Bill Summary
The resolution discusses the Chinese Communist Party's "Made in China 2025" plan, which aims to make China a global leader in advanced science and technology by 2025. It highlights the party's focus on innovation and self-sufficiency, as well as the use of tactics such as unfair subsidies and forced transfers of intellectual property. The resolution also addresses the actions taken by the Chinese government in support of this plan, including passing new laws and regulations, stealing intellectual property, and utilizing state-owned enterprises. The House of Representatives believes that the US must prepare for and counter these tactics in order to protect national security and promote fair trade practices. The Department of Commerce is at the forefront of this competition and Congress should oversee its efforts. Strengthening relationships with allies and promoting fair trade globally are also important aspects of this legislation.
Possible Impacts
1. Chinese citizens will be affected by the "Made in China 2025" plan as it prioritizes certain sectors, such as information technology and biotechnology, which may lead to job opportunities and advancements in those fields.
2. American businesses will be affected by the Chinese government's unfair trade practices and forced transfers of intellectual property, which can put them at a disadvantage and potentially lead to bankruptcy.
3. The US government and its Department of Commerce will be affected by the need to compete with China in terms of security, diplomacy, and economics, and must prioritize protecting American businesses and promoting fair trade practices globally.
[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Res. 697 Introduced in House (IH)]
<DOC>
118th CONGRESS
1st Session
H. RES. 697
Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives relating to the
Communist Party of China's ``Made In China 2025'' Plan and publicly-
known malign Communist Party of China's actions supporting the goals of
its ``Made in China 2025'' plan.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
September 18, 2023
Ms. Sherrill (for herself, Mr. Gallagher, and Mr. Krishnamoorthi)
submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee
on Foreign Affairs
_______________________________________________________________________
RESOLUTION
Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives relating to the
Communist Party of China's ``Made In China 2025'' Plan and publicly-
known malign Communist Party of China's actions supporting the goals of
its ``Made in China 2025'' plan.
Resolved,
SECTION 1. THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA'S ``MADE IN CHINA 2025'' PLAN.
The House of Representatives finds the following:
(1) In 2006, the Communist Party of China (in this
resolution referred to as ``CCP'') intensified its focus on
science and technology innovation as a national goal under the
``Medium- and Long-Term Plan for Science and Technology
Development'' and its 13th and 14th Five-Year Plans.
(2) The ``Made in China 2025'' plan (in this resolution
referred to as ``MIC2025''), issued in 2015, under the 13th
Five Year Plan is the CCP's 10-year national science and
technology industrial policy that seeks to vault China into
global leadership in the research and manufacturing of advanced
science and technology tools, applications, and products, while
using a whole-of-society approach, deep government
intervention, and market protections for the People's Republic
of China (in this resolution referred to as ``PRC'') businesses
in the select sectors.
(3) MIC2025 prioritizes raising high bars to foreign market
access, while increasing PRC investments in and government and
business focus on proactively acquiring technology and
knowledge abroad on these advanced science and technology
areas:
(A) Advanced information technology and
telecommunications services.
(B) Advanced machining and robotics.
(C) Aerospace engineering and equipment.
(D) Maritime infrastructure, equipment, and next
generation vessels.
(E) Advanced railway infrastructure.
(F) Renewable energy products, batteries, and
electric vehicles.
(G) Advanced materials.
(H) Innovative farming equipment, technology, and
agriculture.
(I) Biotechnology, pharmaceuticals, and advanced
medical equipment.
(J) Next generation electrical equipment.
(4) MIC2025 sector development will further integrate
emerging technologies, such as advance semiconductors, 3D
printing, cloud computing, big-data analytics, quantum
computing, artificial intelligence (AI), and new forms of
energy.
(5) The PRC's leader Xi Jinping, who currently holds the
role of State Chairman of the PRC, General Secretary of the
Chinese Communist Party, and Chairman of the Central Military
Commission, states that CCP plans to lessen the PRC's reliance
on foreign markets for goods and services by 2025 and a goal
for at least seventy-percent self-sufficiency in MIC2025 areas
by using foreign technology acquisitions and joint ventures to
acquire, domestically produce, and then sell these goods
abroad.
