[Congressional Bills 116th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Res. 206 Engrossed in House (EH)]

<DOC>
H. Res. 206

                In the House of Representatives, U. S.,

                                                        March 13, 2019.
Whereas money laundering and other financial crimes are serious threats to our 
        national and economic security;
Whereas the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime has reported ``The 
        estimated amount of money laundered globally in one year is 2 -- 5% of 
        global GDP, or $800 billion -- $2 trillion in current US dollars'';
Whereas the scale, efficiency, and complexity of the U.S. financial system make 
        it a prime target for those who seek to conceal, launder, and move the 
        proceeds of illicit activity;
Whereas money launderers, terrorist financiers, corrupt individuals and 
        organizations, and their facilitators have proven to adapt quickly in 
        order to avoid detection;
Whereas given the global nature of money laundering and terrorist financing, and 
        the increasing interrelatedness within the financial system, a secure 
        national and multilateral framework is essential to the integrity of the 
        U.S. financial system;
Whereas extensive collaboration among financial regulators, the Department of 
        the Treasury, law enforcement, and the private sector is required to 
        curtail the illicit flow of money throughout the United States;
Whereas despite how extensive and effective these efforts are in the United 
        States, there is still substantial room for improvement;
Whereas financial compliance, reporting, investigation, and collaboration, as 
        well as courageous whistleblowers and investigative reporting have had 
        significant impact in shining sunlight on the people and institutions 
        behind dark money and markets;
Whereas in 2016, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the international 
        standards setting body, evaluated the United States' anti-money 
        laundering/combating the financing of terrorism measures and determined 
        the United States has significant gaps in its framework;
Whereas in 2016, the FATF found that in the United States, ``Minimal measures 
        are imposed on designated non-financial businesses and professions 
        (DNFBPs), other than casinos and dealers in precious metals and 
        stones'';
Whereas in 2016, the FATF recommended, ``The U.S. should conduct a vulnerability 
        analysis of the minimally covered DNFBP sectors to address the higher 
        risks to which these sectors are exposed, and consider what measures 
        could be introduced to address them'';
Whereas dealers in arts and antiquities are not, by definition, covered 
        ``financial institutions'' required to comply with the Bank Secrecy Act;
Whereas Federal authorities have cautioned that art collectors and dealers to be 
        particularly careful trading Near Eastern antiquities, warning that 
        artifacts plundered by terrorist organizations such as the Islamic State 
        of Iraq and the Levant are entering the marketplace;
Whereas, according to the Antiquities Coalition, ``because the United States is 
        the largest destination for archaeological and ethnological objects from 
        around the world, the discovery of recently looted and trafficked 
        artifacts in our country not only makes Americans and our institutions 
        accessories to crimes, but also threatens our relations with other 
        countries'';
Whereas the real-estate industry, both commercial and residential, is exempt 
        from having to develop and implement a four-pillar anti-money laundering 
        program pursuant to the Bank Secrecy Act;
Whereas it was asserted in a 2018 Conference Report by the Terrorism, 
        Transnational Crime and Corruption Center at the Schar School of Policy 
        and Government of George Mason University, money laundering in real 
        estate (MLRE) has damaging effects on local economies by negatively 
        impacting property prices and dislocating residents;
Whereas in 2017, in response to evidence about significant money laundering 
        through real estate in the United States, the Financial Crimes 
        Enforcement Network (FinCEN) issued Geographic Targeting Orders (GTOs) 
        requiring limited beneficial ownership disclosure in certain 
        transactions involving high-end luxury real estate and ``found that 
        about 30 percent of the transactions covered by the GTOs involve a 
        beneficial owner or purchaser representative that is also the subject of 
        a previous suspicious activity report'';
Whereas the influx of illicit money, including from Russian oligarchs, has 
        flowed largely unimpeded into the United States through these anonymous 
        shell companies and into U.S. investments, including luxury high-end 
        real estate;
Whereas the United States has not fulfilled the recommended steps to address the 
        money-laundering loopholes that the FATF has identified with DNFBP 
        sectors;
Whereas high-profile enforcement actions against some of the largest and most 
        sophisticated financial institutions raise troubling questions about the 
        effectiveness of U.S. domestic anti-money laundering and 
        counterterrorism financing regulatory, compliance, and enforcement 
        efforts;
Whereas there are financial institutions and individuals employed therein which 
        continue to engage in egregious violations of the Bank Secrecy Act and 
        enter into deferred prosecution agreements and non-prosecution 
        agreements rather than facing convictions and sentences corresponding to 
        the severity of their violations;
Whereas effective anti-money laundering programs must emphasize sound corporate 
        governance, including business-line accountability and clear lines of 
        legal responsibility for individuals; and
Whereas anti-money laundering examinations in recent years at times failed to 
        recognize the cumulative effect of the violations they cited, instead 
        narrowly focusing their attention on individual banking units, thus 
        permitting national banks to avoid and delay correcting problems, which 
        allowed massive problems to occur before serious enforcement actions 
        were taken: Now, therefore, be it
    Resolved, That the House of Representatives--
            (1) acknowledges that the lack of sunlight and transparency in 
        financial transactions poses a threat to our national security and our 
        economy's security;
            (2) supports efforts to close loopholes that allow corruption, 
        terrorism, and money laundering to infiltrate our country's financial 
        system;
            (3) encourages transparency to detect, deter, and interdict 
        individuals, entities, and networks engaged in money laundering and 
        other financial crimes;
            (4) urges financial institutions to comply with the Bank Secrecy Act 
        and anti-money laundering laws and regulations; and
            (5) affirms that financial institutions and individuals should be 
        held accountable for money laundering and terror financing crimes and 
        violations.
            Attest:

                                                                          Clerk.