[Congressional Bills 116th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 1690 Introduced in Senate (IS)]
<DOC>
116th CONGRESS
1st Session
S. 1690
To improve United States missile defense, and for other purposes.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
May 23 (legislative day, May 22), 2019
Mr. Sullivan (for himself and Mr. Manchin) introduced the following
bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Armed
Services
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To improve United States missile defense, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Modernizing America's Missile
Defense Act of 2019''.
SEC. 2. EXPANSION OF NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE POLICY AND PROGRAM
REDESIGNATION.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds that the 2019 Missile Defense
Review--
(1) is fully aligned with the 2017 National Security
Strategy (NSS), the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS), and
the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR);
(2) establishes a policy framework for United States
missile defense that is responsive to new threats and exploits
new approaches to the defensive mission;
(3) adopts a balanced and integrated approach to countering
missile threats through a combination of deterrence, active and
passive missile defenses, and attack operations;
(4) is entitled the ``Missile Defense Review'' (MDR)
because of the expanding offensive missile threat includes
nonballistic systems, such as advanced cruise missiles and
hypersonic weapons;
(5) states that the United States, allies, and partners
will pursue a comprehensive missile defense strategy that will
deliver integrated and effective capabilities to counter
ballistic, cruise, and hypersonic missile threats; and
(6) hedges against future unanticipated offensive missile
threats and pledges to develop and field innovative and
advanced missile defense capabilities to counter future
threats.
(b) Sense of the Senate.--It is the Sense of the Senate that--
(1) the United States must continue to pursue a
comprehensive missile defense strategy that will deliver
integrated and effective capabilities to counter ballistic,
cruise, and hypersonic missile threats;
(2) adversaries are quickly expanding the capabilities of
their existing missile systems, adding new and unprecedented
types of missile capabilities to their arsenals, and further
integrating offensive missiles into their coercive threats,
military exercises, and war planning;
(3) both Russia and China are rapidly enhancing their
existing offensive missile systems and developing advanced sea-
, ground-, and air-launched cruise missiles as well as
hypersonic capabilities;
(4) due to the proliferation of offensive ballistic and
cruise missiles and the emergence of game-changing hypersonic
weapons technologies, all of which threaten regional balances,
our allies and partners, United States deployed armed forces,
and the United States homeland, missile defenses become an even
more critical element of United States strategy; and
(5) the United States must outpace adversary offensive
missile capabilities.
(c) Expansion of Policy.--Section 1681(a) of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 114-328; 10 U.S.C.
2431 note) is amended by striking ``ballistic missile threat'' and
inserting ``ballistic, cruise, and hypersonic missile threats''.
(d) Redesignation Requirement.--Not later than the date on which
the President submits to Congress pursuant to section 1105 of title 31,
United States Code, the annual budget request of the President for
fiscal year 2021, the Secretary of Defense shall, as the Secretary
considers appropriate, redesignate all strategies, policies, programs,
and systems under the jurisdiction of the Secretary to reflect that
missile defense programs of the United States defend against ballistic,
cruise, and hypersonic missiles in all phases of flight.
SEC. 3. ACCELERATION OF THE DEPLOYMENT OF PERSISTENT SPACE-BASED SENSOR
ARCHITECTURE.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The Missile Defense Agency currently operates the Space
Tracking and Surveillance System-Demonstration (STSS-D), a two-
satellite constellation for testing purposes, which uses
sensors capable of detecting visible and infrared light and
serves as an experimental space tracker for the ballistic
missile defense system.
(2) Conceptually developed in 2009, the Precision Tracking
Space System (PTSS) would have provided the persistent space-
based tracking of ballistic missiles, including object
characterization and discrimination, and would have also
supported homeland, regional, and theater missile defense.
(3) Projected to enter orbit in 2018, the Missile Defense
Agency and the Applied Physics Laboratory of Johns Hopkins
University is currently conducting a Space-Based Kill
Assessment (SKA) experiment, a network of small sensors hosted
on commercial satellites, used to collect the energy signature
of the impact between a ballistic missile threat and an
interceptor from the ballistic missile defense system.