(6) The PRC's stated goal in its MIC2025 policy is to
advance production in the PRC from products that are ``Made in
China'' to those that are ``Created in China'', using the
underpinnings of MIC2025 to transform foreign innovations into
a homegrown industrial base to promote scientific,
technological, and manufacturing independence.
(7) In 2021, the CCP's Central Committee published a
resolution on its self-made achievements over the course of the
past century, stating that PRC ``self-reliance in science and
technology'' and its ``bolstered . . . creation, protection,
and application of intellectual property rights'' are key
tenets of boosting the CCP's position, while not including
references to foreign trade or economic and commercial
partnerships as a part of its advancement.
(8) In November 2022, during the CCP's Party Congress, the
CCP noted again that science and technological innovation are
core tenets of the PRC's development and according to the PRC's
Ministry of Science and Technology, international collaborative
science and technology efforts are ultimately focused on
boosting the PRC's security.
(9) Importantly, that along with the MIC2025 plan, there is
a policy of ``dual-circulation'', both policies which are
overseen by General Secretary Xi Jinping, that seek to transfer
into the PRC the globe's innovative technical ideas and
products, produce them domestically for their own large
population, and then sell them abroad to obtain growing shares
of foreign markets, all the while protecting those domestic
businesses from foreign competition.
(10) To further support ``dual-circulation'' and speed its
MIC2025 developments, the PRC uses officially sanctioned tools
such as unfair government subsidies, state-sponsored talent
acquisition programs, lax labor and environmental regulations,
coerced foreign investments and acquisitions, direct state
investments and policy direction, burdensome paperwork
requirements for foreign firms, and forced transfers of
intellectual property.
(11) The CCP broadly uses a national concept of military-
civil fusion to adapt and adopt civilian technologies--either
domestically produced or taken from abroad--to boost its
military capabilities.
(12) The CCP has over the past few years and especially in
2023, broadened and deepened the scope of its
counterintelligence and data security laws, along with the use
of these laws against businesses from other countries.
(13) MIC2025 is rapidly coming to a close, and the next
steps include a CCP desire to dominate international standard
setting by 2035 and be the global leader in technological
innovation, manufacturing, industrial production, and military
capabilities by 2049, supported by its 14th Five Year Plan and
its National Medium- to Long-Term Science and Technology
Development Plan. These plans' intentions focus on basic
science, domestication of critical commercial areas and getting
the PRC to the forefront of ``this century's critical
technologies''.
SEC. 2. PUBLICLY-KNOWN MALIGN CCP ACTIONS SUPPORTING ITS MIC2025 GOALS.
The House of Representatives finds the following:
(1) In March 2023, the PRC Commerce Minister stated that
2023 would be a year of ``Invest[ing] in China'', in front of
global business executives, stating the PRC sought to boost
investments in its manufacturing and high-tech sectors and that
the PRC would reduce restrictions on foreign firms. However,
the government took immediate actions to the contrary.
(2) In April 2023, the National People's Congress passed an
updated and newly expanded counterespionage law stating that
any, ``attempts to illegally obtain or share state secrets or
other data, materials, or items related to national security or
national interests, which are carried out by or for foreign
elements other than an espionage organization . . .'' is
punishable, without defining ``national security'', ``national
interests'', or organizations of concern, while reiterating the
policy that all aspects of society are to collect, report, and
defend against any transgressions against the government.
(3) In 2023, PRC authorities raided global consulting firms
Bain & Company, Capvision, and Mintz Group on the grounds of
collecting and assessing PRC business data, which have been a
routine part of these companies' business operations.
(4) General Secretary Xi Jinping has overseen an expansive
growth in national security laws that are loosely defined and
nebulously enforced with no legal recourse and requiring
mandatory cooperation. These laws include the new
Counterespionage Law, the National Security Law, the Foreign
NGO Management Law, the National Intelligence Law, the Hong
Kong National Security Law, and the Data Security Law.
