[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 3524 Reported in House (RH)]
<DOC>
Union Calendar No. 486
117th CONGRESS
2d Session
H. R. 3524
[Report No. 117-667, Part I]
To revitalize and reassert United States leadership, investment, and
engagement in the Indo-Pacific region and globally.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
May 25, 2021
Mr. Meeks introduced the following bill; which was referred to the
Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committees on
Financial Services, Ways and Means, the Judiciary, and Intelligence
(Permanent Select), for a period to be subsequently determined by the
Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall
within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned
December 30, 2022
Reported from the Committee on Foreign Affairs with an amendment
[Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert the part printed
in italic]
December 30, 2022
Committees on Financial Services, Ways and Means, the Judiciary, and
Intelligence (Permanent Select) discharged; committed to the Committee
of the Whole House on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed
[For text of introduced bill, see copy of bill as introduced on May 25,
2021]
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To revitalize and reassert United States leadership, investment, and
engagement in the Indo-Pacific region and globally.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Ensuring American
Global Leadership and Engagement Act'' or the ``EAGLE Act''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as
follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.
Sec. 3. Findings.
Sec. 4. Statement of policy.
Sec. 5. Sense of Congress.
Sec. 6. Rules of construction.
TITLE I--INVESTING IN AMERICAN COMPETITIVENESS
Subtitle A--Science and Technology
Sec. 101. Authorization to assist United States companies with global
supply chain diversification and
management.
Sec. 102. Report on national technology and industrial base.
Subtitle B--Global Infrastructure and Energy Development
Sec. 111. Appropriate committees of Congress defined.
Sec. 112. Sense of Congress on international quality infrastructure
investment standards.
Sec. 113. Supporting economic independence from the People's Republic
of China.
Sec. 114. Strategy for advanced and reliable energy infrastructure.
Sec. 115. Report on the People's Republic of China's investments in
foreign energy development.
Subtitle C--Economic Diplomacy and Leadership
Sec. 121. Findings on regional economic order.
Sec. 122. Review of trade and economic engagement globally of the
People's Republic of China.
Sec. 123. Report on entrenching American economic diplomacy in the
Indo-Pacific.
Sec. 124. Sense of Congress on the need to bolster American leadership
in the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation.
Sec. 125. Strategy on deterrence of economic coercion.
Sec. 126. Sense of Congress on digital technology issues.
Sec. 127. Digital trade agreements.
Sec. 128. Digital connectivity and cybersecurity partnership.
Sec. 129. Sense of Congress on ideological competition.
Subtitle D--Financial Diplomacy and Leadership
Sec. 131. Findings on Chinese financial industrial policy.
Sec. 132. Report on importance of American financial strength for
global leadership.
Sec. 133. Review of Chinese companies on United States capital markets.
Sec. 134. Report on diplomatic and economic implications of changes to
cross-border payment and financial
messaging systems.
TITLE II--INVESTING IN ALLIANCES AND PARTNERSHIPS
Subtitle A--Strategic and Diplomatic Matters
Sec. 201. Appropriate committees of Congress defined.
Sec. 202. United States commitment and support for allies and partners
in the Indo-Pacific.
Sec. 203. Boosting Quad cooperation.
Sec. 204. Establishment of Quad Intra-Parliamentary Working Group.
Sec. 205. Statement of policy on cooperation with ASEAN.
Sec. 206. Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative.
Sec. 207. Sense of Congress on negotiations with G7 and G20 countries.
Sec. 208. Enhancing the United States-Taiwan partnership.
Sec. 209. Taiwan diplomatic review.
Sec. 210. Taiwan Peace and Stability Act.
Sec. 211. Taiwan International Solidarity Act.
Sec. 212. Taiwan Fellowship Program.
Sec. 213. Increasing Department of State personnel and resources
devoted to the Indo-Pacific.
Sec. 214. Report on bilateral efforts to address Chinese fentanyl
trafficking.
Sec. 215. Facilitation of increased equity investments under the Better
Utilization of Investments Leading to
Development Act of 2018.
Sec. 216. Expanding investment by United States International
Development Finance Corporation for vaccine
manufacturing.
Sec. 217. Ensuring United States diplomatic posts align with American
strategic national security and economic
objectives.
Sec. 218. Authorization of appropriations for the Fulbright-Hays
Program.
Sec. 219. Supporting independent media and countering disinformation.
Sec. 219A. Global Engagement Center.
Sec. 219B. Report on origins of the COVID-19 pandemic.
Sec. 219C. Extension of Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018.
Sec. 219D. Investment, trade, and development in Africa and Latin
America and the Caribbean.
Sec. 219E. China Watcher Program.
Sec. 219F. Liu Xiaobo Fund for Study of the Chinese Language.
Sec. 219G. Oversight of funds made available through the American
Rescue Plan Act of 2021.
Sec. 219H. Requirements relating to vaccine branding.
Subtitle B--International Security Matters
Sec. 221. Appropriate committees of Congress.
Sec. 222. Additional funding for international military education and
training in the Indo-Pacific.
Sec. 223. Statement of policy on maritime freedom of operations in
international waterways and airspace of the
Indo-Pacific and on artificial land
features in the South China Sea.
Sec. 224. Report on capability development of Indo-Pacific allies and
partners.
Sec. 225. Statement of policy regarding the threat posed by the Chinese
Communist Party to the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization.
Sec. 226. Identification of PLA-supported institutions.
Subtitle C--Multilateral Strategies to Bolster American Power
Sec. 231. Findings on multilateral engagement.
Sec. 232. Statement of policy on America's multilateral engagement.
Sec. 233. Support for Americans at the United Nations.
Sec. 234. Junior professional officers.
Sec. 235. Report on American employment in international organizations.
Subtitle D--Regional Strategies to Bolster American Power
Sec. 241. Statement of policy on cooperation with allies and partners
around the world.
Part I--Western Hemisphere
Sec. 242. Sense of Congress regarding United States-Canada relations.
Sec. 243. Sense of Congress regarding China's arbitrary imprisonment of
Canadian citizens.
Sec. 244. Strategy to enhance cooperation with Canada.
Sec. 245. Strategy to strengthen economic competitiveness, governance,
human rights, and the rule of law in Latin
America and the Caribbean.
Sec. 246. Engagement in international organizations and the defense
sector in Latin America and the Caribbean.
Sec. 247. Defense cooperation in Latin America and the Caribbean.
Sec. 248. Engagement with civil society in Latin America and the
Caribbean regarding accountability, human
rights, and the risks of pervasive
surveillance technologies.
Sec. 249. Caribbean energy initiative as alternative to China's Belt
and Road Initiative.
Sec. 250. United States-Caribbean Resilience Partnership.
Sec. 251. Countering China's educational and cultural diplomacy in
Latin America.
Sec. 252. Narcotics trafficking in Latin America and the Caribbean.
Part II--Transatlantic Relationships
Sec. 255. Sense of Congress on transatlantic relationships.
Sec. 256. Strategy to enhance transatlantic cooperation with respect to
the People's Republic of China.
Sec. 257. Enhancing transatlantic cooperation on promoting private
sector finance.
Sec. 258. Report and briefing on cooperation between China and Iran and
between China and Russia.
Part III--South and Central Asia
Sec. 261. Sense of Congress on South and Central Asia.
Sec. 262. Strategy to enhance cooperation with South and Central Asia.
Sec. 263. Indian Ocean region strategic review.
Part IV--Africa
Sec. 271. Assessment of political, economic, and security activity of
the People's Republic of China in Africa.
Sec. 272. Increasing the competitiveness of the United States in
Africa.
Sec. 273. Digital security cooperation with respect to Africa.
Sec. 274. Support for Young African Leaders Initiative.
Sec. 275. Africa broadcasting networks.
Sec. 276. Africa energy security and diversification.
Part V--Middle East and North Africa
Sec. 281. Strategy to counter Chinese influence in, and access to, the
Middle East and North Africa.
Sec. 282. Sense of Congress on Middle East and North Africa engagement.
Sec. 283. Sense of Congress on People's Republic of China-Iran
relationship.
Part VI--Arctic Region
Sec. 285. Arctic diplomacy.
Sec. 286. Statement of policy regarding observer status for Taiwan on
the Arctic Council.
Part VII--Oceania
Sec. 291. Statement of policy on United States engagement in Oceania.
Sec. 292. Oceania strategic roadmap.
Sec. 293. Oceania Security Dialogue.
Sec. 294. Oceania Peace Corps partnerships.
Part VIII--Pacific Islands
Sec. 295. Short title.
Sec. 296. Findings.
Sec. 297. Statement of policy.
Sec. 298. Definition.
Sec. 299. Authority to consolidate reports; form of reports.
Sec. 299A. Diplomatic presence in the Pacific Islands.
Sec. 299B. Coordination with regional allies and partners.
Sec. 299C. Climate resilient development in the Pacific Islands.
Sec. 299D. International law enforcement academy for the Pacific
Islands.
Sec. 299E. Security assistance for the Pacific Islands.
Sec. 299F. Countering transnational crime.
Sec. 299G. Emergency preparedness initiative for the Pacific Islands.
Sec. 299H. Peace Corps in the Pacific Islands.
TITLE III--INVESTING IN OUR VALUES
Sec. 301. Statement of Congress on the continued violation of rights
and freedoms of the people of Hong Kong.
Sec. 302. Authorization of appropriations for promotion of democracy in
Hong Kong.
Sec. 303. Hong Kong people's freedom and choice.
Sec. 304. Export prohibition of munitions items to the Hong Kong police
force.
Sec. 305. Sense of Congress on treatment of Uyghurs and other ethnic
minorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonomous Region.
Sec. 306. Prevention of Uyghur forced labor.
Sec. 307. Uyghur human rights protection.
Sec. 308. Removal of members of the United Nations Human Rights Council
that commit human rights abuses.
Sec. 309. Policy with respect to Tibet.
Sec. 310. United States policy and international engagement on the
succession or reincarnation of the Dalai
Lama and religious freedom of Tibetan
Buddhists.
Sec. 311. Development and deployment of internet freedom and Great
Firewall circumvention tools for the people
of Hong Kong.
Sec. 312. Authorization of appropriations for protecting human rights
in the People's Republic of China.
Sec. 313. Modifications to and reauthorization of sanctions with
respect to human rights violations.
Sec. 314. Sense of Congress condemning anti-Asian racism and
discrimination.
Sec. 315. Annual reporting on censorship of free speech with respect to
international abuses of human rights.
Sec. 316. Policy toward the XXIV Olympic Winter Games and the XIII
Paralympic Winter Games.
Sec. 317. Review and controls on export of items with critical
capabilities to enable human rights abuses.
Sec. 318. Sense of Congress on commercial export control policy.
Sec. 319. Imposition of sanctions with respect to systematic rape,
coercive abortion, forced sterilization, or
involuntary contraceptive implantation in
the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.
Sec. 320. Sense of Congress regarding censorship of political speech.
Sec. 321. Report on manner and extent to which the Government of China
exploits Hong Kong to circumvent United
States laws and protections.
Sec. 322. Sense of Congress regarding annual Country Reports on Human
Rights Practices.
Sec. 323. Sense of Congress regarding press freedom in the People's
Republic of China.
Sec. 324. United States Special Envoy for Xinjiang Province.
Sec. 325. China Censorship Monitor and Action Group.
Sec. 326. Public disclosure on BIS licensing information.
TITLE IV--INVESTING IN OUR ECONOMIC STATECRAFT
Sec. 401. Sense of Congress regarding the People's Republic of China's
industrial policy.
Sec. 402. Economic defense response teams.
Sec. 403. Countering overseas kleptocracy.
Sec. 404. Annual report on Chinese surveillance companies.
TITLE V--ENSURING STRATEGIC SECURITY
Sec. 501. Cooperation on a strategic nuclear dialogue.
Sec. 502. Report on United States efforts to engage the People's
Republic of China on nuclear issues and
ballistic missile issues.
Sec. 503. Countering the People's Republic of China's proliferation of
ballistic missiles and nuclear technology
to the Middle East.
TITLE VI--INVESTING IN A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE
Sec. 601. Ensuring national security and economic priorities with the
People's Republic of China and other
countries account for environmental issues
and climate change.
Sec. 602. Enhancing security considerations for global climate
disruptions.
Sec. 603. Balancing accountability and cooperation with China.
Sec. 604. Promoting responsible development alternatives to the
People's Republic of China's Belt and Road
Initiative.
Sec. 605. Using climate diplomacy to better serve national security and
economic interests.
Sec. 606. Driving a global climate change resilience strategy.
Sec. 607. Addressing international climate change mitigation,
adaptation, and security.
Sec. 608. Reducing the negative impacts from black carbon, methane, and
high-GWP hydrofluorocarbons.
Sec. 609. Building United States economic growth and technological
innovation through the Green Climate Fund.
Sec. 610. Ensuring a whole-of-government response to climate action.
Sec. 611. Working with international partners to reduce deforestation.
Sec. 612. Controlling the export of electronic waste to protect United
States supply chains.
SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--Unless otherwise
defined, the term ``appropriate congressional committees''
means--
(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate; and
(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House
of Representatives.
(2) CCP.--The term ``CCP'' means the Chinese Communist
Party.
(3) People's liberation army; pla.--The terms ``People's
Liberation Army'' and ``PLA'' mean the armed forces of the
People's Republic of China.
(4) PRC; china.--The terms ``PRC'' and ``China'' mean the
People's Republic of China.
SEC. 3. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The People's Republic of China (PRC) is leveraging its
political, diplomatic, economic, military, technological, and
ideological power to become a strategic, near-peer, global
competitor of the United States. The policies increasingly
pursued by the PRC in these domains are contrary to the
interests and values of the United States, its partners, and
much of the rest of the world.
(2) A number of policies being pursued by the PRC--
(A) threaten the future character of the
international order and are shaping the rules, norms,
and institutions that govern relations among states;
(B) will put at risk the ability of the United
States to secure its national interests; and
(C) will put at risk the future peace, prosperity,
and freedom of the international community in the
coming decades.
(3) After normalizing diplomatic relations with the PRC in
1979, the United States actively worked to advance the PRC's
economic and social development to ensure that it participated
in, and benefited from, the free and open international order.
The United States pursued these goals and contributed to the
welfare of the Chinese people by--
(A) increasing the PRC's trade relations and access
to global capital markets;
(B) promoting the PRC's accession to the World
Trade Organization;
(C) providing development finance and technical
assistance;
(D) promoting research collaboration;
(E) educating the PRC's top students;
(F) permitting transfers of cutting-edge
technologies and scientific knowledge; and
(G) providing intelligence and military assistance.
(4) It is now clear that the PRC has chosen to pursue
state-led, mercantilist economic policies, an increasingly
authoritarian governance model at home through increased
restrictions on personal freedoms, and an aggressive and
assertive foreign policy. These policies frequently and
deliberately undermine United States interests and are contrary
to core United States values and the values of other nations,
both in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. In response to this
strategic decision of the CCP, the United States has been
compelled to reexamine and revise its strategy towards the PRC
and reanimate its defense of the international order.
(5) The General Secretary of the CCP and the Chairman of
the People's Republic of China, Xi Jinping, has elevated the
``Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation'' as central to the
domestic and foreign policy of the PRC. His program demands--
(A) strong, centralized CCP leadership;
(B) concentration of military power;
(C) a dominant role for the CCP in the state and
the economy;
(D) an aggressive foreign policy seeking control
over broadly asserted territorial claims; and
(E) the denial of any universal values and
individual rights that are deemed to threaten the CCP.
(6) The PRC views its Leninist model of governance as
superior to, and at odds with, the constitutional models of the
United States and other democracies. This approach to
governance is lauded by the CCP as essential to securing the
PRC's status as a global leader, and to shaping the future of
the world. In a 2013 speech, General Secretary Xi said, ``We
firmly believe that as socialism with Chinese characteristics
develops further . . . it is . . . inevitable that the
superiority of our socialist system will be increasingly
apparent . . . [and] our country's road of development will
have increasingly greater influence on the world.''.
(7) The PRC's objectives are to first establish regional
hegemony over the Indo-Pacific and then to use that dominant
position to propel the PRC to become the ``leading world
power'', shaping an international order that is conducive to
the its interests. Achieving these objectives requires turning
the PRC into a wealthy nation under strict CCP rule by using a
strong military and advanced technological capability to pursue
the PRC's objectives, regardless of other countries' interests.
(8) The PRC is reshaping the current international order,
which is built upon the rule of law and free and open ideals
and principles, by conducting global information and influence
operations, seeking to redefine international laws and norms to
align with the objectives of the CCP, rejecting the legitimacy
of internationally recognized human rights, and seeking to co-
opt the leadership and agenda of multinational organizations
for the benefit of the PRC and other authoritarian regimes at
the expense of the interests of the United States and the
international community.
(9) The PRC is encouraging other countries to follow its
model of development and governance. During the 19th Party
Congress in 2017, General Secretary Xi said that the PRC could
serve as a model of development for other countries by
utilizing ``Chinese wisdom'' and a ``Chinese approach to
solving problems''.
(10) The PRC is promoting its governance model and
attempting to weaken other models of governance by--
(A) undermining democratic institutions;
(B) subverting financial institutions;
(C) coercing businesses to accommodate the policies
of the PRC; and
(D) using disinformation to disguise the nature of
the actions described in subparagraphs (A) through (C).
(11) The PRC is progressing toward becoming the global
leader in science and technology. In May 2018, General
Secretary Xi said that for the PRC to reach ``prosperity and
rejuvenation'', it needs to ``endeavor to be a major world
center for science and innovation''. The PRC has invested the
equivalent of billions of dollars into education and research
and development and established joint scientific research
centers and science universities.
(12) The PRC's drive to become a ``manufacturing and
technological superpower'' and to promote ``innovation with
Chinese characteristics'' is coming at the expense of human
rights and longstanding international rules and norms with
respect to economic competition, and presents a challenge to
United States national security and the security of allies and
like-minded countries. In particular, the PRC advances its
illiberal political and social policies through mass
surveillance, social credit systems, and a significant role of
the state in internet governance. Through these means, the PRC
increases direct and indirect government control over its
citizens' everyday lives. Its national strategy of ``civil-
military fusion'' mandates that civil and commercial research,
which increasingly drives global innovation, is leveraged to
develop new military capabilities.
(13) The PRC is using legal and illegal means to achieve
its objective of becoming a manufacturing and technological
superpower. The PRC uses state-directed industrial policies in
anticompetitive ways to ensure the dominance of PRC companies.
The CCP engages in and encourages actions that actively
undermine a free and open international market, such as
intellectual property theft, forced technology transfers,
regulatory and financial subsidies, and mandatory CCP access to
proprietary data as part of business and commercial agreements
between Chinese and foreign companies.
(14) The policies referred to in paragraph (13) are
designed to freeze United States and other foreign firms out of
the PRC market, while eroding competition in other important
markets. The heavy subsidization of Chinese companies includes
potential violation of its World Trade Organization
commitments. In May 2018, General Secretary Xi said that the
PRC aims to keep the ``initiatives of innovation and
development security . . . in [China's] own hands''.
(15) The PRC is advancing its global objectives through a
variety of avenues, including its signature initiative, the
Belt and Road Initiative (referred to in this section as
``BRI''), which is enshrined in the Chinese Constitution and
includes the Digital Silk Road and Health Silk Road. The PRC
describes BRI as a straightforward and wholly beneficial plan
for all countries. Eventually, it seeks to create a web of
economic relations with the PRC at its center, making it the
most concrete geographical representation of the PRC's global
ambitions. BRI increases the economic influence of state-owned
PRC firms in global markets, enhances the PRC's political
leverage with government leaders around the world, and provides
greater access to strategic nodes such as ports and railways.
Through BRI, the PRC seeks political deference through economic
dependence.
(16) The PRC is executing a plan to establish regional
hegemony over the Indo-Pacific and displace the United States
from the region. As a Pacific power, the United States has
built and supported enduring alliances and economic
partnerships that secure peace and prosperity and promote the
rule of law and political pluralism in a free and open Indo-
Pacific. In contrast, the PRC uses economic and military
coercion in the region to secure its own interests.
(17) The PRC's military strategy seeks to keep the United
States military from operating in the Western Pacific and
erodes United States security guarantees.
(18) The PRC is aggressively pursuing exclusive control of
critical land routes, sea lanes, and air space in the Indo-
Pacific in the hopes of eventually exercising greater influence
beyond the region. This includes lanes crucial to commercial
activity, energy exploration, transport, and the exercise of
security operations in areas permitted under international law.
(19) The PRC seeks so-called ``reunification'' with Taiwan
through whatever means may ultimately be required. The CCP's
insistence that so-called ``reunification'' is Taiwan's only
option makes this goal inherently coercive. In January 2019,
General Secretary Xi stated that the PRC ``make[s] no promise
to renounce the use of force and reserve[s] the option of
taking all necessary means''. Taiwan's embodiment of democratic
values and economic liberalism challenges General Secretary
Xi's goal of achieving national rejuvenation. The PRC plans to
exploit Taiwan's dominant strategic position in the First
Island Chain and to project power into the Second Island Chain
and beyond.
(20) In the South China Sea, the PRC has executed an
illegal island-building campaign that threatens freedom of
navigation and the free-flow of commerce, damages the
environment, bolsters the PLA power projection capabilities,
and coerces and intimidates other regional claimants in an
effort to advance its unlawful claims and control the waters
around neighboring countries. Despite General Secretary Xi's
September 2015 speech, in which he said the PRC was not
militarizing the South China Sea, during the 2017 19th Party
Congress, General Secretary Xi announced that ``construction on
islands and reefs in the South China Sea have seen steady
progress''.
(21) The PRC is rapidly modernizing the PLA to attain a
level of capacity and capability superior to the United States
in terms of equipment and conduct of modern military operations
by shifting its military doctrine from having a force
``adequate [for] China's defensive needs'' to having a force
``commensurate with China's international status''. Ultimately,
this transformation could enable China to impose its will in
the Indo-Pacific region through the threat of military force.
In 2017, General Secretary Xi established the following
developmental benchmarks for the advancement of the PLA:
(A) A mechanized force with increased informatized
and strategic capabilities by 2020.
(B) The complete modernization of China's national
defense by 2035.
(C) The full transformation of the PLA into a
world-class force by 2050.
(22) The PRC's strategy and supporting policies described
in this section undermine United States interests, such as--
(A) upholding a free and open international order;
(B) maintaining the integrity of international
institutions with liberal norms and values;
(C) preserving a favorable balance of power in the
Indo-Pacific;
(D) ensuring the defense of its allies;
(E) preserving open sea and air lanes;
(F) fostering the free flow of commerce through
open and transparent markets; and
(G) promoting individual freedom and human rights.
(23) The global COVID-19 pandemic has intensified and
accelerated these trends in the PRC's behavior and therefore
increased the need for United States global leadership and a
competitive posture. The PRC has capitalized on the world's
focus on the COVID-19 pandemic by--
(A) moving rapidly to undermine Hong Kong's
autonomy, including imposing a so-called ``national
security law'' on Hong Kong;
(B) aggressively imposing its will in the East and
South China Seas;
(C) increasing its territorial aggression in South
Asia, including against India; and
(D) engaging in a widespread and government-
directed disinformation campaign to obscure the PRC
Government's efforts to cover up the seriousness of
COVID-19, sow confusion about the origination of the
outbreak, and discredit the United States, its allies,
and global health efforts.
(24) The CCP's disinformation campaign referred to in
paragraph (24)(D) has included--
(A) concerted efforts, in the early days of the
pandemic, to downplay the nature and scope of the
outbreak in Wuhan in the PRC, as well as cases of
person-to-person transmission;
(B) claims that the virus originated in United
States biological defense research at Fort Detrick,
Maryland;
(C) Chinese state media reports insinuating a
possible link between the virus and other United States
biological facilities; and
(D) efforts to block access to qualified
international infectious disease experts who might
contradict the CCP's narrative.
(25) In response to the PRC's strategy and policies, the
United States must adopt a policy of strategic competition with
the PRC to protect and promote our vital interests and values.
(26) The United States policy of strategic competition with
respect to the People's Republic of China is part of a broader
strategic approach to the Indo-Pacific and the world that
aligns with cooperation with United States allies and partners
to advance shared values and interests and to preserve and
enhance a free, open, democratic, inclusive, rules-based,
stable, and diverse region.
(27) The Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018 (Public
Law 115-409) contributed to a comprehensive framework for
promoting United State security interests, economic interests,
and values in the Indo-Pacific region, investing $7,500,000,000
over 5 years--
(A) to support greater security and defense
cooperation between the United States and allies and
partners in the Indo-Pacific region;
(B) to advance democracy and the protection and
promotion of human rights in the Indo-Pacific region;
(C) to enhance cybersecurity cooperation between
the United States and partners in the Indo-Pacific;
(D) to deepen people-to-people engagement through
programs such as the Young Southeast Asian Leaders
Initiative and the ASEAN Youth Volunteers program; and
(E) to enhance energy cooperation and energy
security in the Indo-Pacific region.
SEC. 4. STATEMENT OF POLICY.
(a) Objectives.--It is the policy of the United States to pursue
the following objectives:
(1) The United States global leadership role is sustained
and its political system and major foundations of national
power are secured for the long-term in the political, economic,
technological, and military domains.
(2) The United States position as an indispensable power in
the Indo-Pacific and globally is sustained through diplomacy,
multilateralism, and engagement.
(3) The United States deters military confrontation with
the PRC and both nations work to reduce the risk of conflict.
(4) The United States and its allies maintain a stable
balance of power in the Indo-Pacific with China. The United
States and its allies maintain unfettered access to the region,
including through freedom of navigation and the free flow of
commerce, consistent with international law and practice.
(5) The allies and partners of the United States--
(A) maintain confidence in United States leadership
and its commitment to the Indo-Pacific region;
(B) can withstand and combat subversion by the PRC;
and
(C) work closely with the United States in setting
global rules, norms, and standards that benefit the
international community.
(6) The combined economic and military strength of the
United States and its allies and partners demonstrates to the
PRC that the risks of attempts to dominate other states
outweigh the potential benefits.
(7) The United States leads the free, open, and rules-based
international order, which comprises resilient states and
institutions that uphold and defend principles, such as
sovereignty, rule of law, individual freedom, and human rights.
The international order is strong enough to withstand attempts
at destabilization by illiberal and authoritarian actors.
(8) The key rules, norms, and standards of international
engagement in the 21st century are maintained, including--
(A) the protection of human rights, commercial
engagement and investment, and technology; and
(B) that such rules, norms, and standards are in
alignment with the values and interests of the United
States, its allies and partners, and other stakeholders
in the liberal international order.
(9) The United States counters attempts by the PRC to--
(A) undermine open and democratic societies;
(B) distort global markets;
(C) manipulate the international trade system;
(D) coerce other nations via economic, cyber, and
military means; or
(E) use its technological advantages to undermine
individual freedoms or other states' national security
interests.
(10) The United States deters military confrontation with
the PRC and both nations work to reduce the risk of conflict.
(b) Policy.--It is the policy of the United States, in pursuit of
the objectives set forth in subsection (a)--
(1) to strengthen the United States domestic foundation by
reinvesting in market-based economic growth, education,
scientific and technological innovation, democratic
institutions, and other areas that improve the ability of the
United States to pursue its vital economic, foreign policy, and
national security interests;
(2) to pursue a strategy of strategic competition with the
PRC in the political, diplomatic, economic, development,
security, informational, and technological realms to maximize
the United States' strengths and increase the costs for the PRC
of harming the interests and values of the United States and
its partners and allies;
(3) to lead a free, open, and secure international system
characterized by the rule of law, open markets and the free
flow of commerce, and a shared commitment to security and
peaceful resolution of disputes, human rights, good and
transparent governance, and freedom from coercion;
(4) to strengthen and deepen United States alliances and
partnerships by pursuing greater bilateral and multilateral
cooperative initiatives that advance shared interests and
values and bolster partner countries' confidence that the
United States is and will remain a strong, committed, and
reliable partner that respects the views and interests of its
allies and friends;
(5) to encourage and collaborate with United States allies
and partners in boosting their own capabilities and resiliency
to pursue, defend, and protect shared interests and values,
free from coercion and external pressure;
(6) to pursue fair, reciprocal treatment and healthy,
constructive competition in United States-China economic
relations by--
(A) advancing policies that harden the United
States economy against unfair and illegal commercial or
trading practices and the coercion of United States
businesses; and
(B) improving United States laws and regulations as
necessary to prevent any PRC attempts to harm United
States economic competitiveness;
(7) to demonstrate the value of private sector-led growth
in emerging markets around the world, including through the use
of United States Government tools that--
(A) support greater private sector investment and
advance capacity-building initiatives that are grounded
in the rule of law;
(B) promote open markets;
(C) establish clear policy and regulatory
frameworks;
(D) improve the management of key economic sectors;
(E) combat corruption;
(F) foster and support greater collaboration with
and among partner countries and the United States
private sector to develop secure and sustainable
infrastructure; and
(G) support American workers and create American
jobs;
(8) to play a leading role in advancing international rules
and norms that foster free and reciprocal trade and open and
integrated markets;
(9) to conduct vigorous commercial diplomacy in support of
United States companies and businesses in partner countries
that seek fair competition;
(10) to ensure that the United States is second to none in
the innovation of critical and emerging technologies, such as
next-generation telecommunications, artificial intelligence,
quantum computing, semiconductors, and biotechnology, by--
(A) providing necessary investment and concrete
incentives for the private sector to accelerate
development of such technologies;
(B) modernizing export controls and investment
screening regimes and associated policies and
regulations;
(C) enhancing the role of the United States in
technical standards-setting bodies and avenues for
developing norms regarding the use of emerging critical
technologies;
(D) reducing United States barriers and increasing
incentives for collaboration with allies and partners
on the research and co-development of critical
technologies;
(E) collaborating with allies and partners to
protect critical technologies by--
(i) coordinating and aligning export
control measures;
(ii) building capacity for defense
technology security;
(iii) safeguarding chokepoints in
strategically critical supply chains; and
(iv) ensuring diversification; and
(F) designing major defense capabilities for export
to vetted allies and partners;
(11) to collaborate with like-minded democracies and other
willing partners to promote ideals and principles that--
(A) advance a free and open international order;
(B) strengthen democratic institutions;
(C) protect and promote human rights; and
(D) uphold a free press and fact-based reporting;
(12) to develop comprehensive strategies and policies to
counter PRC disinformation campaigns;
(13) to demonstrate effective leadership at the United
Nations, its associated agencies, and other multilateral
organizations and ensure the integrity and effectiveness of
these organizations in facilitating solutions to global
challenges;
(14) to advocate for the defense of fundamental freedoms
and human rights in the United States relationship with the
PRC;
(15) to cooperate with allies, partners, and multilateral
organizations that sustain and strengthen a free and open order
and address regional and global challenges posed by the
Government of the PRC regarding--
(A) violations and abuses of human rights;
(B) restrictions on religious practices; and
(C) the undermining and abrogation of treaties,
other international agreements, and other international
norms related to human rights;
(16) to expose the PRC's use of corruption, repression, and
coercion to attain unfair economic advantages or compel other
nations to defer to its political and strategic objectives in
ways that threaten the United States or its allies and
partners;
(17) to maintain United States access to the Western
Pacific, including through necessary investments in United
States military capabilities, policies, and concepts in the
Indo-Pacific, as well as robust cooperation, exercises, and
interoperability with allies and partners;
(18) to deter the PRC from--
(A) initiating armed conflict;
(B) coercing nations; or
(C) using grey-zone tactics below the level of
armed conflict;
(19) to strengthen United States-PRC military-to-military
communication and improve both military and civilian crisis
avoidance and management procedures to de-conflict operations
and reduce the risk of unwanted conflict, including through
high-level visits and recurrent exchanges between civilian and
military officials and other measures, in alignment with United
States interests; and
(20) to strengthen stability and reduce suspicions,
cooperate with the PRC when interests align, including through
bilateral or multilateral means and at the United Nations, as
appropriate, and especially in the following areas--
(A) global fight against climate change;
(B) nuclear security; and
(C) global financial stability.
SEC. 5. SENSE OF CONGRESS.
It is the sense of Congress that the execution of the policy
described in section 3(b) requires the following actions:
(1) Revitalizing American leadership globally and in the
Indo-Pacific will require the United States--
(A) to marshal sustained political will to protect
its vital interests, promote its values, and advance
its economic and national security objectives; and
(B) to achieve this sustained political will,
persuade the American people and United States allies
and partners of--
(i) the current challenges facing the
international rules based order; and
(ii) the need for long-term investments and
engagement to defend shared interests and
values.
(2) The United States must coordinate closely with allies
and partners to compete effectively with the PRC, including to
encourage allies and partners to assume, as appropriate,
greater roles in balancing and checking aggressive PRC
behavior.
(3) Effective United States strategy toward China
requires--
(A) bipartisan cooperation within Congress; and
(B) frequent, sustained, and meaningful
collaboration and consultation between the executive
branch and Congress.
(4) The United States must ensure close integration among
economic and foreign policymakers and provide support to the
private sector, civil society, universities and academic
institutions, and other relevant actors in free and open
societies to enable such actors--
(A) to collaborate to advance common interests; and
(B) to identify appropriate policies--
(i) to strengthen the United States and its
allies; and
(ii) to promote a compelling vision of a
free and open order.
(5) The United States must ensure that all Federal
departments, agencies, and overseas missions are organized and
resourced to effectively defend and advance United States
interests, by--
(A) dedicating more personnel in the Indo-Pacific
region, at posts around the world, and in Washington,
DC;
(B) placing greater numbers of foreign service
officers, international development professionals,
members of the foreign commercial service, intelligence
professionals, and other United States Government
personnel in the Indo-Pacific region; and
(C) ensuring that this workforce has the training,
demonstrated proficiency in language and culture,
technical skills, and other competencies required to
advance a successful strategy in relation to the PRC.
(6) The United States must place renewed priority and
emphasis on strengthening the nonmilitary instruments of
national power, including diplomacy, information, technology,
economics, foreign assistance and development finance,
commerce, intelligence, and law enforcement, which are crucial
for addressing the challenges posed by the PRC.
(7) The United States must sustain military capabilities
necessary to achieve United States political objectives in the
Indo-Pacific, including--
(A) promoting regional security in the Indo-
Pacific;
(B) reassuring allies and partners while protecting
them from coercion; and
(C) deterring PRC aggression and preventing
unwanted conflict.
(8) Competition with the PRC requires skillful adaptation
to the information environment of the 21st century. United
States public diplomacy and messaging efforts must
effectively--
(A) promote the value of partnership with the
United States; and
(B) counter CCP propaganda and disinformation that
threatens United States interests.
SEC. 6. RULES OF CONSTRUCTION.
(a) Applicability of Existing Restrictions on Assistance to Foreign
Security Forces.--Nothing in this Act shall be construed to diminish,
supplant, supersede, or otherwise restrict or prevent responsibilities
of the United States Government under section 620M of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2378d) or section 362 of title 10,
United States Code.
(b) No Authorization for the Use of Military Force.--Nothing in
this Act may be construed as authorizing the use of military force.
TITLE I--INVESTING IN AMERICAN COMPETITIVENESS
Subtitle A--Science and Technology
SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION TO ASSIST UNITED STATES COMPANIES WITH GLOBAL
SUPPLY CHAIN DIVERSIFICATION AND MANAGEMENT.
(a) Authorization to Contract Services.--The Secretary of State, in
coordination with the Secretary of Commerce, is authorized to establish
a program to facilitate the contracting by the Department of State for
the professional services of qualified experts, on a reimbursable fee
for service basis, to assist interested United States persons and
business entities with supply chain management issues related to the
People's Republic of China (PRC), including--
(1) exiting from the PRC market or relocating certain
production facilities to locations outside the PRC;
(2) diversifying sources of inputs, and other efforts to
diversify supply chains to locations outside of the PRC;
(3) navigating legal, regulatory, or other challenges in
the course of the activities described in paragraphs (1) and
(2); and
(4) identifying alternative markets for production or
sourcing outside of the PRC, including through providing market
intelligence, facilitating contact with reliable local partners
as appropriate, and other services.
(b) Chief of Mission Oversight.--The persons contracted to perform
the services described in subsection (a) shall--
(1) be under the authority of the United States Chief of
Mission in the country in which they are hired, in accordance
with existing United States laws;
(2) coordinate with Department of State and Department of
Commerce officers; and
(3) coordinate with United States missions and relevant
local partners in other countries as needed to carry out the
services described in subsection (a).
(c) Prioritization of Micro-, Small-, and Medium-sized
Enterprises.--The services described in subsection (a) shall be
prioritized for assisting micro-, small-, and medium-sized enterprises
with regard to the matters described in subsection (a).
(d) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be
appropriated $15,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026 for
the purposes of carrying out this section.
(e) Prohibition on Access to Assistance by Foreign Adversaries.--
None of the funds appropriated pursuant to this section may be provided
to an entity--
(1) under the foreign ownership, control, or influence of
the Government of the PRC or the CCP, or other foreign
adversary;
(2) determined to have beneficial ownership from foreign
individuals subject to the jurisdiction, direction, or
influence of foreign adversaries; and
(3) that has any contract in effect at the time of the
receipt of such funds, or has had a contract within the
previous one year that is no longer in effect, with--
(A) the Government of the PRC;
(B) the CCP;
(C) the PLA;
(D) an entity majority-owned, majority-controlled,
or majority-financed by the Government of the PRC, the
CCP, or the PLA; or
(E) a parent, subsidiary, or affiliate of an entity
described in subparagraph (D).
(f) Definitions.--The terms ``foreign ownership, control, or
influence'' and ``FOCI'' have the meanings given to those terms in the
National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual (DOD 5220.22-M),
or a successor document.
SEC. 102. REPORT ON NATIONAL TECHNOLOGY AND INDUSTRIAL BASE.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) a more streamlined, shared, and coordinated approach,
which leverages economies of scale with major allies, is
necessary for the United States to retain its lead in defense
technology;
(2) allowing for the export, re-export, or transfer of
defense-related technologies and services to members of the
national technology and industrial base (as defined in section
2500 of title 10, United States Code) would advance United
States security interests by helping to leverage the defense-
related technologies and skilled workforces of trusted allies
to reduce the dependence on other countries, including
countries that pose challenges to United States interests
around the world, for defense-related innovation and
investment; and
(3) it is in the interest of the United States to continue
to increase cooperation with Australia, Canada, and the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to protect
critical defense-related technology and services and leverage
the investments of like-minded, major ally nations in order to
maximize the strategic edge afforded by defense technology
innovation.
(b) Report.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit
a report to the appropriate congressional committees that--
(A) describes the Department of State's efforts to
facilitate access among the national technology and
industrial base to defense articles and services
subject to the United States Munitions List under
section 38(a)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act (22
U.S.C. 2778(a)(1)); and
(B) identifies foreign legal, regulatory, foreign
policy, or other challenges or considerations that
prevent or frustrate these efforts, to include any gaps
in the respective export control regimes implemented by
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
Australia, or Canada.
(2) Form.--This report required under paragraph (1) shall
be unclassified, but may include a classified annex.
Subtitle B--Global Infrastructure and Energy Development
SEC. 111. APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DEFINED.
In this subtitle, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress''
means--
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on
Appropriations of the Senate; and
(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
SEC. 112. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON INTERNATIONAL QUALITY INFRASTRUCTURE
INVESTMENT STANDARDS.
(a) Sense of Congress on Collaborative Standards.--It is the sense
of Congress that the United States should initiate collaboration among
governments, the private sector, and civil society to encourage the
adoption of the standards for quality global infrastructure development
advanced by the G20 at Osaka in 2018, including with respect to the
following issues:
(1) Respect for the sovereignty of countries in which
infrastructure investments are made.
(2) Anti-corruption.
(3) Rule of law.
(4) Human rights and labor rights.
(5) Fiscal and debt sustainability.
(6) Social and governance safeguards.
(7) Transparency.
(8) Environmental and energy standards.
(b) Sense of Congress on Commitment to Cooperation.--It is the
sense of Congress that the United States should launch a series of fora
around the world showcasing the commitment of the United States and
partners of the United States to high-quality development cooperation,
including with respect to the issues described in subsection (a).
SEC. 113. SUPPORTING ECONOMIC INDEPENDENCE FROM THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC
OF CHINA.
(a) Finding.--It is in the national interest of the United States
to establish a coordinated interagency strategy to marshal the
resources of the United States Government to provide foreign countries
with financing that strengthens independent economic capacity and
therefore reduces a foreign government's need to enter into agreements
with the People's Republic of China (PRC), including to obtain support
from its Belt and Road Initiative.
(b) Strategy.--
(1) Authority.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the President shall develop and
submit a strategy to the relevant congressional committees to
use the resources of Federal agencies to counteract offers of
assistance and financing from the PRC to foreign governments
that are of strategic importance to the United States.
(2) Components of strategy.--The strategy shall--
(A) identify primary sectors where the United
States could provide a competitive advantage to
increase a country's economic independence;
(B) select countries with corresponding economic
needs, with priority given to those who are vulnerable
to Chinese economic influence;
(C) identify any corresponding existing financing
available from United States Government entities to
prioritize and devise specific financing tailored to
the needs of such foreign governments if none are
currently available;
(D) identify any cooperative and complementary
assistance and financing from friendly foreign
governments, including coordinated assistance and co-
financing;
(E) create a streamlined decision-making process,
directed by the National Security Council, to devise
financing and make agency decisions and commitments on
a timely basis to support United States competitive
offers;
(F) establish a formal G7+European Commission
Working Group to develop a comprehensive strategy to
develop alternatives to the PRC's Belt and Road
Initiative for development finance; and
(G) integrate existing efforts into the strategy,
including efforts to address the Government of the
PRC's use of the United Nations to advance the Belt and
Road Initiative, including the proliferation of
memoranda of understanding between the PRC and United
Nations funds and programs regarding the implementation
of the Belt and Road Initiative.