(4) Section 236 of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2014 (127 Stat. 715; Public Law 113-66)
required the Secretary of Defense to conduct an evaluation of
options and alternatives for future sensor architectures for
ballistic missile defense in order to enhance the ballistic
missile defense capabilities of the United States.
(5) General John Hyten, Commander of the United States
Strategic Command, has argued for the ``deployment of a global
space-based sensor system with discrimination capability'' as a
``critical component to improving the effectiveness of our
deployed interceptors'' to ``conduct both the characterization
of these new threats . . . as well as discriminate better and
earlier the mid-course element of the threat that exists
today'', and finally to ``target against . . . hypersonic
capabilities [and] other capabilities in the boost phase.''.
(6) General O'Shaughnessy, Commander of the United States
Northern Command, stated that--
(A) ``A space-based sensor network will provide far
greater coverage, survivability, and persistence--all
of which are necessary to maintaining confidence in our
ability to deter, detect, and defeat missile threats to
the homeland.'';
(B) ``We must take prudent steps now to ensure our
next generation defensive capabilities to include a
space-based sensing layer [are] not late to need.'';
and
(C) ``The space-based sensing layer . . . is of the
highest urgency [and] that we gain that capability as
soon as possible because our adversaries are actively
developing these weapons as we speak.''.
(7) General Samuel Greaves, a former Director of the
Missile Defense Agency, has stated that--
(A) space provides the critical vantage point
necessary to address rapidly advancing threats across
multiple regions of interest and the only vantage point
for global persistence to address warfighter
requirements;
(B) a space-based sensor layer consisting of two
separate constellations, one for tracking and
discriminating ballistic missiles and one for tracking
dim ballistic targets and hypersonic missiles, would
enable the United States to use interceptor inventory
more efficiently and effectively to counter a broad
array of threats; and
(C) space-based sensors are ``absolutely critical
for the real threat that we see in front of us, the
hypersonic threat''.
(8) Admiral James Syring, a former Director of the Missile
Defense Agency, has stated, ``From a missile defense
perspective, we have to develop a future operational space
layer. Given where the threat is going with hypersonics and
more ICBMs and so forth this persistent tracking and
discrimination capability from space is a must.''.
(9) The Department of Defense's 2019 Missile Defense Review
states that--
(A) the exploitation of space provides a missile
defense posture that is more effective, resilient, and
adaptable to known and unanticipated threats;
(B) space-based sensors, for example, can monitor,
detect, and track missile launches from locations
almost anywhere on the globe--they enjoy a measure of
flexibility of movement that is unimpeded by the
constraints that geographic limitations impose on
terrestrial sensors; and
(C) unlike land-based sensors, space sensors do not
require basing rights or agreements with foreign states
enabling them to be placed where necessary to achieve
the ideal viewing geometry for launch detection,
missile tracking, threat discrimination, and intercept
detection/kill assessment of missile threats to the
United States homeland, our forces abroad, and to our
allies and partners.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the two most recently enacted National Defense
Authorization Acts have expressed support for a space-based
missile defense sensor program;
(2) the Secretary of Defense should rapidly develop and
deploy a persistent, space-based sensor architecture to ensure
missile defenses of the United States are more effective
against ballistic missile threats and more responsive to
emergent threats from hypersonic and cruise missiles;
(3) the responsibility for developing and deploying a
hypersonic and ballistic tracking space sensor should remain
within the Director of the Missile Defense Agency; and
(4) the Director of the Missile Defense Agency should
deploy a hypersonic and ballistic tracking space sensor
constellation as soon as technically feasible.
(c) Assignment of Primary Responsibility for Development and
Deployment of the Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor.--Not
later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
Secretary shall--
(1) assign the Director of the Missile Defense Agency with
the principal responsibility for the development and deployment
of a hypersonic and ballistic tracking space sensor; and
(2) submit to the congressional defense committees
certification of such assignment.