(5) In 2023, PRC regulators put on notice United States
semiconductor company Micron Technologies by embarking on a
surprise investigation without claiming any vulnerabilities in
Micron's products and without concrete evidence that PRC
regulators needed to ``secur[e] the information of
infrastructure of [China's] supply chain'', ostensibly for
national security reasons.
(6) In 2023, the PRC's State Administration for Market
Regulation reportedly slowed and denied its review process
slowed its review process of United States global acquisitions
and mergers, while requiring United States firms make available
all of their products in the PRC that are available to other
countries in a likely effort to dull United States export
controls.
(7) In 2022, the Department of Justice indicted the PRC
firm Hytera Communications Corp for retro-engineering and
stealing proprietary Motorola technology, which Hytera then
sold abroad.
(8) In 2021, a PRC front company named ``LinkOcean''
falsified its business information to steal and transfer to a
PRC military university on the Department of Commerce's Entity
List over $100,000 in special underwater marine technologies.
(9) In 2020, the PRC software technology firm Baidu used
fake ad-clicking software to boost its ad revenues, while
stealing user information and transmitting it back to the PRC.
(10) Since 2020, the CCP has not fulfilled its obligations
under the Phase One Trade Agreement between the United States
and the PRC and continues to require the transfer of sensitive
United States agricultural company knowledge to PRC firms.
(11) In 2019, United States firm Akhan Semiconductor's
proprietary glass was stolen by PRC telecommunications firm
Huawei, who attempted to retro-engineer it in violation of
United States export control law.
(12) In 2018, United States wind energy firm ASMC, after
signing a sales deal with the PRC firm Sinovel Wind Group Co.,
Ltd., had its proprietary intellectual property stolen by
Sinovel, who then manufactured ASMC's products and sold the
products in the United States.
(13) In 2017, PRC cyber actors were caught widely illicitly
collecting private business information on sectors across the
MIC2025 portfolio.
(14) In 2016, a PRC seed company illicitly acquired and
intended to smuggle proprietary seeds from Iowa to the PRC,
while to this day the PRC agricultural seed market remains
blocked from foreign competition.
(15) Throughout the 2020s, PRC state-sanctioned cyber actor
``APT 41'' conducted operations in line with MIC2025, stealing
at least hundreds of billions of dollars worth of intellectual
property from multinational corporations, much of which was
emerging technology or not yet invented products.
(16) According to a Center for Strategic and International
Studies analysis of publicly known PRC espionage cases, which
vastly outnumber any other foreign state, almost half of the
perpetrators were military affiliates, almost half used cyber
means to steal data, and over half sought to collect commercial
information.
(17) The PRC's Tax Bureau previously ordered United States
companies doing business in the PRC to use software
purposefully loaded with malicious malware.
(18) PRC ``Talent Programs'' have been used to select
certain well-placed individuals to target certain United States
research sectors to compromise intellectual property,
tarnishing the sanctity of open and transparent norms of
international research, international academic collaboration,
and America's vibrant and vital foreign student researcher
population.
(19) The China Scholarship Council, which facilitates high
performing PRC students studying abroad and foreign students to
study in the PRC, has been found to require students sign
Council contracts that require reporting on their work to PRC
officials and limitations on students' academic freedom while
abroad.
(20) The CCP allows forced labor, low environmental
standards, mandated overproduction of products, and minimal
worker safeguards, all of which act as non-monetary subsidies
to cheapen products from the PRC.
(21) Since General Secretary Xi Jinping assumed power, he
re-asserted the role of state-owned enterprises in the economy
and increased the purchases of shares in private PRC
businesses.
(22) The Department of Commerce, because of continued PRC
government intervention into important sectors of the PRC
economy, continues to certify that the PRC remains a non-market
economy, alongside the Republic of Armenia, the Republic of
Azerbaijan, the Republic of Belarus, Georgia, the Kyrgyz
Republic, the Republic of Moldova, the Russian Federation, the
Republic of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, the Republic of
Uzbekistan, and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.