(3) Participating agencies.--Participating Federal agencies
should include the Department of State, Department of the
Treasury, United States Agency for International Development
(USAID), United States International Development Finance
Corporation, Millennium Challenge Corporation, United States
Trade and Development Agency, Department of Commerce, and other
Federal departments and agencies as appropriate.
(4) Execution of strategy.--The President should issue an
Executive Order to implement the strategy and make such changes
in agency regulations and procedures as are necessary to put
the strategy into effect.
(5) Relevant congressional committees.--In this section,
the term ``relevant congressional committees'' means--
(A) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee
on Foreign Affairs, and the Committee on Financial
Services of the House of Representatives; and
(B) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee
on Foreign Relations, and the Committee on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate.
(c) Authority.--The Secretary of State, in coordination with the
Administrator of the USAID, is authorized to establish or continue an
initiative, to be known as the ``Infrastructure Transaction and
Assistance Network'', under which the Secretary of State, in
consultation with other relevant Federal agencies, including those
represented on the Global Infrastructure Coordinating Committee, may
carry out various programs to advance the development of sustainable,
transparent, and high-quality infrastructure worldwide in the Indo-
Pacific region by--
(1) strengthening capacity-building programs to improve
project evaluation processes, regulatory and procurement
environments, and project preparation capacity of countries
that are partners of the United States in such development;
(2) providing transaction advisory services and project
preparation assistance to support sustainable infrastructure;
and
(3) coordinating the provision of United States assistance
for the development of infrastructure, including infrastructure
that uses United States manufactured goods and services, and
catalyzing investment led by the private sector.
(d) Transaction Advisory Fund.--As part of the ``Infrastructure
Transaction and Assistance Network'' described under subsection (c),
the Secretary of State is authorized to provide support, including
through the Transaction Advisory Fund, for advisory services to help
boost the capacity of partner countries to evaluate contracts and
assess the financial and environmental impacts of potential
infrastructure projects, including through providing services such as--
(1) legal services;
(2) project preparation and feasibility studies;
(3) debt sustainability analyses;
(4) bid or proposal evaluation; and
(5) other services relevant to advancing the development of
sustainable, transparent, and high-quality infrastructure.
(e) Strategic Infrastructure Fund.----
(1) In general.--As part of the ``Infrastructure
Transaction and Assistance Network'' described under subsection
(c), the Secretary of State is authorized to provide support,
including through the Strategic Infrastructure Fund, for
technical assistance, project preparation, pipeline
development, and other infrastructure project support.
(2) Joint strategic infrastructure projects.--Funds
authorized for the Strategic Infrastructure Fund should be used
in coordination with the Department of Defense, the
International Development Finance Corporation, like-minded
donor partners, and multilateral banks, as appropriate, to
support joint infrastructure projects that are in the national
security interest of the United States and vulnerable to
strategic competitors.
(f) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be
appropriated, for each of fiscal years 2022 to 2026, $75,000,000 to the
Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance Network, of which $20,000,000
should be made available for the Transaction Advisory Fund.
SEC. 114. STRATEGY FOR ADVANCED AND RELIABLE ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE.
(a) In General.--The President shall direct a comprehensive, multi-
year, whole of government effort, in consultation with the private
sector, to counter predatory lending and financing, including in the
form of providing support to companies incorporated in the People's
Republic of China (PRC) that engage in such activities, by the
Government of the PRC in the energy sectors of developing countries.
(b) Policy.--It is the policy of the United States to--
(1) regularly evaluate current and forecasted energy needs
and capacities of developing countries, and analyze the
presence and involvement of PRC state-owned industries and
other companies incorporated in the PRC, Chinese nationals
providing labor, and financing of energy projects, including
direct financing by the PRC government, PRC financial
institutions, or direct state support to state-owned
enterprises and other companies incorporated in the PRC;
(2) pursue strategic support and investment opportunities,
and diplomatic engagement on power sector reforms, to expand
the development and deployment of advanced energy technologies
in developing countries;
(3) offer financing, loan guarantees, grants, and other
financial products on terms that advance domestic economic and
local employment opportunities, utilize advanced energy
technologies, encourage private sector growth, and, when
appropriate United States equity and sovereign lending products
as alternatives to the predatory lending tools offered by
Chinese financial institutions;
(4) pursue partnerships with likeminded international
financial and multilateral institutions to leverage investment
in advanced energy technologies in developing countries; and
(5) pursue bilateral partnerships focused on the
cooperative development of advanced energy technologies with
countries of strategic significance, particularly in the Indo-
Pacific region, to address the effects of energy engagement by
the PRC through predatory lending or other actions that
negatively impact other countries.
(c) Advanced Energy Technologies Exports.--Not later than 180 days
after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter
for 5 years, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary
of Energy, shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a
United States Government strategy to increase United States exports of
advanced energy technologies to--
(1) improve energy security in allied and developing
countries;
(2) create open, efficient, rules-based, and transparent
energy markets;
(3) improve free, fair, and reciprocal energy trading
relationships; and
(4) expand access to affordable, reliable energy.
SEC. 115. REPORT ON THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA'S INVESTMENTS IN
FOREIGN ENERGY DEVELOPMENT.
(a) In General.--No later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 5 years, the
Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate committees of
Congress a report that--
(1) identifies priority countries for deepening United
States engagement on energy matters, in accordance with the
economic and national security interests of the United States
and where deeper energy partnerships are most achievable;
(2) describes the involvement of the Government of the
People's Republic of China (PRC) and companies incorporated in
the PRC in the development, operation, financing, or ownership
of energy generation facilities, transmission infrastructure,
or energy resources in the countries identified in paragraph
(1);
(3) evaluates strategic or security concerns and
implications for United States national interests and the
interests of the countries identified in paragraph (1), with
respect to the PRC's involvement and influence in developing
country energy production or transmission; and
(4) outlines current and planned efforts by the United
States to partner with the countries identified in paragraph
(1) on energy matters that support shared interests between the
United States and such countries.
(b) Publication.--The assessment required in subsection (a) shall
be published on the Department of State's website.
Subtitle C--Economic Diplomacy and Leadership
SEC. 121. FINDINGS ON REGIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The United States played a leadership role in
constructing the architecture, rules, and norms governing the
international economic order following the Second World War,
yielding decades of domestic economic and geopolitical
prosperity and stability.
(2) In 2017, the United States withdrew from the Trans-
Pacific Partnership (TPP), an economic pact that was negotiated
by 12 countries that covered 40 percent of the world economy,
leading the 11 remaining Asia-Pacific countries to sign the
Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific
Partnership (CPTPP) the following year, setting high-standard
rules for regional economic engagement.
(3) In 2020, the 10 countries of the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations along with South Korea, China, Japan,
Australia, and New Zealand signed the Regional Comprehensive
Economic Partnership (RCEP), the world's biggest trade deal in
terms of GDP.
(4) Reduced United States economic engagement has led
United States allies and partners to question the United
States' commitment to the Indo-Pacific region. Despite its
distortive and unfair trade practices, the People's Republic of
China is taking advantage of this vacuum by deepening its
partnerships in the region and promoting its own state-led
economic model.
(5) The United States is increasingly on the outside
looking in with regards to economic pacts in the Indo-Pacific.
United States absence from these agreements puts it at both a
strategic and competitive disadvantage in the region and allows
competitors to expand their economic influence at the United
States' expense.
(6) Given that these partnerships and agreements will
define the rules and norms that will govern regional commerce
over the coming decades, the United States is currently not
well positioned to shape the coming economic landscape.
(7) It is in the United States' vital interest to upgrade
its economic engagement and leadership in the Indo-Pacific and
develop concrete steps to strengthen its commercial diplomacy
to fully participle in the region's economic dynamism.
SEC. 122. REVIEW OF TRADE AND ECONOMIC ENGAGEMENT GLOBALLY OF THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.
(a) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the
United States Trade Representative and the Secretary of Commerce, shall
submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that
describes the global trade and investment diplomacy and engagement of
the People's Republic of China (PRC) over the past decade, including
any bilateral or plurilateral trade and investment agreements it has
signed, and their impact on the United States economy, American
companies and workers, as well as on the countries that have entered
into agreements with the PRC and the global economy as a whole.
(b) Matters to Be Included.--The report shall include the
following:
(1) A survey and comparison of the PRC's international
economic practices, which will--
(A) provide an overview of the PRC's distortive
trade policies;
(B) list the PRC's trade and investment agreements
globally, both agreements it has signed or entered into
and any ongoing negotiations it has with individual
countries or groups of countries;
(C) detail the other mechanisms the PRC uses to
advance its international economic objectives,
including economic and commercial dialogues and BRI
related activities;
(D) compare the United States and Chinese
approaches and priorities on trade and investment with
major global economies, United States allies, and for
each region of the world; and
(E) outline what further steps the PRC may take in
the Indo-Pacific region to bolster its economic
position and influence.
(2) An evaluation of the impacts of the PRC's trade and
investment policies, including--
(A) the impact of these trade and investment
agreements on the PRC's economy, with a focus on its
trade and investment profile, the impact on the PRC's
economic growth and per-capita income, and the impact
on the profitability and market share of Chinese
companies and SOEs;
(B) the impact of these agreements on the PRC's
political and diplomatic relations with the countries
it entered into agreements with and by region; and
(C) the impact of the PRC's trade and investment
relationships with other countries on the market share
of United States companies.
SEC. 123. REPORT ON ENTRENCHING AMERICAN ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY IN THE
INDO-PACIFIC.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that United
States national interests and the primacy of United States power in the
Indo-Pacific are intimately tied to the following economic objectives:
(1) Deepening United States trade and investment
relationships in the region, especially with key allies and
partners.
(2) Confirming American leadership and participation in
global regional economic organizations and fora, including the
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the World Trade
Organization (WTO).
(3) Leveraging bilateral and plurilateral sectoral
agreements on trade and investment, as well as negotiations at
the WTO to reassert United States economic leadership by
writing the rules of the road on critical economic questions.
(4) Building secure and resilient supply chains for
industries critical for United States national interest,
including semiconductors, vaccines, and personal protective
equipment.
(5) Showcasing the benefits and appeal of a market-based
economic model.
(b) Reporting.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the
United States Trade Representative and the Secretary of Commerce, shall
submit a report to the appropriate committees of Congress that presents
the steps the United States is taking and plans to take to achieve the
objectives outlined in subsection (a) and includes specific action
plans for the following:
(1) Enhancing United States trade and investment
relationships in the region bilaterally and plurilaterally,
especially with United States allies and the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations.
(2) Reenergizing APEC as a critical component of the
region's economic architecture.
(3) Work to ensure that the United States absence from the
Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific
Partnership and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership
do not undermine the United States' ability to shape regional
trade and investment rules.
(4) Working with allies and partners to build resilient and
trusted supply chains especially for critical and emerging
technologies, including semiconductors, and products and
components critical for national health, including vaccines and
related materials and personal protective equipment.
(5) Driving the formation and adoption of high-standards
and rules for the region in the following areas:
(A) Advanced technologies and the digital sphere.
(B) Labor practices and environmental standards.
(C) Intellectual property rights.
(6) Developing roadmaps for how to counter the PRC's unfair
trade and economic practices, with a specific focus on--
(A) subsidies and unfair competition by state-owned
enterprises; and
(B) corruption and politicized infrastructure.
(c) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section,
the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs; and
(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on
Energy and Commerce.
SEC. 124. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON THE NEED TO BOLSTER AMERICAN LEADERSHIP
IN THE ASIA PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the United States has benefitted from the regional
economic integration agenda of the Asia Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) forum since its inception in 1989;
(2) APEC is a hub of trade and commerce for 21 member
economies that, as of 2018, accounted for 60 percent of global
GDP and 48 percent of global trade;
(3) APEC has contributed to the reduction in trade
barriers, harmonization of regulations, and enhanced access to
global value chains, while raising the profile of critical
topics such as fair trade, sustainability, gender parity, and
inclusive growth;
(4) it is in the United States interest to engage and lead
at APEC to push for an open and inclusive regional economy that
benefits United States workers, consumers, and businesses and
better integrates the United States economy with others in the
region;
(5) when the United States last hosted APEC in 2011, it was
able to promote United States interests, while reassuring
allies and partners about its strong commitment to the region
in the economic arena;
(6) today, APEC can again be used as a forum to make
progress on several United States priorities, that are shared
by United States allies and partners, including--
(A) making regional commerce more inclusive;
(B) fostering innovation and digitization; and
(C) addressing climate change and environmental
protection;
(7) hosting APEC would provide a tremendous opportunity to
leverage American leadership to shape the regional economic
agenda;
(8) hosting APEC would allow the United States to advance
several of its own priorities in the region, including to--
(A) expand the participation of APEC stakeholders
to include labor groups, environmental advocates, and
other part of civil society;
(B) upgrade APEC's work to empower and promote
small and medium enterprises;
(C) spotlight best practices and plans to upgrade
skills for the next-generation of technology jobs;
(D) advance a climate and sustainable trade and
development agenda with a focus on green technologies,
infrastructure and finance; and
(E) advance work on digital trade, including by
expanding rules on data privacy, promoting digital
inclusiveness and promoting the free flow of data; and
(9) with no host confirmed for 2023, the United States
should immediately announce its interest to host APEC in 2023
and work with the APEC Secretariat and like-minded APEC members
to build support.
SEC. 125. STRATEGY ON DETERRENCE OF ECONOMIC COERCION.
(a) In General.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate
congressional committees a whole-of-government strategy to deter
Chinese economic coercion against third countries that includes the
following:
(1) An explanation of the means available to the United
States, with the cooperation of allies, to enable a country
with a smaller economy to withstand such coercion.
(2) A description of the role that the Secretary of State,
acting through the Under Secretary of State for Public
Diplomacy and Public Affairs, will play in the imposition of
reputational costs on the PRC for conducting economic coercion.
(3) Role clarity for the Secretary of State, the
Administrator of the United States Agency for International
Development, the Secretary of Defense, the head of each element
of the intelligence community (as such term is defined by
section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
3003)), the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of
Commerce, the United States Trade Representative, and the
United States International Development Finance Corporation in
implementing such strategy.
(b) Update.--Not later than 2 years after the date of the
submission of the strategy under subsection (a), and every 2 years
thereafter for 8 years, the President shall submit to the appropriate
congressional committees an assessment of the implementation and
effectiveness of the strategy, lessons learned from the past year, and
planned changes to the strategy.
(c) Form.--The strategy and update required by subsections (a) and
(b), respectively, shall be submitted in classified form with an
unclassified summary.
(d) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this section,
the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on
Energy and Commerce, and the Committee on Ways and Means of the
House of Representatives; and
(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, and the Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate.
SEC. 126. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY ISSUES.
(a) Leadership in International Standards Setting.--It is the sense
of Congress that the United States must lead in international bodies
that set the governance norms and rules for critical digitally enabled
technologies in order to ensure that these technologies operate within
a free, secure, interoperable, and stable digital domain.
(b) Countering Digital Authoritarianism.--It is the sense of
Congress that the United States, along with allies and partners, should
lead an international effort that uses all of the economic and
diplomatic tools at its disposal to combat the expanding use of
information and communications technology products and services to
surveil, repress, and manipulate populations (also known as ``digital
authoritarianism'').
(c) Freedom of Information in the Digital Age.--It is the sense of
Congress that the United States should lead a global effort to ensure
that freedom of information, including the ability to safely consume or
publish information without fear of undue reprisals, is maintained as
the digital domain becomes an increasingly integral mechanism for
communication.
(d) Efforts to Ensure Technological Development Does Not Threaten
Democratic Governance or Human Rights.--It is the sense of Congress
that the United States should lead a global effort to develop and adopt
a set of common principles and standards for critical technologies to
ensure that the use of such technologies cannot be abused by malign
actors, whether they are governments or other entities, and that they
do not threaten democratic governance or human rights.
SEC. 127. DIGITAL TRADE AGREEMENTS.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) as the COVID-19 pandemic accelerated United States
dependence on digital tools, international rules around digital
governance and trade have remained largely piecemeal;
(2) the People's Republic of China is operating under and
advancing a set of digital rules that are contrary to United
States values and interests, and those of United States allies
and partners;
(3) a patchwork of plurilateral, trilateral, and bilateral
digital trade agreements, including the Comprehensive and
Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, the
Singapore-Australia Digital Trade Agreement, and the Singapore-
New Zealand-Chile Digital Economy Partnership Agreement have
emerged, creating a set of rules that the United States should
be driving;
(4) the United States has already underscored the need for
such agreements by signing the U.S.-Japan Digital Trade
Agreement in October 2019 and including a robust digital trade
or e-commerce chapter in the United States-Mexico-Canada
Agreement;
(5) a regional deal on digital governance and trade would
allow the United States to unite a group of like-minded
economies around common standards and norms, including the
principles of openness, inclusiveness, fairness, transparency,
and the free flow of data with trust, that are increasingly
vital for the global economy;
(6) such an agreement would facilitate the creation of
common rules and standards that govern cross-border data flows,
the protection of privacy, and cybersecurity at a time of
growing digital vulnerabilities for individuals, businesses,
and institutions around the world;
(7) such an agreement would facilitate the participation of
small and medium-sized enterprises in the global economy
through trade facilitation measures, including e-marketing, e-
invoicing and e-payment; and
(8) the United States Trade Representative, in consultation
with the Secretary of State should negotiate bilateral and
plurilateral agreements or arrangements relating to digital
trade with the like-minded countries in the Indo-Pacific
region, the European Union, the member countries of the Five
Eyes intelligence-sharing alliance, and other partners and
allies, as appropriate.
SEC. 128. DIGITAL CONNECTIVITY AND CYBERSECURITY PARTNERSHIP.
(a) Digital Connectivity and Cybersecurity Partnership.--The
President is authorized to establish a program, to be known as the
``Digital Connectivity and Cybersecurity Partnership'' to help foreign
countries--
(1) expand and increase secure Internet access and digital
infrastructure;
(2) adopt policies and regulatory positions that foster and
encourage open, interoperable, reliable, and secure internet,
equitable access, the free flow of data, multi-stakeholder
models of internet governance, and pro-competitive and secure
information and communications technology (ICT) policies and
regulations;
(3) promote and protect human rights and counter corruption
and predatory behavior throughout communications and
cybersecurity policy and implementation;
(4) guard against privacy abuses, cybercrime,
disinformation and misinformation, and the use of digital
technology and services to carry out criminal activity or human
rights violations;
(5) bolster the role of civil society in informing ICT
policy and regulations;
(6) promote exports of United States ICT goods and services
and increase United States company market share in target
markets;
(7) promote the innovation and diversification of ICT goods
and supply chain services to be less reliant on imports from
the People's Republic of China;
(8) build cybersecurity capacity, expand interoperability,
and promote best practices for a national approach to
cybersecurity; and
(9) enhance the security of their digital infrastructure to
facilitate better information sharing with the United States
and United States allies and partners, as appropriate.
(b) Implementation Plan.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State and the Administrator
of the United States Agency for International Development shall jointly
submit to the appropriate congressional committees an implementation
plan for the 3-year period beginning on the date of the submission of
the plan to advance the goals identified in subsection (a). The
implementation plan shall also include a description of interagency
responsibilities to carry out implementation, a description of any
barriers to successful implementation, and a description of any
additional resources or authorities needed for successful
implementation.
(c) Consultation.--In developing the implementation plan required
by subsection (b), the Secretary of State and the Administrator of the
United States Agency for International Development shall consult with--
(1) the appropriate congressional committees;
(2) leaders of the United States industry;
(3) civil society leaders with expertise in technology,
telecommunications, cybersecurity, economic development and
competitiveness, and human rights, including from the Open
Technology Fund;
(4) representatives from relevant United States Government
agencies; and
(5) representatives from like-minded allies and partners.
(d) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be
appropriated such sums as necessary for each of fiscal years 2022
through 2026 to carry out this section.
SEC. 129. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON IDEOLOGICAL COMPETITION.
It is the sense of Congress that National Security Advisor Jake
Sullivan correctly observed that the United States and likeminded
democracies are in an ideological competition with the People's
Republic of China, under the direction and control of the Chinese
Communist Party, when he stated, ``China is essentially making the case
that the Chinese model is better than the American model. . . This is
not any longer some kind of implied contrast. It is an explicit
statement that there is an alternative model to the democratic market
economy model that the United States has been advancing over the course
of decades.''.
Subtitle D--Financial Diplomacy and Leadership
SEC. 131. FINDINGS ON CHINESE FINANCIAL INDUSTRIAL POLICY.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The People's Republic of China operates a system of
state-owned financial institutions including retail banks,
investment banks, asset managers, and insurers which are given
favorable treatment under Chinese law while foreign financial
institutions have strict restrictions on their ability to
operate in the PRC.
(2) In order to join the World Trade Organization (WTO) in
2001, the PRC Government committed to opening the credit card
payment business to foreign firms by 2006.
(3) After years of the PRC refusing to open its payment
market, the United States brought a case against the PRC before
the WTO. In 2012, the WTO mandated that the PRC open its card
payment market to global competitors.
(4) Even after the WTO's ruling, the PRC Government refused
to comply with the ruling and maintained a rule that required
all yuan-denominated payment cards to use the PRC's Union Pay
network. Only in 2020, after the Chinese payment market had
grown to $27 trillion, did the PRC Government approve the
application of foreign firms to enter the market.
(5) The PRC continues to maintain aggressive capital
controls, limiting access to the Chinese market to foreign
investors while hamstringing its own citizens ability to
control their money.
(6) On November 5, 2018, Chinese President Xi Jinping
announced that the PRC would launch a technology innovation
stock exchange. The Shanghai Stock Exchange STAR Market
launched on July 22, 2019.
(7) On October 24, 2020, Chinese billionaire Jack Ma
referred to ``pawnshop mentality'' of state-owned banks.
Shortly thereafter, the initial public offering of his firm Ant
Financial was canceled by Chinese regulators.
(8) The PRC Government is pioneering the use of a fully
digitized yuan, which is set to be the world's first central
bank backed digital currency, and the People's Bank of China
and the Hong Kong Monetary Authority have already begun testing
the cross-border functionality of the digital currency.
SEC. 132. REPORT ON IMPORTANCE OF AMERICAN FINANCIAL STRENGTH FOR
GLOBAL LEADERSHIP.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the dominance of the dollar as the global reserve
currency has yielded significant benefits to the United States
and the American people by allowing the United States to
maintain economic independence, better control its monetary
policy, and finance government outlays;
(2) American global leadership has benefited from the
United States monetary stability, creditworthiness, deep
capital markets, and financial technology innovations;
(3) effective diplomacy and safeguarding of American
national security rely on the United States role as the global
financial leader, hub of global trade, and source of economic
opportunity;
(4) by cracking down on dissent in the key financial center
of Hong Kong, driving the creation of a technology focused
stock exchange, and pushing forward a Central Bank digital
currency, the People's Republic of China is attempting to
become the leading hub of finance in the world; and
(5) the United States must maintain its position as a
global financial leader to continue its broader global
leadership role around the world.
(b) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the
Secretary of the Treasury, shall submit to the appropriate committees
of Congress a report that--
(1) lists and examines the benefits to American foreign
policy that derive from the United States financial leadership
and the dollar's status as the world's global reserve currency;
(2) describes the actions taken by the People's Republic of
China that could cement China's role as the world's leading
financial center;
(3) analyzes the possible impact on American national
security and foreign policy were the yuan to supplant the
dollar as the world's leading reserve currency;
(4) outlines how the United States can work diplomatically
with allies, partners, and other nations to preserve a
financial system that is free, open, and fair; and
(5) identifies steps the United States can take to preserve
its status as the world's leading financial center and maintain
the dollar's position as the global reserve currency.
(c) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section,
the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
(1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives;
(2) the Committee on Financial Services of the House of
Representatives;
(3) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and
(4) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of
the Senate.
SEC. 133. REVIEW OF CHINESE COMPANIES ON UNITED STATES CAPITAL MARKETS.
(a) Findings.--
(1) Beginning in the 1990s, a wave of Chinese companies
sought to raise capital and list shares on American stock
markets.
(2) In 2011 and 2012, more than 100 Chinese firms were
delisted from the New York Stock Exchange as a result of fraud,
accounting scandals, and other corporate governance failures.
(3) Following extensive diplomatic efforts by the United
States Government, the Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board (PCAOB) signed a memorandum of understanding with the
China Securities Regulatory Commission and the China Ministry
of Finance for the production and exchange of audit documents.
(4) Despite signing the agreement, Chinese regulators
continue to hinder the PCAOB's access to relevant documents
that are necessary for the PCAOB to carry out its enforcement
duties.
(5) In August 2020, the Department of State sent a letter
to American universities warning about national security
implications related to Chinese stock holdings.
(6) In December 2020, Congress passed and the President
signed the Holding Foreign Companies Accountable Act (Public
Law 116-222), which requires foreign companies listed on
American stock markets to comply with PCAOB auditing rules
within three years. Under the legislation, issuers not in
compliance within three years will be delisted.
(b) Report.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in
coordination with the Secretary of the Treasury, shall submit
to the appropriate congressional committees a report that
describes the costs and benefits to the United States posed by
the presence of companies incorporated in the People's Republic
of China (PRC) that are listed on American stock exchanges or
traded over the counter, in the form of American depository
receipts.
(2) Matters to be included.--The report shall--
(A) identify companies incorporated in the PRC
that--
(i) are listed or traded on one or several
stock exchanges within the United States,
including over-the-counter market and ``A
Shares'' added to indexes and exchange-traded
funds out of mainland exchanges in the PRC; and
(ii) based on the factors for consideration
described in paragraph (3), have knowingly and
materially contributed to--
(I) activities that undermine
United States national security;
(II) serious abuses of
internationally recognized human
rights; or
(III) a substantially increased
financial risk exposure for United
States-based investors;
(B) describe the activities of the companies
identified pursuant to subparagraph (A), and their
implications for the United States; and
(C) develop policy recommendations for the United
States Government, State governments, United States
financial institutions, United States equity and debt
exchanges, and other relevant stakeholders to address
the risks posed by the presence in United States
capital markets of the companies identified pursuant to
subparagraph (A).
(3) Factors for inclusion of a company.--In completing the
report under paragraph (1), the President shall consider
whether a company should be identified pursuant to paragraph
(2)(A) because the company has--
(A) materially contributed to the development or
manufacture, or sold or facilitated procurement by the
PLA, of lethal military equipment or component parts of
such equipment;
(B) contributed to the construction and
militarization of features in the South China Sea;
(C) been sanctioned by the United States or has
been determined to have conducted business with
sanctioned entities;
(D) engaged in an act or a series of acts of
intellectual property theft;
(E) engaged in corporate or economic espionage;
(F) contributed to the proliferation of nuclear or
missile technology in violation of United Nations
Security Council resolutions or United States
sanctions;
(G) contributed to the repression of religious and
ethnic minorities within the PRC, including in Xinjiang
Uyghur Autonomous Region or Tibet Autonomous Region;
(H) contributed to the development of technologies
that enable censorship directed or directly supported
by the Government of the PRC; or
(I) contributed to other activities or behavior
determined to be relevant by the President.
(4) Factors for making policy recommendations.--In
completing the report under paragraph (1), the President shall
weigh the national security implications and consider the
following factors identified pursuant to paragraph (3) (except
that such report should exclude from its analysis the delisting
or potential delisting of companies from United States markets
as a result of failing to retain a Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board-registered public accounting firm as required
by section 104 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (15 U.S.C.
7214)):
(A) The possibility that banning or delisting
companies from United States markets could lead to an
outflow of companies to list in the PRC.
(B) The possibility that banning or delisting
companies from United States markets could impact the
status of the United States as the world's leading
capital markets center, particularly vis-a-vis the PRC.
(C) The impact on American foreign policy and
national security if United States leadership in
capital markets was weakened vis-a-vis the PRC.
(c) Report Form.--The report required under subsection (b) shall be
submitted in unclassified form.
(d) Publication.--The report required under subsection (b) shall be
made accessible to the public online through relevant United States
Government websites.
SEC. 134. REPORT ON DIPLOMATIC AND ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF CHANGES TO
CROSS-BORDER PAYMENT AND FINANCIAL MESSAGING SYSTEMS.
(a) Report.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in
coordination with the Secretary of the Treasury, shall submit
to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the
diplomatic and economic implications of cross-border payment
systems.
(2) Matters to be included.--The report required under
paragraph (1) shall--
(A) assess the extent to which American diplomacy
and global leadership hinge upon the current
infrastructure and existing ecosystem of cross-border
payment and financial messaging systems;
(B) examine the durability of the Society for
Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication
cooperative;
(C) review and analyze ways in which the Cross
Border Interbank Payment Systems, cryptocurrencies, and
central bank digital currencies could erode this
system; and
(D) analyze how changes to global cross-border
payment systems could undermine United States national
security interests including impacts on the efficacy of
sanctions, the countering of terrorist finance, and the
enforcement of anti-money laundering provisions.
(b) Report Form.--The report required under subsection (a)(1) shall
be submitted in unclassified form.
(c) Publication.--The report under subsection (a)(1) shall be made
accessible to the public online through relevant United States
Government websites.
TITLE II--INVESTING IN ALLIANCES AND PARTNERSHIPS
Subtitle A--Strategic and Diplomatic Matters
SEC. 201. APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DEFINED.
In this subtitle, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress''
means--
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on
Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the
Senate; and
(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on
Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the
House of Representatives.
SEC. 202. UNITED STATES COMMITMENT AND SUPPORT FOR ALLIES AND PARTNERS
IN THE INDO-PACIFIC.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the United States treaty alliances in the Indo-Pacific
provide a unique strategic advantage to the United States and
are among the Nation's most precious assets, enabling the
United States to advance its vital national interests, defend
its territory, expand its economy through international trade
and commerce, establish enduring cooperation with allies while
seeking to establish new partnerships, prevent the domination
of the Indo-Pacific and its surrounding maritime and air lanes
by a hostile power or powers, and deter potential aggressors;
(2) the Governments of the United States, Japan, South
Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand are critical
allies in advancing a free and open order in the Indo-Pacific
region and tackling challenges with unity of purpose, and have
collaborated to advance specific efforts of shared interest in
areas such as defense and security, economic prosperity,
infrastructure connectivity, and fundamental freedoms;
(3) the United States greatly values other partnerships in
the Indo-Pacific region, including with India, Singapore,
Indonesia, Taiwan, New Zealand, and Vietnam, as well as its
trilateral and quadrilateral dialogues, and regional
architecture such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN), and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, which are
essential to further shared interests;
(4) the security environment in the Indo-Pacific demands
consistent United States and allied commitment to strengthening
and advancing alliances so that they are postured to meet these
challenges, and will require sustained political will, concrete
partnerships, economic, commercial, technological, and security
cooperation, consistent and tangible commitments, high-level
and extensive consultations on matters of mutual interest,
mutual and shared cooperation in the acquisition of key
capabilities important to allied defenses, and unified mutual
support in the face of political, economic, or military
coercion;
(5) fissures in the United States alliance relationships
and partnerships benefit United States adversaries and weaken
the collective ability to advance shared interests;
(6) the United States must work with allies to prioritize
human rights throughout the Indo-Pacific region;
(7) as the report released in August 2020 by the Expert
Group of the International Military Council on Climate and
Security (IMCCS), entitled ``Climate and Security in the Indo-
Asia Pacific'' noted, the Indo-Pacific region is one of the
regions most vulnerable to climate impacts, and as former
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and
Environment Sherri Goodman, Secretary General of IMCCS, noted,
climate shocks act as a threat multiplier in the Indo-Pacific
region, increasing humanitarian response costs and impacting
security throughout the region as sea levels rise, fishing
patterns shift, food insecurity rises, and storms grow stronger
and more frequent;
(8) the United State should continue to engage on and
deepen cooperation with allies and partners of the United
States in the Indo-Pacific region, as laid out in the Asia
Reassurance Initiative Act (Public Law 115-409), in the areas
of--
(A) forecasting environmental challenges;
(B) assisting with transnational cooperation on
sustainable uses of forest and water resources with the
goal of preserving biodiversity and access to safe
drinking water;
(C) fisheries and marine resource conservation; and
(D) meeting environmental challenges and developing
resilience;
(9) the Secretary of State, in coordination with the
Secretary of Defense and the Administrator of the United States
Agency for International Development, should facilitate a
robust interagency Indo-Pacific climate resiliency and
adaptation strategy focusing on internal and external actions
needed--
(A) to facilitate regional early recovery, risk
reduction, and resilience to weather-related impacts on
strategic interests of the United States and partners
and allies of the United States in the region; and
(B) to address humanitarian and food security
impacts of weather-related changes in the region; and
(10) ASEAN centrality and ASEAN-led mechanisms remain
essential to the evolving institutional architecture of the
Indo-Pacific region.
(b) Statement of Policy.--It shall be the policy of the United
States--
(1) to deepen diplomatic, economic, and security
cooperation with and among United States allies in the Indo-
Pacific, as appropriate, including through diplomatic
engagement, regional development, energy security and
development, scientific and health partnerships, educational
and cultural exchanges, intelligence-sharing, and other
diplomatic and defense-related initiatives;
(2) to uphold the United States multilateral and bilateral
treaty obligations, including--
(A) defending Japan consistent with the Treaty of
Mutual Cooperation and Security Between the United
States of America and Japan, done at Washington,
January 19, 1960, and all related and subsequent
bilateral security agreements and arrangements
concluded on or before the date of enactment of this
Act;
(B) defending the Republic of Korea consistent with
the Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and
the Republic of Korea, done at Washington, October 1,
1953, and all related and subsequent bilateral security
agreements and arrangements concluded on or before the
date of enactment of this Act;
(C) defending the Philippines consistent with
article IV of the Mutual Defense Treaty Between the
United States and the Republic of the Philippines, done
at Washington, August 30, 1951, and all related and
subsequent bilateral security agreements and
arrangements concluded on or before the date of
enactment of this Act;
(D) defending Thailand consistent with the
Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (``Manila
Pact''), done at Manila, September 8, 1954,
understanding thereto the Thanat-Rusk communique of
1962, and all related and subsequent bilateral security
agreements and arrangements concluded on or before the
date of enactment of this Act; and
(E) defending Australia consistent with the
Security Treaty Between Australia and the United States
of America, done at San Francisco, September 1, 1951,
and all related and subsequent bilateral security
agreements and arrangements concluded on or before the
date of enactment of this Act;
(3) to strengthen and deepen the United States' bilateral
and regional partnerships, including with India, Taiwan, ASEAN,
and New Zealand;
(4) to cooperate with allies and partners to promote human
rights across the Indo-Pacific region bilaterally and through
regional and multilateral fora and pacts;
(5) to strengthen and advance diplomatic, economic, and
security cooperation with regional partners, such as Taiwan,
Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and India; and
(6) to collaborate and cooperate on the sustainable
development of the Mekong River Basin, including by providing
support for environmental conservation and protection
initiatives in the Mekong sub-region and through assistance to
Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam, whose governments
comprise the Mekong River Commission (MRC). United States
efforts should focus on increasing MRC member countries'
capacity in the sustainable conservation and management of
natural resources.
SEC. 203. BOOSTING QUAD COOPERATION.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) as a Pacific power, the United States should continue
to strengthen its cooperation with Australia, India, and Japan,
(commonly referred to as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue or
``Quad'') to enhance and implement a shared vision to meet
regional challenges and to promote a free, open, inclusive,
resilient, and healthy Indo-Pacific, characterized by respect
for democratic norms, rule of law, and market-driven economic
growth, and that is free from undue influence and coercion;
(2) the United States should expand dialogue and
cooperation through the Quad with a range of partners to
support the rule of law, freedom of navigation and overflight,
peaceful resolution of disputes, democratic values, and
territorial integrity, and to uphold peace and prosperity and
strengthen democratic resilience in the Indo-Pacific;
(3) the recent pledge from the first-ever Quad leaders
meeting on March 12, 2021, to respond to the economic and
health impacts of COVID-19, including expanding safe,
affordable, and effective vaccine production and equitable
access, and to address shared challenges, including in
cyberspace, critical technologies, counterterrorism, quality
infrastructure investment, and humanitarian assistance and
disaster relief, as well as maritime domains, further advances
the important cooperation among Quad nations that is so
critical to the Indo-Pacific region;
(4) building upon their announced commitment to finance
1,000,000,000 or more COVID-19 vaccines by the end of 2022 for
use in the Indo-Pacific region, the United States International
Development Finance Corporation, the Japan International
Cooperation Agency, and the Japan Bank for International
Cooperation, including through partnerships other multilateral
development banks, should also venture to finance development
and infrastructure projects in the Indo-Pacific region that are
competitive, transparent, and sustainable;
(5) the United States should participate in the Resilient
Supply Chain Initiative launched by Australia, Japan, and India
in 2020, along with similar initiatives that relocate supply
chains in the health, economic, and national security sectors
to the United States, its Quad partners, and other like-minded
countries; and
(6) the formation of a Quad Intra-Parliamentary Working
Group could--
(A) sustain and deepen engagement between senior
officials of the Quad countries on a full spectrum of
issues; and
(B) be modeled on the successful and long-standing
bilateral intra-parliamentary groups between the United
States and Mexico, Canada, and the United Kingdom, as
well as other formal and informal parliamentary
exchanges.
(b) Reporting Requirement.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit
to the appropriate congressional committees a strategy for
bolstering engagement and cooperation with the Quad.
(2) Matters to be included.--The strategy required by
paragraph (1) shall include the following:
(A) A description of how the United States intends
to demonstrate democratic leadership in the Indo-
Pacific through quadrilateral engagement with India,
Japan, and Australia on shared interests and common
challenges.
(B) A summary of--
(i) current and past Quad initiatives
across the whole of the United States
Government, including to promote broad based
and inclusive economic growth, trade, and
investment, and to advance technology
cooperation, energy innovation, climate
mitigation and adaptation, physical and digital
infrastructure development, education, disaster
management, and global health security;
(ii) proposals shared among Quad countries
to deepen existing security cooperation,
intelligence sharing, economic partnerships,
and multilateral coordination; and
(iii) initiatives and agreements undertaken
jointly with Quad countries, in addition to
other like-minded partners in the Indo-Pacific,
on areas of shared interest.
(C) A description of efforts to jointly--
(i) expand ongoing COVID-19 cooperation to
prepare for the next pandemic by focusing on
medium-term vaccine and medical supply
production and building a broader dialogue on
global public health;
(ii) combat economic coercion, deepen
regional economic engagement and integration,
and strengthen regional rules and standards
around trade and investment;
(iii) strengthen climate actions on
mitigation, adaptation, resilience, technology,
capacity-building, and climate finance;
(iv) facilitate the development of quality
infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific through
joint financing, investment, technical
assistance, and standards setting;
(v) enhance joint maritime security and
maritime domain awareness initiatives to
protect the maritime commons and support
international law and freedom of navigation in
the Indo-Pacific; and
(vi) develop international technology
standards and share or co-develop new
innovative technologies of the future.
SEC. 204. ESTABLISHMENT OF QUAD INTRA-PARLIAMENTARY WORKING GROUP.
(a) Establishment.--Not later than 30 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall seek to enter into
negotiations with the governments of Japan, Australia, and India
(collectively, with the United States, known as the ``Quad'') with the
goal of reaching a written agreement to establish a Quad Intra-
Parliamentary Working Group to facilitate closer cooperation on shared
interests and values.
(b) United States Group.--
(1) In general.--At such time as the governments of the
Quad countries enter into a written agreement described in
subsection (a) to establish a Quad Intra-Parliamentary Working
Group, there shall be established a United States Group, which
shall represent the United States at the Quad Intra-
Parliamentary Working Group.
(2) Membership.--
(A) In general.--The United States Group shall be
comprised of not more than 24 Members of Congress.
(B) Appointment.--Of the Members of Congress
appointed to the United States Group under subparagraph
(A)--
(i) half shall be appointed by the Speaker
of the House of Representatives from among
Members of the House, not fewer than four of
whom shall be members of the Committee on
Foreign Affairs; and
(ii) half shall be appointed by the
President Pro Tempore of the Senate, based on
recommendations of the majority leader and
minority leader of the Senate, from among
Members of the Senate, not fewer than four of
whom shall be members of the Committee on
Foreign Relations (unless the majority leader
and minority leader determine otherwise).
(3) Meetings.--
(A) In general.--The United States Group shall seek
to meet not less frequently than annually with
representatives and appropriate staff of the
legislatures of Japan, Australia, and India, and any
other country invited by mutual agreement of the Quad
countries.
(B) Limitation.--A meeting described in
subparagraph (A) may be held--
(i) in the United States;
(ii) in another Quad country during periods
when Congress is not in session; or
(iii) virtually.
(4) Chairperson and vice chairperson.--
(A) House delegation.--The Speaker of the House of
Representatives shall designate the chairperson or vice
chairperson of the delegation of the United States
Group from the House from among members of the
Committee on Foreign Affairs.
(B) Senate delegation.--The President Pro Tempore
of the Senate shall designate the chairperson or vice
chairperson of the delegation of the United States
Group from the Senate from among members of the
Committee on Foreign Relations.
(5) Authorization of appropriations.--
(A) In general.--There is authorized to be
appropriated $1,000,000 for each fiscal years 2022
through 2025 for the United States Group.
(B) Distribution of appropriations.--
(i) In general.--For each fiscal year for
which an appropriation is made for the United
States Group, half of the amount appropriated
shall be available to the delegation from the
House of Representatives and half of the amount
appropriated shall be available to the
delegation from the Senate.
(ii) Method of distribution.--The amounts
available to the delegations of the House of
Representatives and the Senate under clause (i)
shall be disbursed on vouchers to be approved
by the chairperson of the delegation from the
House of Representatives and the chairperson of
the delegation from the Senate, respectively.
(6) Private sources.--The United States Group may accept
gifts or donations of services or property, subject to the
review and approval, as appropriate, of the Committee on Ethics
of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Ethics of
the Senate.
(7) Certification of expenditures.--The certificate of the
chairperson of the delegation from the House of Representatives
or the delegation of the Senate of the United States Group
shall be final and conclusive upon the accounting officers in
the auditing of the accounts of the United States Group.
