is
linked with the global illegal trade in wildlife; or
(B) the manner of processing the wildlife is
determined under section 6(a)(1) to be a risk factor
for zoonotic disease spread to humans.
(3) One health.--The term ``One Health'' means a
collaborative and transdisciplinary approach to achieving
optimal health outcomes that recognizes the interconnection
between people, animals, plants, and their shared environment.
(4) Spillover event.--The term ``spillover event'' means
the transmission of a pathogen from one species to another that
was not previously a host for that pathogen.
(5) Zoonotic disease.--The term ``zoonotic disease'' means
any disease that is naturally transmissible from vertebrate
animals to humans.
SEC. 3. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) According to the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, the majority of emerging infectious diseases in
recent years have originated in wildlife, and the rate of
outbreaks of these diseases is increasing.
(2) Zoonotic disease spillover events can occur from
unnatural interaction between human and wildlife populations or
between wildlife populations without human presence.
(3) The collection, production, trade, and sale of wildlife
for human consumption can be a serious risk factor for
spillover events, particularly if it involves animal species
not typically in close proximity to humans or to each other,
living under poorly regulated and stressful conditions that
exacerbate the shedding of zoonotic pathogens.
(4) Changing land use practices and human expansion into
wildlife habitat also increase opportunities for contact
between wildlife and humans that can lead to disease
transmission.
(5) Markets where wildlife is sold for human consumption
are found in many countries throughout the world, and in some
cases these products represent the only accessible source of
protein for communities; therefore, sustainable production of
alternative protein should be supported in such communities in
order to reduce need or demand for wildlife as a food source.
(6) The human, economic, and security costs of global
pandemics and regional epidemics of zoonotic diseases and
emerging infectious diseases is overwhelming. It is believed
that the COVID-19 pandemic will result in tens of thousands of
deaths and trillions of dollars in economic damage to the
United States alone.
SEC. 4. SENSE OF CONGRESS.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the United States Government should prioritize actions
that lead to the immediate and permanent closure of high risk
wildlife markets around the world; and
(2) the United States Government should utilize a One
Health approach to emerging zoonotic and infectious disease
prevention, detection, reporting, and response that leverages
expertise across public health, epidemiology, wildlife and
biodiversity conservation, food security, and veterinary
medicine designed to eliminate the risk of future such zoonotic
and emerging infectious disease epidemics and pandemics.
SEC. 5. CLOSING HIGH RISK WILDLIFE MARKETS.
(a) Closure of Markets.--The Department of State, the United States
Agency for International Development, the United States Fish and
Wildlife Service, and the Department of Agriculture, in collaboration
with other relevant United States agencies, shall--
(1) prioritize the closure of high risk wildlife markets
around the world and associated activities as part of United
States diplomatic efforts;
(2) provide support for other governments around the world
in their efforts to close high risk wildlife markets;
(3) work with other governments and multilateral
organizations, through appropriate existing treaties and
conventions, to develop agreements or protocols around closing
high risk wildlife markets; and
(4) coordinate these activities with existing United States
Government efforts to combat wildlife trafficking, including--
(A) providing assistance to combat corruption,
strengthen governance, and build law enforcement
capacity abroad;
(B) aiding countries in detecting and deterring
illegal import, transit, and export of wildlife;
(C) improving information sharing in order to halt
wildlife trade that may spread zoonotic disease and
emerging infectious disease; and
(D) reducing demand for wildlife and wildlife
products, including by increasing access to alternative
protein sources for food insecure communities.
(b) National Security Council Measures.--The National Security
Council, in consultation with the United States Agency for
International Development, the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, the United States Fish and Wildlife Service, and the
Department of Agriculture, shall develop policies and mechanisms to
support the closure of high risk wildlife markets and associated
activities globally.
(c) Sanctions.--
(1) Findings warranting sanctions.--If the Secretary of
State, the Secretary of the Interior, or the Secretary of
Agriculture finds that a country is continuing to willfully
harbor high risk wildlife markets, including a failure to
enforce relevant laws and regulations, the Secretary making
such finding shall certify such finding to the President and
shall report this certification within 15 days to Congress.