(23) Upon widespread public acknowledgment and initial
United States action to confront MIC2025, the CCP still abides
by, but no longer publicly acknowledges MIC2025 or the detailed
plans, intentions, and activities to accomplish its 14th Five
Year Plan or long-term science and technology goals.
SEC. 3. SENSE OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.
It is the sense of the House of Representatives that--
(1) the United States finds itself in not only a security
and diplomatic competition, but one heavily based upon economic
and commercial competition;
(2) the CCP seeks to dominate the sectors in MIC2025
through unfair trade practices, such as forced labor, low
environmental standards, illegal subsidies, and stolen foreign
research and intellectual property, and then create and
recreate the products in the PRC often to be sold abroad at
cheaper-than-market rates, with the ultimate goal being to
undercut, if not bankrupt, United States businesses and stifle
United States manufacturing and investments in critical future
technologies;
(3) all United States businesses, research institutions,
and United States Federal entities involved in cutting edge
research and design--no matter their size, funding, or where
they are located--are MIC2025 targets for CCP disruption,
intelligence collection, intellectual property theft, unfair
competitive practices, and commercial coercion;
(4) United States science and technology firms should
prepare themselves for growing unfair trade practices and
continued theft of intellectual property, particularly as Xi
Jinping's tenure continues;
(5) United States public, private, and non-profit
collaboration will drive United States innovation and must do
so with speed and purpose, as this era of strategic competition
will be won by close, coordinated, and collaborative work
between the United States public, private, and non-profit
sectors and strategic partners abroad;
(6) United States businesses, non-profits, academia, and
Federal entities should review their security practices to
protect their buildings, technology, products, proprietary
knowledge, and personnel from all undue foreign interference
and espionage, including instituting thorough screenings and
reviews for business or research collaborations with countries
and entities that are named in sanctions or export control
documents or are known to use illicit third party entities,
such as ``shell companies'', to subvert import restrictions or
obfuscate dual-use military interests in seemingly benign
civilian research efforts;
(7) United States businesses, non-profits, academia, and
Federal entities involved in MIC2025 areas should review and
invest in Federal and State guidelines on cybersecurity
practices and tools, research security standards, and
counterintelligence risk postures;
(8) every United States Government agency and department
should orient their internal resources and postures to prepare
for an era of strategic competition with the CCP, which will
affect security, diplomatic, economic, and commercial factors;
(9) Federal entities should also seek to boost outreach to
the private, academic, and non-profits sectors to find new ways
to partner in science and technical efforts, alongside new ways
to protect United States innovation;
(10) United States Government agencies and departments
should review their regulations and processes to ensure that
internal rulemaking does not unnecessarily slow the United
States ability to compete with the CCP and that it protects
United States ingenuity and commercial products, while keeping
pace with the rate of scientific, technological, manufacturing,
and commercial advancements;
(11) the Department of Commerce finds itself at the
frontline of global strategic competition;
(12) Congress should support the Department of Commerce's
efforts at home and abroad while conducting rigorous oversight
to ensure the Department is prioritizing the long-term interest
of the national security, economic security, and well-being of
the United States;
(13) Federal entities should support United States private
and research institutions organizations that seek to diversify
their supply chains, increase their understanding of the level
of PRC-produced content in their supply chains, or extend trade
relationships with new Pacific partners;
(14) United States treaty allies and non-treaty partners
have a tremendous part to play in strategic competition and the
United States Government should seek to bolster diplomatic and
commercial relationships with these partners;
(15) the United States desires a stable and fair playing
field in its commercial relationships abroad, with reciprocal
access and mutual benefits, and the United States values
international research and development relationships based upon
trust and goodwill; and
(16) opposes the above-mentioned unfair, aggressive actions
and policies of the CCP and supports the people of the PRC in
creating an economy that is open to honest global partnership,
free from malign intent, and aligns with the norms of modern
global trade.
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