(8) Annual report.--The United States Group shall submit to
the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate a report for each fiscal year for which an appropriation
is made for the United States Group, including a description of
its expenditures under such appropriation.
SEC. 205. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON COOPERATION WITH ASEAN.
It is the policy of the United States to--
(1) stand with the nations of the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN) as they respond to COVID-19 and support
greater cooperation in building capacity to prepare for and
respond to pandemics and other public health challenges;
(2) support high-level United States participation in the
annual ASEAN Summit held each year;
(3) reaffirm the importance of United States-ASEAN economic
engagement, including the elimination of barriers to cross-
border commerce, and support the ASEAN Economic Community's
(AEC) goals, including strong, inclusive, and sustainable long-
term economic growth and cooperation with the United States
that focuses on innovation and capacity-building efforts in
technology, education, disaster management, food security,
human rights, and trade facilitation, particularly for ASEAN's
poorest countries;
(4) urge ASEAN to continue its efforts to foster greater
integration and unity within the ASEAN community, as well as to
foster greater integration and unity with non-ASEAN economic,
political, and security partners, including Japan, the Republic
of Korea, Australia, the European Union, and India;
(5) recognize the value of strategic economic initiatives
such as United States-ASEAN Connect, which demonstrates a
commitment to ASEAN and the AEC and builds upon economic
relationships in the region;
(6) support ASEAN nations in addressing maritime and
territorial disputes in a constructive manner and in pursuing
claims through peaceful, diplomatic, and, as necessary,
legitimate regional and international arbitration mechanisms,
consistent with international law, including through the
adoption of a code of conduct in the South China Sea that
represents the interests of all parties and promotes peace and
stability in the region;
(7) urge all parties involved in the maritime and
territorial disputes in the Indo-Pacific region, including the
Government of the People's Republic of China--
(A) to cease any current activities, and avoid
undertaking any actions in the future, that undermine
stability, or complicate or escalate disputes through
the use of coercion, intimidation, or military force;
(B) to demilitarize islands, reefs, shoals, and
other features, and refrain from new efforts to
militarize, including the construction of new garrisons
and facilities and the relocation of additional
military personnel, material, or equipment;
(C) to oppose actions by any country that prevent
other countries from exercising their sovereign rights
to the resources in their exclusive economic zones and
continental shelves by enforcing claims to those areas
in the South China Sea that lack support in
international law; and
(D) to oppose unilateral declarations of
administrative and military districts in contested
areas in the South China Sea;
(8) urge parties to refrain from unilateral actions that
cause permanent physical damage to the marine environment and
support the efforts of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration and ASEAN to implement guidelines to address the
illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing in the region;
(9) urge ASEAN nations to develop a common approach to
encourage China and the Philippines to comply with the decision
of the Permanent Court of Arbitration's 2016 ruling in favor of
the Republic of the Philippines in the case against the
People's Republic of China's excessive maritime claims;
(10) reaffirm the commitment of the United States to
continue joint efforts with ASEAN to halt human smuggling and
trafficking in persons and urge ASEAN to create and strengthen
regional mechanisms to provide assistance and support to
refugees and migrants;
(11) support the Mekong-United States Partnership;
(12) support newly created initiatives with ASEAN nations,
including the United States-ASEAN Smart Cities Partnership, the
ASEAN Policy Implementation Project, the United States-ASEAN
Innovation Circle, and the United States-ASEAN Health Futures;
(13) encourage the President to communicate to ASEAN
leaders the importance of promoting the rule of law and open
and transparent government, strengthening civil society, and
protecting human rights, including releasing political
prisoners, ceasing politically motivated prosecutions and
arbitrary killings, and safeguarding freedom of the press,
freedom of assembly, freedom of religion, and freedom of speech
and expression;
(14) support efforts by organizations in ASEAN that address
corruption in the public and private sectors, enhance anti-
bribery compliance, enforce bribery criminalization in the
private sector, and build beneficial ownership transparency
through the ASEAN-USAID PROSPECT project partnered with the
South East Asia Parties Against Corruption (SEA-PAC);
(15) support the Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative
as an example of a people-to-people partnership that provides
skills, networks, and leadership training to a new generation
that will create and fill jobs, foster cross-border cooperation
and partnerships, and rise to address the regional and global
challenges of the future;
(16) support the creation of initiatives similar to the
Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative for other parts of the
Indo-Pacific to foster people-to-people partnerships with an
emphasis on civil society leaders;
(17) acknowledge those ASEAN governments that have fully
upheld and implemented all United Nations Security Council
resolutions and international agreements with respect to the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea's nuclear and ballistic
missile programs and encourage all other ASEAN governments to
do the same; and
(18) allocate appropriate resources across the United
States Government to articulate and implement an Indo-Pacific
strategy that respects and supports the crucial role of ASEAN
and supports ASEAN as a source of well-functioning and problem-
solving regional architecture in the Indo-Pacific community.
SEC. 206. YOUNG SOUTHEAST ASIAN LEADERS INITIATIVE.
(a) Short Title.--This section may be cited as the ``Young
Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative Act'' or the ``YSEALI Act''.
(b) Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative.--
(1) Establishment.--There is established in the Department
of State the Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative
(``YSEALI'') program.
(2) Goals.--The YSEALI program shall seek to build to
capacity of young leaders in Southeast Asia to--
(A) support young leaders from Southeast Asia by
offering professional development and a global network
to share expertise, including in the areas of civic
engagement, economic empowerment and social
entrepreneurship, education and environmental issues;
and
(B) further strengthen the enduring partnership
between the United States and Southeast Asia and
connect United States experts with YSEALI participants.
(3) YSEALI programs.--
(A) YSEALI academic fellows program.--There is
established the YSEALI Academic Fellows Program to
bring students from YSEALI partner countries to the
United States for the purposes of building practical
expertise, leadership skills, and professional networks
relating to one or more of the YSEALI themes. The
Secretary of State may award fellowships under the
Academic Fellows Program to eligible individuals based
on the following:
(i) Citizenship and residency in a YSEALI
partner country.
(ii) Status as a full-time undergraduate
student, or recent graduate of college,
university, or other institutions of higher
learning.
(iii) Other criteria determined appropriate
by the Secretary.
(B) YSEALI professional fellows program.--There is
established the YSEALI Professional Fellows Program to
bring professionals from YSEALI partner countries to
the United States for the purposes of building
practical expertise, leadership skills, and
professional networks relating to one or more of the
YSEALI themes. The Secretary of State may award
fellowships under the Professional Fellows Program to
eligible individuals based on the following:
(i) Citizenship and residency in a YSEALI
partner country.
(ii) Status as an emerging leader in
government, civil society, or the private
sector, and demonstrated expertise relating to
one or more of the YSEALI themes.
(iii) Current employment, and two or more
years of professional work experience relevant
to one or more YSEALI themes.
(iv) Other criteria determined appropriate
by the Secretary.
(C) Other initiatives.--The Secretary of State may
designate other initiatives as YSEALI initiatives under
this section if they advance the goals of the YSEALI
program as described in paragraph (2).
(4) Activities.--
(A) United states-based activities.--The Secretary
of State shall oversee all United States-based
activities carried out under the YSEALI program,
including the participation of YSEALI Academic Fellows
in a program at a United States university or college,
and the participation of YSEALI Professional Fellows at
United States private and public sector organizations
for individually-tailored work placements. Both
fellowships may include site visits, professional
networking opportunities, leadership training,
community service, and organized cultural activities,
as appropriate.
(B) Southeast asia-based activities.--The Secretary
of State should continue to support overseas
initiatives of the program, including the following:
(i) Quality leadership training,
professional development, and networking
opportunities for YSEALI alumni.
(ii) Reciprocal exchanges for YSEALI
Professional Fellows Program's United States
professional hosts and interlocutors to support
post-United States exchange action plans and
other related public diplomacy goals, as
appropriate.
(iii) Opportunities for networking with
YSEALI alumni and professionals and experts who
are American and Southeast Asian.
(iv) The YSEALI Regional Workshop program,
offering networking, mentoring, hands-on
training, and the tools necessary to lead
communities in addressing economic,
environmental, educational, and civic
engagement issues.
(v) The YSEALI Seeds for the Future
program, providing small, competitive grants to
young leaders in Southeast Asia to improve
their communities, countries, and the region
towards one or more of the themes of civic
engagement, economic empowerment and social
entrepreneurship, education, or environmental
issues.
(vi) The YSEALI Academy at Fulbright
University Vietnam, offering executive-level
seminars for entry to mid-level professionals
around the themes of technology and innovation,
public policy, and entrepreneurship.
(vii) The YSEALI Women's Leadership Academy
Program, enhancing people-to-people ties and
engagement with young and emerging leaders by
promoting gender equality and advancing the
status of women and girls, such as in the
public health sector
(C) Alumni platform.--The Secretary of State is
authorized to convene current YSEALI participants and
YSEALI alumni through a platform to promote networking
opportunities within the YSEALI community.
(D) Implementation.--To carry out this paragraph,
United States diplomatic and consular posts, the
Secretary of State, and agency external partners
managing and implementing the YSEALI program--
(i) shall promote United States policy
goals in Southeast Asia by providing tools and
resources to help young Southeast Asian leaders
develop important skills and connections,
including through online campaigns and public
diplomacy initiatives;
(ii) shall establish a system for
monitoring, evaluating, and improving the
YSEALI program; and
(iii) may accept financial contributions
from foundations, corporations, private donors,
program partners, and implementing agency
external partners intended to foster the goals
of the YSEALI program.
(5) Reports.--
(A) Strategy.--The Secretary of State shall submit
to the appropriate congressional committees a strategy
for implementing the YSEALI program, including the
following:
(i) YSEALI program goals, targets, and
planned outcomes for each year and, separately,
for the YSEALI program generally during the
duration of its implementation.
(ii) The continuation of YSEALI program
monitoring and evaluation plan, including
metrics for measuring YSEALI program progress
identification of annual YSEALI program goals,
and targets.
(B) Annual reports.--Not later than 1 year after
the date of the enactment of this section, and annually
thereafter for 4 years, the Secretary of State shall
submit to the appropriate congressional committees and
publish on a publicly available website of the
Department a report on--
(i) YSEALI program progress and an
assessment of the metrics, goals, targets, and
outcomes described in subparagraph (A)(i),
including information relating to YSEALI
program implementation and outcome activities
during the year covered by each report; and
(ii) recommendations for improvements or
amendments to the YSEALI program and strategy,
if any, that would improve their effectiveness
during subsequent years of YSEALI program
implementation.
(C) Final report.--Not later than the date of the
submission of the last report required under
subparagraph (B), the Secretary of State shall submit
to the appropriate congressional committees a final
assessment report that evaluates YSEALI program
implementation and outcomes during the entire duration
of YSEALI program operation, including recommendations
regarding whether the YSEALI program should be
reauthorized and any changes that would improve its
effectiveness.
(6) Definitions.--In this section:
(A) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(i) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
House of Representatives;
(ii) the Committee on Appropriations of the
House of Representatives;
(iii) the Committee on Foreign Relations of
the Senate; and
(iv) the Committee on Appropriations of the
Senate.
(B) Implementing agency external partners.--The
term ``implementing agency external partners'' means
any external partner that is not a United States
Government agency, and may include one or more of the
following entities:
(i) Local or multinational corporations.
(ii) Nongovernmental organizations.
(iii) Universities.
(iv) Regional institutions.
(C) YSEALI theme.--The term ``YSEALI theme''
means--
(i) civic engagement;
(ii) economic empowerment and social
entrepreneurship;
(iii) education;
(iv) environmental issues; or
(v) any other theme included by the
Secretary of State.
(D) YSEALI partner countries.--The term ``YSEALI
partner countries'' includes each member country of the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations and each other
country or political entity the Secretary of State
determines appropriate to include in the programs
established under this section.
SEC. 207. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON NEGOTIATIONS WITH G7 AND G20 COUNTRIES.
It is the sense of Congress that the President, acting through the
Secretary of State, should initiate an agenda with G7 and G20 countries
on matters relevant to economic and democratic freedoms, including
relating to the following:
(1) Trade and investment issues and enforcement.
(2) Building support for international infrastructure
standards, including standards agreed to at the G20 summit in
Osaka in 2018.
(3) The erosion of democracy and human rights.
(4) The security of 5G telecommunications.
(5) Anti-competitive behavior, such as intellectual
property theft, massive subsidization of companies, and other
policies and practices.
(6) Predatory international sovereign lending that is
inconsistent with Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development and Paris Club principles.
(7) International influence campaigns.
(8) Environmental standards.
(9) Coordination with like-minded regional partners that
are not in the G7 and G20.
SEC. 208. ENHANCING THE UNITED STATES-TAIWAN PARTNERSHIP.
(a) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States--
(1) to support the close economic, political, and security
relationship between Taiwan and the United States and recognize
Taiwan as a vital part of the approach to the United States
Indo-Pacific;
(2) to advance the security of Taiwan and its democracy a
vital national security interest of the United States;
(3) to reinforce all existing United States Government
commitments to Taiwan, consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act
(Public Law 96-8), the three joint communiques, and the ``Six
Assurances'';
(4) to support Taiwan's implementation of its asymmetric
defense strategy, including the priorities identified in
Taiwan's Overall Defense Concept;
(5) to urge Taiwan to increase its defense spending in
order to fully resource its defense strategy;
(6) to conduct regular transfers of defense articles to
Taiwan in order to enhance Taiwan's self-defense capabilities,
particularly its efforts to develop and integrate asymmetric
capabilities, such as anti-ship, coastal defense, anti-armor,
air defense, advanced command, control, communications,
computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, and
resilient command and control capabilities, into its military
forces;
(7) to advocate and actively advance Taiwan's meaningful
participation in international organizations, including the
World Health Assembly, the International Civil Aviation
Organization, the International Criminal Police Organization,
and other international bodies as appropriate;
(8) to advocate for information sharing with Taiwan in the
International Agency for Research on Cancer;
(9) to promote meaningful cooperation among the United
States, Taiwan, and other like-minded partners;
(10) to enhance bilateral trade, including potentially
through new agreements or resumption of talks under the Trade
and Investment Framework Agreement;
(11) to actively engage in trade talks in pursuance of a
bilateral free trade agreement;
(12) to expand bilateral economic and technological
cooperation, including improving supply chain security;
(13) to support United States educational and exchange
programs with Taiwan, including by promoting the study of
Chinese language, culture, history, and politics in Taiwan; and
(14) to expand people-to-people exchanges between the
United States and Taiwan.
(b) Supporting United States Educational and Exchange Programs With
Taiwan.--
(1) Establishment of the united states-taiwan cultural
exchange foundation.--The Secretary of State should consider
establishing an independent nonprofit entity that--
(A) is dedicated to deepening ties between the
future leaders of Taiwan and the United States; and
(B) works with State and local school districts and
educational institutions in the United States to send
high school and university students to Taiwan to study
the Chinese language, culture, history, politics, and
other relevant subjects.
(2) Partner.--State and local school districts and
educational institutions, including public universities, in the
United States are encouraged to partner with the Taipei
Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United
States to establish programs to promote an increase in
educational and cultural exchanges.
SEC. 209. TAIWAN DIPLOMATIC REVIEW.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
(1) Pursuant to the Taiwan Relations Act (22 U.S.C.
3301(b)(1)), it is the policy of the United States to ``promote
extensive, close, and friendly commercial, cultural, and other
relations between the people of the United States and the
people of Taiwan''.
(2) In May 2019, the Taiwanese counterpart to the American
Institute in Taiwan, the Coordination Council for North
American Affairs, was renamed the ``Taiwan Council for U.S.
Affairs''.
(3) It is the policy of the United States to refer to
Taiwan as ``Taiwan'', not ``Taipei'' or ``Chinese Taipei''.
(4) The Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office
is inaptly named as it works to cultivate the extensive, close,
and friendly commercial, cultural, and other relations between
the people of the United States and the people, organizations,
and enterprises of Taiwan, not merely those in Taipei.
(b) Negotiations to Rename Tecro.--Reflective of the substantively
deepening ties between Taiwan and the United States, the Secretary of
State shall seek to enter into negotiations with appropriate officials
of the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United
States with the objective of renaming its office in Washington, D.C.,
the Taiwan Representative Office in the United States, and its
subsidiary offices in the United States, accordingly.
SEC. 210. TAIWAN PEACE AND STABILITY ACT.
(a) Short Title.--This section may be cited as the ``Taiwan Peace
and Stability Act''.
(b) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House
of Representatives; and
(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate.
(2) International organization.--The term ``international
organization'' includes United Nations funds, programs,
specialized agencies, entities, and bodies, as well as other
organizations outside of the United Nations system that the
Secretary of State determines appropriate, in consultation with
other relevant Federal departments and agencies.
(3) One-china principle.--The term ``One-China Principle''
means only the PRC's policy toward Taiwan.
(4) Civil society organizations.--The term ``civil society
organizations'' means international civil society organizations
that are critical to maintaining Taiwan's international space
and enabling Taiwan to play a positive and constructive role in
the global community.
(5) Potential pla campaigns.--The term ``potential PLA
campaigns'' means--
(A) a naval blockade of Taiwan;
(B) an amphibious assault and ground invasion of
Taiwan, especially such invasion designed to accomplish
a fiat accompli before intervention is possible; or
(C) a seizure of one or more of Taiwan's outlying
islands.
(c) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The United States has consistently sought to advance
peace and stability in East Asia as a central element of United
States foreign policy toward the region.
(2) The Government of the People's Republic of China (PRC),
especially since the election of Tsai Ing-Wen in 2016, has
conducted a coordinated campaign to weaken Taiwan
diplomatically, economically, and militarily in a manner that
threatens to erode United States policy and create a fait
accompli on questions surrounding Taiwan's future.
(3) In order to ensure the longevity of United States
policy and preserve the ability of the people of Taiwan to
determine their future independently, it is necessary to
reinforce Taiwan's diplomatic, economic, and physical space.
(4) Taiwan has provided monetary, humanitarian, and medical
assistance to combat diseases such as AIDS, tuberculosis,
Ebola, and dengue fever in countries around the world. During
the COVID-19 pandemic, Taiwan donated millions of pieces of
personal protective equipment and COVID-19 tests to countries
in need.
(5) Since 2016, the Gambia, Sao Tome and Principe, Panama,
the Dominican Republic, Burkina Faso, El Salvador, the Solomon
Islands, and Kiribati have severed diplomatic relations with
Taiwan in favor of diplomatic relations with China.
(6) Taiwan was invited to participate in the World Health
Assembly (WHA), the decision-making body of the World Health
Organization, as an observer annually between 2009 and 2016.
Since the 2016 election of President Tsai, the PRC has
increasingly resisted Taiwan's participation in the WHA. Taiwan
was not invited to attend the WHA in 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, or
2021.
(7) The Taipei Flight Information Region reportedly served
1,750,000 flights and 68,900,000 passengers in 2018 and is home
to Taiwan Taoyuan International Airport, the 11th busiest
airport in the world. Taiwan has been excluded from
participating at the International Civil Aviation Organization
since 2013.
(8) United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758 (1971)
does not address the issue of representation of Taiwan and its
people at the United Nations, nor does it give the PRC the
right to represent the people on Taiwan.
(d) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States
to--
(1) maintain the position that peace and stability in the
Western Pacific are in the political, security, and economic
interests of the United States, and are matters of
international concern; and
(2) work with allies and partners to promote peace and
stability in the Indo-Pacific and deter military acts or other
forms of coercive behavior that would undermine regional
stability.
(e) Sense of Congress on Taiwan's Meaningful Participation in the
International Community.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) Taiwan is free, democratic, and prosperous, is home to
23,500,000 people, and is an important contributor to the
global community;
(2) multiple United States Government Administrations have
taken important steps to advance Taiwan's meaningful
participation in international organizations and to enhance
cooperation with Taiwan to provide global public goods,
including through development assistance, humanitarian
assistance, and disaster relief in trilateral and multilateral
fora;
(3) nonetheless, significant structural, policy, and legal
barriers remain to advancing Taiwan's meaningful participation
in the international community; and
(4) efforts to share Taiwan's expertise with other parts of
the global community could be further enhanced through a
systematic approach, along with greater attention from Congress
and the American public to such efforts.
(f) Strategy to Support Taiwan's Meaningful Participation in
International Organizations.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this section, the Secretary of State, in
consultation with other Federal departments and agencies as
appropriate, shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees a strategy--
(A) to advance Taiwan's meaningful participation in
a prioritized set of international organizations; and
(B) that responds to growing pressure from the PRC
on foreign governments, international organizations,
commercial actors, and civil society organizations to
comply with its ``One-China Principle'' with respect to
Taiwan.
(2) Matters to be included.--The strategy required under
paragraph (1) shall include--
(A) an assessment of the methods the PRC uses to
coerce actors to into adhering to its ``One-China
Principle'', including those employed against
governments, international organizations, and civil
society organizations and pressure on commercial
actors, to the extent relevant in the context of
Taiwan's meaningful participation international
organizations;
(B) an assessment of the policies of foreign
governments toward the PRC and Taiwan, to identify
likeminded allies and partners who might become public
or private partners in the strategy;
(C) a systematic analysis of all international
organizations, as practicable, to identify those that
best lend themselves to advancing Taiwan's
participation, including--
(i) the organization's policy on the
requirements to obtain membership and observer
status, as well as the foundational documents
defining membership requirements and observer
status within the organization;
(ii) the organization's participation
rules;
(iii) the processes for developing
membership requirements and participation
rules;
(iv) the policies of current members
regarding Taiwan's political status; and
(v) the organization's relative reliance on
contributions from the PRC and how it may
affect internal decision-making;
(D) an evaluation of the feasibility and
advisability of expanding economic, security, and
diplomatic engagement with countries that have
demonstrably strengthened, enhanced, or upgraded
relations with Taiwan, where it aligns with United
States interests;
(E) a survey of international organizations that
have allowed Taiwan's meaningful participation,
including an assessment of whether any erosion in
Taiwan's engagement has occurred within those
organizations and how Taiwan's participation has
positively strengthened the capacity and activity of
these organizations, providing positive models for
Taiwan's inclusion in other similar forums;
(F) a list of not more than 20 international
organizations at which the United States Government
will prioritize using its voice, vote, and influence to
advance Taiwan's meaningful participation over the
three-year period following the date of enactment of
this Act, to be derived from the organizations
identified pursuant to subparagraph (C); and
(G) a description of the diplomatic strategies and
the coalitions the United States Government plans to
develop to implement subparagraph (F).
(3) Form.--The strategy required under paragraph (1) shall
be submitted in classified form but may include an unclassified
summary.
(4) Consultation.--The Secretary of State shall consult
with the appropriate congressional committees--
(A) not later than 90 days after the date of
enactment of this Act, with respect to the
international organizations identified pursuant to
paragraph (2)(C); and
(B) not later than 180 days after the date of the
submission of the strategy required under paragraph
(1), and every 180 days thereafter for 2 years,
regarding the development and implementation of the
strategy required.
(g) Expanding United States-Taiwan Development Cooperation.--
(1) In general.--No later than 120 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Administrator of the United
States Agency for International Development (USAID), in
consultation with the United States International Development
Finance Corporation (DFC), shall submit to the appropriate
congressional committees a report on cooperation with Taiwan on
trilateral and multilateral development initiatives, through
the American Institute in Taiwan as appropriate.
(2) Matters to be included.--The report required in
paragraph (1) shall include the following:
(A) A comprehensive review of existing cooperation
mechanisms and initiatives between USAID or DFC and
relevant departments and agencies in Taiwan, including,
but not limited to Taiwan's International Cooperation
and Development Fund (ICDF).
(B) An assessment of how USAID and DFC development
cooperation with relevant departments and agencies in
Taiwan compares to comparable cooperation with partners
of similar economic size and foreign assistance
capacity.
(C) An analysis of the opportunities and challenges
the cooperation described in subparagraph (A) has
offered to date, including--
(i) opportunities collaboration has offered
to expand USAID's and DFC's ability to deliver
assistance into a wider range communities;
(ii) sectors where USAID, DFC, ICDF, other
relevant agencies and departments in Taiwan, or
the organizations' implementing partners, have
a comparative advantage in providing
assistance; and
(iii) opportunities to transition virtual
capacity building events relevant departments
and agencies in Taiwan, through the Global
Cooperation and Training Framework and other
forums, into in-person, enduring forms of
development cooperation.
(D) An assessment of any legal, policy, logistical,
financial, or administrative barriers to expanding
cooperation in trilateral or multilateral development,
including--
(i) availability of personnel at the
American Institute in Taiwan responsible for
coordinating development assistance
cooperation;
(ii) volume of current cooperation
initiatives and barriers to expanding it;
(iii) diplomatic, policy, or legal barriers
facing the United States or other partners to
including Taiwan in formal and informal
multilateral development cooperation
mechanisms;
(iv) resource or capacity barriers to
expanding cooperation facing the United States
or Taiwan; and
(v) geopolitical barriers that complicate
United States-Taiwan cooperation in third
countries.
(E) Recommendations to address the challenges
identified in subparagraph (D).
(F) A description of any additional resources or
authorities that expanding cooperation might require.
(3) Form.--The strategy required in paragraph (1) shall be
submitted in unclassified form but may include a classified
annex.
(h) Sense of Congress on Expanding United States Economic Relations
With Taiwan.--It is the sense of the Congress that--
(1) expanding United States economic relations with Taiwan
has benefited the people of both the United States and Taiwan;
and
(2) the United States should explore opportunities to
deepen, and where possible expand, economic ties between Taiwan
and the United States, through dialogue, and by developing the
legal templates required to support potential future
agreements.
(i) Sense of Congress on Peace and Stability in the Taiwan
Strait.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) PRC attempts to intimidate Taiwan, including through
high rates of PRC sorties into air space near Taiwan, and PRC
amphibious assault exercises near Taiwan, jeopardizes the long-
standing United States position that differences in cross-
Strait relations must be resolved peacefully;
(2) given the potential for a cross-Strait conflict to be
highly destructive and destabilizing, any increase in the risk
of conflict demands attention and obligates leaders to
reinforce deterrence, as the most viable means to prevent war;
(3) Taiwan should continue to implement its asymmetric
defense strategy, including investing in cost-effective and
resilient capabilities, while also strengthening recruitment
and training of its reserve and civil defense forces, and those
capabilities include, but are not limited to, coastal defense
cruise missiles; and
(4) while enhancing deterrence, it is also essential to
maintain open and effective crisis communication and risk
reduction mechanisms, as a means to reduce the risk of
misunderstanding and ultimately, conflict.
(j) Strategy to Enhance Deterrence Over a Cross-strait Conflict.--
(1) In general.--No later than 90 days after the date of
enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees a whole-of-government
strategy to enhance deterrence over a cross-Strait military
conflict between the PRC and Taiwan.
(2) Matters to be included.--The strategy shall include the
following:
(A) A comprehensive review of existing diplomatic,
economic, and military tools to establish deterrence
over a cross-Strait conflict and an assessment of their
efficacy.
(B) An examination of the present and future
capabilities of the United States and Taiwan to respond
to the potential PLA campaigns against Taiwan in 5, 10,
and 15 years. The analysis shall include an assessment
of the progress Taiwan has made in developing the cost-
effective and resilient capabilities needed to respond
to its strategic environment, as well as any additional
personnel, procurement, or training reforms required.
(C) An evaluation of the feasibility of expanding
coordination with United States allies and partners to
enhance deterrence over a cross-Strait conflict. The
review shall include a review of the following matters:
(i) Expanding coordination of public or
private messaging on deterrence vis-a-vis
Taiwan.
(ii) Coordinating use of economic tools to
raise the costs of PRC military action that
could precipitate a cross-Strait conflict.
(iii) Enhancing codevelopment and
codeployment of military capabilities related
to deterrence over a cross-Strait conflict, or
enhancing coordination on training of Taiwan's
military forces.
(D) Recommendations on significant additional
diplomatic, economic, and military steps available to
the United States Government, unilaterally and in
concert with United States allies and partners, to
enhance the clarity and credibility of deterrence over
a cross-Strait conflict.
(E) A description of any additional resources or
authorities needed to implement the recommendations
identified in subparagraph (D).
(3) Form.--The strategy required in paragraph (1) shall be
submitted classified form but may include an unclassified
annex.
(4) Consultation.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
enactment of this Act, and not less frequently than every 180
days thereafter for 7 years, the President (or a designee), as
well as representatives from the agencies and departments
involved in developing the strategy required in paragraph (1),
shall consult with the appropriate congressional committees
regarding the development and implementation of the strategy
required in this subsection. The representatives from the
relevant agencies and departments shall be at the Under
Secretary level or above.
(k) Strengthening Taiwan's Civilian Defense Professionals.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in
consultation with the Secretary of Defense, shall present to
the appropriate congressional committees a plan for
strengthening the community of civilian defense professionals
in Taiwan, facilitated through the American Institute in Taiwan
as appropriate.
(2) Matters to be included.--The plan required by paragraph
(1) shall include the following:
(A) A comprehensive review of existing United
States Government and non-United States Government
programmatic and funding modalities to support Taiwan's
civilian defense professionals in pursuing professional
development, educational, and cultural exchanges in the
United States, including--
(i) opportunities through Department of
State-supported programs, such as the
International Visitor Leaders Program; and
(ii) opportunities offered through
nongovernmental institutions, such as think
tanks, to the extent the review can practicably
make such an assessment.
(B) A description of the frequency that civilian
defense professionals from Taiwan pursue or are
selected for the programs reviewed pursuant to
subparagraph (A).
(C) An analysis of any funding, policy,
administrative, or other barriers preventing greater
participation from Taiwan's civilian defense
professionals in the opportunities identified pursuant
to subparagraph (A).
(D) An evaluation of the value expanding the
opportunities reviewed pursuant to subparagraph (A)
would offer for strengthening Taiwan's existing
civilian defense community, and for increasing the
perceived value of the field for young professionals in
Taiwan.
(E) An assessment of options the United States
Government could take individually, with partners in
Taiwan, or with foreign governments, or nongovernmental
partners, to expand the opportunities reviewed pursuant
to subparagraph (A).
(F) A description of additional resources and
authorities required by the options assessed pursuant
to subparagraph (E).
(3) Form.--The plan required by paragraph (1) shall be
submitted in unclassified form but may include a classified
annex.
SEC. 211. TAIWAN INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY ACT.
(a) Short Title.--This section may be cited as the ``Taiwan
International Solidarity Act''.
(b) Clarification Regarding United Nations General Assembly
Resolution 2758.--Subsection (a) of section 2 of the Taiwan Allies
International Protection and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act of
2019 (Public Law 116-135) (relating to diplomatic relations with
Taiwan) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraphs:
``(10) United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758
(1971) established the representatives of the Government of the
People's Republic of China as the only lawful representatives
of China to the United Nations. The resolution did not address
the issue of representation of Taiwan and its people in the
United Nations or any related organizations, nor did the
resolution take a position on the relationship between the
People's Republic of China and Taiwan or include any statement
pertaining to Taiwan's sovereignty.
``(11) The United States opposes any initiative that seeks
to change Taiwan's status without the consent of the people.''.
(c) United States Advocacy for International Organizations to
Resist the People's Republic of China's Efforts to Distort the ``One
China'' Position.--Section 4 of the Taiwan Allies International
Protection and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act of 2019 (relating to
the policy of the United States regarding Taiwan's participation in
international organizations) is amended--
(1) in paragraph (2), by striking ``and'' after the
semicolon at the end;
(2) in paragraph (3), by striking the period at the end and
inserting ``; and''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(4) to instruct, as appropriate, representatives of the
United States Government in all organizations described in
paragraph (1) to use the voice, vote, and influence of the
United States to advocate such organizations to resist the
People's Republic of China's efforts to distort the decisions,
language, policies, or procedures of such organizations
regarding Taiwan.''.
(d) Opposing the People's Republic of China's Efforts to Undermine
Taiwan's Ties and Partnerships Internationally.--Subsection (a) of
section 5 of the Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement
Initiative (TAIPEI) Act of 2019 (relating to strengthening ties with
Taiwan) is amended--
(1) in paragraph (2), by striking ``and'' after the
semicolon at the end;
(2) in paragraph (3), by striking the period at the end and
inserting ``; and''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(4) encourage, as appropriate, United States allies and
partners to oppose the People's Republic of China's efforts to
undermine Taiwan's official diplomatic relationships and its
partnerships with countries with which it does not maintain
diplomatic relations.''.
(e) Report on the People's Republic of China's Attempts to Promote
Its ``One China'' Position.--
(1) In general.--Subsection (b) of section 5 of the Taiwan
Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative
(TAIPEI) Act of 2019 (relating to strengthening ties with
Taiwan) is amended by inserting before the period at the end
the following: ``, as well as information relating to any prior
or ongoing attempts by the People's Republic of China to
undermine Taiwan's membership or observer status in all
organizations described in section (4)(1) and Taiwan's ties and
relationships with other countries in accordance with
subsection (a) of this section''.
(2) Effective date.--The amendment made by paragraph (1)
shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act and
apply beginning with the first report required under subsection
(b) of section 5 of the Taiwan Allies International Protection
and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act of 2019, as amended by
paragraph (1), that is required after such date.
SEC. 212. TAIWAN FELLOWSHIP PROGRAM.
(a) Short Title.--This section may be cited as the ``Taiwan
Fellowship Act''.
(b) Findings; Purposes.--
(1) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
(A) The Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96-8; 22
U.S.C. 3301 et seq.) affirmed United States policy ``to
preserve and promote extensive, close, and friendly
commercial, cultural, and other relations between the
people of the United States and the people on Taiwan,
as well as the people on the China mainland and all
other peoples of the Western Pacific area''.
(B) Consistent with the Asia Reassurance Initiative
Act of 2018 (Public Law 115-409), the United States has
grown its strategic partnership with Taiwan's vibrant
democracy of 23,000,000 people.
(C) Despite a concerted campaign by the People's
Republic of China to isolate Taiwan from its diplomatic
partners and from international organizations,
including the World Health Organization, Taiwan has
emerged as a global leader in the coronavirus global
pandemic response, including by donating more than
2,000,000 surgical masks and other medical equipment to
the United States.
(D) The creation of a United States fellowship
program with Taiwan would support--
(i) a key priority of expanding people-to-
people exchanges, which was outlined in
President Donald J. Trump's 2017 National
Security Strategy;
(ii) President Joseph R. Biden's commitment
to Taiwan, ``a leading democracy and a critical
economic and security partner'', as expressed
in his March 2021 Interim National Security
Strategic Guidance; and
(iii) April 2021 guidance from the
Department of State based on a review required
under the Taiwan Assurance Act of 2020
(subtitle B of title III of division FF of
Public Law 116-260) to ``encourage U.S.
government engagement with Taiwan that reflects
our deepening unofficial relationship''.
(2) Purposes.--The purposes of this section are--
(A) to further strengthen the United States-Taiwan
strategic relationship and broaden understanding of the
Indo-Pacific region by temporarily assigning officials
of agencies of the United States Government to Taiwan
for intensive study in Mandarin Chinese and placement
as Fellows with the governing authorities on Taiwan or
a Taiwanese civic institution;
(B) to expand United States Government expertise in
Mandarin Chinese language skills and understanding of
the politics, history, and culture of Taiwan and the
Indo-Pacific region by providing eligible United States
personnel the opportunity to acquire such skills and
understanding through the Taiwan Fellowship Program
established under subsection (c); and
(C) to better position the United States to advance
its economic, security, and human rights interests and
values in the Indo-Pacific region.
(c) Taiwan Fellowship Program.--
(1) Definitions.--In this section:
(A) Agency head.--The term ``agency head'' means,
in the case of the executive branch of United States
Government, or in the case of a legislative branch
agency specified in subparagraph (B), the head of the
respective agency.
(B) Agency of the united states government.--The
term ``agency of the United States Government''
includes the Government Accountability Office, the
Congressional Budget Office, the Congressional Research
Service, and the United States-China Economic and
Security Review Commission of the legislative branch,
as well as any agency of the executive branch.
(C) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(i) the Committee on Appropriations, the
Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Committee
on Armed Services of the House of
Representatives; and
(ii) the Committee on Appropriations and
the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate.
(D) Detailee.--The term ``detailee'' means an
employee of an agency of the United States Government
on loan to the American Institute in Taiwan, without a
change of position from the agency at which such
employee is employed.
(E) Implementing partner.--The term ``implementing
partner'' means any United States organization
described in section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986 and exempt from tax under section 501(a)
of such Code that--
(i) is selected through a competitive
process;
(ii) performs logistical, administrative,
and other functions, as determined by the
Department of State and the American Institute
of Taiwan, in support of the Taiwan Fellowship
Program; and
(iii) enters into a cooperative agreement
with the American Institute in Taiwan to
administer the Taiwan Fellowship Program.
(2) Establishment of taiwan fellowship program.--
(A) Establishment.--The Secretary of State shall
establish the ``Taiwan Fellowship Program'' (referred
to in this section as the ``Program'') to provide a
fellowship opportunity in Taiwan of up to two years for
eligible United States citizens through the cooperative
agreement established in subparagraph (B). The
Secretary of State, in consultation with appropriate
counterparts at the American Institute in Taiwan and
the implementing partner, may modify the name of the
Program.
(B) Cooperative agreements.--
(i) In general.--The American Institute in
Taiwan shall use amounts appropriated pursuant
to the authorization under paragraph (6)(A) to
enter into an annual or multi-year cooperative
agreement with an appropriate implementing
partner.
(ii) Fellowships.--The Secretary of State,
in consultation with the American Institute in
Taiwan and, as appropriate, the implementing
partner, shall award to eligible United States
citizens, subject to available funding--
(I) not fewer than five fellowships
during the first two years of the
Program; and
(II) not fewer than ten fellowships
during each of the remaining years of
the Program.
(C) International agreement; implementing
partner.--Not later than 30 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the American Institute in
Taiwan, in consultation with the Secretary of State,
shall--
(i) begin negotiations with the Taipei
Economic and Cultural Representative Office, or
with another appropriate entity, for the
purpose of entering into an agreement to
facilitate the placement of fellows in an
agency of the governing authorities on Taiwan;
and
(ii) begin the process of selecting an
implementing partner, which--
(I) shall agree to meet all of the
legal requirements required to operate
in Taiwan; and
(II) shall be composed of staff who
demonstrate significant experience
managing exchange programs in the Indo-
Pacific region.
(D) Curriculum.--
(i) First year.--During the first year of
each fellowship under this subsection, each
fellow should study--
(I) the Mandarin Chinese language;
(II) the people, history, and
political climate on Taiwan; and
(III) the issues affecting the
relationship between the United States
and the Indo-Pacific region.
(ii) Second year.--During the second year
of each fellowship under this section, each
fellow, subject to the approval of the
Secretary of State, the American Institute in
Taiwan, and the implementing partner, and in
accordance with the purposes of this section,
shall work in--
(I) a parliamentary office,
ministry, or other agency of the
governing authorities on Taiwan; or
(II) an organization outside of the
governing authorities on Taiwan, whose
interests are associated with the
interests of the fellow and the agency
of the United States Government from
which the fellow had been employed.
(E) Flexible fellowship duration.--Notwithstanding
any requirement under this section, the Secretary of
State, in consultation with the American Institute in
Taiwan and, as appropriate, the implementing partner,
may award fellowships that have a duration of between
nine months and two years, and may alter the curriculum
requirements under subparagraph (D) for such purposes.
(F) Sunset.--The Program shall terminate ten years
after the date of the enactment of this section.
(3) Program requirements.--
(A) Eligibility requirements.--A United States
citizen is eligible for a fellowship under this section
if he or she--
(i) is an employee of the United States
Government;
(ii) has at least two years of experience
in any branch of the United States Government;
(iii) has received at least one exemplary
performance review in his or her current United
States Government role within at least the last
three years prior to beginning the fellowship;
(iv) has a demonstrated professional or
educational background in the relationship
between the United States and countries in the
Indo-Pacific region; and
(v) has demonstrated his or her commitment
to further service in the United States
Government.
(B) Responsibilities of fellows.--Each recipient of
a fellowship under this section shall agree, as a
condition of such fellowship--
(i) to maintain satisfactory progress in
language training and appropriate behavior in
Taiwan, as determined by the Department of
State, the American Institute in Taiwan and, as
appropriate, its implementing partner;
(ii) to refrain from engaging in any
intelligence or intelligence-related activity
on behalf of the United States Government; and
(iii) to continue Federal Government
employment for a period of not less than four
years after the conclusion of the fellowship,
or for not less than two years for a fellowship
that is one year or shorter.
(C) Responsibilities of implementing partner.--
(i) Selection of fellows.--The implementing
partner, in close coordination with the
Secretary of State and the American Institute
in Taiwan, shall--
(I) make efforts to recruit
fellowship candidates who reflect the
diversity of the United States;
(II) select fellows for the Program
based solely on merit, with appropriate
supervision from the Department of
State and the American Institute in
Taiwan; and
(III) prioritize the selection of
candidates willing to serve a
fellowship lasting one year or longer.
(ii) First year.--The implementing partner
should provide each fellow in the first year
(or shorter duration, as jointly determined by
the Secretary of State and the American
Institute in Taiwan, for those who are not
serving a two-year fellowship) with--
(I) intensive Mandarin Chinese
language training; and
(II) courses in the politic,
culture, and history of Taiwan, China,
and the broader Indo-Pacific.
(iii) Waiver of required training.--The
Secretary of State, in coordination with the
American Institute in Taiwan and, as
appropriate, the implementing partner, may
waive any of the training required under clause
(ii) to the extent that a fellow has Mandarin
Chinese language skills, knowledge of the
topics described in clause (ii)(II), or for
other related reasons approved by the Secretary
of State and the American Institute in Taiwan.
If any of the training requirements are waived
for a fellow serving a two-year fellowship, the
training portion of his or her fellowship may
be shortened to the extent appropriate.
(iv) Office; staffing.--The implementing
partner, in consultation with the Secretary of
State and the American Institute in Taiwan,
shall maintain an office and at least one full-
time staff member in Taiwan to--
(I) liaise with the American
Institute in Taiwan and the governing
authorities on Taiwan; and
(II) serve as the primary in-
country point of contact for the
recipients of fellowships under this
section and their dependents.