(2) Actions.--Upon the receipt of any certification made
under subsection (c), the President may--
(A) prohibit the import of any products from the
offending country, to the extent that such prohibition
is permitted under current trade agreements;
(B) freeze assets of any government officials from
the offending country; or
(C) impose travel bans and visa restrictions on any
government officials from the offending country.
(d) Exceptions.--In carrying out this section, limited exceptions
shall be considered if necessary to meet the nutritional, subsistence,
or cultural needs and rights of indigenous peoples or communities
dependent on wildlife for food security.
SEC. 6. PREVENTING OUTBREAKS OF DISEASES OF WILDLIFE ORIGIN.
(a) Integrating Human, Animal, and Environmental Health.--The
Department of State, the United States Agency for International
Development, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the United
States Fish and Wildlife Service, the United States Geological Survey,
and the Department of Agriculture, in collaboration with other relevant
United States agencies as appropriate, shall leverage public health,
animal health, and environmental health expertise to--
(1) identify high risk wildlife markets for the purposes of
carrying out section 5;
(2) coordinate an integrated, Federal government-wide
approach to global zoonotic disease preparedness, surveillance,
and response;
(3) support efforts to better understand the connection
between human and wildlife health;
(4) promote a multi-sectoral approach that coordinates
global health, food security, and biodiversity activities;
(5) strengthen global capacity for detection of zoonotic
diseases with pandemic potential by--
(A) supporting institutions that can prevent and
provide early detection of zoonotic outbreaks;
(B) investing in laboratory diagnostic capability
and workforce training;
(C) supporting surveillance at locations at high
risk of spillover events; and
(D) preventing biodiversity loss and ecosystem
degradation that can lead to zoonotic disease
transmission;
(6) invest in food security efforts that aim to--
(A) eliminate public health threats from zoonotic
disease spillover events;
(B) prevent biodiversity loss and species
extinction; and
(C) protect food insecure communities from loss of
access to protein that may result from closure of high
risk wildlife markets and efforts to reduce demand for
wildlife as a food source; and
(7) take action to minimize the human-wildlife interface in
the wild, including by--
(A) preventing the degradation and fragmentation of
intact ecosystems;
(B) restoring the integrity of degraded and
fragmented ecosystems;
(C) supporting effective indigenous and local
stewardship of traditional territories;
(D) supporting national and subnational governments
in effectively managing their protected areas;
(E) helping enforce current laws that protect
wildlife; and
(F) investing in risk reduction and community
education programs that reduce demand for wildlife as a
food source and increase access to alternative protein
sources.
(b) Identification of High Risk Wildlife Markets.--In carrying out
subsection (a)(1), the following factors shall be considered:
(1) Wildlife markets that are regulated under national and
international veterinary standards for slaughter shall not be
considered high risk wildlife markets.
(2) Mammals, birds, reptiles, and amphibians of wild
origin, whether removed directly from the wild or bred in
captivity, shall be considered wildlife for the purposes of
identifying high risk wildlife markets.
(c) Global Health Funding Plan.--The Secretary of State and the
Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development
shall include information about zoonotic disease preparedness and
surveillance in the reports required under section 406(b) of the
Coronavirus Preparedness and Response Supplemental Appropriations Act,
2020 (Public Law 116-123).
SEC. 7. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
The following amounts are authorized to be appropriated for fiscal
year 2021 to carry out the activities outlined in this Act:
(1) $100,000,000 for State International Narcotics Control
and Law Enforcement.
(2) $50,000,000 for the Fish and Wildlife Service Office of
Law Enforcement.
(3) $20,000,000 for the Fish and Wildlife Service Office of
International Affairs.
(4) $40,000,000 for the United States Geological Survey
National Wildlife Health Center.
(5) $30,000,000 for the USDA National Animal Health
Laboratory Network.
(6) $200,000,000 for USAID Global Health Security Programs.
(7) $125,000,000 for USAID Food Security Programs.
(8) $500,000,000 for USAID Biodiversity Programs.
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