(d) Certification Regarding Funding of Hypersonic and Ballistic
Tracking Space Sensor Program.--At the same time that the President
submits to Congress pursuant to section 1105 of title 31, United States
Code, the annual budget request of the President for fiscal year 2021,
the Under Secretary of Defense Comptroller and the Director for Cost
Assessment and Program Evaluation shall jointly certify to the
congressional defense committees whether the hypersonic and ballistic
tracking space sensor program is sufficiently funded in the Future-
Years Defense Program for the Missile Defense Agency.
(e) Deployment Deadline.--Section 1683(a) of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 (Public Law 115-91; 10 U.S.C.
2431 note) is amended--
(1) by striking ``(a) In General.--'' and inserting the
following:
``(a) Development, Testing, and Deployment.--
``(1) Development.--''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following new paragraphs:
``(2) Testing and deployment.--The Director shall begin on-
orbit testing of a hypersonic and ballistic tracking space
sensor no later than December 31, 2021, with full operational
deployment as soon as technically feasible thereafter.
``(3) Waiver.--The Secretary of Defense may waive the
deadline for testing specified in paragraph (2) if the
Secretary submits to the congressional defense committees a
report containing--
``(A) the explanation why the Secretary cannot meet
such deadline;
``(B) the technical risks and estimated cost of
accelerating the program to attempt to meet such
deadline;
``(C) an assessment of threat systems that could
not be detected or tracked persistently due to waiving
such deadline; and
``(D) a plan, including a timeline, for beginning
the required testing.''.
(f) Report on Progress.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall
submit to the congressional defense committees a report on the
progress of all efforts being made by the Missile Defense
Agency, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, the Air
Force, and the Space Development Agency relating to space-based
sensing and tracking capabilities for missile defense and how
each of such organizations will work together to avoid
duplication of efforts.
(2) Form.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified
annex.
SEC. 4. NONSTANDARD ACQUISITION PROCESSES OF MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) In 2002, four years prior to North Korea's Taepodong-2
ICBM/SLV test in 2006, the Department of Defense directed the
Missile Defense Agency to utilize flexible acquisition
approaches to quickly develop missile defense capabilities,
which led to the fielding of an initial operational homeland
missile defense system by the fall of 2004.
(2) The Department of Defense's 2018 National Defense
Strategy states that the Department of Defense must ``[d]eliver
performance at the speed of relevance [and to] prioritize speed
of delivery, continuous adaptation, and frequent modular
upgrades.''.
(3) The Department of Defense's 2019 Missile Defense Review
states that--
(A) the Department must adopt processes and
cultures that enable the Missile Defense Agency and the
military departments to deliver missile defense
capabilities faster, learn from failure and rapidly
adjust, and swiftly adapt systems once fielded;
(B) the Department cannot meet this goal by
returning the Missile Defense Agency to the standard
acquisition and requirements generation processes; and
(C) the Department must instead continue to
streamline and refine acquisition processes and ensure
flexibility in the development, testing, and fielding
of missile defenses.
(4) General Greaves, the former Director of the Missile
Defense Agency, stated that--
(A) the Missile Defense Agency understands the
importance of innovating, developing, and delivering
new missile defense capabilities quickly, accelerating
where possible missile defense acquisition timelines
while adhering to sound acquisition principles; and
(B) United States missile defenses must be
responsive to existing and new threats and leverage new
approaches to the homeland and regional defensive
missions by delivering capabilities faster, learning
from failures to make rapid adjustments, and swiftly
adapting our systems once they are fielded.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense Congress that--
(1) in order for the Department of Defense to provide more
lethal capabilities at the speed of relevance, the Department
needs to ensure its acquisition processes continue to fulfill
the needs of members of the Armed Forces now and in the future;
(2) significant defense acquisition reforms enacted over
the past three National Defense Authorization Acts have
improved access to nontraditional and commercial innovation and
to expanded flexible acquisition authorities in the development
of alternative acquisition pathways to acquire critical
national security capabilities;
(3) the Department appropriately recognized the Missile
Defense Agency for its acquisition success by presenting it
with the 2018 David Packard Excellence in Acquisition Award for
the development of the Space-Based Kill Assessment (SKA)
program and the Missile Defense Agency should be commended for
its numerous and rapid acquisition successes;
(4) the recently completed Missile Defense Review
explicitly highlights, in stark terms, the threat posed to the
United States by ballistic and hypersonic missile threats; and
(5) the Missile Defense Agency should maintain its
nonstandard acquisition authorities in order to continue to
rapidly design, test, and deliver critically needed defensive
capabilities to the warfighter.