(v) Other functions.--The implementing
partner should perform other functions in
association in support of the Program,
including logistical and administrative
functions, as included in the cooperative
agreement entered into pursuant to paragraph
(2)(B) by the Secretary of State and the
American Institute in Taiwan.
(D) Noncompliance.--
(i) In general.--Any fellow who fails to
comply with the requirements under this section
shall reimburse the American Institute in
Taiwan for--
(I) the Federal funds expended for
the fellow's participation in the
fellowship, as set forth in clauses
(ii) and (iii); and
(II) interest accrued on such funds
(calculated at the prevailing rate).
(ii) Full reimbursement.--Any fellow who
violates clause (i) or (ii) of subparagraph (B)
shall reimburse the American Institute in
Taiwan in an amount equal to the sum of--
(I) all of the Federal funds
expended for the fellow's participation
in the fellowship; and
(II) interest on the amount
specified in subclause (I), which shall
be calculated at the prevailing rate.
(iii) Pro rata reimbursement.--Any fellow
who violates subparagraph (B)(iii) shall
reimburse the American Institute in Taiwan in
an amount equal to the difference between--
(I) the amount specified in clause
(ii); and
(II) the product of--
(aa) the amount the fellow
received in compensation during
the final year of the
fellowship, including the value
of any allowances and benefits
received by the fellow;
multiplied by
(bb) the percentage of the
period specified in
subparagraph (B)(iii) during
which the fellow did not remain
employed by the United States
Government.
(E) Annual report.--Not later than 90 days after
the selection of the first class of fellows under this
section and annually thereafter for 10 years, the
Secretary of State shall offer to brief the appropriate
congressional committees regarding the following:
(i) An assessment of the performance of the
implementing partner in fulfilling the purposes
of this section.
(ii) The number of applicants each year,
the number of applicants willing to serve a
fellowship lasting one year or longer, and the
number of such applicants selected for a
fellowship.
(iii) The names and sponsoring agencies of
the fellows selected by the implementing
partner and the extent to which such fellows
represent the diversity of the United States.
(iv) The names of the parliamentary
offices, ministries, other agencies of the
governing authorities on Taiwan, and
nongovernmental institutions to which each
fellow was assigned.
(v) Any recommendations, as appropriate, to
improve the implementation of the Program,
including added flexibilities in the
administration of the program.
(vi) An assessment of the Program's value
upon the relationship between the United States
and Taiwan or the United States and Asian
countries.
(F) Annual financial audit.--
(i) In general.--The financial records of
any implementing partner shall be audited
annually in accordance with generally accepted
auditing standards by independent certified
public accountants or independent licensed
public accountants who are certified or
licensed by a regulatory authority of a State
or another political subdivision of the United
States.
(ii) Location.--Each audit under clause (i)
shall be conducted at the place or places where
the financial records of the implementing
partner are normally kept.
(iii) Access to documents.--The
implementing partner shall make available to
the accountants conducting an audit under
clause (i)--
(I) all books, financial records,
files, other papers, things, and
property belonging to, or in use by,
the implementing partner that are
necessary to facilitate the audit; and
(II) full facilities for verifying
transactions with the balances or
securities held by depositories, fiscal
agents, and custodians.
(iv) Report.--
(I) In general.--Not later than 180
days after the end of each fiscal year,
the implementing partner shall provide
a report of the audit conducted for
such fiscal year under clause (i) to
the Secretary of State and the American
Institute in Taiwan.
(II) Contents.--Each audit report
under subclause (I) shall--
(aa) set forth the scope of
the audit at issue;
(bb) include such
statements, along with the
auditor's opinion of those
statements, as may be necessary
to present fairly the
implementing partner's assets
and liabilities, surplus or
deficit, with reasonable
detail;
(cc) include a statement of
the implementing partner's
income and expenses during the
year; and
(dd) include a schedule
of--
(AA) all contracts
and cooperative
agreements requiring
payments greater than
$5,000; and
(BB) any payments
of compensation,
salaries, or fees at a
rate greater than
$5,000 per year.
(III) Copies.--Each audit report
shall be produced in sufficient copies
for distribution to the public.
(4) Taiwan fellows on detail from government service.--
(A) In general.--
(i) Detail authorized.--With the approval
of the Secretary of State, an agency head may
detail, for a period of not more than two
years, an employee of the agency of the United
States Government who has been awarded a
fellowship under this Act, to the American
Institute in Taiwan for the purpose of
assignment to the governing authorities on
Taiwan or an organization described in
paragraph (2)(D)(ii)(II).
(ii) Agreement.--Each detailee shall enter
into a written agreement with the Federal
Government before receiving a fellowship, in
which the fellow shall agree--
(I) to continue in the service of
the sponsoring agency at the end of
fellowship for a period of at least
four years (or at least two years if
the fellowship duration is one year or
shorter) unless such detailee is
involuntarily separated from the
service of such agency; and
(II) to pay to the American
Institute in Taiwan any additional
expenses incurred by the United States
Government in connection with the
fellowship if the detailee voluntarily
separates from service with the
sponsoring agency before the end of the
period for which the detailee has
agreed to continue in the service of
such agency.
(iii) Exception.--The payment agreed to
under clause (ii)(II) may not be required of a
detailee who leaves the service of the
sponsoring agency to enter into the service of
another agency of the United States Government
unless the head of the sponsoring agency
notifies the detailee before the effective date
of entry into the service of the other agency
that payment will be required under this
subsection.
(B) Status as government employee.--A detailee
under this paragraph--
(i) is deemed, for the purpose of
preserving allowances, privileges, rights,
seniority, and other benefits, to be an
employee of the sponsoring agency;
(ii) is entitled to pay, allowances, and
benefits from funds available to such agency,
which is deemed to comply with section 5536 of
title 5, United States Code; and
(iii) may be assigned to a position with an
entity described in paragraph (2)(D)(ii)(I) if
acceptance of such position does not involve--
(I) the taking of an oath of
allegiance to another government; or
(II) the acceptance of compensation
or other benefits from any foreign
government by such detailee.
(C) Responsibilities of sponsoring agency.--
(i) In general.--The agency of the United
States Government from which a detailee is
detailed should provide the fellow allowances
and benefits that are consistent with
Department of State Standardized Regulations or
other applicable rules and regulations,
including--
(I) a living quarters allowance to
cover the cost of housing in Taiwan;
(II) a cost of living allowance to
cover any possible higher costs of
living in Taiwan;
(III) a temporary quarters
subsistence allowance for up to seven
days if the fellow is unable to find
housing immediately upon arriving in
Taiwan;
(IV) an education allowance to
assist parents in providing the
fellow's minor children with
educational services ordinarily
provided without charge by public
schools in the United States;
(V) moving expenses to transport
personal belongings of the fellow and
his or her family in their move to
Taiwan, which is comparable to the
allowance given for American Institute
in Taiwan employees assigned to Taiwan;
and
(VI) an economy-class airline
ticket to and from Taiwan for each
fellow and the fellow's immediate
family.
(ii) Modification of benefits.--The
American Institute in Taiwan and its
implementing partner, with the approval of the
Department of State, may modify the benefits
set forth in clause (i) if such modification is
warranted by fiscal circumstances.
(D) No financial liability.--The American Institute
in Taiwan, the implementing partner, and any governing
authorities on Taiwan or nongovernmental entities in
Taiwan at which a fellow is detailed during the second
year of the fellowship may not be held responsible for
the pay, allowances, or any other benefit normally
provided to the detailee.
(E) Reimbursement.--Fellows may be detailed under
clause (A)(ii) without reimbursement to the United
States by the American Institute in Taiwan.
(F) Allowances and benefits.--Detailees may be paid
by the American Institute in Taiwan for the allowances
and benefits listed in subparagraph (C).
(5) GAO report.--Not later than one year before the sunset
of the Program pursuant to paragraph (2)(F), the Comptroller
General of the United States shall transmit to the Committee on
Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign
Affairs of the House of Representatives a report that includes
the following:
(A) An analysis of United States Government
participants in the Program, including the number of
applicants and the number of fellowships undertaken,
and the places of employment.
(B) An assessment of the costs and benefits for
participants in the Program and for the United States
Government of such fellowships.
(C) An analysis of the financial impact of the
fellowship on United States Government offices that
have detailed fellows to participate in the Program.
(D) Recommendations, if any, on how to improve the
Program.
(6) Funding.--
(A) Authorization of appropriations.--There are
authorized to be appropriated to the American Institute
in Taiwan--
(i) for fiscal year 2022, $2,900,000, of
which $500,000 should be made available to an
appropriate implementing partner to launch the
Program; and
(ii) for fiscal year 2023, and each
succeeding fiscal year, $2,400,000.
(B) Private sources.--The implementing partner
selected to implement the Program may accept, use, and
dispose of gifts or donations of services or property
in carrying out such program, subject to the review and
approval of the American Institute in Taiwan.
SEC. 213. INCREASING DEPARTMENT OF STATE PERSONNEL AND RESOURCES
DEVOTED TO THE INDO-PACIFIC.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) In fiscal year 2020, the Department of State allocated
$1,500,000,000 to the Indo-Pacific region in bilateral and
regional foreign assistance resources, including as authorized
by section 201(b) of the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of
2018 (Public Law 115-409; 132 Stat. 5391), and $798,000,000 in
the fiscal year 2020 diplomatic engagement budget. These
amounts represent only 5 percent of the diplomatic engagement
budget and only 4 percent of the total Department of State-
USAID budget.
(2) Over the last 5 years the diplomatic engagement budget
and personnel levels in the Indo-Pacific averaged only 5
percent of the total, while foreign assistance resources
averaged only 4 percent of the total.
(3) In 2020, the Department of State began a process to
realign certain positions at posts to ensure that its personnel
footprint matches the demands of great-power competition,
including in the Indo-Pacific.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the size of the United States diplomatic corps must be
sufficient to meet the current and emerging challenges of the
21st century, including those in the Indo-Pacific region and
elsewhere;
(2) robust Chinese-language skills are necessary for the
success of the United States diplomatic corps and integral to
its ability to meet national security objectives;
(3) the increase must be designed to meet the objectives of
an Indo-Pacific strategy focused on strengthening the good
governance and sovereignty of countries that adhere to and
uphold the rules-based international order; and
(4) the increase must be implemented with a focus on
increased numbers of economic, political, and public diplomacy
officers, representing a cumulative increase of at least 200
Foreign Service officer generalists, to--
(A) advance free, fair, and reciprocal trade and
open investment environments for United States
entities, and engaged in increased commercial diplomacy
in key markets;
(B) better articulate and explain United States
policies, strengthen civil society and democratic
principles, enhance reporting on global activities,
promote people-to-people exchanges, and advance United
States influence; and
(C) increase capacity at small- and medium-sized
embassies and consulates in the Indo-Pacific and other
regions around the world, as necessary.
(c) Statement of Policy.--It shall be the policy of the United
States to--
(1) ensure Department of State funding levels and personnel
footprint in the Indo-Pacific reflect the region's high degree
of importance and significance to United States political,
economic, and security interests; and
(2) increase diplomatic engagement and foreign assistance
funding and the quantity of personnel dedicated to the Indo-
Pacific region respective to the Department of State's total
budget.
(d) Action Plan.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall provide to the
appropriate congressional committees of Congress an action plan that
includes the following elements:
(1) Identification of requirements to advance United States
strategic objectives in the Indo-Pacific and the personnel and
budgetary resources for the Department of State needed to
satisfy such objectives, assuming an unconstrained resource
environment.
(2) A plan to increase the portion of the Department's
budget dedicated to the Indo-Pacific in terms of DE and FA
focused on development, economic, and security assistance.
(3) A plan to increase the number of positions at posts in
the Indo-Pacific region and bureaus with responsibility for the
Indo-Pacific region, including a description of increases at
each post or bureau, a breakdown of increases by cone, and a
description of how such increases in personnel will advance
United States strategic objectives in the Indo-Pacific region.
(4) A plan to increase the number of Chinese-language
speakers and translation specialists at posts in the Indo-
Pacific region and within bureau offices with responsibility
for the Indo-Pacific region, including in INR.
(5) A description of any staffing or other training or
personnel reforms that may be required to quickly increase
departmental capacity to address the inter-disciplinary,
interconnected opportunities and challenges presented in the
Indo-Pacific, including but not limited to issues related to
climate change, public health, supply chains, cybersecurity,
and digital technology issues.
(6) Defined concrete and annual benchmarks that the
Department will meet in implementing the action plan.
(7) A description of any barriers to implementing the
action plan and recommendations to address these barriers,
noting whether additional authorities or resources from
Congress is needed to address these barriers.
(e) Updates to Report and Briefing.--Every 180 days after the
submission of the action plan described in subsection (d) for not more
than 3 years, the Secretary of State shall submit an update and brief
the appropriate congressional committees on the implementation of such
action plan, with supporting data and including a detailed assessment
of benchmarks reached.
(f) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be
appropriated, for fiscal year 2022, $2,000,000,000 in bilateral and
regional foreign assistance resources to carry out the purposes of part
I and chapter 4 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22
U.S.C. 2151 et seq., 2346 et seq.) to the Indo-Pacific region and
$1,250,000,000 in diplomatic engagement resources to the Indo-Pacific
region.
(g) Inclusion of Amounts Appropriated Pursuant to Asia Reassurance
Initiative Act of 2018.--Amounts authorized to be appropriated under
subsection (f) include funds authorized to be appropriated pursuant to
section 201(b) of the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018 (Public
Law 115-409).
(h) Benchmarks Update.--Not later than 2 years after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall report to the
appropriate congressional committees on the extent to which the
strategic objectives described in the action plan in subsection (d)
have been satisfied or progress toward such satisfaction has been made.
SEC. 214. REPORT ON BILATERAL EFFORTS TO ADDRESS CHINESE FENTANYL
TRAFFICKING.
(a) China's Class Scheduling of Fentanyl and Synthetic Opioid
Precursors.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the Secretary of State and Attorney General shall submit to
the appropriate congressional committees a written report detailing--
(1) a description of United States Government efforts to
gain a commitment from the Government of the People's Republic
of China (PRC) to submit unregulated fentanyl precursors such
as 4-AP to controls;
(2) a plan for future steps the United States Government
will take to urge the PRC to combat illicit fentanyl production
and trafficking originating in the PRC;
(3) an assessment of the intersection between illicit
fentanyl trafficking originating in China and illicit
environmental trade and possible relationships of trade-based
money laundering; and
(4) an assessment of the intersection between illicit
fentanyl trafficking originating in China and counterfeit
medicines and medical supplies in the United States.
(b) Form of Report.--The report required under subsection (a) shall
be submitted in unclassified form with a classified annex.
SEC. 215. FACILITATION OF INCREASED EQUITY INVESTMENTS UNDER THE BETTER
UTILIZATION OF INVESTMENTS LEADING TO DEVELOPMENT ACT OF
2018.
(a) Applicability of Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990.--Section
1421(c) of the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development
Act of 2018 (22 U.S.C. 9621(c)) is amended by adding at the end the
following:
``(7) Applicability of federal credit reform act of 1990.--
``(A) In general.--Subject to subparagraphs (B) and
(C), support provided under paragraph (1) with respect
to a project shall be considered to be a Federal credit
program that is subject to the Federal Credit Reform
Act of 1990 (2 U.S.C. 661 et seq.) for purposes of
applying the requirements of such Act to such support.
``(B) Determination of cost.--
``(i) In general.--For purposes of section
502(5) of the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990
(2 U.S.C. 661a(5) et seq.) the cost of support
provided under paragraph (1) with respect to a
project shall be the net present value, at the
time when funds are disbursed to provide the
support, of the following estimated cash flows:
``(I) The purchase price of the
support.
``(II) Dividends, redemptions, and
other shareholder distributions during
the term of the support.
``(III) Proceeds received upon a
sale, redemption, or other liquidation
of the support.
``(IV) Adjustments for risk of
estimated losses, if any.
``(ii) Changes in terms included.--The
estimated cash flows described in subclauses
(I) through (IV) of clause (i) shall include
the effects of changes in terms resulting from
the exercise of options included in the
agreement to provide the support.
``(C) Reestimate of cost.--When the estimated cost
of support provided under paragraph (1) with respect to
a project made in a single fiscal year is reestimated
in a subsequent year, the difference between the
reestimated cost and the previous cost estimate shall
be paid from the balances available in the Corporate
Capital Account established under section 1434.''.
(b) Maximum Contingent Liability.--Section 1433 of the Better
Utilization of Investments Leading to Development Act of 2018 (22
U.S.C. 9633) is amended by striking ``$60,000,000,000'' and inserting
``$100,000,000,000''.
(c) Funding for Corporate Capital Account.--Section 1434(b) of the
Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development Act of 2018
(22 U.S.C. 9634(b)) is amended--
(1) in paragraph (5), by striking ``and'' at the end;
(2) by redesignating paragraph (6) as paragraph (7); and
(3) by inserting after paragraph (5) the following:
``(6) receipts of reestimated costs received pursuant to
section 1421(c); and''.
(d) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Chief Executive Officer of the United States
International Development Finance Corporation shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees and the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives and the Senate a report
on--
(1) a plan to expand the Corporation's financing to support
United States national security and development priorities in
critical regions; and
(2) the budgetary, staffing, and programmatic resources
that would be required in order to carry out the plan required
by this subsection.
SEC. 216. EXPANDING INVESTMENT BY UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT FINANCE CORPORATION FOR VACCINE
MANUFACTURING.
(a) In General.--The Development Finance Corporation is authorized
to provide financing to entities in India and in other less developed
countries to increase vaccine manufacturing capacity for the following
purposes:
(1) Manufacturing Stringent Regulatory Authorization (SRA)
or World Health Organization (WHO) Emergency Use Listing COVID-
19 vaccines.
(2) Manufacturing SRA or WHO Emergency Use Listing
therapeutics used to treat symptoms related to COVID-19.
(3) Manufacturing critical medical supplies needed for
preventing, detecting and treating COVID-19, including
ventilators, personal protective equipment, oxygen,
diagnostics, therapeutics and vaccines.
(b) Reporting Requirement.--Not later than 180 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the Chief Executive Officer of the
Development Finance Corporation, in coordination with the Secretary of
State, shall provide a report to the appropriate congressional
committees--
(1) outlining the countries where DFC financing could be
most impactful for vaccine manufacturing and to achieve the
goal of manufacturing 1 billion COVID-19 vaccines by 2022;
(2) including a detailed explanation of the United States
and partner country interests served by the United States
providing support to such projects;
(3) including a detailed description of any support
provided by other United States allies and partners to expand
the initiatives outlined in subsection (a); and
(4) including a detailed description of any support
provided by the People's Republic of China in support of the
initiatives outlined in subsection (a).
(c) Form of Report.--The report required by subsection (b) shall be
submitted in unclassified form with a classified annex if necessary.
SEC. 217. ENSURING UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC POSTS ALIGN WITH AMERICAN
STRATEGIC NATIONAL SECURITY AND ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES.
(a) Finding.--With 276 embassies and other representative offices
globally, China now has more diplomatic posts around the world than any
other country, including the United States. Many of Beijing's new
missions can be found in countries that recently broke ties with Taiwan
(Burkina Faso, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, the Gambia, and Sao
Tome and Principe) or do not have any United States diplomatic physical
presence despite these countries asking for increased United States
engagement and investment (Antigua and Barbuda and Dominica).
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress, that the
Department of State should conduct an assessment of all United States
diplomatic missions and posts to verify such missions and posts align
with United States national security and economic interests, as well as
ensuring that these locations position the United States appropriately
with its strategic competitors to advance the national interest in
every country worldwide, including those countries currently lacking
any physical United States diplomatic presence, whether an embassy,
consulate general, or principal officer post.
(c) Reporting.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act and biennially thereafter for 4 years, the
Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees a report assessing the number, location, and objectives of
each of its diplomatic missions and posts worldwide, including an
assessment of any gaps that exist compared to other country strategic
competitors. The Secretary of State shall coordinate with the heads of
other Federal departments and agencies having an overseas presence at
any United States diplomatic mission or post to ensure such assessment
reflects all Federal Government equities and viewpoints.
SEC. 218. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE FULBRIGHT-HAYS
PROGRAM.
There are authorized to be appropriated, for the 5-year period
beginning on October 1, 2021, $105,500,000, to promote education,
training, research, and foreign language skills through the Fulbright-
Hays Program, in accordance with section 102(b) of the Mutual
Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2452(b)).
SEC. 219. SUPPORTING INDEPENDENT MEDIA AND COUNTERING DISINFORMATION.
(a) Authorization of USAGM Appropriations.--There is authorized to
be appropriated for the United States Agency for Global Media
$100,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026, for ongoing
and new programs to support local media, build independent media,
combat CCP disinformation inside and outside of the People's Republic
of China, invest in technology to subvert censorship, and monitor and
evaluate such programs, of which--
(1) not less than $50,000,000 shall be directed to a grant
to Radio Free Asia language services;
(2) not less than $20,000,000 shall be made available to
serve populations in China through Mandarin, Cantonese, Uyghur,
and Tibetan language services; and
(3) not less than $5,500,000 shall be made available for
digital media services--
(A) to counter propaganda of non-Chinese
populations in foreign countries; and
(B) to counter propaganda of Chinese populations in
China through ``Global Mandarin'' programming.
(b) Support for Local Media.--The Secretary of State, acting
through the Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights,
and Labor, and the Administrator of the United States Agency for
International Development, acting through the Assistant Administrator
for Development, Democracy, and Innovation, shall jointly support and
train foreign journalists on investigative techniques necessary to
ensure public accountability, promote transparency, fight corruption,
and support the ability of the public to develop informed opinions
about pressing issues facing their countries.
(c) Internet Freedom Programs.--The Bureau of Democracy, Human
Rights, and Labor shall continue to support internet freedom programs.
(d) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be
appropriated to the Department of State and United States Agency for
International Development $170,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2022
through 2026, for ongoing and new programs in support of press freedom,
training, and protection of journalists. Amounts appropriated pursuant
to this authorization are authorized to remain available until expended
and shall be in addition to amounts otherwise authorized to be
appropriated to support press freedom, training, and protection of
journalists.
SEC. 219A. GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT CENTER.
(a) Finding.--Congress established the Global Engagement Center to
``direct, lead, and coordinate efforts'' of the Federal Government to
``recognize, understand, expose, and counter foreign state and non-
state propaganda and disinformation globally''.
(b) Extension.--Section 1287(j) of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (22 U.S.C. 2656 note) is amended
by striking ``the date that is 8 years after the date of the enactment
of this Act'' and inserting ``December 31, 2027''.
(c) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the Global
Engagement Center should expand its coordinating capacity of diplomatic
messaging through the exchange of liaison officers with Federal
departments and agencies that manage aspects of identifying and
countering foreign disinformation, including the Office of the Director
of National Intelligence and Special Operations Command's Joint MISO
Web Operations Center.
(d) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be
appropriated $150,000,000 for fiscal year 2022 for the Global
Engagement Center to counter foreign state and non-state sponsored
propaganda and disinformation.
SEC. 219B. REPORT ON ORIGINS OF THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) it is critical to understand the origins of the COVID-
19 pandemic so the United States can better prepare, prevent,
and respond to pandemic health threats in the future;
(2) given the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on all
Americans, the American people deserve to know what information
the United States Government possesses about the origins of
COVID-19, as appropriate;
(3) it is critical for independent experts to have full
access to all pertinent human, animal, and environmental data,
biological sample, research, and personnel involved in the
early stages of the outbreak relevant to determining how this
pandemic emerged;
(4) Congress shares the concerns expressed by the United
States Government and 13 other foreign governments that the
international team of experts dispatched to the People's
Republic of China by the World Health Organization (WHO) to
study the origins of the SARS-CoV-2 virus was ``significantly
delayed and lacked access to complete, original data and
samples'';
(5) the March 30, 2021, statement by the Director-General
of the WHO, Dr. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, further affirms
that the investigative team had encountered ``difficulties'' in
accessing necessary raw data, that ``we have not yet found the
source of the virus'', and that ``all hypotheses remain on the
table'';
(6) the G7 communique expressing support for full
implementation of the International Health Regulations,
including ``a timely, transparent, expert-led, and science-
based WHO-convened Phase 2 COVID-19 Origins study including, as
recommended by the experts' report, in China'' is a valuable
commitment by the United States and its allies to investigating
the origins of COVID-19 in order to better prepare for future
pandemics; and
(7) Congress supports the effort announced by President
Biden, directing the intelligence community to conduct a 90 day
review to further analyze information pointing to the origins
of COVID-19.
(b) Report Required.--Not later than 180 days after enactment of
this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate committees of
Congress a report consisting of--
(1) an assessment of the most likely source or origin of
the SARS-CoV-2 virus, including a detailed review of all
information the United States possesses that it has identified
as potentially relevant to the source or origin of the SARS-
CoV-2 virus, including zoonotic transmission and spillover, or
other sources of origin, transmission, or spillover, based on
the information the United States Government has to date;
(2) its level of confidence in its assessment; and
(3) challenges identified to its ability to make such an
assessment.
(c) Form.--The report required by subsection (b) shall be submitted
in unclassified form but may include a classified annex.
(d) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section,
the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
(2) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate;
(3) the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions
of the Senate;
(4) the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources of the
Senate;
(5) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives;
(6) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the
House of Representatives; and
(7) the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of
Representatives.
SEC. 219C. EXTENSION OF ASIA REASSURANCE INITIATIVE ACT OF 2018.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the Indo-Pacific region is home to many of the world's
most dynamic democracies, economic opportunities, as well as
many challenges to United States interests and values as a
result of the growth in authoritarian governance in the region
and by broad challenges posed by nuclear proliferation, the
changing environment, and deteriorating adherence to human
rights principles and obligations;
(2) the People's Republic of China poses a particular
threat as it repeatedly violates internationally recognized
human rights, engages in unfair economic and trade practices,
disregards international laws and norms, coerces its neighbors,
engages in malign influence operations, and enables global
digital authoritarianism;
(3) the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018 (``ARIA'')
enhances the United States' commitment in the Indo-Pacific
region by--
(A) expanding its defense cooperation with its
allies and partners;
(B) investing in democracy and the protection of
human rights;
(C) engaging in cybersecurity initiatives; and
(D) supporting people-to-people engagement and
other shared priorities; and
(4) the 2019 Department of Defense Indo-Pacific Strategy
Report concludes that ARIA ``enshrines a generational whole-of-
government policy framework that demonstrates U.S. commitment
to a free and open Indo-Pacific region''.
(b) Authorization of Appropriations.--The Asia Reassurance
Initiative Act of 2018 (Public Law 115-409) is amended--
(1) in section 201(b), by striking ``$1,500,000,000 for
each of the fiscal years 2019 through 2023'' and inserting
``$2,000,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026'';
(2) in section 215(b), by striking ``2023'' and inserting
``2026'';
(3) in section 306(a)--
(A) in paragraph (1), by striking ``5 years'' and
inserting ``8 years''; and
(B) in paragraph (2), by striking ``2023'' and
inserting ``2026'';
(4) in section 409(a)(1), by striking ``2023'' and
inserting ``2026'';
(5) in section 410--
(A) in subsection (c), by striking ``2023'' and
inserting ``2026''; and
(B) in subsection (d), in the matter preceding
paragraph (1), by striking ``2023'' and inserting
``2026''; and
(6) in section 411, by striking ``2023'' and inserting
``2026''.
SEC. 219D. INVESTMENT, TRADE, AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA AND LATIN
AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN.
(a) Strategy Required.--
(1) In general.--The President shall establish United
States strategies to promote, facilitate, and increase trade
and investment and development in Africa and Latin America and
the Caribbean.
(2) Focus of strategy.--The strategy required by paragraph
(1) shall focus on increasing two-way trade and investment with
Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean by 200 percent in
real dollar value by the date that is 5 years after the date of
the enactment of this Act.
(3) Submission to congress.--
(A) United states strategy to promote two-way trade
and investment in africa, latin america, and the
caribbean.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the President, in
consultation with the heads of the relevant Federal
departments and agencies, shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees and make publicly
available a government-wide strategy for Africa, to be
known as the Prosper Africa Strategy, and for Latin
America and the Caribbean, that provides detailed
descriptions of how the United States intends to
fulfill the policy objectives described in paragraph
(2). The strategies shall--
(i) support and be aligned with other
existing United States Government strategies;
and
(ii) include specific and measurable goals,
benchmarks, performance metrics, timetables,
and monitoring and evaluation plans to ensure
the accountability and effectiveness of all
policies and initiatives carried out under the
strategy.
(B) Specific plans for departments and agencies.--
The strategies submitted pursuant to subparagraph (A)
shall also include specific implementation plans, in
coordination with the recommendations and activities of
the Economic Diplomacy Action Group under section 708
of the Championing American Business Through Diplomacy
Act of 2019 (22 U.S.C. 9904), from each of the relevant
Federal departments and agencies that describes--
(i) the anticipated contributions of the
department or agency, including technical,
financial, and in-kind contributions, to
implement the strategies;
(ii) the efforts of the department or
agency to ensure that the policies and
initiatives carried out pursuant to the
strategies are designed to achieve maximum
impact and effectiveness; and
(iii) recommendations on necessary
resources, including staffing, to expand
efforts to promote trade and investment between
the United States and Africa, and the United
States and Latin America and the Caribbean.
(C) Interagency coordination.--The strategies
submitted pursuant to subparagraph (A) shall include
plans for coordinating with relevant departments and
agencies the implementation of agency-specific plans
described in subparagraph (B), particularly as it
relates to advancing two-way trade and investment
transactions and business enabling environment reforms.
(b) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the submission of the
strategies required by subsection (a)(3), and annually thereafter until
2026, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees a report, in coordination with the report required by
section 707 of the Championing American Business Through Diplomacy Act
of 2019 (22 U.S.C. 9903) that--
(1) summarizes and evaluates the implementation of United
States diplomatic efforts and foreign assistance programs,
projects, and activities to advance the policy objectives set
forth in subsection (a)(2);
(2) describes the nature and extent of the coordination
among the relevant Federal departments and agencies, including
summary of activities and engagements of the Economic Diplomacy
Action Group; and
(3) describes the monitoring and evaluation tools,
mechanisms, and indicators to assess progress made on the
policy objectives of this section.
(c) Executive Directors for Africa and Latin America and the
Caribbean Trade and Investment.--The President shall designate an
individual to serve as the Executive Director for Trade and Investment
Strategy in Africa, also known as the Prosper Africa Executive
Director, and an individual to serve as Executive Director for Trade
and Investment Strategy in Latin America and the Caribbean to--
(1) oversee the development and implementation of the
strategies required by subsection (a); and
(2) coordinate developing and implementing the strategy
with the Office of the United States Trade Representative, the
Office of Management and Budget, and the relevant departments
and agencies.
(d) Business Development Exchanges With Africa and Latin America
and the Caribbean.--It is the sense of Congress that, not later than
one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, high-level
officials of relevant departments and agencies of the United States
Government with responsibility for promoting trade, investment,
financing, and development should conduct joint activities to advance
the strategies described in subsection(a), including business
development exchanges with public and private sector representatives
from Africa and Latin America, and the Caribbean who are focused on
promoting two-way trade and investment.
(e) Training, Interagency Coordination, and Information Sharing.--
The President shall develop a plan--
(1) to standardize the training received by United States
and Foreign Commercial Service officers, economic officers of
the Department of State, and economic officers of the United
States Agency for International Development with respect to the
programs and procedures of the Export-Import Bank of the United
States, the United States International Development Finance
Corporation, the Small Business Administration, and the United
States Trade and Development Agency; and
(2) to ensure that--
(A) not later than one year after the date of the
enactment of this Act--
(i) all personnel referred to in paragraph
(1) receive the training described in that
paragraph; and
(ii) relevant departments and agencies
share information on trade and investment
transactions facilitated by the United States
Government and funded by the public or private
sector;
(B) not later than 60 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Administrator of USAID and
the Chief Executive Officer of DFC shall develop a plan
to enhance coordination and expedite information
sharing that includes--
(i) a process for sharing of information in
a timely fashion, and at least monthly, on--
(I) active and early stage leads on
transactions initiated, promoted, or
facilitated by DFC;
(II) transactions deemed ineligible
for DFC support or not being pursued by
DFC for other reasons; and
(III) transaction opportunities
identified by USAID or other relevant
United States departments and agencies
submitted for DFC consideration; and
(ii) any training required for DFC, USAID,
or other interagency staff to implement the
plan;
(C) the Executive Directors and their appointed
staff shall be responsible for coordinating
implementation of this plan; and
(D) DFC and USAID shall, in consultation with the
Executive Directors and Congress, identify targets for
DFC's financial commitments and any private capital
mobilized to finalize a transaction.
(f) Data Sharing Platform.--
(1) Establishment.--The Administrator of USAID shall, in
consultation with the Executive Directors and relevant
department and agencies, establish an interoperable digital
platform maintained by the staff of the Executive Directors
to--
(A) facilitate interagency information sharing and
collaboration on trade and investment transactions; and
(B) ensure relevant department and agencies use
such platform to review, track, and develop consensus
on transactions and their relative priorities.
(2) Coordination.--The Executive Directors shall coordinate
regularly with the leadership of relevant Federal department
and agencies to--
(A) advance and finalize transactions; or
(B) provide a written justification for any
transaction deemed ineligible for United States
Government financing under existing authorities.
(g) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate;
(B) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;
(C) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House
of Representatives; and
(D) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives.
(2) Relevant federal departments and agencies.--The term
``relevant Federal departments and agencies'' includes--
(A) the Department of State;
(B) the Department of the Treasury;
(C) the Department of Commerce;
(D) the United States Agency for International
Development (USAID);
(E) the Millennium Challenge Corporation;
(F) the United States International Development
Finance Corporation (DFC);
(G) the United States Trade and Development Agency;
(H) the United States African Development
Foundation;
(I) the Export Import Bank;
(J) the Small Business Administration;
(K) the Department of Agriculture; and
(L) any other entity deemed appropriate by the
President.
(3) Early-stage lead.--The term ``early-stage lead'' means
a prospective transaction which is being evaluated by DFC
staff, prior to DFC holding an internal screening meeting or
accepting an application.
(4) Two-way trade and investment.--The term ``two-way trade
and investment'' means United States exports to Africa and
Latin America and the Caribbean, United States public and
private investment in Africa and Latin America and the
Caribbean, exports from Africa and Latin America and the
Caribbean to the United States, and Africa and Latin America
and the Caribbean investment in the United States.
SEC. 219E. CHINA WATCHER PROGRAM.
(a) In General.--The Secretary of State, acting through the
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, and in
coordination with relevant offices and bureaus of the Department of
State, shall implement a ``China Watcher Program'' within the
Department of State to--
(1) monitor and combat Chinese malign influence across
economic and political sectors in foreign countries; and
(2) augment the capacity of United States Government
engagement with foreign countries and regional and
international economic and political organizations and
institutions relating to policy coordination regarding China
and such Chinese malign influence.
(b) Placement.--In carrying out the China Watcher Program under
this section, the Secretary of State shall place Foreign Service
officers in positions in select United States diplomatic and consular
posts, at the discretion of the Secretary of State, to engage both
Chinese and third-country nationals, including host governments, on the
matters described in subsection (a).
(c) Annual Report.--Each diplomatic or consular post with a China
Watcher Program shall produce an annual report outlining the steps each
such post has taken to advance the mission, trends observed, and the
nature and extent of Chinese foreign direct investment and influence in
key economic and political sectors, including technology,
manufacturing, transportation, energy, metals, agriculture, and real
estate.
(d) Authorization of Annual Appropriations.--There is authorized to
be appropriated $5,000,000 for fiscal year 2022 and each fiscal year
thereafter to carry out this section.
SEC. 219F. LIU XIAOBO FUND FOR STUDY OF THE CHINESE LANGUAGE.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) as a substitute to Confucius Institutes, the United
States Government should invest heavily into alternative
programs and institutions that ensure there remains a robust
pipeline of Americans learning China's many languages; and
(2) in a 21st century that will be dominated by a strategic
competition between the United States and China, it is in the
national security interests of the United States to ensure that
Americans continue to invest in Chinese language skills, as
well as Tibetan, Uyghur, and Mongolian languages, while
ensuring they can do so in a context free of malign political
influence from foreign state actors.
(b) Establishment of the Liu Xiaobo Fund for Study of the Chinese
Language.--The Secretary of State shall establish in the Department of
State the ``Liu Xiaobo Fund for Study of the Chinese Language'' to fund
study by United States persons of Mandarin and Cantonese Chinese,
Tibetan, Uyghur, Mongolian, and other contemporary spoken languages of
China, abroad or in the United States.
(c) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be
appropriated to the Department of State for fiscal year 2021 and every
fiscal year thereafter, $10,000,000 to carry out the Liu Xiaobo Fund
for Study of the Chinese Language.
(d) Required Activities.--Amounts authorized to be appropriated
pursuant to subsection (c) shall--
(1) be designed to advance the national security and
foreign policy interests of the United States, as determined by
the Secretary of State;
(2) favor funding mechanisms that can maximize the total
number of United States persons given the opportunity to
acquire full conversational linguistic proficiency in Mandarin
and Cantonese Chinese, Tibetan, Uyghur, Mongolian, and other
contemporary spoken languages of China;
(3) favor funding mechanisms that provide opportunities for
such language study to areas traditionally under-served by such
opportunities;
(4) be shaped by an ongoing consultative process taking
into account design inputs of--
(A) civil society institutions, including Chinese
diaspora community organizations;
(B) language experts in Mandarin and Cantonese
Chinese, Tibetan, Uyghur, Mongolian, and other
contemporary spoken languages of China;
(C) organizations representing historically
disadvantaged socioeconomic groups in the United
States; and
(D) human rights organizations; and
(5) favor opportunities to fund the study of Mandarin and
Cantonese Chinese, Tibetan, Uyghur, Mongolian, and other
contemporary spoken languages of China at Alaska Native-serving
institutions, Asian American and Native American Pacific
Islander-serving institutions, Hispanic-serving institutions,
historically Black college or universities, Native American-
serving nontribal institutions, Native Hawaiian-serving
institutions, Predominantly Black institutions, Tribal Colleges
or Universities.
(e) Report.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 120 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter for five
years, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the heads
of appropriate Federal departments and agencies, as
appropriate, shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Affairs
of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign
Relations of the Senate a report detailing activities and
disbursements made to carry out this Act over the immediately
preceding academic year.
(2) Report contents.--Each report required under paragraph
(1) shall include details on--
(A) which institutions, programs, or entities
received funds through the Liu Xiaobo Fund for Study of
the Chinese Language;
(B) funds distribution disaggregated by
institution, program, or entity, including
identification of the State or country in which such
institution, program, or entity is located;
(C) the number of United States persons who
received language study under the Liu Xiaobo Fund for
Study of the Chinese Language, and the average amount
disbursed per person for such study;
(D) a comparative analysis of per dollar program
effectiveness and efficiency in allowing United States
persons to reach conversational proficiency Mandarin or
Cantonese Chinese, Tibetan, Uyghur, Mongolian, or other
contemporary spoken languages of China;
(E) an analysis of which of the languages referred
to in subparagraph (D) were studied through the funding
from the Liu Xiaobo Fund for Study of the Chinese
Language; and
(F) any recommendations of the Secretary of State
for improvements to the authorities, priorities, or
management of the Liu Xiaobo Fund for Study of the
Chinese Language.
(f) Interagency Funds Transfers Authorization.--Amounts authorized
to be appropriated to the Secretary of State to carry out this Act are
authorized to be transferred to the heads of other appropriate Federal
departments and agencies for similar purposes, subject to prior
notification to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.
Such heads shall consult with the Secretary in the preparation of the
report required under subsection (e).
(g) Limitations.--Amounts authorized to be appropriated to carry
out this Act may only be made available for the costs of language study
funded and administration incurred by the Department of State or
programs carried out by the Department of State (or by another Federal
department or agency pursuant to subsection (f)) to carry out this
section.
(h) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Alaska native-serving institution.--The term ``Alaska
Native-serving institution'' has the meaning given such term in
section 317(b) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C.
1059d(b)).
(2) Asian american and native american pacific islander-
serving institution.--The term ``Asian American and Native
American Pacific Islander-serving institution'' has the meaning
given such term in section 371(c) of the Higher Education Act
of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1067q(c)).
(3) Hispanic-serving institution.--The term ``Hispanic-
serving institution'' has the meaning given such term in
section 502 of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C.
1101a).
(4) Historically black college or university.--The term
``historically Black college or university'' means a part B
institution described in section 322(2) of the Higher Education
Act of 1965 (22 U.S.C. 1061(2)).
(5) Native american-serving nontribal institution.--The
term ``Native American-serving nontribal institution'' has the
meaning given such term in section 371(c) of the Higher
Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1067q(c)).
(6) Native hawaiian-serving institution.--The term ``Native
Hawaiian-serving institution'' has the meaning given such term
in section 317(b) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20
U.S.C. 1059d(b)).
(7) Predominantly black institution.--The term
``Predominantly Black institution'' has the meaning given such
term in section 371(c) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20
U.S.C. 1067q(c)).
(8) Tribal college or university.--The term ``Tribal
College or University'' has the meaning given such term in
section 316(b) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C.
1059c(b)).
SEC. 219G. OVERSIGHT OF FUNDS MADE AVAILABLE THROUGH THE AMERICAN
RESCUE PLAN ACT OF 2021.
(a) Authorities and Conditions.--Amounts authorized and
appropriated under title X of the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021
(Public Law 117-2) to carry out the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22
U.S.C. 2151 et seq.) shall be subject to the applicable authorities and
conditions for funds made available to carry out the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.) and division K of Public Law 116-
260.
(b) Oversight and Accountability.--Amounts authorized and
appropriated under sections 10001 and 10002 of American Rescue Plan Act
of 2021 may be transferred to the Inspector General of the Department
of State and the Inspector General of the United States Agency for
International Development to expand the capacity of such Inspectors
General to conduct effective oversight of the foreign assistance
programs and activities under such Act.
(c) United States Contributions to the Global Fund to Fight Aids,
Tuberculosis, and Malaria Covid-19 Response Mechanism.--United States
contributions to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and
Malaria COVID-19 Response Mechanism under section 10003(a)(2) of
American Rescue Plan Act of 2021--
(1) shall be meaningfully leveraged in a manner that
incentivizes other public and private donor contributions; and
(2) shall be subject to the reporting and withholding
requirements under subsections (c), (d)(4)(A)(ii), (d)(4)(C),
(d)(5), (d)(6), (f), and (g) of section 202 of the United
States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria
Act of 2003 (22 U.S.C. 7622).
SEC. 219H. REQUIREMENTS RELATING TO VACCINE BRANDING.
The President shall ensure that every vaccine donated or otherwise
procured and financed by the United States Government shall be clearly
branded with the United States flag.
Subtitle B--International Security Matters
SEC. 221. APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS.
In this subtitle, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress''
means--
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on
Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the
Senate; and
(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on
Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the
House of Representatives.
SEC. 222. ADDITIONAL FUNDING FOR INTERNATIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION AND
TRAINING IN THE INDO-PACIFIC.
There is authorized to be appropriated for each of fiscal years
2022 through fiscal year 2026 for the Department of State, out of
amounts authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available for
assistance under chapter 5 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961 (22 U.S.C. 2347 et seq.) (relating to international military
education and training assistance), $45,000,000 for activities in the
Indo-Pacific region in accordance with this subtitle. Funds may be
disbursed only after vetting of individuals proposed to be trained,
consistent with sections 502B and 620M of the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961 (22 U.S.C. 2304 and 2378d).
SEC. 223. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON MARITIME FREEDOM OF OPERATIONS IN
INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS AND AIRSPACE OF THE INDO-PACIFIC
AND ON ARTIFICIAL LAND FEATURES IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA.
(a) Sense of Congress.--Congress--
(1) condemns coercive and threatening actions or the use of
force to impede freedom of navigation operations in
international airspace by military or civilian aircraft, to
alter the status quo, or to destabilize the Indo-Pacific
region;
(2) urges the Government of the People's Republic of China
to refrain from implementing the declared East China Sea Air
Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), or an ADIZ in the South
China Sea, where contrary to freedom of overflight in
international airspace, and to refrain from taking similar
provocative actions elsewhere in the Indo-Pacific region;
(3) reaffirms that the 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration
decision is final and legally binding on both parties and that
the People's Republic of China's claims to offshore resources
across most of the South China Sea are unlawful; and
(4) condemns the People's Republic of China for failing to
abide by the 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling,
despite the PRC's obligations as a state party to the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
(b) Statement of Policy.--It shall be the policy of the United
States to--
(1) reaffirm its commitment and support for allies and
partners in the Indo-Pacific region, including with respect to
the mutual defense treaties with Indo-Pacific allies;
(2) oppose claims that impinge on the rights, freedoms, and
lawful use of the sea, or the airspace above it, that are
available to all countries, and oppose the militarization of
new and reclaimed land features in the South China Sea;
(3) continue certain policies with respect to the PRC
claims in the South China Sea, specifically--
(A) that PRC claims in the South China Sea,
including to offshore resources across most of the
South China Sea, are unlawful;
(B) that the PRC cannot lawfully assert a maritime
claim vis-a-vis the Philippines in areas that the
Permanent Court of Arbitration found to be in the
Philippines' Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) or on its
continental shelf;
(C) to reject any PRC claim to waters beyond a 12
nautical mile territorial sea derived from islands it
claims in the Spratly Islands; and
(D) that the PRC has no lawful territorial or
maritime claim to James Shoal;
(4) urge all parties to refrain from engaging in
destabilizing activities, including environmentally harmful and
provocative land reclamation;
(5) ensure that disputes are managed without intimidation,
coercion, or force;
(6) call on all claimants to clarify or adjust claims in
accordance with international law;
(7) uphold the principle that territorial and maritime
claims, including territorial waters or territorial seas, must
derive from land features and otherwise comport with
international law;
(8) oppose the imposition of new fishing regulations
covering disputed areas in the South China Sea, regulations
which have raised tensions in the region;
(9) support an effective Code of Conduct, if that Code of
Conduct reflects the interests of Southeast Asian claimant
countries and does not serve as a vehicle for the People's
Republic of China to advance its unlawful maritime claims;
(10) reaffirm that an existing body of international rules
and guidelines, including the International Regulations for
Preventing Collisions at Sea, done at London October 12, 1972
(COLREGs), is sufficient to ensure the safety of navigation
between the United States Armed Forces and the forces of other
countries, including the People's Republic of China;
(11) support the development of regional institutions and
bodies, including the ASEAN Regional Forum, the ASEAN Defense
Minister's Meeting Plus, the East Asia Summit, and the expanded
ASEAN Maritime Forum, to build practical cooperation in the
region and reinforce the role of international law;
(12) encourage the deepening of partnerships with other
countries in the region for maritime domain awareness and
capacity building, as well as efforts by the United States
Government to explore the development of appropriate
multilateral mechanisms for a ``common operating picture'' in
the South China Sea among Southeast Asian countries that would
serve to help countries avoid destabilizing behavior and deter
risky and dangerous activities;
(13) oppose actions by any country to prevent any other
country from exercising its sovereign rights to the resources
of the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and continental shelf by
making claims to those areas in the South China Sea that have
no support in international law; and
(14) assure the continuity of operations by the United
States in the Indo-Pacific region, including, when appropriate,
in cooperation with partners and allies, to reaffirm freedom of
navigation and overflight and other lawful uses of the sea.
SEC. 224. REPORT ON CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT OF INDO-PACIFIC ALLIES AND
PARTNERS.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the Secretary of State should expand and strengthen
existing measures under the United States Conventional Arms
Transfer Policy to provide capabilities to allies and partners
consistent with agreed-on division of responsibility for
alliance roles, missions and capabilities, prioritizing allies
and partners in the Indo-Pacific region in accordance with
United States strategic imperatives;
(2) the United States should design for export to Indo-
Pacific allies and partners capabilities critical to
maintaining a favorable military balance in the region,
including long-range precision fires, air and missile defense
systems, anti-ship cruise missiles, land attack cruise
missiles, conventional hypersonic systems, intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities, and command and
control systems consistent with law, regulation, policy, and
international commitments;
(3) the United States should pursue, to the maximum extent
possible, anticipatory technology security and foreign
disclosure policy on the systems described in paragraph (2);
(4) the Secretary of State, in coordination with the
Secretary of Defense, should--
(A) urge allies and partners to invest in
sufficient quantities of munitions to meet contingency
requirements and avoid the need for accessing United
States stocks in wartime; and
(B) cooperate with allies to deliver such
munitions, or when necessary, to increase allies'
capacity to produce such munitions; and
(5) it is in the United States interest to not authorize
arms transfers or security cooperation to governments that
demonstrate patterns of gross violations of human rights if
such arms or security cooperation could be used to commit or
support such violations.
(b) Appropriate Committees of Congress.--In this section, the term
``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on
Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the
Senate; and
(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on
Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the
House of Representatives.
(c) Report.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in
consultation with the Secretary of Defense, shall submit to the
appropriate committees of Congress a report that describes
United States priorities for building more capable security
partners in the Indo-Pacific region.
(2) Matters to be included.--The report required under
paragraph (1) shall--
(A) provide a priority list of defense and military
capabilities that Indo-Pacific allies and partners must
possess for the United States to be able to achieve its
military objectives in the Indo-Pacific region;
(B) identify, from the list referred to in
subparagraph (A), the capabilities that are best
provided, or can only be provided, by the United
States;
(C) identify--
(i) actions required to expedite fielding
the capabilities identified in subparagraph
(B); and
(ii) steps needed to fully account for and
a plan to integrate all means of United States
foreign military sales, direct commercial
sales, security assistance, and all applicable
authorities of the Department of State and the
Department of Defense;
(D) assess the requirements for United States
security assistance, including International Military
Education and Training, in the Indo-Pacific region, as
a part of the means to deliver critical partner
capability requirements identified in subparagraph (B);
(E) assess the resources necessary to meet the
requirements for United States security assistance, and
identify resource gaps;
(F) assess the major obstacles to fulfilling
requirements for United States security assistance in
the Indo-Pacific region, including resources and
personnel limits, foreign legislative and policy
barriers, and factors related to specific partner
countries;
(G) identify limitations on the ability of the
United States to provide such capabilities, including
capabilities identified under subparagraph (B), because
of existing United States treaty obligations, United
States policies, including sections 502B and 620M of
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2304 and
2378d), or other regulations;
(H) recommend improvements to the process for
developing requirements for United States partner
capabilities; and
(I) identify required jointly agreed
recommendations for infrastructure and posture, based
on any ongoing mutual dialogues.
(3) Form.--The report required under this subsection shall
be unclassified, but may include a classified annex.
SEC. 225. STATEMENT OF POLICY REGARDING THE THREAT POSED BY THE CHINESE
COMMUNIST PARTY TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY
ORGANIZATION.
It is the policy of the United States to--
(1) urge NATO allies to work closely with like-minded
partners, in particular with the European Union, to protect
critical infrastructure, strengthen resilience, maintain a
technological edge, and address the challenges to the rules-
based international order posed by the Chinese Communist Party;
(2) encourage NATO allies to explore how to monitor and
defend against any activity of the Chinese Communist Party that
could impact collective defense, military readiness, or
resilience in the Supreme Allied Commander Europe's Area of
Responsibility, including by identifying vulnerabilities of key
sectors and supply chains, in coordination with the European
Union;
(3) push for NATO allies to establish a consultative body
to bring together such allies, and other institutions and
partners as relevant, to exchange information, share
experiences, and discuss all aspects of such allies' security
interests with respect to the Chinese Communist Party; and
(4) prioritize urging all NATO allies to share the burden
that comes with collective security in an increasingly complex
security environment by reaching by 2024 the pledge set at the
2014 Wales Summit to spend two percent of GDP on defense
spending and 20 percent of annual defense spending on major new
equipment.
SEC. 226. IDENTIFICATION OF PLA-SUPPORTED INSTITUTIONS.
(a) In General.--Not later than 60 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State
shall publish and disseminate to United States institutions and places
of study a list identifying the research, engineering, and scientific
institutions that the Secretary determines are affiliated with, or
funded by, the Chinese People's Liberation Army.
(b) Form.--The list published and disseminated under subsection (a)
shall be unclassified and publicly accessible, but may include a
classified annex.
Subtitle C--Multilateral Strategies to Bolster American Power
SEC. 231. FINDINGS ON MULTILATERAL ENGAGEMENT.
Congress finds the following:
(1) Every UN member state is legally required to finance
the UN's core budget in order to ensure that these missions are
properly resourced, and assessment rates are renegotiated every
three years by the UN General Assembly.
(2) While the United States is the largest single financial
contributor to the UN system, the current model is beneficial
because it requires all UN member states, no matter how big or
small, to help shoulder the UN's regular and peacekeeping
budgets at specified levels.
(3) Failing to meet our financial commitments to the UN
also empowers the PRC, which has raised our annual shortfalls
to claim we are not a reliable partner and is seeking to
leverage its own contributions to the regular budget and
peacekeeping in ways that run counter to United States
interests and values.
(4) The People's Republic of China is now the second
largest financial contributor to UN peacekeeping, having gone
from an assessment rate of just 3 percent in 2008 to more than
15 percent today, and is the ninth largest troop-contributor to
UN missions, providing more personnel than the other four
permanent members of the Security Council combined.
(5) With greater engagement comes greater influence, and
PRC diplomats have sought to use their expanded clout to push
back against the human rights, civilian protection, and gender-
based violence aspects of UN peacekeeping mandates, using
United States funding shortfalls as a pretext.
(6) The PRC has also used its growing clout to fill key
posts at UN agencies: Chinese nationals currently occupy the
top posts of four of the UN's 15 specialized agencies, while
the United States occupies only one.
(7) From 2021 to 2022, there will be 15 elections for the
heads of UN specialized agencies and five for major UN funds
and programs. With the exception of the World Food Programme,
none are currently led by Americans.
(8) A 2020 Department of State Inspector General Inspection
found that the Bureau for International Organizations did not
have a standard operating procedure for tracking and promoting
the employment of American Citizens in the UN system, and their
recommendation to the department to establish one remains open.
SEC. 232. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON AMERICA'S MULTILATERAL ENGAGEMENT.
It is the policy of the United States that--
(1) the Permanent Representative of the United States to
the United Nations serves as a standing member of the cabinet;
(2) assessed dues to multilateral organizations be paid in
full in a timely fashion;
(3) Federal agencies utilize all the authorities under
section 3343 of title 5, United States Code, and subpart C of
title 5, Code of Federal Regulations (relating to detail and
transfer of Federal employees to international organizations),
to detail or transfer employees to relevant international
organizations;
(4) the Secretary of State should assist the Department of
State and other Federal agencies in carrying out paragraph (3)
to the fullest extent;
(5) the Secretary of State should support qualified
American candidates in their bid to win election to United
Nations-related leadership positions; and
(6) the Secretary of State should support the placement of
Junior Professional Officers sponsored by the United States in
United Nations-affiliated agencies.
SEC. 233. SUPPORT FOR AMERICANS AT THE UNITED NATIONS.
(a) Establishment.--The Secretary of State is authorized to
establish within the Department of State's Bureau of International
Organization Affairs an Office of Multilateral Strategy and Personnel.
(b) Duties.--The office established under subsection (a) of this
section shall be responsible for--
(1) promoting United States leadership and participation in
the United Nations system, with a focus on issue areas where
authoritarian nations are exercising increased influence in and
determining the agenda of the United Nations system;
(2) establishing and implementing a standard operating
procedure for the promotion and efficient tracking of United
States citizen employment at the United Nations and other
international organizations that includes Mission Geneva;
(3) monitoring the pipeline of United Nations jobs and
identifying qualified United States citizens and other
qualified nationals to promote for such positions;
(4) tracking leadership changes in United Nations
Secretariat, funds, programs, and agencies, and developing
strategies to ensure that coalitions of like-minded countries
are assembled to ensure leadership races are not won by
countries that do not share United States interests;
(5) eliminating current barriers to the employment of
United States citizens in the United Nations Secretariat,
funds, programs, and agencies; and
(6) increasing the number of qualified United States
candidates for leadership and oversight positions at the United
Nations Secretariat, funds, programs, agencies, and at other
international organizations.
SEC. 234. JUNIOR PROFESSIONAL OFFICERS.
(a) Increase in Junior Professional Officer Positions.--The
Secretary of State should increase the number of Junior Professional
Officer positions sponsored by the United States within the United
Nations system.
(b) Report.--Not later than December 31 of each year, the Secretary
of State shall provide the appropriate congressional committees
information regarding the amount of funding each bureau has designated
during the immediately preceding fiscal year for Junior Professional
Officer positions in the United Nations system and the number of such
positions that exist as of the end of the prior fiscal year.
SEC. 235. REPORT ON AMERICAN EMPLOYMENT IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS.
(a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State,
in consultation with the heads of other Federal departments and
agencies as appropriate, shall develop and submit to the appropriate
congressional committees a report on how many Federal employees are
currently detailed or transferred to an international organization
during the immediately preceding 1-year period and a strategy for
increasing the number of Federal employees so detailed or transferred.
(b) Matters to Be Included.--Each report required by subsection (a)
shall include the following:
(1) The number of Federal employees detailed or transferred
to an international organization under section 3343 of title 5,
United States Code, and subpart C of title 5, Code of Federal
Regulations (relating to the detail and transfer of Federal
employees to international organizations), including--
(A) an identification of the Federal agency from
which such employees were detailed or transferred; and
(B) an identification of the international
organizations to and from which such employees have
been so detailed or transferred.
(2) A list of international organizations to and from which
the United States previously detailed or transferred Federal
employees.
Subtitle D--Regional Strategies to Bolster American Power
SEC. 241. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON COOPERATION WITH ALLIES AND PARTNERS
AROUND THE WORLD.
It is the policy of the United States--
(1) to strengthen alliances and partnerships with like-
minded countries around the globe; and
(2) to work in collaboration with such allies and
partners--
(A) to address significant diplomatic, economic,
and military challenges posed by the People's Republic
of China (PRC);
(B) to deter the PRC from pursuing military
aggression;
(C) to promote the peaceful resolution of
territorial disputes in accordance with international
law;
(D) to promote private sector-led long-term
economic development while countering efforts by the
Government of the PRC to leverage predatory economic
practices as a means of political and economic coercion
in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond;
(E) to promote the values of democracy and human
rights, including through efforts to end the repression
by the PRC of political dissidents, Uyghurs and other
Muslim minorities, Tibetan Buddhists, Christians, and
other ethnic minorities;
(F) to respond to the crackdown by the PRC, in
contravention of the commitments made under the Sino-
British Joint Declaration of 1984 and the Basic Law of
Hong Kong, on the legitimate aspirations of the people
of Hong Kong; and
(G) to counter the PRC Government's efforts to
spread disinformation in the PRC and beyond with
respect to its response to COVID-19.
PART I--WESTERN HEMISPHERE
SEC. 242. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING UNITED STATES-CANADA RELATIONS.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the United States and Canada have a unique relationship
based on shared geography, extensive personal connections, deep
economic ties, mutual defense commitments, and a shared vision
to uphold democracy, human rights, and the rules based
international order established after World War II;
(2) the United States and Canada can better address the
People's Republic of China's economic, political, and security
influence through closer cooperation on counternarcotics,
environmental stewardship, transparent practices in public
procurement and infrastructure planning, the Arctic, energy and
connectivity issues, trade and commercial relations, bilateral
legal matters, and support for democracy, good governance, and
human rights;
(3) amidst the COVID-19 pandemic, the United States and
Canada should maintain joint initiatives to address border
management, commercial and trade relations and infrastructure,
a shared approach with respect to the People's Republic of
China, and transnational challenges, including pandemics,
energy security, and environmental stewardship;
(4) the United States and Canada should enhance cooperation
to counter Chinese disinformation, influence operations,
economic espionage, and propaganda efforts;
(5) the People's Republic of China's infrastructure
investments, particularly in 5G telecommunications technology,
extraction of natural resources, and port infrastructure, pose
national security risks for the United States and Canada;
(6) the United States should share, as appropriate,
intelligence gathered regarding--
(A) Huawei's 5G capabilities; and
(B) the PRC government's intentions with respect to
5G expansion;
(7) the United States and Canada should continue to advance
collaborative initiatives to implement the January 9, 2020,
United States-Canada Joint Action Plan on Critical Minerals
Development Collaboration; and
(8) the United States and Canada should prioritize
cooperation on continental defense and in the Arctic, including
by modernizing the North American Aerospace Defense Command
(NORAD) sensor architecture to provide effective warning and
tracking of threats by peer competitors, including long-range
missiles and high-precision weapons, to the Northern
Hemisphere.
SEC. 243. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING CHINA'S ARBITRARY IMPRISONMENT OF
CANADIAN CITIZENS.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the Government of the People's Republic of China's
apparent arbitrary detention and abusive treatment of Canadian
nationals Michael Spavor and Michael Kovrig in apparent
retaliation for the Government of Canada's arrest of Meng
Wanzhou is deeply concerning;
(2) the Government of Canada has shown international
leadership by--
(A) upholding the rule of law and complying with
its international legal obligations, including
obligations pursuant to the Extradition Treaty Between
the United States of America and Canada, signed at
Washington December 3, 1971; and
(B) launching the Declaration Against Arbitrary
Detention in State-to-State Relations, which has been
endorsed by 57 countries and the European Union, and
reaffirms well-established prohibitions under
international human rights conventions against the
arbitrary detention of foreign nationals to be used as
leverage in country-to-country relations; and
(3) the United States continues to join the Government of
Canada in calling for the immediate release of Michael Spavor
and Michael Kovrig and for due process for Canadian national
Robert Schellenberg.
SEC. 244. STRATEGY TO ENHANCE COOPERATION WITH CANADA.
(a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate
congressional committees, and the Committees on Armed Services of the
Senate and the House of Representatives, a strategy that describes how
the United States will enhance cooperation with the Government of
Canada in managing relations with the Government of the People's
Republic of China.
(b) Elements.--The strategy required under subsection (a) shall--
(1) identify key policy points of convergence and
divergence between the United States and Canada in managing
relations with the People's Republic of China in the areas of
technology, trade, economic practices, cyber security, secure
supply chains and critical minerals, and illicit narcotics;
(2) include a description of United States development and
coordination efforts with Canadian counterparts to enhance the
cooperation between the United States and Canada with respect
to--
(A) managing economic relations with the People's
Republic of China;
(B) democracy and human rights in the People's
Republic of China;
(C) technology issues involving the People's
Republic of China;
(D) defense issues involving the People's Republic
of China; and
(E) international law enforcement and transnational
organized crime issues;
(3) detail diplomatic efforts and future plans to work with
Canada to counter the People's Republic of China's projection
of an authoritarian governing model around the world;
(4) detail diplomatic, defense, and intelligence
cooperation to date and future plans to support Canadian
efforts to identify cost-effective alternatives to Huawei's 5G
technology;
(5) detail diplomatic and defense collaboration--
(A) to advance joint United States-Canadian
priorities for responsible stewardship in the Arctic
Region; and
(B) to counter the People's Republic of China's
efforts to project political, economic, and military
influence into the Arctic Region; and
(6) detail diplomatic efforts to work with Canada to track
and counter the People's Republic of China's attempts to exert
influence across the multilateral system.
(c) Form.--The strategy required under this section shall be
submitted in an unclassified form that can be made available to the
public, but may include a classified annex, if necessary.
(d) Consultation.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act and not less frequently than every 180 days
thereafter for five years, the Secretary of State shall consult with
the appropriate congressional committees, and the Committees on Armed
Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, regarding the
development and implementation of the strategy required under this
section.
SEC. 245. STRATEGY TO STRENGTHEN ECONOMIC COMPETITIVENESS, GOVERNANCE,
HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW IN LATIN AMERICA AND
THE CARIBBEAN.
(a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation, as
appropriate, with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of
Commerce, the Administrator of the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID), the Attorney General, the United
States Trade Representative, and the Chief Executive Officer of the
United States International Development Finance Corporation, shall
submit to the appropriate congressional committees, the Committee on
Ways and Means and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives, and the Committee on Finance and the Committee on
Appropriations of the Senate a multi-year strategy for increasing
United States economic competitiveness and promoting good governance,
human rights, and the rule of law in Latin American and Caribbean
countries, particularly in the areas of--
(1) investment;
(2) equitable, inclusive, and sustainable development;
(3) commercial relations;
(4) anti-corruption activities; and
(5) infrastructure projects.
(b) Additional Elements.--The strategy required under subsection
(a) shall include a plan of action, including benchmarks to achieve
measurable progress, to--
(1) enhance the technical capacity of Latin American and
Caribbean countries to advance the sustainable and inclusive
development of equitable economies;
(2) reduce trade and non-tariff barriers between such
countries;
(3) facilitate a more open, transparent, and competitive
environment for United States businesses in the region;
(4) establish frameworks or mechanisms to review long term
financial sustainability and security implications of foreign
investments in strategic sectors or services, including
transportation, communications, natural resources, and energy;
(5) establish competitive, transparent, and inclusive
infrastructure project selection and procurement processes that
promote transparency, supplier diversity, open competition,
financial sustainability, adherence to robust global standards,
and the employment of a diverse local workforce and management;
(6) strengthen legal structures critical to robust
democratic governance, fair competition, combatting corruption,
and ending impunity; and
(7) enhance transparent, affordable, and equitable access
to the internet and digital infrastructure in the Western
Hemisphere.
(c) Briefing Requirement.--Not later than one year after the date
of the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter for five years,
the Secretary of State, after consultation with the Secretary of the
Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, the Attorney General, the United
States Trade Representative, and the leadership of the United States
International Development Finance Corporation, shall brief the
congressional committees specified in subsection (a) regarding the
implementation of this section, including examples of successes and
challenges.
SEC. 246. ENGAGEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THE DEFENSE
SECTOR IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN.
(a) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section,
the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
(2) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate;
(3) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate;
(4) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives;
(5) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the
House of Representatives; and
(6) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of
Representatives.
(b) Reporting Requirement.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in
coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, the
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Defense
Intelligence Agency, shall submit to the appropriate committees
of Congress a report that assesses the nature, intent, and
impact on United States strategic interests of Chinese
diplomatic activity aimed at influencing the decisions,
procedures, and programs of multilateral organizations in Latin
America and the Caribbean, including the World Bank,
International Monetary Fund, Organization of American States,
and the Inter-American Development Bank.
(2) Defense sector.--The report required under paragraph
(1) shall include an assessment of the nature, intent, and
impact on United States strategic interests of Chinese military
activity in Latin America and the Caribbean, including military
education and training programs, weapons sales, and space-
related activities in the military or civilian spheres, such
as--
(A) the satellite and space control station the
People's Republic of China constructed in Argentina;
and
(B) defense and security cooperation carried out by
the People's Republic of China in Latin America and the
Caribbean, including sales of surveillance and
monitoring technology to governments in the region such
as Venezuela, Cuba, Ecuador, and Colombia, and the
potential use of such technologies as tools of Chinese
intelligence services.
(3) Form.--The report required under paragraph (1) shall be
submitted in unclassified form and include classified annexes.
SEC. 247. DEFENSE COOPERATION IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN.
(a) In General.--There is authorized to be appropriated to the
Department of State $13,500,000 for the International Military
Education and Training Program for Latin America and the Caribbean for
each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026.
(b) Modernization.--The Secretary of State shall modernize and
strengthen the programs receiving funding in accordance with subsection
(a) to ensure that such programs are vigorous, substantive, and the
preeminent choice for international military education and training for
Latin American and Caribbean partners.
(c) Required Elements.--The programs referred to in subsection (a)
shall--
(1) provide training and capacity-building opportunities to
Latin American and Caribbean security services;
(2) provide practical skills and frameworks for--
(A) improving the functioning and organization of
security services in Latin America and the Caribbean;
(B) creating a better understanding of the United
States and its values; and
(C) using technology for maximum efficiency and
organization;
(3) promote and ensure that security services in Latin
America and the Caribbean respect civilian authority and
operate in compliance with international norms, standards, and
rules of engagement, including a respect for human rights, and
full compliance with requirements under section 620M of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2378d; commonly
referred to as the ``Leahy law''); and
(4) receive funds only after vetting of individuals
proposed to be trained, consistent with sections 502B and 620M
of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2304 and
2378d).
SEC. 248. ENGAGEMENT WITH CIVIL SOCIETY IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE
CARIBBEAN REGARDING ACCOUNTABILITY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE
RISKS OF PERVASIVE SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGIES.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the Government of the People's Republic of China is
exporting its model for internal security and state control of
society through advanced technology and artificial
intelligence; and
(2) the inclusion of communication networks and
communications supply chains with equipment and services from
companies with close ties to or that are susceptible to
pressure from governments or security services without reliable
legal checks on governmental powers can lead to breaches of
citizens' private information, increased censorship, violations
of human rights, and harassment of political opponents.
(b) Diplomatic Engagement.--The Secretary of State shall conduct
diplomatic engagement with governments and civil society organizations
in Latin America and the Caribbean to--
(1) help identify and mitigate the risks to civil liberties
posed by technologies and services described in subsection (a);
and
(2) offer recommendations on ways to mitigate such risks.
(c) Internet Freedom Programs.--The Chief Executive Officer of the
United States Agency for Global Media, who may work through the Open
Technology Fund of the Agency, and the Secretary of State, working
through the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor's Internet
Freedom and Business and Human Rights Section, shall expand and
prioritize efforts to provide anti-censorship technology and services
to journalists in Latin America and the Caribbean, in order to enhance
their ability to safely access or share digital news and information.
(d) Support for Civil Society.--The Secretary of State, in
coordination with the Administrator of the United States Agency for
International Development, shall work through nongovernmental
organizations to--
(1) support and promote programs that support internet
freedom and the free flow of information online in Latin
America and the Caribbean;
(2) protect open, interoperable, secure, and reliable
access to internet in Latin America and the Caribbean;
(3) provide integrated support to civil society for
technology, digital safety, policy and advocacy, and applied
research programs in Latin America and the Caribbean;
(4) train journalists and civil society leaders in Latin
America and the Caribbean on investigative techniques necessary
to ensure public accountability and prevent government
overreach in the digital sphere;
(5) assist independent media outlets and journalists in
Latin America and the Caribbean to build their own capacity and
develop high-impact, in-depth news reports covering governance
and human rights topics;
(6) provide training for journalists and civil society
leaders on investigative techniques necessary to improve
transparency and accountability in government and the private
sector;
(7) provide training on investigative reporting of
incidents of corruption and unfair trade, business, and
commercial practices;
(8) assist nongovernmental organizations to strengthen
their capacity to monitor the incidents and practices described
in paragraph (7); and
(9) identify local resources to support the preponderance
of activities that would be carried out under this subsection.
SEC. 249. CARIBBEAN ENERGY INITIATIVE AS ALTERNATIVE TO CHINA'S BELT
AND ROAD INITIATIVE.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The countries of the Caribbean are heavily reliant upon
imported oil to provide for approximately 90 percent of their
energy production.
(2) The level of dependence is even higher including--
(A) Jamaica, which relies on oil for 95.9 percent
of its electricity;
(B) Barbados, which relies on oil for 96 percent of
its electricity;
(C) The Virgin Islands, which relies on oil for
nearly 100 percent of its electricity; and
(D) St. Lucia, which relies on oil for 100 percent
of its electricity.
(3) Overreliance on imported fossil fuels has had a
detrimental effect on economic development, growth, and
competitiveness in the Caribbean.
(4) Since 1970, more than 80 percent of Caribbean coral
reefs have been lost due to coastal development and pollution.
Soot particulates and climate change caused by burning fossil
fuels have seriously damaged coral reefs, which are a
significant source of tourism dollars, fishing, biodiversity,
and natural beauty.
(5) Air pollution caused by burning oil for electricity--
(A) has serious health impacts in the form of
higher rates of asthma and other lung ailments; and
(B) can also exacerbate climate change.
(6) The Caribbean region is particularly vulnerable to sea
level rise and stronger storms.
(7) Between 2005 and 2018, the dependence of the countries
of the Caribbean on oil was perpetuated by the Venezuelan-led
Petrocaribe oil alliance, which--
(A) offered preferential terms for oil sales; and
(B) supplies some countries with up to 40 percent
of their energy production needs.
(8) The ongoing domestic economic crisis and political
turmoil in Venezuela has forced the Government of Venezuela to
retract its commitments to the Petrocaribe oil alliance and
step away as a regional power. Only Cuba still receives
preferential Petrocaribe pricing on fuel exports from
Venezuela, while other Petrocaribe member countries are
experiencing a destabilized flow of oil.
(9) China has spent more than $244,000,000,000 on energy
projects worldwide since 2000, 25 percent of which was spent in
Latin America and the Caribbean. Although the majority of this
spending was for oil, gas, and coal, China has also been the
largest investor in clean energy globally for almost a decade.
(10) The World Bank estimates that the Caribbean will need
$12,000,000,000 in power investments through 2035.
(11) Renewable energy technology costs have decreased
dramatically in recent years, offering a more viable economic
alternative for energy production. Solar energy prices have
fallen by 80 percent since 2008, causing significant market
growth, and according to data released by the International
Renewable Energy Agency, \1/3\ of global power capacity is
based in renewable energy.
(12) In 2016, the International Monetary Fund estimated
that transportation accounted for 36 percent of the total
primary energy consumed in the Caribbean subregion.
(13) According to the United Nations Environment Programme,
Latin America and the Caribbean could achieve annual savings of
$621,000,000,000 and a reduction of 1,100,000,000 tons of CO2
by 2050 if the region's energy and transport sectors reach net
zero emissions.
(14) The Caribbean has an abundance of onshore and offshore
resources needed for renewable energy, including sun, wind,
geothermal, and some hydropower production capacity.
(15) The United States Government is deeply engaged in
providing technical and policy assistance to countries of the
Caribbean on energy issues through--
(A) the Energy and Climate Partnership of the
Americas;
(B) Connecting the Americas 2022; and
(C) bilateral assistance programs.
(16) On February 19, 2014, at the North American Leaders'
Summit, President Barack Obama, Prime Minister Stephen Harper
of Canada, and President Enrique Pena Nieto of Mexico
reaffirmed their commitment to bring affordable, reliable, and
increasingly renewable power to the Caribbean, while opening
wider markets for clean energy and green technology.
(17) On June 19, 2015, President Barack Obama announced the
Caribbean Energy Security Initiative, which would partner with
individual countries--
(A) to transform its energy sector;
(B) to work to increase access to finance, good
governance, and diversification; and
(C) to maximize the impact of existing donor
effects.
(18) On May 4, 2016, at the United States-Caribbean-Central
American Energy Summit, the energy security task force formally
launched the Caribbean Sustainable Energy Roadmap and Strategy
(C-SERMS) as a mechanism to manage regional coordination and
action on energy security and agreed to expand the regional
market and transmission system.
(19) The United States has an important opportunity--
(A) to deepen this engagement;
(B) to work as a partner with Caribbean countries
on a more regional and coordinated basis;
(C) to help ease the region's dependence on
imported oil; and
(D) to promote affordable alternative sources of
energy.
(b) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Caribbean countries.--The term ``Caribbean countries''
means countries in the Caribbean region, but does not include
Cuba or Venezuela.
(2) Caribbean governments.--The term ``Caribbean
governments'' means the national governments of the Caribbean
countries.
(c) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States to
help Caribbean countries--
(1) achieve greater energy security and improve domestic
energy resource mobilization;
(2) lower their dependence on imported fuels;
(3) eliminate the use of diesel, heavy fuel oil, other
petroleum products, and coal for the generation of electricity;
(4) increase production of renewable energy; and
(5) meet the greenhouse gas mitigation goals of their
national determined contributions to the Paris Agreement.
(d) Strategy.--
(1) Submission.--Not later than 120 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in
coordination with the Administrator of the United States Agency
for International Development (USAID), shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees a multi-year strategy that
describes how the Department of State will promote regional
cooperation with Caribbean countries--
(A) to lower dependence on imported fuels, grow
domestic clean energy production in the region,
strengthen regional energy security, and lower energy
sector greenhouse gas emissions;
(B) to decrease dependence on oil in the
transportation sector;
(C) to increase energy efficiency, energy
conservation, and investment in alternatives to
imported fuels;
(D) to improve grid reliability and modernize
electricity transmission networks;
(E) to advance deployment of innovative solutions
to expand community and individuals' access to
electricity;
(F) to help reform energy markets to encourage good
regulatory governance and to promote a climate of
private sector investment; and
(G) to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions from the
energy and transportation sector.
(2) Elements.--The strategy required under subsection (a)
shall include--
(A) a thorough review and inventory of United
States Government activities that are being carried out
bilaterally, regionally, and in coordination with
multilateral institutions--
(i) to promote energy and climate security
in the Caribbean region; and
(ii) to reduce the region's reliance on oil
for electricity generation;
(B) opportunities for marshaling regional
cooperation--
(i) to overcome market barriers resulting
from the small size of Caribbean energy
markets;
(ii) to address the high transportation and
infrastructure costs faced by Caribbean
countries;
(iii) to ensure greater donor coordination
between governments, multilateral institutions,
multilateral banks, and private investors; and
(iv) to expand regional financing
opportunities to allow for lower cost energy
entrepreneurship;
(C) measures to ensure that each Caribbean
government has--
(i) an independent utility regulator or
equivalent;
(ii) affordable access by third party
investors to its electrical grid with minimal
regulatory interference;
(iii) effective energy efficiency and
energy conservation;
(iv) programs to address technical and
nontechnical issues;
(v) a plan to eliminate major market
distortions;
(vi) cost-reflective tariffs; and
(vii) no tariffs or other taxes on clean
energy solutions; and
(D) recommendations for how United States policy,
technical, and economic assistance can be used in the
Caribbean region--
(i) to advance renewable energy development
and the incorporation of renewable technologies
into existing energy grids and the development
and deployment of micro-grids where appropriate
and feasible to boost energy security and
reliability, particularly to underserved
communities;
(ii) to increase the generation of clean
energy sufficiently to replace and allow for
the retirement of obsolete fossil fuel energy
generation units in Caribbean countries;
(iii) to create regional financing
opportunities to allow for lower cost energy
entrepreneurship;
(iv) to deploy transaction advisors in the
region to help attract private investment and
break down any market or regulatory barriers;
and
(v) to establish a mechanism for each host
government to have access to independent legal
advice--
(I) to speed the development of
energy-related contracts; and
(II) to better protect the
interests of Caribbean governments and
citizens.
(3) Consultation.--In devising the strategy under this
subsection, the Secretary of State shall work with the
Secretary of Energy and shall consult with--
(A) the Secretary of the Interior;
(B) the Secretary of Commerce;
(C) the Secretary of the Treasury;
(D) the Board of Directors of the Export-Import
Bank of the United States;
(E) the Board of Directors of the Development
Finance Corporation;
(F) the Administrator of the United States Agency
for International Development;
(G) the Caribbean governments;
(H) the Inter-American Development Bank;
(I) the World Bank Group; and
(J) the Caribbean Electric Utility Services
Corporation.
SEC. 250. UNITED STATES-CARIBBEAN RESILIENCE PARTNERSHIP.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The United States shares with the Caribbean a
collective vulnerability to natural disasters, which affects
the lives and the economies of our citizens.
(2) The April 9, 2021, eruption of the La Soufriere volcano
is another reminder of the devastation caused by the many
natural disasters the Caribbean confronts each year and the
region's vulnerability to external shocks. Hurricane Dorian,
the largest storm to hit the region, wiped out large parts of
the northern Bahamas in 2019, and Hurricanes Maria and Irma
devastated multiple islands across the region in 2017,
including Puerto Rico. According to IMF research, of the 511
plus disasters worldwide to hit small states since 1950, around
two-thirds (324) have been in the Caribbean.
(3) This region is seven times more likely to experience a
natural disaster than elsewhere. And, when one occurs, it will
incur as much as six times more damage.
(4) Extreme weather events and other environmental impacts
will only worsen over the coming years, and if not addressed,
we will see only increasing economic shocks on these countries,
driving irregular migration.
(5) While the United States has considerable expertise and
capacity in assisting countries with disaster response, there
remains a need for stronger partnerships that build regional
resilience through efficient and interoperable platforms,
protecting people and speeding recovery.
(6) The People's Republic of China has dramatically
increased its engagement in the Caribbean in the past five
years, including offering loans and grants related to disaster
response and resilience and sought to acquire property rights
in the Caribbean that would be detrimental to United States
national security interests.
(7) In 2019, the United States launched a new U.S.-
Caribbean Resilience Partnership to deepen cooperation and
investment to strengthen our disaster resilience throughout the
Caribbean region, including--
(A) to streamline early warning response networks
and formalize communication channels;
(B) to enhance, encourage, and work collaboratively
on further developing aviation disaster resilience
plans and partnerships;
(C) to prioritize regional technical exchange in
energy planning, risk reduction, and resilience;
(D) to increase communications network
interoperability between Caribbean partners and the
United States;
(E) to utilize storm surge mapping data and share
real-time information in preparation for potential
damage resulting from tropical cyclones and tsunamis;
(F) to use meteorological services to strengthen
and deepen physical and communications infrastructure,
data collection networks, and human and technical
capacity throughout the region, as well as interactions
with the public;
(G) to understand that while the use of
international and military and civil defense assets in
disaster response may only be considered as a last
resort, when local, national, and international
civilian capabilities are overwhelmed, civil-military
coordination should occur, in support of the affected
nation;
(H) to develop a framework that would govern the
deployment of international military and civil defense
assets in disaster response when local, national, and
international civilian capabilities are overwhelmed, in
support of the affected nation;
(I) to seek common mechanisms for ensuring rapid
disaster response and recovery, including waiving or
expediting diplomatic clearances, waiving of or
reducing customs fees, streamlining overflight and
airspace clearance, and ensuring that the first
responders have the ability to rapidly respond to
disasters in other countries;
(J) to promote the integration and coordination of
regional response mechanisms in the Caribbean,
including through the Caribbean Disaster Emergency
Management Agency, the Regional Security System, United
States Government Agencies, and allies in ways that
facilitate more effective and efficient planning,
mitigation, response, and resilience to natural
disasters;
(K) to share best practices in improved building
codes with national disaster organizations, including
building better programs, at regional, national and
community levels; and
(L) to promote community-based disaster
preparedness and mitigation activities, particularly in
underserved communities, with the aim of increasing
broad public participation and resilience.
(b) Policy.--It is the policy of the United States to help
Caribbean countries--
(1) increase their resilience and adapt to natural
disasters and the impacts of severe weather events and a
changing environment;
(2) partner with United States Federal, State, and local
agencies and engage in technical cooperation, dialogue, and
assistance activities;
(3) harmonize standards and practices related to paragraphs
(1) and (2) to promote increased investment and integration;
(4) increase investment from United States companies in the
Caribbean on resilience-building, adaptation, and climate-
related mitigation efforts;
(5) promote regional cooperation and ensure efforts by the
United States, Caribbean countries, and international partners
complement each other; and
(6) further assist with the efforts described in subsection
(a)(7).
(c) Strategy.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the
heads of other Federal departments and agencies, shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees a multi-year strategy that
describes how the Department of State will achieve the policies
described in subsection (b).
(d) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be
appropriated for activities, programs, technical assistance, and
engagement under this section the following:
(1) $20,000,000 for fiscal year 2022.
(2) $25,000,000 for fiscal year 2023.
(3) $30,000,000 for fiscal year 2024 and each fiscal year
thereafter.
(e) Reporting and Monitoring.--
(1) In general.--Of the amounts authorized to be
appropriated each fiscal year pursuant to subsection (d), at
least five percent of all programming funding allocation shall
support and be directed toward reporting, monitoring, and
assessment of effectiveness.