(c) Changes to Nonstandard Acquisition Processes and
Responsibilities.--
(1) Limitation.--None of the funds authorized to be
appropriated by this Act may be obligated or expended to change
the nonstandard acquisition processes and responsibilities
described in paragraph (2) until the Secretary--
(A) has consulted with the Under Secretary of
Defense for Engineering and Policy, the secretaries of
the military departments, the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, the Commander of United States
Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), the Commander of United
States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), and the Director
of the Missile Defense Agency;
(B) certifies to the congressional defense
committees that the Secretary has coordinated the
changes with and received the views of the individuals
referred to in subparagraph (A);
(C) submits to the congressional defense committees
a report describing the changes, the rationale for the
changes, and the views of the individuals referred to
in subparagraph (A) with respect to such changes; and
(D) a period of 270 days has elapsed since
submittal of the report under subparagraph (C).
(2) Nonstandard acquisition processes and responsibilities
described.--The nonstandard acquisition processes and
responsibilities described in this paragraph are such processes
and responsibilities described in--
(A) the memorandum of the Secretary of Defense
titled ``Missile Defense Program Direction'' signed on
January 2, 2002; and
(B) Department of Defense Directive 5134.09, as in
effect on the date of the enactment of this Act.
SEC. 5. PLAN FOR THE REDESIGNED KILL VEHICLE.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the ground-based midcourse defense system is the only
system capable of defending the United States from long-range
ballistic missile threats and is critical to our national
security;
(2) the redesigned kill vehicle for the ground-based
interceptor is a top priority for the Missile Defense Agency
and a critical element to increasing system reliability to
build warfighter confidence;
(3) the Missile Defense Agency must continue to leverage
mature technologies from proven fielded components in a modular
design to reduce the number of production processes and improve
reliability, producibility, and maintainability of the
redesigned kill vehicle;
(4) the consensus among senior Department of Defense
experts on missile defense, including General Terrance
O'Shaughnessy, Commander of the United States Northern Command,
and Lieutenant General Greaves, the Director the Missile
Defense Agency, is that the redesigned kill vehicle will make
homeland defenses much more robust and will improve our ability
to defend the homeland of the United States;
(5) the Redesigned Kill Vehicle Program is vital to
providing the warfighter with a more reliable and effective
capability to defend the homeland from long-rage ballistic
missile threats; and
(6) the Missile Defense Agency should be commended for its
rigorous and disciplined acquisition and engineering processes
it has applied to the Redesigned Kill Vehicle Program.
(b) Report Required.--The Director of the Missile Defense Agency
shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report on the
delay in the Redesigned Kill Vehicle Program.
(c) Elements.--The report required by subsection (b) shall include
the following:
(1) A description of the reason for the delay.
(2) An overview of the revised program schedule including a
revised test plan and revised acquisition strategy.
(3) A detailed description of any recommendations that
could be utilized to accelerate the scheduled fielding
including modifications to the acquisition strategy or the
procurement and assembly of long-lead materials unaffected by
the reason for the delay.
(4) A timeline associated with such recommendations.
(5) Additional funding required to carry out such
recommendations.
(6) An assessment of risk associated with such
recommendations.