(2) Engagement and collaboration.--The Department of State
shall ensure that at least 20 percent of amounts authorized to
be appropriated pursuant to subsection (d) directly support the
training of, engagement with, collaboration with, and exchange
of expertise on resilience between United States Federal,
State, and local officials and their Caribbean government
counterparts. Such amounts should also support, as appropriate,
increased academic, civil society, media, and private sector
engagement in the fields of resilience-building, adaptation,
and mitigation.
SEC. 251. COUNTERING CHINA'S EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL DIPLOMACY IN
LATIN AMERICA.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
(1) According to a report by the National Endowment for
Democracy, China has spent the equivalent of billions of
dollars to shape public opinion and perceptions around the
world through thousands of people-to-people exchanges, cultural
activities, educational programs, and the development of media
enterprises and information initiatives with global reach.
(2) Educational and exchange programs are a core element of
United States public diplomacy, elevating our culture,
policies, and interests worldwide.
(3) These programs provide students with access to
international knowledge, an opportunity to learn foreign
languages, and a unique environment for developing cultural
understanding, all of which are valuable skills in today's
global economy.
(4) 90 percent of ECA's appropriation is spent in the
United States or invested directly in American citizens or
American organizations.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) China's efforts to mold public opinion and influence
educational institutions undermine United States' influence in
Latin America and the Caribbean and threaten democratic
institutions and practices in the region;
(2) the United States Government should expand current
educational and cultural exchange programs in Latin America and
the Caribbean, which are cost-effective and strengthen people-
to-people diplomacy, to promote national security and foreign
policy interests of the United States; and
(3) educational exchanges foster linguistic, cultural, and
educational skills that advance United States economic
competitiveness, strengthen alliances, and support democracies
worldwide.
(c) Strategy.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, acting through the
Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs, and
in coordination with the Assistant Administrator for the Bureau of
Economic Growth, Education, and Environment at the United States Agency
for International Development, shall devise a strategy--
(1) to evaluate and expand existing programs and, as
necessary, design and implement new educational, professional,
and cultural exchanges and other programs to--
(A) create and sustain mutual understanding with
other countries necessary to advance United States
foreign policy goals by cultivating people-to-people
ties among current and future global leaders that build
enduring networks and personal relationships; and
(B) promote United States national security
interests and values, including through the expansion
of exchange visitor programs such as international
visitor leadership programs and the Young Leaders of
the Americas Initiative, as well as professional
capacity building programs that prioritize building
skills in entrepreneurship, promoting transparency, and
technology;
(2) to ensure that exchange programs for Americans abroad
and international visitors attract a diverse pool of
participants, including from underrepresented, marginalized,
and low-income communities; and
(3) to evaluate, expand, and strengthen existing programs,
and, as necessary, design and implement new basic and higher
education programs in Latin America and the Caribbean, in
accordance with the United States Strategy on International
Basic Education and the United States Agency for International
Development Education Policy, to enable all young adults,
youth, and children to acquire the quality education and skills
needed to be productive members in society, which will lead to
better individual and societal outcomes.
(d) Report With Intelligence Assessment.--Not later than 180 days
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State
shall, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence,
submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that
assesses the nature and impact of the People's Republic of China's
educational and cultural sector activity in Latin America and the
Caribbean, its impact on United States' strategic interests, and
recommendations for the United States Government to expand people-to-
people ties.
SEC. 252. NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) narcotics trafficking continues to pose a security
threat to the countries and peoples of Latin America and the
Caribbean;
(2) other forms of transnational organized crime, including
arms trafficking, human smuggling, money laundering, and
illicit financing, are drivers of irregular migration;
(3) narcotics trafficking is fueled by governments that
fail to curb the illicit drug trade by adequately regulating
the legal trade of non-fentanyl opioids and precursor chemicals
used to produce fentanyl, fentanyl analogs, and other synthetic
drugs;
(4) further, governments that do not cooperate sufficiently
on financial investigations and prosecutions, withhold
information with respect to money laundering crimes, or are
determined to facilitate illicit activities, particularly by
transnational organized criminal organizations, should be held
accountable;
(5) as noted in the International Narcotics Control
Strategy Report 2020, China ``has not cooperated sufficiently
on financial investigations and does not provide adequate
responses to requests for financial investigation
information'';
(6) the United States should apply economic and other
targeted financial sanctions with respect to individuals
engaged in financial crimes and money laundering that fosters
narcotics trafficking in the countries of Latin America and the
Caribbean; and
(7) the United States should look to policies to hold
accountable countries that fail to sufficiently investigate
financial crimes and money laundering that foster narcotics
trafficking in the countries of Latin America and the
Caribbean.
PART II--TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIPS
SEC. 255. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIPS.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the United States, European Union, the United Kingdom,
and other European countries are close partners, sharing values
grounded in democracy, human rights, transparency, and the
rules-based international order established after World War II;
(2) without a common approach by the United States,
European Union, the United Kingdom, and other European
countries on connectivity, trade, transnational challenges, and
support for democracy and human rights, the People's Republic
of China will continue to increase its economic, political, and
security leverage in Europe;
(3) the People's Republic of China's deployment of
assistance to European countries following the COVID-19
outbreak showcased a coercive approach to aid, but it also
highlighted Europe's deep economic ties to the People's
Republic of China;
(4) as European countries seek to recover from the economic
toll of the COVID-19 outbreak, the United States must stand in
partnership with Europe to support our collective economic
recovery, reinforce our collective national security, and
defend shared values;
(5) the United States, European Union, the United Kingdom,
and other European countries should coordinate on joint
strategies to diversify reliance on supply chains away from the
People's Republic of China, especially in the medical and
pharmaceutical sectors;
(6) the United States, European Union, the United Kingdom,
and other European countries should leverage their respective
economic innovation capabilities to support the global economic
recovery from the COVID-19 recession and draw a contrast with
the centralized economy of the People's Republic of China;
(7) the United States, United Kingdom, and European Union
should accelerate efforts to de-escalate their trade disputes,
including negotiating a United States-European Union trade
agreement that benefits workers and the broader economy in both
the United States and European Union;
(8) the United States, European Union, and Japan should
continue trilateral efforts to address the security, economic,
democracy, and human rights challenges posed by the People's
Republic of China;
(9) the United States, European Union, the United Kingdom,
and other European countries should enhance cooperation to
counter People's Republic of China disinformation, influence
operations, and propaganda efforts;
(10) the United States and Europe share serious concerns
with the repressions being supported and executed by the
Government of the People's Republic of China, and should
continue implementing measures to address the Government of the
People's Republic of China's specific abuses in Tibet, Hong
Kong, and Xinjiang, and should build joint mechanisms and
programs to prevent the export of China's authoritarian
governance model to countries around the world;
(11) the United States and Europe should remain united in
their shared values against attempts by the Government of the
People's Republic of China at the United Nations and other
multilateral organizations to promote efforts that erode the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, like the ``community of
a shared future for mankind'' and ``democratization of
international relations'';
(12) the People's Republic of China's infrastructure
investments around the world, particularly in 5G
telecommunications technology and port infrastructure, could
threaten democracy across Europe and the national security of
key countries;
(13) as appropriate, the United States should share
intelligence with European allies and partners on Huawei's 5G
capabilities and the intentions of the Government of the
People's Republic of China with respect to 5G expansion in
Europe;
(14) the European Union's Investment Screening Regulation,
which came into force in October 2020, is a welcome
development, and member states should closely scrutinize PRC
investments in their countries through their own national
investment screening measures;
(15) the President should actively engage the European
Union on the implementation of the Export Control Reform Act
regulations and to better harmonize United States and European
Union policies with respect to export controls;
(16) the President should strongly advocate for the listing
of more items and technologies to restrict dual use exports
controlled at the National Security and above level to the
People's Republic of China under the Wassenaar Arrangement;
(17) the United States should explore the value of
establishing a body akin to the Coordinating Committee for
Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom) that would specifically
coordinate United States and European Union export control
policies with respect to limiting exports of sensitive
technologies to the People's Republic of China; and
(18) the United States should work with counterparts in
Europe to--
(A) evaluate United States and European
overreliance on goods originating in the People's
Republic of China, including in the medical and
pharmaceutical sectors, and develop joint strategies to
diversify supply chains;
(B) develop a common strategy for promoting energy
security and economic growth in eastern Europe and the
Balkans that addresses shared concerns related to
China's Belt and Road Initiative in these regions,
including complementary investments in the Three Seas
Initiative Fund for clean energy and digital
connectivity projects;
(C) counter PRC efforts to use COVID-19-related
assistance as a coercive tool to pressure developing
countries by offering relevant United States and
European expertise and assistance; and
(D) leverage the United States and European private
sectors to advance the post-COVID-19 economic recovery.
SEC. 256. STRATEGY TO ENHANCE TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION WITH RESPECT TO
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.
(a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the President shall brief the appropriate
congressional committees, the Committee on Armed Services of the
Senate, and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of
Representatives on a strategy for how the United States will enhance
cooperation with the European Union, NATO, and European partner
countries with respect to the People's Republic of China.
(b) Elements.--The briefing required under subsection (a) shall
include the following elements with respect to the strategy referred to
in such subsection:
(1) An identification of the senior Senate-confirmed
Department of State official who leads United States efforts to
cooperate with the European Union, NATO, and European partner
countries to advance a shared approach with respect to the
People's Republic of China.
(2) An identification of key policy points of convergence
and divergence between the United States and European allies
and partners with respect to the People's Republic of China in
the areas of technology, trade, and economic practices.
(3) A description of efforts to advance shared interests
with European counterparts on--
(A) security and economic challenges with respect
to the People's Republic of China;
(B) democracy and human rights challenges with
respect to the People's Republic of China;
(C) technology issues with respect to the People's
Republic of China;
(D) defense issues with respect to the People's
Republic of China; and
(E) developing a comprehensive strategy to respond
to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) established by
the Government of the People's Republic of China.
(4) A description of the coordination mechanisms among key
regional and functional bureaus within the Department of State
and Department of Defense tasked with engaging with European
allies and partners on the People's Republic of China.
(5) A detailing of diplomatic efforts up to the date of the
briefing and future plans to work with European allies and
partners to counter the Government of the People's Republic of
China's advancement of an authoritarian governance model around
the world.
(6) A detailing of the diplomatic efforts made up to the
date of the briefing and future plans to support European
efforts to identify cost-effective alternatives to Huawei's 5G
technology.
(7) A detailing of how United States public diplomacy
tools, including the Global Engagement Center of the Department
of State, will coordinate efforts with counterpart entities
within the European Union to counter Chinese propaganda.
(8) A description of the staffing and budget resources the
Department of State dedicates to engagement between the United
States and the European Union on the People's Republic of China
and provide an assessment of out-year resource needs to execute
such strategy.
(9) A detailing of diplomatic efforts to work with European
allies and partners to track and counter Chinese attempts to
exert influence across multilateral fora, including at the
World Health Organization.
(c) Form.--The briefing required under section (a) shall be
classified.
(d) Consultation.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act and annually thereafter for three years, the
Secretary of State shall consult with the appropriate congressional
committees, the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate, and the
Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives regarding
the development and implementation of the elements described in
subsection (b).
SEC. 257. ENHANCING TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION ON PROMOTING PRIVATE
SECTOR FINANCE.
(a) In General.--The President should work with transatlantic
partners to build on the agreement among the Development Finance
Corporation, FinDev Canada, and the European Development Finance
Institutions (referred to as the ``DFI Alliance'') to enhance
coordination on shared objectives to foster private sector-led
development and provide market-based alternatives to state-directed
financing in emerging markets, particularly as related to the People's
Republic of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), including by
integrating efforts such as--
(1) the European Union Strategy on Connecting Europe and
Asia;
(2) the Three Seas Initiative and Three Seas Initiative
Fund;
(3) the Blue Dot Network among the United States, Japan,
and Australia; and
(4) a European Union-Japan initiative that has leveraged
$65,000,000,000 for infrastructure projects and emphasizes
transparency standards.
(b) Standards.--The United States and the European Union should
coordinate and develop a strategy to enhance transatlantic cooperation
with the OECD and the Paris Club on ensuring the highest possible
standards for Belt and Road Initiative contracts and terms with
developing countries.
SEC. 258. REPORT AND BRIEFING ON COOPERATION BETWEEN CHINA AND IRAN AND
BETWEEN CHINA AND RUSSIA.
(a) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section,
the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Select
Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Armed Services, the
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, the
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, the Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on Finance,
and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Armed Services, the
Committee on Energy and Commerce, the Committee on Financial
Services, the Committee on Ways and Means, and the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
(b) Report and Briefing Required.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence shall, in coordination with the Secretary of
State, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Commerce, the
Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of the Treasury, and such
other heads of Federal agencies as the Director considers
appropriate, submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a
report and brief such committees on cooperation between--
(A) the People's Republic of China and the Islamic
Republic of Iran; and
(B) the People's Republic of China and the Russian
Federation.
(2) Contents.--The report and briefing under paragraph (1)
shall include the following elements:
(A) An identification of major areas of diplomatic
energy, infrastructure, banking, financial, economic,
military, and space cooperation--
(i) between the People's Republic of China
and the Islamic Republic of Iran; and
(ii) between the People's Republic of China
and the Russian Federation.
(B) An assessment of the effect of the COVID-19
pandemic on such cooperation.
(C) An assessment of the effect that United States
compliance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
(JCPOA) starting in January 14, 2016, and United States
withdrawal from the JCPOA on May 8, 2018, had on the
cooperation described in subparagraph (A)(i).
(D) An assessment of the effect on the cooperation
described in subparagraph (A)(i) that would be had by
the United States reentering compliance with the JCPOA
or a successor agreement and the effect of the United
States not reentering compliance with the JCPOA or
reaching a successor agreement.
(3) Form.--The report submitted under paragraph (1) shall
be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified
annex.
(c) Sense of Congress on Sharing With Allies and Partners.--It is
the sense of Congress that the Director of National Intelligence and
the heads of other appropriate Federal departments and agencies should
share with important allies and partners of the United States, as
appropriate, the findings of the report required under subsection (b).
PART III--SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA
SEC. 261. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the United States should continue to stand with friends
and partners, while also working to establish new partners in
South and Central Asia as they contend with efforts by the
Government of the People's Republic of China to interfere in
their respective political systems and encroach upon their
sovereign territory; and
(2) the United States should reaffirm its commitment to the
Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership with India and
further deepen bilateral defense consultations and
collaboration with India commensurate with its status as a
major defense partner.
SEC. 262. STRATEGY TO ENHANCE COOPERATION WITH SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA.
(a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate
congressional committees, the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate
and, the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives a
strategy for how the United States will engage with the countries of
South and Central Asia, including through the C5+1 mechanism, with
respect to the People's Republic of China.
(b) Elements.--The strategy required under subsection (a) shall
include the following elements:
(1) A detailed description of the security and economic
challenges that the People's Republic of China (PRC) poses to
the countries of South and Central Asia, including border
disputes with South and Central Asian countries that border the
People's Republic of China, and PRC investments in land and sea
ports, transportation infrastructure, and energy projects
across the region.
(2) A detailed description of United States efforts to
provide alternatives to PRC investment in infrastructure and
other sectors in South and Central Asia.
(3) A detailed description of bilateral and regional
efforts to work with countries in South Asia on strategies to
build resilience against PRC efforts to interfere in their
political systems and economies.
(4) A detailed description of United States diplomatic
efforts to work with the Government of Afghanistan on
addressing the challenges posed by PRC investment in the Afghan
mineral sector.
(5) A detailed description of United States diplomatic
efforts with the Government of Pakistan with respect to matters
relevant to the People's Republic of China, including
investments by the People's Republic of China in Pakistan
through the Belt and Road Initiative.
(6) In close consultation with the Government of India,
identification of areas with respect to which the United States
Government can provide diplomatic and other support as
appropriate for India's efforts to address economic and
security challenges posed by the People's Republic of China in
the region.
(7) A description of the coordination mechanisms among key
regional and functional bureaus within the Department of State
and Department of Defense tasked with engaging with the
countries of South and Central Asia on issues relating to the
People's Republic of China.
(8) A description of the efforts being made by Federal
departments and agencies, including the Department of State,
the United States Agency for International Development, the
Department of Commerce, the Department of Energy, and the
Office of the United States Trade Representative, to help the
countries of South and Central Asia develop trade and commerce
links that will help those countries diversify their trade away
from the People's Republic of China.
(9) A detailed description of United States diplomatic
efforts with Central Asian countries, Turkey, and any other
countries with significant populations of Uyghurs and other
ethnic minorities fleeing persecution in the People's Republic
of China to press those countries to refrain from deporting
ethnic minorities to the People's Republic of China, protect
ethnic minorities from intimidation by Chinese Government
authorities, and protect the right to the freedoms of assembly
and expression.
(c) Form.--The strategy required under section (a) shall be
submitted in an unclassified form that can be made available to the
public, but may include a classified annex as necessary.
(d) Consultation.--Not later than 120 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act and not less often than annually thereafter for
five years, the Secretary of State shall consult with the appropriate
congressional committees, the Committee on Armed Services of the
Senate, and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of
Representatives regarding the development and implementation of the
strategy required under subsection (a).
SEC. 263. INDIAN OCEAN REGION STRATEGIC REVIEW.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The Indian Ocean region is a vitally important part of
the Indo-Pacific where the United States has political,
economic, and security interests.
(2) The United States has an interest in working with
partners in the Indo-Pacific, including India, Japan, and
Australia, to address regional governance, economic
connectivity, and security challenges including threats to
freedom of navigation.
(b) Statement of Policy.--As a part of the United States engagement
in the Indo-Pacific, it shall be the policy of the United States to
strengthen engagement with the countries in the Indian Ocean region,
including with governments, civil society, and private sectors in such
countries to--
(1) promote United States political engagement with such
region, including through active participation in regional
organizations, and strengthened diplomatic relations with
United States partners in such region;
(2) enhance United States economic connectivity and
commercial exchange with such region;
(3) defend freedom of navigation in such region from
security challenges, including related to piracy;
(4) support the ability of governments and organizations in
such region to respond to natural disasters;
(5) support and facilitate the role of regional allies and
partners as net providers of security to such region and as
partners to the United States in addressing security challenges
in such region, including through assistance to such allies and
partners to build capacity in maritime security and maritime
domain awareness;
(6) continue to build the United States-India relationship
in order to regularize security cooperation through the
negotiation of agreements concerning access, communication, and
navigation, including through foundational agreements; and
(7) promote cooperation with United States allies in the
Indo-Pacific, including Japan and Australia, and major defense
partners, including India, and NATO allies, including the
United Kingdom and France, to support a rules-based order in
such region.
(c) Strategy.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in
coordination with the Secretary of Defense and the
Administrator of the United States Agency for International
Development (USAID), shall submit to the appropriate committees
of Congress a multi-year strategy for United States engagement
to support United States interests in the Indian Ocean region.
Such strategy shall--
(A) define United States political, economic, and
security interests in the Indian Ocean region;
(B) outline challenges to the interests of the
United States in such region;
(C) outline efforts to improve cooperation between
the United States and members of the Quad, including
India, Japan, and Australia, through coordination in
diplomacy and development priorities, joint military
exercises and operations, and other activities that
promote United States political, economic, and security
interests;
(D) outline efforts to support economic
connectivity in such region, including through the
United States-India-Japan Trilateral Infrastructure
Working Group, the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor, and
other efforts to expand and enhance connectivity across
the Indo-Pacific, including with the countries of
Southeast Asia, that maintain high standards of
investment and support for civil society and people-to-
people connectivity;
(E) describe how the United States can engage with
regional intergovernmental organizations and entities,
including the Indian Ocean Rim Association, to promote
United States political, economic, and security
interests in such region;
(F) review the United States diplomatic posture in
such region, including an assessment of United States
diplomatic engagement in countries without a permanent
United States embassy or diplomatic mission, and an
assessment of ways to improve the cooperation with the
Maldives, the Seychelles, and Comoros;
(G) review United States diplomatic agreements with
countries in such region that facilitate United States
military operations in such region, including bilateral
and multilateral agreements, and describe efforts to
expand United States cooperation with such countries
through the negotiation of additional agreements; and
(H) include a security assistance strategy for such
region that outlines priorities, objectives, and
actions for United States security assistance efforts
to governments of countries in such region to promote
United States political, economic, and security
interests in such region.
(2) Inclusion.--The strategy required under paragraph (1)
may be submitted as a part of any other strategy relating to
the Indo-Pacific.
(3) Report on implementation.--Not later than one year
after the submission of the strategy required under paragraph
(1) and one year thereafter, the Secretary of State shall
submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on
progress made toward implementing such strategy.
(d) United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission.--
(1) In general.--Subparagraph (E) of section 1238(c)(2) of
the Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2001 (22 U.S.C. 7002(c)(2)) is amended--
(A) by inserting ``, including in the Indian Ocean
region'' after ``deployments of the People's Republic
of China military''; and
(B) by adding at the end the following new
sentence: ``In this subparagraph, the term `Indian
Ocean region' means the Indian Ocean, including the
Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal, and the littoral
areas surrounding the Indian Ocean.''.
(2) Effective date.--The amendments made by paragraph (1)
shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act and
apply beginning with the first report required under section
1238 of the Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2001 (as amended by such paragraph) that is
submitted after such date.
(e) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Appropriate committees of congress.--The term
``appropriate committees of Congress'' means the Committee on
Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Armed Services of the
House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations
and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate.
(2) Indian ocean region.--The term ``Indian Ocean region''
means the Indian Ocean, including the Arabian Sea and the Bay
of Bengal, and the littoral areas surrounding the Indian Ocean.
PART IV--AFRICA
SEC. 271. ASSESSMENT OF POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SECURITY ACTIVITY OF
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN AFRICA.
(a) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section,
the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on
Armed Services, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
Senate; and
(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on
Armed Services, and the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
(b) Intelligence Assessment.--Not later than 180 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall, in
coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, submit to the
appropriate committees of Congress a report that assesses the nature
and impact of the People's Republic of China's political, economic,
socio-cultural, and security sector activity in Africa, and its impact
on United States strategic interests, including information relating
to--
(1) the amount and impact of direct investment, loans,
development financing, oil-for-loans deals, and other
preferential trading arrangements;
(2) the involvement of People's Republic of China (PRC)
state-owned enterprises in Africa;
(3) the amount of African debt held by the PRC;
(4) the involvement of PRC private security, technology and
media companies in Africa;
(5) the scale and impact of PRC arms sales to African
countries;
(6) the scope of PRC investment in and control of African
energy resources and minerals critical for emerging and
foundational technologies;
(7) an analysis on the linkages between PRC's aid and
assistance to African countries and African countries
supporting PRC geopolitical goals in international fora;
(8) the methods, tools, and tactics used to facilitate
illegal and corrupt activity, including trade in counterfeit
and illicit goods, to include smuggled extractive resources and
wildlife products, between Africa and the PRC;
(9) the methods and techniques that the PRC uses to exert
undue influence on African governments and facilitate corrupt
activity in Africa, including through the CCP's party-to-party
training program, and to influence African multilateral
organizations; and
(10) an analysis of the soft power, cultural and
educational activities undertaken by the PRC and CCP to seek to
expand its influence in Africa.
SEC. 272. INCREASING THE COMPETITIVENESS OF THE UNITED STATES IN
AFRICA.
(a) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section,
the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on
Appropriations, and the Committee on Finance of the Senate; and
(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on
Appropriations, and the Committee on Ways and Means of the
House of Representatives.
(b) Strategy Requirement.--Not later than 180 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall, in
consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of
Commerce, the Attorney General, the United States Trade Representative,
the Administrator of the United States Agency for International
Development, and the leadership of the United States International
Development Finance Corporation, submit to the appropriate committees
of Congress a report setting forth a multi-year strategy for increasing
United States economic competitiveness and promoting improvements in
the investment climate in Africa, including through support for--
(1) democratic institutions and the rule of law, including
property rights; and
(2) improved transparency, anti-corruption efforts, and
good governance.
(c) Elements.--The strategy submitted pursuant to subsection (a)
shall include--
(1) a description and assessment of barriers to United
States investment in Africa for United States businesses,
including a clear identification of the different barriers
facing small-sized and medium-sized businesses, and an
assessment of whether existing programs effectively address
such barriers;
(2) a description and assessment of barriers to African
diaspora investment in Africa, and recommendations to overcome
such barriers;
(3) an identification of the economic sectors in the United
States that have a comparative advantage in African markets;
(4) a determination of priority African countries for
promoting two-way trade and investment and an assessment of
additional foreign assistance needs, including democracy and
governance and rule of law support, to promote a conducive
operating environment in priority countries;
(5) an identification of opportunities for strategic
cooperation with European allies on trade and investment in
Africa, and for establishing a dialogue on trade, security,
development, and environmental issues of mutual interest; and
(6) a plan to regularly host a United States-Africa Leaders
Summit to promote two-way trade and investment, strategic
engagement, and security in Africa.
(d) Assessment of United States Government Human Resources
Capacity.--The Comptroller General of the United States shall--
(1) conduct a review of the number of Foreign Commercial
Service Officers and Department of State Economic Officers at
United States embassies in sub-Saharan Africa; and
(2) develop and submit to the appropriate congressional
committees an assessment of whether human resource capacity in
such embassies is adequate to meet the goals of the various
trade and economic programs and initiatives in Africa,
including the African Growth and Opportunity Act and Prosper
Africa.
SEC. 273. DIGITAL SECURITY COOPERATION WITH RESPECT TO AFRICA.
(a) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section,
the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on
Armed Services, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
Senate; and
(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on
Armed Services, and the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
(b) Interagency Working Group to Counter PRC Cyber Aggression in
Africa.--
(1) In general.--The President shall establish an
interagency Working Group, which shall include representatives
of the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the
Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and such other
agencies of the United States Government as the President
considers appropriate, on means to counter PRC cyber aggression
with respect to Africa.
(2) Duties.--The Working Group established pursuant to this
subsection shall develop and submit to the appropriate
congressional committees a set of recommendations, such as
for--
(A) bolstering the capacity of governments in
Africa to ensure the integrity of their data networks
and critical infrastructure, where applicable;
(B) providing alternatives to Huawei;
(C) an action plan for United States embassies in
Africa to provide assistance to host-country
governments with respect to protecting their vital
digital networks and infrastructure from PRC espionage,
including an assessment of staffing resources needed to
implement the action plan in embassies in Africa;
(D) utilizing interagency resources to counter PRC
disinformation and propaganda in traditional and
digital media targeted to African audiences; and
(E) helping civil society in Africa counter digital
authoritarianism and identifying tools and assistance
to enhance and promote digital democracy.
SEC. 274. SUPPORT FOR YOUNG AFRICAN LEADERS INITIATIVE.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the Young African Leaders Initiative, launched in 2010,
is a signature effort to invest in the next generation of
African leaders;
(2) Africa is a continent of strategic importance and it is
vital for the United States to support strong and enduring
partnerships with the next generation of African leaders; and
(3) the United States Government should prioritize
investments to build the capacity of emerging young African
leaders in sub-Saharan Africa, including through efforts to
enhance leadership skills, encourage entrepreneurship,
strengthen public administration and the role of civil society,
and connect young African leaders continentally and globally
across the private, civic, and public sectors.
(b) Young African Leaders Initiative Program.--
(1) In general.--There is established in the Department of
State the Young African Leaders Initiative (``YALI'') program.
(2) Purpose.--The YALI program shall seek to build the
capacity of young African leaders in sub-Saharan Africa in the
areas of business, civic engagement, or public administration,
including through efforts to--
(A) support young African leaders by offering
professional development, training, and networking
opportunities, particularly in the areas of leadership,
innovation, civic engagement, elections, human rights,
entrepreneurship, good governance, and public
administration; and
(B) provide increased economic and technical
assistance to young African leaders to promote economic
growth and strengthen ties between United States and
African businesses.
(3) Fellowships.--The YALI program shall award fellowships
under the Mandela Washington Fellowship for Young African
Leaders program to young African leaders ages 18 to 35 who have
demonstrated strong capabilities in entrepreneurship,
innovation, public service, and leadership, and who have had a
positive impact in their communities, organizations, or
institutions.
(4) Regional leadership centers.--The YALI program shall
seek to establish regional leadership centers in sub-Saharan
Africa to offer training to young African leaders ages 18 to 35
who have demonstrated strong capabilities in entrepreneurship,
innovation, public service and leadership, and who have had a
positive impact in their communities, organizations, or
institutions.
(5) Activities.--
(A) United states-based activities.--The Secretary
of State, in coordination with the Administrator for
the United States Agency for International Development
and the heads of other relevant Federal departments and
agencies, shall oversee all United States-based
activities carried out under the YALI program,
including the following:
(i) The participation of Mandela Washington
fellows in a six-week Leadership Institute at a
United States university or college in
business, civic engagement, or public
management, including academic sessions, site
visits, professional networking opportunities,
leadership training, community service, and
organized cultural activities.
(ii) The participation by Mandela
Washington fellows in an annual Mandela
Washington Fellowship Summit, to provide such
Fellows the opportunity to meet with United
States leaders from the private, public, and
non-profit sectors.
(B) Africa-based activities.--The Secretary of
State, in coordination with the Administrator for the
United States Agency for International Development and
the heads of other relevant Federal departments and
agencies, should continue to support YALI programs in
sub-Saharan Africa, including the following:
(i) Access to continued leadership training
and other professional development
opportunities for Mandela Washington Fellowship
for Young African Leaders alumni upon their
return to their home countries, including
online courses, technical assistance, and
access to funding.
(ii) Training for young African leaders at
regional leadership centers established in
accordance with paragraph (4), and through
online and in-person courses offered by such
centers.
(iii) Opportunities for networking and
engagement with--
(I) other alumni of the Mandela
Washington Fellowship for Young African
Leaders;
(II) alumni of programs at regional
leadership centers established in
accordance with paragraph (4); and
(III) United States and like-minded
diplomatic missions, business leaders,
and others as appropriate.
(C) Implementation.--To carry out this paragraph,
the Secretary of State, in coordination with the
Administrator of the United States Agency for
International Development and the heads of other
relevant Federal departments and agencies shall seek to
partner with the private sector to pursue public-
private partnerships, leverage private sector
expertise, expand networking opportunities, and
identify funding opportunities as well as fellowship
and employment opportunities for participants in the
YALI program.
(6) Implementation plan.--Not later than 180 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in
coordination with the Administrator of the United States Agency
for International Development and the heads of other relevant
Federal departments and agencies, shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees a plan for implementing
the YALI program, including the following:
(A) A description of clearly defined program goals,
targets, and planned outcomes for each year and for the
duration of implementation of the program.
(B) A strategy to monitor and evaluate the program
and progress made toward achieving such goals, targets,
and planned outcomes.
(C) A strategy to ensure the program is promoting
United States foreign policy goals in Africa, including
ensuring that the program is clearly branded and paired
with robust public diplomacy efforts.
(7) Report.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the
enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 5 years, the
Secretary of State, in coordination with the Administrator of
the United States Agency for International Development, shall
submit to the appropriate congressional committees and publish
in a publicly accessible, internet-based form, a report on the
following:
(A) The progress made toward achieving the goals,
targets, and planned outcomes described in paragraph
(6)(A), including an overview of the program
implemented in the previous year and an estimated
number of beneficiaries.
(B) An assessment of how the YALI program is
contributing to and promoting United States-Africa
relations, particularly in areas of increased private
sector investment, trade promotion, support to civil
society, improved public administration, and fostering
entrepreneurship and youth empowerment.
(C) Recommendations for improvements or changes to
the program and implementation plan, if any, that would
improve their effectiveness during subsequent years of
implementation of the program.
(8) Appropriate congressional committees defined.--In this
subsection, the term ``appropriate congressional committees''
means--
(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the
Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives; and
(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the
Committee on Appropriations of the Senate.
(9) Sunset.--The requirements of this section shall
terminate on the date that is 5 years after the date of the
enactment of this Act.
SEC. 275. AFRICA BROADCASTING NETWORKS.
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this
Act, the Chief Executive Officer of the United States Agency for Global
Media shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report
on the resources and timeline needed to establish within the Agency an
organization the mission of which shall be to promote democratic values
and institutions in Africa by providing objective, accurate, and
relevant news and information to the people of Africa and counter
disinformation from malign actors, especially in countries in which a
free press is banned by the government or not fully established, about
the region, the world, and the United States through uncensored news,
responsible discussion, and open debate.
SEC. 276. AFRICA ENERGY SECURITY AND DIVERSIFICATION.
(a) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States to
support increased access to energy in Africa and reduce Africa's energy
dependence on countries that use energy reliance for undue political
influence such as the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of
China.
(b) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
(1) Lack of access to energy remains a significant barrier
to economic advancement and opportunity in Africa. As of 2018,
an estimated 789,000,000 people, the vast majority of them in
sub-Saharan Africa, lacked access to any modern electricity.
Even in the region's most advanced economies, average annual
per capita electricity consumption is often under 200 kilowatt-
hours, less than what is needed to power a typical
refrigerator. Only a small fraction of the 12,000,000 young
Africans who enter the job market each year find employment;
and the cost and reliability of electricity remain top
constraints to job creation and economic competitiveness.
(2) The United States' global strategic competitors have
stepped in to address this disparity and finance energy sector
development across Africa. China is the single largest trading
partner for African countries in aggregate, and the largest
bilateral lender for public sector loans across Africa.
Approximately 65 percent of Chinese lending to Africa goes to
infrastructure, and between 2013-2020, the energy sector
consistently accounted for the largest share of all investment
under China's Belt and Road Initiative.
(3) Reliable, affordable, and sustainable power is the
foundation for all modern economies and necessary for
increasing growth and employment.
(4) Increasing energy supply in low- and lower middle-
income countries is necessary in the next decades in order to
meet human, social, security, and economic needs.
(5) Addressing energy poverty, powering inclusive
economies, and making energy systems resilient in low- and
lower middle-income countries will require diversified power
systems and a mix of technologies that align with local
conditions, resources, and needs.
(c) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that countries
in Africa continue to be important partners to the United States and
the DFC should continue to make investments in sub-Saharan Africa to
facilitate technologies that contribute to energy security and
reliable, affordable, and sustainable power in low and lower middle-
income countries.
(d) Amendment.--Section 3 of the Electrify Africa Act of 2015
(Public Law 114-121; 22 U.S.C. 2293 note) is amended--
(1) in paragraph (8), by striking ``and'' at the end;
(2) in paragraph (9), by striking the period and inserting
a semicolon; and
(3) by inserting after paragraph (9) the following:
``(10) advance United States foreign policy and development
goals by assisting African countries to reduce their dependence
on energy resources from countries that use energy dependence
for undue political influence, such as the Russian Federation
or the People's Republic of China, which have used energy and
financial resources to influence other countries;
``(11) promote the energy security of allies and partners
of the United States by encouraging the development of
accessible, transparent, and competitive energy markets that
provide diversified sources and reliable, affordable, and
sustainable power;
``(12) encourage United States public and private sector
investment in African energy infrastructure projects to bridge
the gap between energy security requirements and commercial
demand in a way that is consistent with the region's capacity;
and
``(13) help facilitate the export of United States energy
resources, technology, and expertise to global markets in a way
that benefits the energy security of allies and partners of the
United States, including in Africa.''.
PART V--MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
SEC. 281. STRATEGY TO COUNTER CHINESE INFLUENCE IN, AND ACCESS TO, THE
MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the People's Republic of China is upgrading its
influence in the Middle East and North Africa through its
energy and infrastructure investments, technology transfer, and
arms sales;
(2) the People's Republic of China seeks to establish
military or dual use facilities in geographically strategic
locations in the Middle East and North Africa to further its
Belt and Road Initiative at the expense of United States
national security interests; and
(3) the export of certain communications infrastructure
from the People's Republic of China degrades the security of
partner networks, exposes intellectual property to theft,
threatens the ability of the United States to conduct security
cooperation with compromised regional partners, and furthers
China's authoritarian surveillance model.
(b) Strategy Required.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in
consultation with the Secretary of Defense, the Administrator
of the United States Agency for International Development, and
the heads of other appropriate Federal agencies, shall jointly
develop and submit to the appropriate congressional committees
and the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the
House of Representatives a strategy for countering and limiting
the People's Republic of China's influence in, and access to,
the Middle East and North Africa.
(2) Elements.--The strategy required under paragraph (1)
shall include--
(A) an assessment of the People's Republic of
China's intent with regards to increased cooperation
with Middle East and North African countries and how
such cooperation fits into its broader global strategic
objectives;
(B) an assessment of how governments across the
region are responding to the People's Republic of
China's efforts to increase its military presence in
their countries;
(C) efforts to improve regional cooperation through
foreign military sales, financing, and efforts to build
partner capacity and increase interoperability with the
United States;
(D) an assessment of the People's Republic of
China's joint research and development with the Middle
East and North Africa, impacts on the United States'
national security interests, and recommended steps to
mitigate the People's Republic of China's influence in
such area;
(E) an assessment of arms sales and weapons
technology transfers from the People's Republic of
China to the Middle East and North Africa, impacts on
United States' national security interests, and
recommended steps to mitigate the People's Republic of
China's influence in such area;
(F) an assessment of the People's Republic of
China's military sales to the region, including lethal
and non-lethal unmanned aerial systems;
(G) an assessment of People's Republic of China
military basing and dual-use facility initiatives
across the Middle East and North Africa, impacts on
United States' national security interests, and
recommended steps to mitigate the People's Republic of
China's influence in such area;
(H) efforts to improve regional security
cooperation with United States allies and partners with
a focus on--
(i) maritime security in the Arabian Gulf,
the Red Sea, and the Eastern Mediterranean;
(ii) integrated air and missile defense;
(iii) cyber security;
(iv) border security; and
(v) critical infrastructure security, to
include energy security;
(I) increased support for government-to-government
engagement on critical infrastructure development
projects, including ports and water infrastructure;
(J) efforts to encourage United States private
sector and public-private partnerships in healthcare
technology and foreign direct investment in non-energy
sectors;
(K) efforts to expand youth engagement and
professional education exchanges with key partner
countries;
(L) specific steps to counter increased investment
from the People's Republic of China in
telecommunications infrastructure and diplomatic
efforts to stress the political, economic, and social
benefits of a free and open internet;
(M) efforts to promote United States private sector
engagement in and public-private partnerships on
renewable energy development;
(N) the expansion of public-private partnership
efforts on water, desalination, and irrigation
projects; and
(O) efforts to warn United States partners in the
Middle East and North Africa of the risks associated
with the People's Republic of China's
telecommunications infrastructure and provide
alternative ``clean paths'' to the People's Republic of
China's technology.
(c) Form.--The strategy required under section (b) shall be
submitted in an unclassified form that can be made available to the
public, but may include a classified annex as necessary.
SEC. 282. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA ENGAGEMENT.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The United States and the international community have
long-term interests in the stability, security, and prosperity
of the people of the Middle East and North Africa.
(2) In addition to and apart from military and security
efforts, the United States should harness a whole of government
approach, including bilateral and multilateral statecraft,
economic lines of effort, and public diplomacy to compete with
and counter PRC influence.
(3) A clearly articulated positive narrative of United
States engagement, transparent governance structures, and
active civil society engagement help counter predatory foreign
investment and influence efforts.
(b) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States
that the United States and the international community should continue
diplomatic and economic efforts throughout the Middle East and North
Africa that support reform efforts to--
(1) promote greater economic opportunity;
(2) foster private sector development;
(3) strengthen civil society;
(4) promote transparent and democratic governance and the
rule of law; and
(5) promote greater regional integration and intraregional
cooperation, including with Israel.
SEC. 283. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA-IRAN
RELATIONSHIP.
It is the sense of Congress that the People's Republic of China's
economic relationship with Iran, including oil purchases in violation
of United States sanctions, undermines United States efforts to compel
Iran to abandon its malign activities.
PART VI--ARCTIC REGION
SEC. 285. ARCTIC DIPLOMACY.
(a) Sense of Congress on Arctic Security.--It is the sense of
Congress that--
(1) the rapidly changing Arctic environment--
(A) creates new national and regional security
challenges due to increased military activity in the
Arctic;
(B) heightens the risk of the Arctic emerging as a
major theater of conflict in ongoing strategic
competition;
(C) threatens maritime safety as Arctic littoral
countries have inadequate capacity to patrol the
increased vessel traffic in this remote region, which
is a result of diminished annual levels of sea ice;
(D) impacts public safety due to increased human
activity in the Arctic region where search and rescue
capacity remains very limited; and
(E) threatens the health of the Arctic's fragile
and pristine environment and the unique and highly
sensitive species found in the Arctic's marine and
terrestrial ecosystems; and
(2) the United States should reduce the consequences
described in paragraph (1) by--
(A) evaluating the wide variety and dynamic set of
security and safety risks developing in the Arctic;
(B) developing policies and making preparations to
mitigate and respond to threats and risks in the
Arctic, including by continuing to work with allies and
partners in the Arctic region to deter potential
aggressive activities and build Arctic competencies;
(C) adequately funding the National Earth System
Prediction Capability to substantively improve weather,
ocean, and ice predictions on the time scales necessary
to ensure regional security and trans-Arctic shipping;
(D) investing in resources, including a
significantly expanded icebreaker fleet, to ensure that
the United States has adequate capacity to prevent and
respond to security threats in the Arctic region; and
(E) pursuing diplomatic engagements with all states
in the Arctic region to reach an agreement for--
(i) maintaining peace and stability in the
Arctic region;
(ii) fostering cooperation on stewardship
and safety initiatives in the Arctic region;
(iii) ensuring safe and efficient
management of commercial maritime traffic in
the Arctic;
(iv) promoting responsible natural resource
management and economic development; and
(v) countering China's Polar Silk Road
initiative;
(vi) examining the possibility of
reconvening the Arctic Chiefs of Defense Forum;
and
(vii) reducing black carbon and methane
emissions in the Arctic Region, including by
working with observers of the Arctic Council,
including India and the People's Republic of
China, to adopt mitigation plans consistent
with the findings and recommendations of the
Arctic Council's Framework for Action on Black
Carbon and Methane.