(7) A description of any recommendations that were
submitted to the Director by contractors that the Director
considers reasonable but were not adopted.
(8) An explanation as to why the recommendations described
in paragraph (7) were not adopted.
(d) Form of Report.--The report required under subsection (b) shall
be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.
SEC. 6. REPORT ON IMPROVING GROUND-BASED MIDCOURSE DEFENSE ELEMENT OF
BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) A report from Johns Hopkins University, published in
2015, and entitled ``North Korea's Nuclear Futures: Technology
and Strategy'', concluded that, by 2020, North Korea could have
as many as 100 nuclear weapons.
(2) Currently, the United States will have 44 operational
ground-based interceptors distributed between Fort Greely,
Alaska, and Vandenberg Air Force Base, California.
(3) Section 1686 of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2018 (Public Law 115-91; 10 U.S.C. 2431 note)
authorizes up 28 additional ground-based interceptors (GBIs)
and begins the deployment of 20 additional ground-based
interceptors to Fort Greely.
(4) In September 2017, Congress approved a Department of
Defense reprogramming of fiscal year 2017 funding of more than
$400,000,000 to counter the North Korean missile threat.
(5) In November 2017, the President submitted an amendment
to his fiscal year 2018 budget request, which Congress
subsequently approved, for $4,000,000,000 for missile defeat
and defense, including funding to begin the construction of a
new missile field at Fort Greely, Alaska, and additional
procurement funding necessary for 20 new ground-based
interceptors.
(6) The 2000 Final Environmental Impact Statement for Fort
Greely included the authorization for up to 100 ground-based
interceptors to ensure that growth would not incur any
unexpected environmental delays.
(7) The current maximum potential capacity for ground-based
interceptors is 104, with up to 100 at Fort Greely, and 4 at
Vandenberg Air Force Base.
(b) Report Required.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of the Missile Defense Agency shall
submit to the congressional defense committees a report on--
(1) the options to increase the capability, capacity, and
reliability of the ground-based midcourse defense element of
the United States ballistic missile defense system; and
(2) the infrastructure requirements for increasing the
number of ground-based interceptors as part of such element.
(c) Contents.--The report required by subsection (b) shall include
the following:
(1) An assessment of the requirements of the ground-based
midcourse defense element of the United States ballistic
missile defense system to meet threats outlined in the 2018
National Defense Strategy and the 2019 Missile Defense Review.
(2) An assessment of the feasibility of fielding up to 104
ground-based interceptors as part of such element, including a
description of the additional infrastructure and components
needed to further outfit missile fields at Fort Greely, Alaska.
(3) A cost estimate of such infrastructure and components.
(4) An estimated schedule for completing such construction
as may be required for such infrastructure and components.
(5) An identification of any environmental assessments or
impact studies that would need to be conducted to expand
missile fields at Fort Greely beyond current capacity.
(6) A determination of the appropriate fleet mix of ground-
based interceptor kill vehicles and boosters to maximize
overall system effectiveness and increase its capacity and
capability, including the costs and benefits of continued
inclusion of capability enhancement II block 1 interceptors
after the fielding of the redesigned kill vehicle.
(7) The modernization requirements for the ground-based
midcourse system, including all command and control, ground
systems, sensors and sensor interfaces, boosters and kill
vehicles, and integration of known future systems and
components.
(8) A discussion of the obsolescence of such systems and
components.
(9) The industrial base requirements relating to the
ground-based midcourse system, as determined by the Director of
the Missile Defense Agency.
(10) Such other matters as the Director considers
appropriate.
(d) Form.--The report submitted under subsection (b) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
SEC. 7. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON RECENT MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY TESTS.