(b) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States--
(1) to recognize only the states specified in subsection
(c)(1) as Arctic states, and to reject all other claims to such
status; and
(2) that the militarization of the Arctic poses a serious
threat to Arctic peace and stability, and the interests of
United States allies and partners.
(c) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Arctic states.--The term ``Arctic states'' means
Russia, Canada, the United States, Norway, Denmark (including
Greenland), Finland, Sweden, and Iceland.
(2) Arctic region.--The term ``Arctic Region'' means the
geographic region north of the 66.56083 parallel latitude north
of the equator.
(d) Designation of Ambassador At Large for Arctic Affairs.--There
is established within the Department of State an Ambassador at Large
for Arctic Affairs (referred to in this section as the ``Ambassador''),
appointed in accordance with paragraph (1).
(1) Appointment.--The Ambassador shall be appointed by the
President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.
(2) Duties.--
(A) Diplomatic representation.--Subject to the
direction of the President and the Secretary of State,
the Ambassador is authorized to represent the United
States in matters and cases relevant to the Arctic
Region in--
(i) contacts with foreign governments,
intergovernmental organizations, and
specialized agencies of the United Nations, the
Arctic Council, and other international
organizations of which the United States is a
member; and
(ii) multilateral conferences and meetings
relating to Arctic affairs.
(B) Chair of the arctic council.--The Ambassador
shall serve as the Chair of the Arctic Council when the
United States holds the Chairmanship of the Arctic
Council.
(3) Policies and procedures.--The Ambassador shall
coordinate United States policies related to the Arctic Region,
including--
(A) meeting national security, economic, and
commercial needs pertaining to Arctic affairs;
(B) protecting the Arctic environment and
conserving its biological resources;
(C) promoting environmentally sustainable natural
resource management and economic development;
(D) strengthening institutions for cooperation
among the Arctic states;
(E) involving Arctic indigenous people in decisions
that affect them;
(F) enhancing scientific monitoring and research on
local, regional, and global environmental issues;
(G) integrating scientific data on the current and
projected effects of climate change in the Arctic
Region and ensure that such data is applied to the
development of security strategies for the Arctic
Region;
(H) making available the methods and approaches on
the integration of climate science to other regional
security planning programs in the Department of State
to better ensure that broader decision-making processes
may more adequately account for the effects of climate
change; and
(I) reducing black carbon and methane emissions in
the Arctic Region.
(e) Arctic Region Security Policy.--The Ambassador shall develop a
policy, to be known as the ``Arctic Region Security Policy'', to
assess, develop, budget for, and implement plans, policies, and
actions--
(1) to bolster the diplomatic presence of the United States
in Arctic states, including through enhancements to diplomatic
missions and facilities, participation in regional and
bilateral dialogues related to Arctic security, and
coordination of United States initiatives and assistance
programs across agencies to protect the national security of
the United States and its allies and partners;
(2) to enhance the resilience capacities of Arctic states
to the effects of environmental change and increased civilian
and military activity by Arctic states and other states that
may result from increased accessibility of the Arctic Region;
(3) to assess specific added risks to the Arctic Region and
Arctic states that--
(A) are vulnerable to the changing Arctic
environment; and
(B) are strategically significant to the United
States;
(4) to coordinate the integration of environmental change
and national security risk and vulnerability assessments into
the decision making process on foreign assistance awards with
Greenland;
(5) to advance principles of good governance by encouraging
and cooperating with Arctic states on collaborative
approaches--
(A) to responsibly manage natural resources in the
Arctic Region;
(B) to share the burden of ensuring maritime safety
in the Arctic Region;
(C) to prevent the escalation of security tensions
by mitigating against the militarization of the Arctic
Region;
(D) to develop mutually agreed upon multilateral
policies among Arctic states on the management of
maritime transit routes through the Arctic Region and
work cooperatively on the transit policies for access
to and transit in the Arctic Region by non-Arctic
states; and
(E) to facilitate the development of Arctic Region
Security Action Plans to ensure stability and public
safety in disaster situations in a humane and
responsible fashion;
(6) to evaluate the vulnerability, security, survivability,
and resiliency of United States interests and non-defense
assets in the Arctic Region; and
(7) to reduce black carbon and methane emissions in the
Arctic.
SEC. 286. STATEMENT OF POLICY REGARDING OBSERVER STATUS FOR TAIWAN ON
THE ARCTIC COUNCIL.
It is the policy of the United States to urge that Taiwan be given
observer status on the Arctic Council.
PART VII--OCEANIA
SEC. 291. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON UNITED STATES ENGAGEMENT IN OCEANIA.
It shall be the policy of the United States--
(1) to elevate the countries of Oceania as a strategic
national security and economic priority of the United States
Government;
(2) to promote civil society, the rule of law, and
democratic governance across Oceania as part of a free and open
Indo-Pacific region;
(3) to broaden and deepen relationships with the Freely
Associated States of the Republic of Palau, the Republic of the
Marshall Islands, and the Federated States of Micronesia
through robust defense, diplomatic, economic, and development
exchanges that promote the goals of individual countries and
the entire region;
(4) to work with the Governments of Australia, New Zealand,
and Japan to advance shared alliance goals of the Oceania
region concerning health, environmental protection, disaster
resilience and preparedness, illegal, unreported and
unregulated fishing, maritime security, and economic
development;
(5) to participate, wherever possible and appropriate, in
existing regional organizations and international structures to
promote the national security and economic goals of the United
States and countries of Oceania;
(6) to invest in a whole-of-government United States
strategy that will enhance youth engagement and advance long-
term growth and development throughout the region, especially
as such relates to protecting marine resources that are
critical to livelihoods and strengthening the resilience of the
countries of Oceania against current and future threats
resulting from extreme weather and severe changes in the
environment;
(7) to deter and combat acts of malign foreign influence
and corruption aimed at undermining the political,
environmental, social, and economic stability of the people and
governments of the countries of Oceania;
(8) to improve the local capacity of the countries of
Oceania to address public health challenges and improve global
health security;
(9) to help the countries of Oceania access market-based
private sector investments that adhere to best practices
regarding transparency, debt sustainability, and environmental
and social safeguards as an alternative to state-directed
investments by authoritarian governments;
(10) to ensure the people and communities of Oceania remain
safe from the risks of old and degrading munitions hazards and
other debris that threaten health and livelihoods;
(11) to cooperate with Taiwan by offering United States
support for maintaining Taiwan's diplomatic partners in
Oceania; and
(12) to work cooperatively with all governments in Oceania
to promote the dignified return of the remains of members of
the United States Armed Forces who are missing in action from
previous conflicts in the Indo-Pacific region.
SEC. 292. OCEANIA STRATEGIC ROADMAP.
(a) Oceania Strategic Roadmap.--Not later than 180 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit
to the appropriate congressional committees a strategic roadmap for
strengthening United States engagement with the countries of Oceania,
including an analysis of opportunities to cooperate with Australia, New
Zealand, and Japan, to address shared concerns and promote shared goals
in pursuit of security and resiliency in the countries of Oceania.
(b) Elements.--The strategic roadmap required by subsection (a)
shall include the following:
(1) A description of United States regional goals and
concerns with respect to Oceania and increasing engagement with
the countries of Oceania.
(2) An assessment, based on paragraph (1), of United States
regional goals and concerns that are shared by Australia, New
Zealand, and Japan, including a review of issues related to
anti-corruption efforts, maritime and other security issues,
environmental protection, fisheries management, economic growth
and development, and disaster resilience and preparedness.
(3) A review of ongoing programs and initiatives by the
Governments of the United States, Australia, New Zealand, and
Japan in pursuit of shared regional goals and concerns.
(4) A review of ongoing programs and initiatives by
regional organizations and other related intergovernmental
structures aimed at addressing shared regional goals and
concerns.
(5) A plan for aligning United States programs and
resources in pursuit of shared regional goals and concerns, as
appropriate.
(6) Recommendations for additional United States
authorities, personnel, programs, or resources necessary to
execute the strategic roadmap.
(7) Any other elements the Secretary of State considers
appropriate.
SEC. 293. OCEANIA SECURITY DIALOGUE.
(a) In General.--Not later than one year after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall brief the
appropriate committees of Congress on the feasibility and advisability
of establishing a United States-based public-private sponsored security
dialogue (to be known as the ``Oceania Security Dialogue'') among the
countries of Oceania for the purposes of jointly exploring and
discussing issues affecting the economic, diplomatic, and national
security of the Indo-Pacific countries of Oceania.
(b) Report Required.--The briefing required by subsection (a)
shall, at a minimum, include the following:
(1) A review of the ability of the Department of State to
participate in a public-private sponsored security dialogue.
(2) An assessment of the potential locations for conducting
an Oceania Security Dialogue in the jurisdiction of the United
States.
(3) Consideration of dates for conducting an Oceania
Security Dialogue that would maximize participation of
representatives from the Indo-Pacific countries of Oceania.
(4) A review of the funding modalities available to the
Department of State to help finance an Oceania Security
Dialogue, including grant-making authorities available to the
Department of State.
(5) An assessment of any administrative, statutory, or
other legal limitations that would prevent the establishment of
an Oceania Security Dialogue with participation and support of
the Department of State.
(6) An analysis of how an Oceania Security Dialogue could
help to advance the Boe Declaration on Regional Security,
including its emphasis on the changing environment as the
greatest existential threat to countries of Oceania.
(7) An evaluation of how an Oceania Security Dialogue could
help amplify the issues and work of existing regional
structures and organizations dedicated to the security of the
Oceania region, such as the Pacific Island Forum and Pacific
Environmental Security Forum.
(8) An analysis of how an Oceania Security Dialogue would
help with implementation of the strategic roadmap required by
section 292 and advance the National Security Strategy of the
United States.
(c) Interagency Consultation.--To the extent practicable, the
Secretary of State may consult with the Secretary of Defense and, where
appropriate, evaluate the lessons learned of the Regional Centers for
Security Studies of the Department of Defense to determine the
feasibility and advisability of establishing the Oceania Security
Dialogue.
SEC. 294. OCEANIA PEACE CORPS PARTNERSHIPS.
(a) In General.--Not later than one year after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of the Peace Corps shall submit to
the appropriate congressional committees a report on strategies to
reasonably and safely expand the number of Peace Corps volunteers in
Oceania, with the goals of--
(1) expanding the presence of the Peace Corps to all
currently feasible locations in Oceania; and
(2) working with regional and international partners of the
United States to expand the presence of Peace Corps volunteers
in low-income Oceania communities in support of climate
resilience initiatives.
(b) Elements.--The report required by subsection (a) shall--
(1) assess the factors contributing to the current absence
of the Peace Corps and its volunteers in Oceania;
(2) examine potential remedies that include working with
United States Government agencies and regional governments,
including governments of United States allies--
(A) to increase the health infrastructure and
medical evacuation capabilities of the countries of
Oceania to better support the safety of Peace Corps
volunteers while in such countries;
(B) to address physical safety concerns that have
decreased the ability of the Peace Corps to operate in
Oceania; and
(C) to increase transportation infrastructure in
the countries of Oceania to better support the travel
of Peace Corps volunteers and their access to necessary
facilities;
(3) evaluate the potential to expand the deployment of
Peace Corps Response volunteers to help the countries of
Oceania address social, economic, and development needs of
their communities that require specific professional expertise;
and
(4) explore potential new operational models to address
safety and security needs of Peace Corps volunteers in the
countries of Oceania, including--
(A) changes to volunteer deployment durations; and
(B) scheduled redeployment of volunteers to
regional or United States-based healthcare facilities
for routine physical and behavioral health evaluation.
(c) Volunteers in Low-income Oceania Communities.--
(1) In general.--In examining the potential to expand the
presence of Peace Corps volunteers in low-income Oceania
communities under subsection (a)(2), the Director of the Peace
Corps shall consider the development of initiatives described
in paragraph (2).
(2) Initiatives described.--Initiatives described in this
paragraph are volunteer initiatives that help the countries of
Oceania address social, economic, and development needs of
their communities, including by--
(A) addressing, through appropriate resilience-
based interventions, the vulnerability that communities
in Oceania face as result of extreme weather, severe
environmental change, and other climate related trends;
and
(B) improving, through smart infrastructure
principles, access to transportation and connectivity
infrastructure that will help address the economic and
social challenges that communities in Oceania confront
as a result of poor or nonexistent infrastructure.
(d) Oceania Defined.--In this section, the term ``Oceania''
includes the following:
(1) Easter Island of Chile.
(2) Fiji.
(3) French Polynesia of France.
(4) Kiribati.
(5) New Caledonia of France.
(6) Nieu of New Zealand.
(7) Papua New Guinea.
(8) Samoa.
(9) Vanuatu.
(10) The Ashmore and Cartier Islands of Australia.
(11) The Cook Islands of New Zealand.
(12) The Coral Islands of Australia.
(13) The Federated States of Micronesia.
(14) The Norfolk Island of Australia.
(15) The Pitcairn Islands of the United Kingdom.
(16) The Republic of the Marshal Islands.
(17) The Republic of Palau.
(18) The Solomon Islands.
(19) Tokelau of New Zealand.
(20) Tonga.
(21) Tuvalu.
(22) Wallis and Futuna of France.
PART VIII--PACIFIC ISLANDS
SEC. 295. SHORT TITLE.
This part may be cited as the ``Boosting Long-term U.S. Engagement
in the Pacific Act'' or the ``BLUE Pacific Act''.
SEC. 296. FINDINGS.
Congress finds the following:
(1) The Pacific Islands--
(A) are home to roughly 10 million residents,
including over 8.6 million in Papua New Guinea,
constituting diverse and dynamic cultures and peoples;
(B) are spread across an expanse of the Pacific
Ocean equivalent to 15 percent of the Earth's surface,
including the three sub-regions of Melanesia,
Micronesia, and Polynesia; and
(C) face shared challenges in development that have
distinct local contexts, including climate change and
rising sea levels, geographic distances from major
markets, and vulnerability to external shocks such as
natural disasters.
(2) The United States is a Pacific country with
longstanding ties and shared values and interests with the
Pacific Islands, including through the Compacts of Free
Association with the Freely Associated States, the Republic of
the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, and
the Republic of Palau.
(3) The United States has vital national security interests
in the Pacific Islands, including--
(A) protecting regional peace and security that
fully respects the sovereignty of all nations;
(B) advancing economic prosperity free from
coercion through trade and sustainable development; and
(C) supporting democracy, good governance, the rule
of law, and human rights and fundamental freedoms.
(4) Successive United States administrations have
recognized the importance of the Pacific region, including the
Pacific Islands, in high-level strategic documents, including
the following:
(A) The 2015 National Security Strategy, which
first declared the rebalance to Asia and the Pacific,
affirmed the United States as a Pacific nation, and
paved the way for subsequent United States engagement
with the Pacific Islands, including several new
policies focused on conservation and resilience to
climate change announced in September 2016.
(B) The 2017 National Security Strategy, which
includes a commitment to ``shore up fragile partner
states in the Pacific Islands region to reduce their
vulnerability to economic fluctuations and natural
disasters''.
(C) The 2019 Indo-Pacific Strategy Report, which
identified the Pacific Islands as ``critical to U.S.
strategy because of our shared values, interests, and
commitments'' and committed the United States to
``building capacity and resilience to address maritime
security; Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated fishing;
drug trafficking; and resilience to address climate
change and disaster response''.
(5) The United States has deepened its diplomatic
engagement with the Pacific Islands through several recent
initiatives, including--
(A) the Pacific Pledge, which provided an
additional $100,000,000 in 2019 and $200,000,000 in
2020, on top of the approximately $350,000,000 that the
United States provides annually to the region to
support shared priorities in economic and human
development, climate change, and more; and
(B) the Small and Less Populous Island Economies
(SALPIE) Initiative launched in March 2021 to
strengthen United States collaboration with island
countries and territories, including in the Pacific
Islands, on COVID-19 economic challenges, long-term
economic development, climate change, and other shared
interests.
(6) The Boe Declaration on Regional Security, signed by
leaders of the Pacific Islands Forum in 2018, affirmed that
climate change ``remains the single greatest threat to the
livelihoods, security, and wellbeing of the peoples of the
Pacific'' and asserted ``the sovereign right of every Member to
conduct its national affairs free of external interference and
coercion''.
(7) The Asian Development Bank has estimated that the
Pacific Islands region needs upwards of $2.8 billion a year in
investment needs through 2030, in addition to $300 million a
year for climate mitigation and adaptation over the same
period.
(8) The Pacific Islands swiftly enacted effective policies
to prevent and contain the spread of the Coronavirus Disease
2019 (commonly referred to as ``COVID-19'') pandemic to their
populations. The United States has provided over $130,000,000
in assistance to the Pacific Islands for their COVID-19
response. However, priorities must be met to ensure continued
success in preventing the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic,
achieving swift and widespread vaccinations, and pursuing long-
term economic recovery in the Pacific Islands, including
through--
(A) expanding testing capacity and acquisition of
needed medical supplies, including available COVID-19
vaccines and supporting vaccination efforts, through a
reliable supply chain;
(B) planning for lifting of lockdowns and reopening
of economic and social activities; and
(C) mitigating and recovering from the impacts of
the COVID-19 pandemic on the health system and the
reliance on food and energy imports as well as lost
tourism revenue and other economic and food security
damages caused by the pandemic.
(9) Since 1966, thousands of Peace Corps volunteers have
proudly served in the Pacific Islands, building strong people-
to-people relationships and demonstrating the United States
commitment to peace and development in the region. Prior to the
COVID-19 pandemic, the Peace Corps maintained presence in four
countries of the Pacific Islands. Peace Corps volunteers
continue to be in high demand in the Pacific Islands and have
been requested across the region.
SEC. 297. STATEMENT OF POLICY.
It is the policy of the United States--
(1) to develop and commit to a comprehensive, multifaceted,
and principled United States policy in the Pacific Islands
that--
(A) promotes peace, security, and prosperity for
all countries through a rules-based regional order that
respects the sovereignty and political independence of
all nations;
(B) preserves the Pacific Ocean as an open and
vibrant corridor for international maritime trade and
promotes trade and sustainable development that
supports inclusive economic growth and autonomy for all
nations and addresses socioeconomic challenges related
to public health, education, renewable energy, digital
connectivity, and more;
(C) supports regional efforts to address the
challenges posed by climate change, including by
strengthening resilience to natural disasters and
through responsible stewardship of natural resources;
(D) improves civil society, strengthens democratic
governance and the rule of law, and promotes human
rights and the preservation of the region's unique
cultural heritages;
(E) assists the Pacific Islands in preventing and
containing the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic and in
pursuing long-term economic recovery; and
(F) supports existing regional architecture and
international norms;
(2) to support the vision, values, and objectives of
existing regional multilateral institutions and frameworks,
such as the Pacific Islands Forum and the Pacific Community,
including--
(A) the 2014 Framework for Pacific Regionalism;
(B) the 2018 Boe Declaration on Regional Security;
and
(C) the Boe Declaration Action Plan;
(3) to extend and renew the provisions of the Compacts of
Free Association and related United States law that will expire
in 2023 for the Republic of the Marshall Islands and the
Federated States of Micronesia and in 2024 for the Republic of
Palau unless they are extended and renewed; and
(4) to work closely with United States allies and partners
with existing relationships and interests in the Pacific
Islands, such as Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and Taiwan, in
advancing common goals.
SEC. 298. DEFINITION.
In this part, the terms ``Pacific Islands'' means the Cook Islands,
the Republic of Fiji, the Republic of Kiribati, the Republic of the
Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of
Nauru, Niue, the Republic of Palau, the Independent State of Papua New
Guinea, the Independent State of Samoa, the Solomon Islands, the
Kingdom of Tonga, Tuvalu, and the Republic of Vanuatu.
SEC. 299. AUTHORITY TO CONSOLIDATE REPORTS; FORM OF REPORTS.
(a) Authority to Consolidate Reports.--Any reports required to be
submitted to the appropriate congressional committees under this part
that are subject to deadlines for submission consisting of the same
units of time may be consolidated into a single report that is
submitted to the appropriate congressional committees pursuant to such
deadlines and that contains all information required under such
reports.
(b) Form of Reports.--Each report required by this part shall be
submitted in unclassified form but may contain a classified annex.
SEC. 299A. DIPLOMATIC PRESENCE IN THE PACIFIC ISLANDS.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the strategic importance of the Pacific Islands
necessitates an examination of whether United States
diplomatic, economic, and development engagement and presence
in the Pacific Islands region is sufficient to effectively
support United States objectives and meaningful participation
in regional fora;
(2) improving shared understanding of and jointly
combatting the transnational challenges pertinent to the
Pacific Islands region with countries of the Pacific Islands
and regional partners such as Australia, New Zealand, Japan,
and Taiwan is vitally important to our shared long-term
interests of stability, security, and prosperity;
(3) the United States should seek to participate in and
support efforts to coordinate a regional response toward
maritime security, including through continued United States
and Pacific Islands participation in the Pacific Fusion Centre
in Vanuatu and Information Fusion Centre in Singapore, and
robust cooperation with regional allies and partners; and
(4) the United States Government should commit to sending
appropriate levels of representation to regional events.
(b) Report.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter for five
years, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the
Secretary of Commerce and the Administrator of the United
States Agency for International Development, shall submit to
the appropriate congressional committees a report on the
diplomatic and development presence of the United States in the
Pacific Islands.
(2) Elements.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall
include the following:
(A) A description of the Department of State,
United States Agency for International Development,
United States International Development Finance
Corporation, Millennium Challenge Corporation, and
United States Commercial Service presence, staffing,
programming, and resourcing of operations in the
Pacific Islands, including programming and resourcing
not specifically allocated to the Pacific Islands.
(B) A description of gaps in such presence,
including unfilled full-time equivalent positions.
(C) A description of limitations and challenges
such gaps pose to United States strategic objectives,
including--
(i) gaps in support of the Pacific Islands
due to operations being conducted from the
United States Agency for International
Development offices in Manila and Suva; and
(ii) gaps in programming and resourcing.
(D) A strategy to expand and elevate such presence
to fill such gaps, including by establishing new
missions, expanding participation in regional forums,
and elevating United States representation in regional
forums.
(c) Authority to Enhance Diplomatic and Economic Engagement.--The
Secretary of State and the Secretary of Commerce are authorized to hire
locally employed staff in the Pacific Islands for the purpose of
promoting increased diplomatic engagement and economic and commercial
engagement between the United States and the Pacific Islands.
(d) Regional Development Cooperation Strategy.--Not later than 180
days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every five years
thereafter, the Administrator of the United States Agency for
International Development shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees a regional development cooperation strategy for the Pacific
Islands.
SEC. 299B. COORDINATION WITH REGIONAL ALLIES AND PARTNERS.
(a) In General.--The Secretary of State shall consult and
coordinate with regional allies and partners, such as Australia, Japan,
New Zealand, Taiwan, and regional institutions such as the Pacific
Islands Forum and the Pacific Community, with respect to programs to
provide assistance to the Pacific Islands, including programs
established by this Act, including for purposes of--
(1) deconflicting programming;
(2) ensuring that any programming does not adversely affect
the absorptive capacity of the Pacific Islands; and
(3) ensuring complementary programs benefit the Pacific
Islands to the maximum extent practicable.
(b) Formal Consultative Process.--The Secretary of State shall
establish a formal consultative process with such regional allies and
partners to coordinate with respect to such programs and future-years
programming.
(c) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State
shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees and the Armed
Services Committees of the Senate and the House of Representatives a
report that includes--
(1) a review of ongoing efforts, initiatives, and programs
undertaken by regional allies and partners, including
multilateral organizations, to advance priorities identified in
this Act;
(2) a review of ongoing efforts, initiatives, and programs
undertaken by non-allied foreign actors that are viewed as
being potentially harmful or in any way detrimental to one or
more countries of the Pacific Islands;
(3) an assessment of United States programs in the Pacific
Islands and their alignment and complementarity with the
efforts of regional allies and partners identified in paragraph
(1); and
(4) a review of the formal consultative process required in
subsection (b) to summarize engagements held and identify
opportunities to improve coordination with regional allies and
partners.
SEC. 299C. CLIMATE RESILIENT DEVELOPMENT IN THE PACIFIC ISLANDS.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the United States Government should leverage the full
range of authorities and programs available to assist the
Pacific Islands in achieving their development goals;
(2) United States development assistance should seek to
build on existing public and private sector investments while
creating new opportunities toward a favorable environment for
additional such investments; and
(3) United States development efforts should be coordinated
with and seek to build on existing efforts by like-minded
partners and allies and regional and international multilateral
organizations.
(b) Strategy.--The Secretary of State, in coordination with the
Administrator of the United States Agency for International
Development, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Chief Executive
Officer of the United States International Development Finance
Corporation, shall develop and implement a strategy to--
(1) invest in and improve critical infrastructure,
including transport connectivity, information and
communications technology, food security, coastal zone
management, marine and water resource management, and energy
security and access to electricity in the Pacific Islands, with
an emphasis on climate resiliency and sustainable development;
(2) provide technical assistance to assist local government
and civil society leaders assess risks to local infrastructure,
especially those posed by climate change, consider and
implement risk mitigation efforts and policies to strengthen
resilience, and evaluate proposed projects and solutions for
their efficacy and sustainability; and
(3) support investment and improvement in ecosystem
conservation and protection for the long-term sustainable use
of ecosystem services, especially those that mitigate effects
of climate change and those that support food security and
livelihoods.
(c) Conduct of Strategy.--The strategy developed under this section
shall be coordinated with like-minded partners and allies, regional and
international multilateral organizations, and regional frameworks for
development in the Pacific Islands.
(d) International Financial Institutions.--The Secretary of the
Treasury shall direct the representatives of the United States to the
World Bank Group, the International Monetary Fund, and the Asian
Development Bank to use the voice and vote of the United States to
support climate resilient infrastructure projects in the Pacific
Islands.
(e) Report.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment this Act and annually thereafter, the Secretary
of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees, the Committee on Natural Resources of the House of
Representatives, and the Committee on Energy and Natural
Resources of the Senate a report on foreign infrastructure
developments in the Pacific Islands.
(2) Matters to be included.--The report required by
paragraph (1) shall include--
(A) a review of foreign infrastructure developments
in the Pacific Islands by non-United States allies and
partners;
(B) assessments of the environmental impact and
sustainability of such developments; and
(C) an analysis of the financial sustainability of
such developments and their impacts on the debt of host
countries in the Pacific Islands.
(f) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be
appropriated $50,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2022 through 2026
to carry out this section.
SEC. 299D. INTERNATIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT ACADEMY FOR THE PACIFIC
ISLANDS.
(a) In General.--The Secretary of State shall develop and implement
a plan to expand coverage of the International Law Enforcement
Academies (ILEA) program for the Pacific Islands, including by--
(1) expanding coverage of the regional program located in
Bangkok, Thailand, to the Pacific Islands; or
(2) establishing a new regional program for the Pacific
Islands.
(b) Matters to Be Included.--The plan required by subsection (a)
shall include consultation and coordination with existing regional law
enforcement entities, including the Pacific Islands Chiefs of Police
and civil society, including those focused on human rights and
specializing in victim-centered approaches, and take into consideration
costs of implementation, effectiveness, and capacity of the Pacific
Islands to participate in the ILEA program.
(c) Briefing Required.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall provide the
appropriate congressional committees a briefing on the plan developed
under this section.
SEC. 299E. SECURITY ASSISTANCE FOR THE PACIFIC ISLANDS.
(a) Strategy.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary of State, with the
concurrence of the Secretary of Defense and in coordination
with the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall develop and
implement a comprehensive strategy to provide assistance to and
build the capacity of local civilian and national security
institutions of the Pacific Islands for purposes of--
(A) enhancing maritime security and maritime domain
awareness to address challenges such as illegal,
unreported, and unregulated fishing;
(B) assisting local law enforcement in detecting,
preventing, and combatting human and drug trafficking
and other forms of transnational crime;
(C) participating in efforts by regional
institutions and frameworks to coordinate and
facilitate cooperation on shared security challenges;
and
(D) expanding information sharing and to work
toward operational coordination and interoperability
among Pacific Island maritime security forces,
including through regional fusion centers.
(2) Programs and authorities described.--The strategy
required by this subsection shall build on but not be limited
to the following programs and authorities:
(A) The International Military Education and
Training program.
(B) The Foreign Military Financing program.
(C) The authority to build the capacity of foreign
security forces under section 333 of title 10, United
States Code.
(D) The authority to provide excess defense
articles under section 516 of the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321j).
(E) The Department of Defense State Partnership
Program.
(3) National police forces and coast guards.--The national
police forces and coast guards of the Pacific Islands are
eligible to receive assistance under the programs and
authorities described in paragraph (2) (other than the programs
and authorities described in subparagraphs (A), (D), and (F) of
paragraph (2)) for purposes of the strategy required by this
subsection.
(b) Matters to Be Included.--The strategy required by subsection
(a) shall seek to preserve peace and regional stability in the Pacific
Islands and take into consideration and seek to build upon but not
duplicate existing assistance provided by United States allies and
partners.
(c) Report.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees a report that contains the
strategy developed under this section.
(2) Matters to be included.--The report required by
paragraph (1) shall include--
(A) an assessment of security challenges to the
Pacific Islands;
(B) an analysis of demonstrated needs of the
Pacific Islands for assistance;
(C) a review of existing security assistance
programs in the Pacific Islands, including programs and
efforts provided by United States allies and partners;
(D) a plan for programs for training, equipping,
and sustainment, including excess defense equipment and
related materials;
(E) a list of militaries, national police forces,
coast guards, and other national security forces of the
Pacific Islands receiving assistance under the
strategy;
(F) a review of existing cross-border maritime law
enforcement operations (commonly known as ``shiprider
agreements'') with the Pacific Islands, an assessment
of additional resourcing needs to enhance operational
capacity, and a plan to improve on these programs and
operations;
(G) a review of existing Department of Defense
State Partnership Programs with the Pacific Islands and
an assessment of additional opportunities to leverage
Department of Defense State Partnership Programs to
address national security, law enforcement, disaster
relief and emergency management, and related
priorities;
(H) a review of current efforts and progress in
removing unexploded ordnance in the Pacific Islands and
an assessment of additional resourcing needed to ensure
continued progress, including to support coordination
with regional efforts and those of United States allies
and partners;
(I) a review of existing regional fusion centers
and other cooperative intelligence sharing efforts in
the Pacific Islands to address maritime security,
transnational crime, natural disasters, and other
security challenges and an assessment of opportunities
for the United States to participate in such efforts,
including by allocating staff and supplying resourcing;
(J) measures to evaluate success for the strategy;
and
(K) a detailed assessment of appropriations
required to achieve the objectives for the strategy in
future years.
(3) Appropriate congressional committees defined.--In this
subsection, the term ``appropriate congressional committees''
means--
(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee
on Armed Services, and the Committee on Transportation
and Infrastructure of the House of Representatives; and
(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the
Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate.
SEC. 299F. COUNTERING TRANSNATIONAL CRIME.
(a) Ratification of International Legal Instruments.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary of State shall prioritize
efforts to assist the Pacific Islands in ratifying and
implementing international legal conventions related to
transnational crime, such as--
(A) the Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species of Wildlife Fauna and Flora;
(B) the Agreement on Port State Measures; and
(C) relevant protocols supplementing the United
Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized
Crime, such as--
(i) the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and
Punish Trafficking in Person, Especially Women
and Children; and
(ii) the Protocol Against the Smuggling of
Migrants by Land, Sea, and Air.
(2) Biennial report.--Not later than 180 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act and every two years
thereafter as appropriate, the Secretary of State shall submit
to the appropriate congressional committees a report on--
(A) the status of the progress of each country of
the Pacific Islands toward ratifying and implementing
international legal conventions related to
transnational crime; and
(B) United States plans for assisting those
countries that have yet to fully ratify such
conventions with their respective ratification efforts.
(b) Updates of Certain Reports.--The Secretary of State, in
coordination with other Federal agencies as appropriate, shall identify
and update existing reports to include forms of transnational crime
affecting the Pacific Islands, such as--
(1) the International Narcotics Control Strategy report;
(2) the Improving International Fisheries Management
report; and
(3) the Trafficking in Persons report.
(c) Illegal Logging and Associated Trade.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter, the
Secretary of State, in coordination with the heads of relevant
Federal agencies, shall submit to appropriate congressional
committees a report that identifies countries of the Pacific
Islands that are countries of concern with respect to illegal
logging and associated trade.
(2) Elements.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall
include the following:
(A) A description of the impact illegal logging and
associated trade have had on local communities, good
governance, and biodiversity, including an
identification of those foreign countries that may be
financing or in any other manner supporting illegal
logging activities.
(B) A description of efforts taken by countries
identified under paragraph (1) to comply and take
appropriate corrective action to mitigate illegal
logging, and an evaluation of the progress of those
efforts.
(C) A description of steps taken by the heads of
relevant Federal agencies to assist the Pacific Islands
in adopting and implementing international measures
comparable to those of the United States, such as the
Lacey Act, to reduce impacts of illicit logging.
(3) Appropriate congressional committees defined.--In this
subsection, the term ``appropriate congressional committees''
means--
(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the
Committee on Ways and Means of the House of
Representatives; and
(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the
Committee on Finance of the Senate.
(d) Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing.--Section 3553 of
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (16 U.S.C.
8033) is amended--
(1) in paragraph (7), by striking ``and'' at the end;
(2) by redesignating paragraph (8) as paragraph (9); and
(3) by inserting after paragraph (7) (as amended) the
following:
``(8) an assessment of gaps or limitations in the ability
of the United States to effectively assist priority regions and
priority flag states relating to IUU fishing due to resource
constraints and the additional resources necessary to overcome
those constraints; and''.
SEC. 299G. EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS INITIATIVE FOR THE PACIFIC ISLANDS.
(a) In General.--The Administrator of the United States Agency for
International Development shall develop and implement an initiative to
assist the Pacific Islands in enhancing their preparedness for and
resilience to natural disasters and other emergencies.
(b) Conduct of Program.--The program developed under this section
shall include--
(1) education and training programs on natural disaster
prevention and preparedness for emergency management
professionals in the Pacific Islands, including by leveraging
the expertise of nonprofit organizations and institutions of
higher education in the United States;
(2) technical assistance, including through grants and
cooperative agreements for qualified United States and local
nongovernmental organizations, to enhance early warning
systems, emergency management and preparedness procedures, and
post-disaster relief and recovery; and
(3) coordination of existing disaster mitigation and
response plans in the region, including by United States allies
and partners in the region.
(c) Report.--
(1) In general.--Not later than one year after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Administrator shall submit to
the appropriate congressional committees a report on the
program developed under this section.
(2) Matters to be included.--The report required by
paragraph (1) shall include--
(A) an assessment of disaster risks in the Pacific
Islands and existing local and regional capacity to
respond to such risks;
(B) a review of existing efforts by United States
allies and partners to provide assistance and training
for natural disaster preparedness and emergency
management; and
(C) objectives, means of implementation, and
measures of success for the initiative.
(3) Appropriate congressional committees defined.--In this
subsection, the term ``appropriate congressional committees''
means--
(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the
Committee on Natural Resources of the House of
Representatives; and
(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources of the
Senate.
(d) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be
appropriated $40,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2022 through 2026
to carry out this section.
SEC. 299H. PEACE CORPS IN THE PACIFIC ISLANDS.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the presence of the Peace Corps in the Pacific Islands
should be expanded and the Peace Corps should reopen its
programs in as many of the Pacific Islands as possible,
including where it has previously operated but has suspended
operations;
(2) consulting like-minded regional allies and partners,
such as Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and Taiwan is crucial
for identifying and overcoming challenges for increased Peace
Corps presence in the Pacific Islands;
(3) the Peace Corps, whose mission is to promote world
peace and friendship in part by helping the people of
interested countries in meeting their need for trained men and
women, provides an invaluable opportunity to connect the
American people with the people of the Republic of the Marshall
Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, and the Republic
of Palau; and
(4) the Peace Corps should promptly reopen its programs in
the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of
Micronesia, and the Republic of Palau.
(b) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of the Peace Corps shall submit to
the appropriate congressional committees a report that includes--
(1) a comparative analysis of the Peace Corps presence in
the Pacific Islands region to other regions of the world,
including a cost-benefit analysis of placement in the region
versus elsewhere globally;
(2) analysis of current impediments to Peace Corps
expansion in the Pacific Islands region;
(3) outcomes of consultations among United States agencies,
and with regional allies and partners, on areas in which
cooperation can reduce factors limiting Peace Corps expansion,
particularly those related to medical transportation and
personal safety; and
(4) a plan and timeline for implementing outcomes
identified in paragraph (3) to facilitate expansion of Peace
Corps presence in the region, where appropriate.
TITLE III--INVESTING IN OUR VALUES
SEC. 301. STATEMENT OF CONGRESS ON THE CONTINUED VIOLATION OF RIGHTS
AND FREEDOMS OF THE PEOPLE OF HONG KONG.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
(1) Despite international condemnation, the Government of
the People's Republic of China (``PRC'') continues to disregard
its international legal obligations under the Joint Declaration
of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland and the Government of the People's Republic of
China on the Question of Hong Kong (``Joint Declaration''), in
which the PRC committed that--
(A) Hong Kong would enjoy a high degree of
autonomy;
(B) for at least 50 years the ``social and economic
systems in Hong Kong'' would remain unchanged; and
(C) the personal rights and freedoms of the people
of Hong Kong would be protected by law.
(2) As part of its continued efforts to undermine the
established rights of the Hong Kong people, the PRC National
People's Congress Standing Committee (``Standing Committee'')
passed and imposed upon Hong Kong oppressive and intentionally
vague national security legislation on June 30, 2020, that
grants Beijing sweeping powers to punish acts of ``separating
the country, subverting state power, and organizing terroristic
activities''.
(3) The legislative process by which the Standing Committee
imposed the national security law on Hong Kong bypassed Hong
Kong's local government in a potential violation of the Basic
Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the
People's Republic of China (``Basic Law''), and involved
unusual secrecy, as demonstrated by the fact that the
legislation was only the second law since 2008 that the
Standing Committee has passed without releasing a draft for
public comment.
(4) On July 30, 2020, election officials of the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) disqualified twelve pro-
democracy candidates from participating in the September 6
Legislative Council elections, which were subsequently
postponed for a year until September 5, 2021, by citing the
public health risk of holding elections during the COVID-19
pandemic.
(5) On July 31, 2020, in an attempt to assert
extraterritorial jurisdiction, the HKSAR Government announced
indictments of and arrest warrants for six Hong Kong activists
living overseas, including United States citizen Samuel Chu,
for alleged violations of the national security law.
(6) On November 11, 2020, the HKSAR Government removed four
lawmakers from office for allegedly violating the law after the
Standing Committee passed additional legislation barring those
who promoted or supported Hong Kong independence and refused to
acknowledge PRC sovereignty over Hong Kong, or otherwise
violates the national security law, from running for or serving
in the Legislative Council.
(7) On December 2, 2020, pro-democracy activists Joshua
Wong, Agnes Chow, and Ivan Lam were sentenced to prison for
participating in 2019 protests.
(8) Ten of the twelve Hong Kong residents (also known as
``the Hong Kong 12'') who sought to flee by boat from Hong Kong
to Taiwan on August 23, 2020, were taken to mainland China and
sentenced on December 30, 2020, to prison terms ranging from
seven months to three years for illegal border crossing.
(9) On December 31, 2020, Hong Kong's highest court revoked
bail for Jimmy Lai Chee-Ying, a pro-democracy figure and
publisher, who was charged on December 12 with colluding with
foreign forces and endangering national security under the
national security legislation.
(10) On January 4, 2021, the Departments of Justice in
Henan and Sichuan province threatened to revoke the licenses of
two lawyers hired to help the Hong Kong 12.
(11) On January 5, 2021, the Hong Kong Police Force
arrested more than fifty opposition figures, including pro-
democracy officials, activists, and an American lawyer, for
their involvement in an informal July 2020 primary to select
candidates for the general election originally scheduled for
September 2020, despite other political parties having held
similar primaries without retribution.
(12) On April 22, 2021, a Hong Kong court convicted Choy
Yuk-ling, a video producer with Radio Television Hong Kong, in
relation to her investigative reporting on the Hong Kong
police.
(13) On June 24, 2021, Apple Daily, Hong Kong's only
surviving pro-democracy newspaper, published its final edition
following months of intimidation and repression by the HKSAR
Government, including through the arrest of its senior editors,
police raids on its offices, and the freezing of its financial
assets.
(b) Statement of Congress.--Congress--
(1) condemns the actions taken by the Government of the
People's Republic of China (``PRC'') and the Government of the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (``HKSAR''), including
the adoption and implementation of national security
legislation for Hong Kong through irregular procedures, that
violate the rights and freedoms of the people of Hong Kong that
are guaranteed by the Joint Declaration and its implementing
document, the Basic Law;
(2) reaffirms its support for the people of Hong Kong, who
face grave threats to their rights and freedoms;
(3) calls on the Governments of the PRC and HKSAR to--
(A) respect and uphold--
(i) commitments made to the international
community and the people of Hong Kong under the
Joint Declaration; and
(ii) the judicial independence of the Hong
Kong legal system; and
(B) release pro-democracy activists and politicians
arrested under the national security law; and
(4) encourages the President, the Secretary of State, and
the Secretary of the Treasury to coordinate with allies and
partners and continue United States efforts to respond to
developments in Hong Kong, including by--
(A) providing protection for Hong Kong residents
who fear persecution;
(B) supporting those who may seek to file a case
before the International Court of Justice to hold the
Government of the PRC accountable for violating its
binding legal commitments under the Joint Declaration;
(C) encouraging allies and partner countries to
instruct, as appropriate, their respective
representatives to the United Nations to use their
voice, vote, and influence to press for the appointment
of a United Nations special mandate holder to monitor
and report on human rights developments in Hong Kong;
(D) ensuring the private sector, particularly
United States companies with economic interests in Hong
Kong, is aware of risks the national security
legislation poses to the security of United States
citizens and to the medium and long-term interest of
United States businesses in Hong Kong;
(E) continuing to implement sanctions authorities,
especially authorities recently enacted to address
actions undermining the rights and freedoms of the Hong
Kong people, such as the Hong Kong Autonomy Act (Public
Law 116-149) and the Hong Kong Human Rights and
Democracy Act of 2019 (Public Law 116-76), with respect
to officials of the Chinese Communist Party, the
Government of the PRC, or the Government of the HKSAR
who are responsible for undermining such rights and
freedoms; and
(F) coordinating with allies and partners to ensure
that such implementation of sanctions is multilateral.