It is the sense of Congress that the Office of the Under Secretary
of Defense for Research and Engineering, the Missile Defense Agency,
the Office of the Director for Operational Test and Evaluation, the
operational test agencies, the military departments, and warfighters
should--
(1) be strongly commended for a highly successful 2018
flight test campaign, which consisted of 13 total flight test
events including--
(A) FTX-35, which successfully proved
interoperability between Terminal High Altitude Area
Defense (THAAD) and the Phased Array Tracking Radar to
Intercept on Target (PATRIOT) to detect and track a
simulated engagement with a short-range ballistic
missile;
(B) Pacific Dragon 2018, which successfully
demonstrated joint ballistic missile defense
interoperability with Japan and Korea to engage a
short-range ballistic missile with a Standard Missile 3
(SM-3) Block IB by a Japanese ship and an Aegis Ashore
site;
(C) JFTM-5, which successfully demonstrated the
intercept of a short-range ballistic missile with a
Standard Missile 3 Block IB threat upgrade from a
Japanese ship;
(D) FTM-45, which successfully demonstrated the
intercept of a medium-range ballistic missile with a
Standard Missile 3 Block IIA from a United States ship;
and
(E) FTI-03, which as a part of the operational test
of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) Phase 3
architecture, successfully demonstrated the intercept
of an intermediate-range ballistic missile using the
Aegis Weapon System's Engage-on-Remote capability;
(2) be especially recognized for the success of FTG-11, the
first salvo test of the United States Ground-based Midcourse
Defense system, during which two ground-based interceptors were
launched nearly simultaneously from the same location and
successfully intercepted a threat-representative
intercontinental ballistic missile target, and then the next
most lethal object;
(3) continue to pursue an increasingly rigorous testing
regime for all elements of the Ballistic Missile Defense
System, in coordination with the Office of the Director,
Operational Test and Evaluation, to more rapidly deliver
capabilities to the warfighter as the threat evolves;
(4) not consider tests which do not achieve an intercept or
the main objective as failures; and
(5) recognize, in an effort to deliver capabilities at the
speed of relevance, the learning value of individual
advancements made by all test events, rather than viewing any
total outcome as an indication of the reliability of entire
missile defense systems.
SEC. 8. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON MISSILE DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT
PRIORITIES.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the 2019 Missile Defense Review articulates a
comprehensive approach to preventing and defeating the rapidly
expanding offensive missile threat through a combination of
deterrence, active and passive missile defense, and attack
operations;
(2) to counter the expanding offense missile capabilities
of potential adversaries and hedge against unanticipated
missile threats, the Secretary of Defense should aggressively
pursue new missile defense capabilities and examine concepts
and technologies for advanced missile defense systems;
(3) the Secretary should fully implement the 2019 Missile
Defense Review's focus on increasing investments in and
deploying new technologies and concepts, including--
(A) the redesigned kill vehicle;
(B) a hypersonic and ballistic tracking space
sensor;
(C) hypersonic glide vehicle defense;
(D) directed energy for missile defense to include
laser scaling;
(E) the multi-object kill vehicle;
(F) a space-based missile intercept layer;
(G) improved Standard Missile 3 (SM-3) ballistic
missile interceptors;
(H) F-35 sensor suite missile defense integration;
(I) neutral particle beam; and
(J) missile defense capabilities from Missile
Defense Agency-configured airborne platforms, including
the discrimination sensor demonstrator; and
(4) the Secretary should work to ensure that all missile
defense systems are more survivable, including through--
(A) more distributed air and missile defense
operations; and
(B) improved camouflage, concealment, and
deception, including emission control.
<all>
Modernizing America’s Missile Defense Act of 2019
#1690 | S Congress #116
Policy Area: Armed Forces and National Security
Subjects: AlaskaArms control and nonproliferationAsiaChinaCongressional oversightDefense spendingDepartment of DefenseEnvironmental assessment, monitoring, researchMilitary facilities and propertyMilitary operations and strategyMilitary procurement, research, weapons developmentNuclear weaponsPublic contracts and procurementRussiaSpacecraft and satellites
Last Action: Read twice and referred to the Committee on Armed Services. (5/23/2019)
Bill Text Source: Congress.gov
Summary and Impacts
Original Text