SEC. 302. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR PROMOTION OF DEMOCRACY IN
HONG KONG.
(a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be
appropriated $10,000,000 for fiscal year 2022 for the Bureau of
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor of the Department of State to
promote democracy in Hong Kong.
(b) Administration.--The Secretary of State shall designate an
office with the Department of State to administer and coordinate the
provision of such funds described in subsection (a) within the
Department of State and across the United States Government.
SEC. 303. HONG KONG PEOPLE'S FREEDOM AND CHOICE.
(a) Definitions.--For purposes of this section:
(1) Joint declaration.--The term ``Joint Declaration''
means the Joint Declaration of the Government of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the
Government of the People's Republic of China on the Question of
Hong Kong, signed on December 19, 1984, and entered into force
on May 27, 1985.
(2) Priority hong kong resident.--The term ``Priority Hong
Kong resident'' means--
(A) a permanent resident of Hong Kong who--
(i) holds no right to citizenship in any
country or jurisdiction other than the People's
Republic of China (referred to in this section
as the ``PRC''), Hong Kong, or Macau as of the
date of enactment of this Act;
(ii) has resided in Hong Kong for not less
than the last ten years as of the date of
enactment of this Act; and
(iii) has been designated by the Secretary
of State or Secretary of Homeland Security as
having met the requirements of this
subparagraph, in accordance with the procedures
described in subsection (f) of this section; or
(B) the spouse of a person described in
subparagraph (A), or the child of such person as such
term is defined in section 101(b)(1) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(b)(1)), except that
a child shall be an unmarried person under twenty-seven
years of age.
(3) Hong kong national security law.--The term ``Hong Kong
National Security Law'' means the Law of the People's Republic
of China on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region that was passed unanimously by
the National People's Congress and signed by President Xi
Jinping on June 30, 2020, and promulgated in the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region (referred to in this section as
``Hong Kong SAR'') on July 1, 2020.
(4) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the
Committee on the Judiciary of the House of
Representatives; and
(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the
Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate.
(b) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
(1) The Hong Kong National Security Law promulgated on July
1, 2020--
(A) contravenes the Basic Law of the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region (referred to in this Act
as ``the Basic Law'') that provides in Article 23 that
the Legislative Council of Hong Kong shall enact
legislation related to national security;
(B) violates the PRC's commitments under
international law, as defined by the Joint Declaration;
and
(C) causes severe and irreparable damage to the
``one country, two systems'' principle and further
erodes global confidence in the PRC's commitment to
international law.
(2) On July 14, 2020, in response to the promulgation of
the Hong Kong National Security Law, President Trump signed an
Executive order on Hong Kong normalization that, among other
policy actions, suspended the special treatment of Hong Kong
persons under U.S. law with respect to the issuance of
immigrant and nonimmigrant visas.
(3) The United States has a long and proud history as a
destination for refugees and asylees fleeing persecution based
on race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or
membership in a particular social group.
(4) The United States also shares deep social, cultural,
and economic ties with the people of Hong Kong, including a
shared commitment to democracy, to the rule of law, and to the
protection of human rights.
(5) The United States has sheltered, protected, and
welcomed individuals who have fled authoritarian regimes,
including citizens from the PRC following the violent June 4,
1989, crackdown in Tiananmen Square, deepening ties between the
people of the United States and those individuals seeking to
contribute to a free, open society founded on democracy, human
rights, and the respect for the rule of law.
(6) The United States has reaped enormous economic,
cultural, and strategic benefits from welcoming successive
generations of scientists, doctors, entrepreneurs, artists,
intellectuals, and other freedom-loving people fleeing fascism,
communism, violent Islamist extremism, and other repressive
ideologies, including in the cases of Nazi Germany, the Soviet
Union, and Soviet-controlled Central Europe, Cuba, Vietnam, and
Iran.
(7) A major asymmetric advantage of the United States in
its long-term strategic competition with the Communist Party of
China is the ability of people from every country in the world,
irrespective of their race, ethnicity, or religion, to
immigrate to the United States and become American citizens.
(c) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States--
(1) to reaffirm the principles and objectives set forth in
the United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992 (Public Law 102-
383), specifically that--
(A) the United States has ``a strong interest in
the continued vitality, prosperity, and stability of
Hong Kong'';
(B) ``support for democratization is a fundamental
principle of United States foreign policy'', and
therefore ``naturally applies to United States policy
toward Hong Kong'';
(C) ``the human rights of the people of Hong Kong
are of great importance to the United States and are
directly relevant to United States interests in Hong
Kong and serve as a basis for Hong Kong's continued
economic prosperity''; and
(D) Hong Kong must remain sufficiently autonomous
from the PRC to ``justify treatment under a particular
law of the United States, or any provision thereof,
different from that accorded the People's Republic of
China'';
(2) to continue to support the high degree of autonomy and
fundamental rights and freedoms of the people of Hong Kong, as
enumerated by--
(A) the Joint Declaration;
(B) the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, done at New York, December 19, 1966;
and
(C) the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, done
at Paris, December 10, 1948;
(3) to continue to support the democratic aspirations of
the people of Hong Kong, including the ``ultimate aim'' of the
selection of the Chief Executive and all members of the
Legislative Council by universal suffrage, as articulated in
the Basic Law;
(4) to urge the Government of the PRC, despite its recent
actions, to uphold its commitments to Hong Kong, including
allowing the people of Hong Kong to govern Hong Kong with a
high degree of autonomy and without undue interference, and
ensuring that Hong Kong voters freely enjoy the right to elect
the Chief Executive and all members of the Hong Kong
Legislative Council by universal suffrage;
(5) to support the establishment of a genuine democratic
option to freely and fairly nominate and elect the Chief
Executive of Hong Kong, and the establishment of open and
direct democratic elections for all members of the Hong Kong
Legislative Council;
(6) to support the robust exercise by residents of Hong
Kong of the rights to free speech, the press, and other
fundamental freedoms, as provided by the Basic Law, the Joint
Declaration, and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights;
(7) to support freedom from arbitrary or unlawful arrest,
detention, or imprisonment for all Hong Kong residents, as
provided by the Basic Law, the Joint Declaration, and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;
(8) to draw international attention to any violations by
the Government of the PRC of the fundamental rights of the
people of Hong Kong, as provided by the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, and any encroachment upon the
autonomy guaranteed to Hong Kong by the Basic Law and the Joint
Declaration;
(9) to protect United States citizens and long-term
permanent residents living in Hong Kong, as well as people
visiting and transiting through Hong Kong;
(10) to maintain the economic and cultural ties that
provide significant benefits to both the United States and Hong
Kong, including the reinstatement of the Fulbright exchange
program with regard to Hong Kong at the earliest opportunity;
(11) to coordinate with allies, including the United
Kingdom, Australia, Canada, Japan, and the Republic of Korea,
to promote democracy and human rights in Hong Kong; and
(12) to welcome and protect in the United States residents
of Hong Kong fleeing persecution or otherwise seeking a safe
haven from violations by the Government of the PRC of the
fundamental rights of the people of Hong Kong.
(d) Temporary Protected Status for Hong Kong Residents in the
United States.--
(1) Designation.--
(A) In general.--For purposes of section 244 of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1254a), Hong
Kong shall be treated as if it had been designated
under subsection (b)(1)(C) of such section, subject to
the provisions of this section.
(B) Period of designation.--The initial period of
the designation referred to in subparagraph (A) shall
be for the 18-month period beginning on the date of
enactment of this Act.
(2) Aliens eligible.--As a result of the designation made
under subsection (a), an alien is deemed to satisfy the
requirements under paragraph (1) of section 244(c) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1254a(c)), subject to
paragraph (3) of such section, if the alien--
(A) was a permanent resident of Hong Kong at the
time such individual arrived into the United States and
is a national of the PRC (or in the case of an
individual having no nationality, is a person who last
habitually resided in Hong Kong);
(B) has been continuously physically present in the
United States since the date of the enactment of this
Act;
(C) is admissible as an immigrant, except as
otherwise provided in paragraph (2)(A) of such section,
and is not ineligible for temporary protected status
under paragraph (2)(B) of such section; and
(D) registers for temporary protected status in a
manner established by the Secretary of Homeland
Security.
(3) Consent to travel abroad.--
(A) In general.--The Secretary of Homeland Security
shall give prior consent to travel abroad, in
accordance with section 244(f)(3) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1254a(f)(3)), to an alien
who is granted temporary protected status pursuant to
the designation made under paragraph (1) if the alien
establishes to the satisfaction of the Secretary of
Homeland Security that emergency and extenuating
circumstances beyond the control of the alien require
the alien to depart for a brief, temporary trip abroad.
(B) Treatment upon return.--An alien returning to
the United States in accordance with an authorization
described in subparagraph (A) shall be treated as any
other returning alien provided temporary protected
status under section 244 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1254a).
(4) Fee.--
(A) In general.--In addition to any other fee
authorized by law, the Secretary of Homeland Security
is authorized to charge and collect a fee of $360 for
each application for temporary protected status under
section 244 of the Immigration and Nationality Act by a
person who is only eligible for such status by reason
of paragraph (1).
(B) Waiver.--The Secretary of Homeland Security
shall permit aliens to apply for a waiver of any fees
associated with filing an application referred to in
subparagraph (A).
(e) Treatment of Hong Kong Residents for Immigration Purposes.--
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, during the five fiscal year
period beginning on the first day of the first full fiscal year after
the date of enactment of this Act, Hong Kong shall continue to be
considered a foreign state separate and apart from the PRC as mandated
under section 103 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1990
(Public Law 101-649) for purposes of the numerical limitations on
immigrant visas under sections 201, 202, and 203 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1151, 1152, and 1153).
(f) Verification of Priority Hong Kong Residents.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in
consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall
publish in the Federal Register, an interim final rule
establishing procedures for designation of Priority Hong Kong
Residents. Notwithstanding section 553 of title 5, United
States Code, the rule shall be effective, on an interim basis,
immediately upon publication, but may be subject to change and
revision after public notice and opportunity for comment. The
Secretary of State shall finalize such rule not later than one
year after the date of the enactment of this Act. Such rule
shall establish procedures--
(A) for individuals to register with any United
States embassy or consulate outside of the United
States, or with the Department of Homeland Security in
the United States, and request designation as a
Priority Hong Kong Resident; and
(B) for the appropriate Secretary to verify the
residency of registered individuals and designate those
who qualify as Priority Hong Kong Residents.
(2) Documentation.--The procedures described in paragraph
(1) shall include the collection of--
(A) biometric data;
(B) copies of birth certificates, residency cards,
and other documentation establishing residency; and
(C) other personal information, data, and records
deemed appropriate by the Secretary.
(3) Guidance.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall issue
guidance outlining actions to enhance the ability of the
Secretary to efficiently send and receive information to and
from the United Kingdom and other like-minded allies and
partners for purposes of rapid verification of permanent
residency in Hong Kong and designation of individuals as
Priority Hong Kong Residents.
(4) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to
the appropriate congressional committees, the Committee on the
Judiciary of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on
the Judiciary of the Senate a report detailing plans to
implement the requirements described in this subsection.
(5) Protection for refugees.--Nothing in this section may
be construed to prevent a Priority Hong Kong Resident from
seeking refugee status under section 207 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1157) or requesting asylum under
section 208 of such Act (8 U.S.C. 1158).
(g) Reporting Requirements.--
(1) In general.--On an annual basis, the Secretary of State
and the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with
other Federal agencies, as appropriate, shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees, the Committee on the
Judiciary of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on
the Judiciary of the Senate a report detailing for the previous
fiscal year--
(A) the number of Hong Kong SAR residents who have
applied for United States visas or immigration
benefits, disaggregated by visa type or immigration
benefit, including asylum, refugee status, temporary
protected status, and lawful permanent residence;
(B) the number of approvals, denials, or rejections
of applicants for visas or immigration benefits
described in subparagraph (A), disaggregated by visa
type or immigration benefit and basis for denial;
(C) the number of pending refugee and asylum
applications for Hong Kong SAR residents, and the
length of time and reason for which such applications
have been pending; and
(D) other matters determined relevant by the
Secretaries relating to efforts to protect and
facilitate the resettlement of refugees and victims of
persecution in Hong Kong.
(2) Form.--Each report under paragraph (1) shall be
submitted in unclassified form and published on a text-
searchable, publicly available website of the Department of
State and the Department of Homeland Security.
(h) Strategy for International Cooperation on Hong Kong.--
(1) In general.--It is the policy of the United States--
(A) to support the people of Hong Kong by providing
safe haven to Hong Kong SAR residents who are nationals
of the PRC following the enactment of the Hong Kong
National Security Law that places certain Hong Kong
persons at risk of persecution; and
(B) to encourage like-minded nations to make
similar accommodations for Hong Kong people fleeing
persecution by the Government of the PRC.
(2) Plan.--The Secretary of State, in consultation with the
heads of other Federal agencies, as appropriate, shall develop
a plan to engage with other countries, including the United
Kingdom, on cooperative efforts to--
(A) provide refugee and asylum protections for
victims of, and individuals with a fear of, persecution
in Hong Kong, either by Hong Kong authorities or other
authorities acting on behalf of the PRC;
(B) enhance protocols to facilitate the
resettlement of refugees and displaced persons from
Hong Kong;
(C) identify and prevent the exploitation of
immigration and visa policies and procedures by corrupt
officials; and
(D) expedite the sharing of information, as
appropriate, related to the refusal of individual
applications for visas or other travel documents
submitted by residents of the Hong Kong SAR based on--
(i) national security or related grounds
under section 212(a)(3) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)); or
(ii) fraud or misrepresentation under
section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(C)).
(3) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation
with the heads of other Federal agencies, as appropriate, shall
submit to the appropriate congressional committees, the
Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, and
the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate a report on the
plan described in paragraph (2).
(i) Refugee Status for Certain Residents of Hong Kong.--
(1) In general.--Aliens described in paragraph (2) may
establish, for purposes of admission as a refugee under
sections 207 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C.
1157) or asylum under section 208 of such Act (8 U.S.C. 1158),
that such alien has a well-founded fear of persecution on
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion by asserting such
a fear and a credible basis for concern about the possibility
of such persecution.
(2) Aliens described.--
(A) In general.--An alien is described in this
subsection if such alien--
(i) is a Priority Hong Kong Resident and--
(I) had a significant role in a
civil society organization supportive
of the protests in 2019 and 2020
related to the Hong Kong National
Security Law and the encroachment on
the autonomy of Hong Kong by the PRC;
(II) was arrested, charged,
detained, or convicted of an offense
arising from their participation in an
action as described in section
206(b)(2) of the United States-Hong
Kong Policy Act of 1992 (22 U.S.C.
5726(b)(2)) that was not violent in
nature; or
(III) has had their citizenship,
nationality, or residency revoked for
having submitted to any United States
Government agency a nonfrivolous
application for refugee status, asylum,
or any other immigration benefit under
the immigration laws (as defined in
section 101(a) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)));
(ii) is a Priority Hong Kong Resident
spouse or child of an alien described in clause
(i); or
(iii) is the parent of an alien described
in clause (i), if such parent is a citizen of
the PRC and no other foreign state.
(B) Other categories.--The Secretary of Homeland
Security, in consultation with the Secretary of State,
may designate other categories of aliens for purposes
of establishing a well-founded fear of persecution
under paragraph (1) if such aliens share common
characteristics that identify them as targets of
persecution in the PRC on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group,
or political opinion.
(C) Significant role.--For purposes of subclause
(I) of paragraph (2)(A)(i), a significant role shall
include, with respect to the protests described in such
clause--
(i) an organizing role;
(ii) a first aid responder;
(iii) a journalist or member of the media
covering or offering public commentary;
(iv) a provider of legal services to one or
more individuals arrested for participating in
such protests; or
(v) a participant who during the period
beginning on June 9, 2019, and ending on June
30, 2020, was arrested, charged, detained, or
convicted as a result of such participation.
(3) Age out protections.--For purposes of this subsection,
a determination of whether an alien is a child shall be made
using the age of the alien on the date an application for
refugee or asylum status in which the alien is a named
beneficiary is filed with the Secretary of Homeland Security.
(4) Exclusion from numerical limitations.--Aliens provided
refugee status under this subsection shall not be counted
against the numerical limitation on refugees established in
accordance with the procedures described in section 207 of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1157).
(5) Reporting requirements.--
(A) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act and every 90 days
thereafter, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of
Homeland Security shall submit to the appropriate
congressional committees, the Committee on the
Judiciary of the House of Representatives, and the
Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate a report on
the matters described in subparagraph (B).
(B) Matters to be included.--Each report required
by subparagraph (A) shall include, with respect to
applications submitted under this section--
(i) the total number of refugee and asylum
applications that are pending at the end of the
reporting period;
(ii) the average wait-times for all
applicants for refugee status or asylum
pending--
(I) a prescreening interview with a
resettlement support center;
(II) an interview with United
States Citizenship and Immigration
Services; and
(III) the completion of security
checks;
(iii) the number of approvals, referrals
including the source of the referral, denials
of applications for refugee status or asylum,
disaggregated by the reason for each such
denial; and
(iv) the number of refugee circuit rides to
interview populations that would include Hong
Kong SAR completed in the last 90 days, and the
number planned for the subsequent 90-day
period.
(C) Form.--Each report required by subparagraph (A)
shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may
include a classified annex.
(D) Public reports.--The Secretary of State shall
make each report submitted under this paragraph
available to the public on the internet website of the
Department of State.
(j) Admission for Certain Highly Skilled Hong Kong Residents.--
(1) In general.--Subject to subsection (c), the Secretary
of Homeland Security, or, notwithstanding any other provision
of law, the Secretary of State in consultation with the
Secretary of Homeland Security, may provide an alien described
in subsection (b) with the status of a special immigrant under
section 101(a)(27) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8
U.S.C. 1101(a)(27)), if the alien--
(A) or an agent acting on behalf of the alien,
submits a petition for classification under section
203(b)(4) of such Act (8 U.S.C. 1153(b)(4));
(B) is otherwise eligible to receive an immigrant
visa;
(C) is otherwise admissible to the United States
for permanent residence (excluding the grounds for
inadmissibility specified in section 212(a)(4) of such
Act (8 U.S.C. (a)(4))); and
(D) clears a background check and appropriate
screening, as determined by the Secretary of Homeland
Security.
(2) Aliens described.--
(A) Principal aliens.--An alien is described in
this subsection if--
(i) the alien--
(I) is a Priority Hong Kong
Resident; and
(II) has earned a bachelor's or
higher degree from an institution of
higher education; and
(ii) the Secretary of Homeland Security
determines that such alien's relocation to the
United States would provide a significant
benefit to the United States.
(B) Spouses and children.--An alien is described in
this subsection if the alien is the spouse or child of
a principal alien described in paragraph (1).
(3) Numerical limitations.--
(A) In general.--The total number of principal
aliens who may be provided special immigrant status
under this section may not exceed 5,000 per year for
each of the five fiscal years beginning after the date
of the enactment of this Act. The Secretary of Homeland
Security may, in consultation with the Secretary of
State, prioritize the issuance of visas to individuals
with a bachelor's or higher degree in science,
technology, engineering, mathematics, medicine, or
health care.
(B) Exclusion from numerical limitations.--Aliens
provided immigrant status under this section shall not
be counted against any numerical limitation under
section 201, 202, 203, or 207 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1151, 1152, 1153, and 1157).
(4) Eligibility for admission under other classification.--
No alien shall be denied the opportunity to apply for admission
under this section solely because such alien qualifies as an
immediate relative or is eligible for any other immigrant
classification.
(5) Timeline for processing applications.--
(A) In general.--The Secretary of State and the
Secretary of Homeland Security shall ensure that all
steps under the control of the United States Government
incidental to the approval of such applications,
including required screenings and background checks,
are completed not later than one year after the date on
which an eligible applicant submits an application
under subsection (a).
(B) Exception.--Notwithstanding paragraph (1), the
relevant Federal agencies may take additional time to
process applications described in paragraph (1) if
satisfaction of national security concerns requires
such additional time, provided that the Secretary of
Homeland Security, or the designee of the Secretary,
has determined that the applicant meets the
requirements for status as a special immigrant under
this section and has so notified the applicant.
(k) Termination.--Except as provided in section 6 of this Act, this
section shall cease to have effect on the date that is five years after
the date of the enactment of this Act.
SEC. 304. EXPORT PROHIBITION OF MUNITIONS ITEMS TO THE HONG KONG POLICE
FORCE.
Section 3 of the Act entitled ``An Act to prohibit the commercial
export of covered munitions items to the Hong Kong Police Force'',
approved November 27, 2019 (Public Law 116-77; 133 Stat. 1173), is
amended by striking ``on December 31, 2021.'' and inserting the
following: ``on the date on which the President certifies to the
appropriate congressional committees that--
``(1) the Secretary of State has, on or after the date of
the enactment of this paragraph, certified under section 205 of
the United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992 that Hong Kong
warrants treatment under United States law in the same manner
as United States laws were applied to Hong Kong before July 1,
1997;
``(2) the Hong Kong Police have not engaged in gross
violations of human rights during the 1-year period ending on
the date of such certification; and
``(3) there has been an independent examination of human
rights concerns related to the crowd control tactics of the
Hong Kong Police and the Government of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region has adequately addressed those
concerns.''.
SEC. 305. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON TREATMENT OF UYGHURS AND OTHER ETHNIC
MINORITIES IN THE XINJIANG UYGHUR AUTONOMOUS REGION.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The Uyghurs are one of several predominantly Muslim
Turkic groups living in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region
(XUAR) in the northwest of the People's Republic of China
(PRC).
(2) Following Uyghur demonstrations and unrest in 2009 and
clashes with government security personnel and other violent
incidents in subsequent years, PRC leaders sought to
``stabilize'' the XUAR through large-scale arrests and extreme
security measures, under the pretext of combatting alleged
terrorism, religious extremism, and ethnic separatism.
(3) In May 2014, the PRC launched its ``Strike Hard Against
Violent Extremism'' campaign, which placed further restrictions
on and facilitated additional human rights violations against
minorities in the XUAR under the pretext of fighting terrorism.
(4) In August 2016, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Politburo
member Chen Quanguo, former Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) Party
Secretary, known for overseeing intensifying security
operations and human rights abuses in the TAR, was appointed as
Party Secretary of the XUAR.
(5) Beginning in 2017, XUAR authorities have sought to
forcibly ``assimilate'' Uyghurs and other Turkic minorities
into Chinese society through a policy of cultural erasure known
as ``Sinicization''.
(6) Since 2018, credible reporting including from the BBC,
France24, and the New York Times has shown that the Government
of the PRC has built mass internment camps in the XUAR, which
it calls ``vocational training'' centers, and detained Uyghurs
and other groups in them and other facilities.
(7) Since 2015, XUAR authorities have arbitrarily detained
an estimated 1,500,000 Uyghurs--12.5 percent of the XUAR's
official Uyghur population of 12,000,000--and a smaller number
of other ethnic minorities in the ``vocational training''
centers and other detention and pre-detention facilities.
(8) In 2017, the XUAR accounted for less than two percent
of the PRC's total population but 21 percent of all arrests in
China.
(9) The Atlantic, Radio Free Asia, and other sources have
revealed that detainees are forced to renounce many of their
Islamic beliefs and customs and repudiate Uyghur culture,
language, and identity.
(10) Investigations by Human Rights Watch and other human
rights organizations have documented how detainees are subject
to political indoctrination, forced labor, crowded and
unsanitary conditions, involuntary biometric data collection,
both medical neglect and intrusive medical interventions, food
and water deprivation, beatings, sexual violence, and torture.
(11) Research by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute
suggests that, since late 2019, many detainees have been placed
in higher security facilities and convicted of formal crimes.
(12) Human Rights Watch has reported that the PRC uses data
collection programs, including facial recognition technology,
to surveil Uyghurs in the XUAR and to identify individuals whom
authorities may detain.
(13) PRC authorities have placed countless children whose
parents are detained or in exile in state-run institutions and
boarding schools without the consent of their parents.
(14) New York Times reporting revealed that numerous local
PRC officials who did not agree with the policies carried out
in XUAR have been fired and imprisoned.
(15) Associated Press reporting documented widespread and
systemic efforts by PRC authorities to force Uyghur women to
take contraceptives or to subject them to sterilization or
abortion, threatening to detain those who do not comply.
(16) PRC authorities prohibit family members and advocates
inside and outside China from having regular communications
with relatives and friends imprisoned in the XUAR, such as
journalist and entrepreneur Ekpar Asat.
(17) PRC authorities have imposed pervasive restrictions on
the peaceful practice of Islam in the XUAR, to the extent that
Human Rights Watch asserts the PRC ``has effectively outlawed
the practice of Islam''.
(18) Individuals who are not detained in camps have been
forced to attend political indoctrination sessions, subjected
to movement restrictions, mass surveillance systems,
involuntary biometric data collection, and other human rights
abuses.
(19) International media, nongovernmental organizations,
scholars, families, and survivors have reported on the systemic
nature of many of these abuses.
(20) On June 26, 2020, a group of 50 independent United
Nations experts jointly expressed alarm over China's
deteriorating human rights record, including its repression in
Xinjiang, and called on the international community ``to act
collectively and decisively to ensure China respects human
rights and abides by its international obligations''.
(21) On October 6, 2020, 39 United Nations member countries
issued a public statement condemning human rights violations by
PRC authorities and calling on the PRC to allow the United
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights unfettered access to
Xinjiang.
(22) The United States Congress passed the Uyghur Human
Rights Policy Act of 2020 (Public Law 116-145).
(23) The United States Congress passed the Global Magnitsky
Human Rights Accountability Act (subtitle F of title XII of
Public Law 114-328; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note), which has been used
to sanction PRC officials and entities for their activities in
the XUAR.
(24) The United States Government has implemented
additional targeted restrictions on trade with Xinjiang and
imposed visa and economic sanctions on PRC officials and
entities for their activities in the XUAR.
(25) The United States Government has documented human
rights abuses and violations of individual freedoms in the
XUAR, including in the 2019 Department of State Report on
International Religious Freedom.
(26) On January 19, 2021, during his confirmation hearing,
Secretary of State Antony Blinken testified that ``forcing men,
women, and children into concentration camps, trying to in
effect reeducate them to be adherents to the Chinese Communist
Party--all of that speaks to an effort to commit genocide''.
(27) On January 19, 2021, Secretary of the Treasury Janet
L. Yellen, during her confirmation hearing, publicly stated
that China is guilty of ``horrendous human rights abuses''.
(28) On January 27, 2021, in response to a question from
the press regarding the Uyghurs, Secretary Blinken stated that
his ``judgement remains that genocide was committed against the
Uyghurs''.
(29) On March 10, 2021, in response to a question on
Xinjiang during his testimony before the Committee on Foreign
Affairs of the House of Representatives, Secretary Blinken
reiterated, ``We`ve been clear, and I've been clear, that I see
it as genocide, other egregious abuses of human rights, and
we'll continue to make that clear.''.
(30) The 2020 Department of State Country Reports on Human
Rights Practices: China states that ``[g]enocide and crimes
against humanity occurred during the year against the
predominantly Muslim Uyghurs and other ethnic and religious
minority groups in Xinjiang''.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the atrocities committed by the PRC against Uyghurs and
other predominantly Muslim Turkic groups in Xinjiang, including
forced labor, sexual violence, the internment of over 1,000,000
individuals, and other horrific abuses must be condemned;
(2) the President, the Secretary of State, and the United
States Ambassador to the United Nations should speak publicly
about the ongoing human rights abuses in the XUAR, including in
formal speeches at the United Nations and other international
fora;
(3) the President, the Secretary of State, and the United
States Ambassador to the United Nations should appeal to the
United Nations Secretary-General to take a more proactive and
public stance on the situation in the XUAR, including by
supporting calls for an investigation and accountability for
individuals and entities involved in abuses against the people
of the XUAR;
(4) the United States should continue to use targeted
sanctions and all diplomatic tools available to hold those
responsible for the atrocities in Xinjiang to account;
(5) United States agencies engaged with China on trade,
climate, defense, or other bilateral issues should include
human rights abuses in the XUAR as a consideration in
developing United States policy;
(6) the United States supports Radio Free Asia Uyghur, the
only Uyghur-language news service in the world independent of
Chinese government influence; and
(7) the United States recognizes the repeated requests from
the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights for
unfettered access to the XUAR and the PRC's refusal to comply,
and therefore--
(A) PRC authorities must allow unfettered access by
the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights to the XUAR;
(B) the United States should urge collaborative
action between the United States Government and
international partners to pressure PRC authorities to
allow unfettered access to the XUAR;
(C) the President, the Secretary of State, and the
United States Ambassador to the United Nations should
simultaneously outline a strategy to investigate the
human rights abuses and crimes that have taken place in
the XUAR, collect evidence, and transfer the evidence
to a competent court; and
(D) United States partners and allies should
undertake similar strategies in an effort to build an
international investigation outside of the PRC if PRC
authorities do not comply with a United Nations
investigation in the XUAR.
SEC. 306. PREVENTION OF UYGHUR FORCED LABOR.
(a) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States--
(1) to prohibit the import of all goods, wares, articles,
or merchandise mined, produced, or manufactured, wholly or in
part, by forced labor from the People's Republic of China and
particularly any such goods, wares, articles, or merchandise
produced in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (commonly
referred to as ``Xinjiang'' or ``XUAR'') of China;
(2) to encourage the international community to reduce the
import of any goods made with forced labor from the People's
Republic of China, particularly goods mined, manufactured, or
produced in the XUAR;
(3) to coordinate with Mexico and Canada to effectively
implement Article 23.6 of the United States-Mexico-Canada
Agreement to prohibit the importation of goods produced in
whole or in part by forced or compulsory labor, which includes
goods produced in whole or in part by forced or compulsory
labor in the People's Republic of China;
(4) to actively work to prevent, publicly denounce, and end
human trafficking as a horrific assault on human dignity and to
restore the lives of those affected by human trafficking, a
modern form of slavery;
(5) to regard the prevention of atrocities as in its
national interest, including efforts to prevent torture,
enforced disappearances, severe deprivation of liberty,
including mass internment, arbitrary detention, and widespread
and systematic use of forced labor, and persecution targeting
any identifiable ethnic or religious group; and
(6) to address gross violations of human rights in the XUAR
through bilateral diplomatic channels and multilateral
institutions where both the United States and the People's
Republic of China are members and with all the authorities
available to the United States Government, including visa and
financial sanctions, export restrictions, and import controls.
(b) Prohibition on Importation of Goods Made in the XUAR.--
(1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), all
goods, wares, articles, and merchandise mined, produced, or
manufactured wholly or in part in the XUAR of China, or by
persons working with the XUAR government for purposes of the
``poverty alleviation'' program or the ``pairing-assistance''
program which subsidizes the establishment of manufacturing
facilities in the XUAR, shall be deemed to be goods, wares,
articles, and merchandise described in section 307 of the
Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1307) and shall not be entitled
to entry at any of the ports of the United States.
(2) Exception.--The prohibition described in paragraph (1)
shall not apply if the Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border
Protection--
(A) determines, by clear and convincing evidence,
that any specific goods, wares, articles, or
merchandise described in paragraph (1) were not
produced wholly or in part by convict labor, forced
labor, or indentured labor under penal sanctions; and
(B) submits to the appropriate congressional
committees and makes available to the public a report
that contains such determination.
(3) Effective date.--This section shall take effect on the
date that is 120 days after the date of the enactment of this
Act.
(c) Enforcement Strategy to Address Forced Labor in the XUAR.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 120 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Forced Labor Enforcement Task
Force, established under section 741 of the United States-
Mexico-Canada Agreement Implementation Act (19 U.S.C. 4681),
shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a
report that contains an enforcement strategy to effectively
address forced labor in the XUAR of China or products made by
Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Tibetans, or members of other
persecuted groups through forced labor in any other part of the
People's Republic of China. The enforcement strategy shall
describe the specific enforcement plans of the United States
Government regarding--
(A) goods, wares, articles, and merchandise
described in subsection (b)(1) that are imported into
the United States directly from the XUAR or made by
Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Tibetans, or members of other
persecuted groups in any other part of the People's
Republic of China;
(B) goods, wares, articles, and merchandise
described in subsection (b)(1) that are imported into
the United States from the People's Republic of China
and are mined, produced, or manufactured in part in the
XUAR or by persons working with the XUAR government or
the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps for
purposes of the ``poverty alleviation'' program or the
``pairing-assistance'' program; and
(C) goods, wares, articles, and merchandise
described in subsection (b)(1) that are imported into
the United States from third countries and are mined,
produced, or manufactured in part in the XUAR or by
persons working with the XUAR government or the
Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps for purposes
of the ``poverty alleviation'' program or the
``pairing-assistance'' program.
(2) Matters to be included.--The strategy required by
paragraph (1) shall include the following:
(A) A description of the actions taken by the
United States Government to address forced labor in the
XUAR under section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19
U.S.C. 1307), including a description of all Withhold
Release Orders issued, goods detained, and fines
issued.
(B) A list of products made wholly or in part by
forced or involuntary labor in the XUAR or made by
Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Tibetans, or members of other
persecuted groups in any other part of the People's
Republic of China, and a list of businesses that sold
products in the United States made wholly or in part by
forced or involuntary labor in the XUAR or made by
Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Tibetans, or members of other
persecuted groups in any other part of the People's
Republic of China.
(C) A list of facilities and entities, including
the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, that
source material from the XUAR or by persons working
with the XUAR government or the Xinjiang Production and
Construction Corps for purposes of the ``poverty
alleviation'' program or the ``pairing-assistance''
program, a plan for identifying additional such
facilities and entities, and facility- and entity-
specific enforcement plans, including issuing specific
Withhold Release Orders to support enforcement of
subsection (b), with regard to each listed facility or
entity.
(D) A list of high-priority sectors for
enforcement, including cotton, tomatoes, polysilicon,
and a sector-specific enforcement plan for each high-
priority sector.
(E) A description of the additional resources
necessary for U.S. Customs and Border Protection to
effectively implement the enforcement strategy.
(F) A plan to coordinate and collaborate with
appropriate nongovernmental organizations and private
sector entities to discuss the enforcement strategy for
products made in the XUAR.
(3) Form.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified
annex, if necessary.
(4) Updates.--The Forced Labor Enforcement Task Force shall
provide briefings to the appropriate congressional committees
on a quarterly basis and, as applicable, on any updates to the
strategy required by paragraph (1) or any additional actions
taken to address forced labor in the XUAR, including actions
described in this section.
(5) Sunset.--This section shall cease to have effect on the
earlier of--
(A) the date that is eight years after the date of
the enactment of this Act; or
(B) the date on which the President submits to the
appropriate congressional committees a determination
that the Government of the People's Republic of China
has ended mass internment, forced labor, and any other
gross violations of human rights experienced by
Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and members of other Muslim
minority groups in the XUAR.
(d) Determination Relating to Crimes Against Humanity or Genocide
in the XUAR.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall--
(A) determine if the practice of forced labor or
other crimes against Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and
members of other Muslim minority groups in the XUAR of
China can be considered systematic and widespread and
therefore constitutes crimes against humanity or
constitutes genocide as defined in subsection (a) of
section 1091 of title 18, United States Code; and
(B) submit to the appropriate congressional
committees and make available to the public a report
that contains such determination.
(2) Form.--The report required by paragraph (1)--
(A) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may
include a classified annex, if necessary; and
(B) may be included in the report required by
subsection (e).
(e) Diplomatic Strategy to Address Forced Labor in the XUAR.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in
coordination with the heads of other appropriate Federal
departments and agencies, shall submit to the appropriate
congressional committees a report that contains a United States
strategy to promote initiatives to enhance international
awareness of and to address forced labor in the XUAR of China.
(2) Matters to be included.--The strategy required by
paragraph (1) shall include--
(A) a plan to enhance bilateral and multilateral
coordination, including sustained engagement with the
governments of United States partners and allies, to
end forced labor of Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and
members of other Muslim minority groups in the XUAR;
(B) public affairs, public diplomacy, and counter-
messaging efforts to promote awareness of the human
rights situation, including forced labor in the XUAR;
and
(C) opportunities to coordinate and collaborate
with appropriate nongovernmental organizations and
private sector entities to raise awareness about forced
labor made products from the XUAR and to provide
assistance to Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and members of
other Muslim minority groups in the XUAR, including
those formerly detained in mass internment camps in the
region.
(3) Additional matters to be included.--The report required
by paragraph (1) shall also include--
(A) to the extent practicable, a list of--
(i) entities in the People's Republic of
China or affiliates of such entities that
directly or indirectly use forced or
involuntary labor in the XUAR; and
(ii) foreign persons that acted as agents
of the entities or affiliates of entities
described in clause (i) to import goods into
the United States; and
(B) a description of actions taken by the United
States Government to address forced labor in the XUAR
under existing authorities, including--
(i) the Trafficking Victims Protection Act
of 2000 (Public Law 106-386; 22 U.S.C. 7101 et
seq.);
(ii) the Elie Wiesel Genocide and
Atrocities Prevention Act of 2018 (Public Law
115-441; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note); and
(iii) the Global Magnitsky Human Rights
Accountability Act (22 U.S.C. 2656 note).
(4) Form.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified
annex, if necessary.
(5) Updates.--The Secretary of State shall include any
updates to the strategy required by paragraph (1) in the annual
Trafficking in Persons report required by section 110(b) of the
Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 7107(b)).
(6) Sunset.--This section shall cease to have effect the
earlier of--
(A) the date that is eight years after the date of
the enactment of this Act; or
(B) the date on which the President submits to the
appropriate congressional committees a determination
that the Government of the People's Republic of China
has ended mass internment, forced labor, and any other
gross violations of human rights experienced by
Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and members of other Muslim
minority groups in the XUAR.
(f) Imposition of Sanctions Relating to Forced Labor in the
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.--
(1) Report required.--
(A) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act and not less
frequently than annually thereafter, the President
shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees a report that identifies each foreign
person, including any official of the Government of the
People's Republic of China, that the President
determines--
(i) knowingly engages in, is responsible
for, or facilitates the forced labor of
Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and members of other
Muslim minority groups in the XUAR; and
(ii) knowingly engages in, contributes to,
assists, or provides financial, material or
technological support for efforts to contravene
United States law regarding the importation of
forced labor goods from the XUAR.
(B) Form.--The report required under subparagraph
(A) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may
contain a classified annex.
(2) Imposition of sanctions.--The President shall impose
the sanctions described in paragraph (3) with respect to each
foreign person identified in the report required under
paragraph (1)(A).
(3) Sanctions described.--The sanctions described in this
subsection are the following:
(A) Asset blocking.--The President shall exercise
all of the powers granted to the President under the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C.
1701 et seq.) to the extent necessary to block and
prohibit all transactions in property and interests in
property of a foreign person identified in the report
required under paragraph (1)(A) if such property and
interests in property--
(i) are in the United States;
(ii) come within the United States; or
(iii) come within the possession or control
of a United States person.
(B) Ineligibility for visas, admission, or
parole.--
(i) Visas, admission, or parole.--An alien
described in paragraph (1)(A) is--
(I) inadmissible to the United
States;
(II) ineligible to receive a visa
or other documentation to enter the
United States; and
(III) otherwise ineligible to be
admitted or paroled into the United
States or to receive any other benefit
under the Immigration and Nationality
Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.).
(ii) Current visas revoked.--
(I) In general.--An alien described
in paragraph (1)(A) is subject to
revocation of any visa or other entry
documentation regardless of when the
visa or other entry documentation is or
was issued.
(II) Immediate effect.--A
revocation under subclause (I) shall--
(aa) take effect
immediately; and
(bb) automatically cancel
any other valid visa or entry
documentation that is in the
alien's possession.
(4) Implementation; penalties.--
(A) Implementation.--The President may exercise all
authorities provided under sections 203 and 205 of the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C.
1702 and 1704) to carry out this section.
(B) Penalties.--The penalties provided for in
subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C.
1705) shall apply to a foreign person that engages in
an activity described in paragraph (1)(A) to the same
extent that such penalties apply to a person that
commits an unlawful act described in subsection (a) of
such section 206.
(5) Waiver.--The President may waive the application of
sanctions under this section with respect to a foreign person
identified in the report required under paragraph (1)(A) if the
President determines and certifies to the appropriate
congressional committees that such a waiver is in the national
interest of the United States.
(6) Exceptions.--
(A) Exception for intelligence activities.--
Sanctions under this section shall not apply to any
activity subject to the reporting requirements under
title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
3091 et seq.) or any authorized intelligence activities
of the United States.
(B) Exception to comply with international
obligations and for law enforcement activities.--
Sanctions under paragraph (3)(B) shall not apply with
respect to an alien if admitting or paroling the alien
into the United States is necessary--
(i) to permit the United States to comply
with the Agreement regarding the Headquarters
of the United Nations, signed at Lake Success
June 26, 1947, and entered into force November
21, 1947, between the United Nations and the
United States, or other applicable
international obligations; or
(ii) to carry out or assist law enforcement
activity in the United States.
(7) Termination of sanctions.--The President may terminate
the application of sanctions under this section with respect to
a foreign person if the President determines and reports to the
appropriate congressional committees not less than 15 days
before the termination takes effect that--
(A) information exists that the person did not
engage in the activity for which sanctions were
imposed;
(B) the person has been prosecuted appropriately
for the activity for which sanctions were imposed;
(C) the person has credibly demonstrated a
significant change in behavior, has paid an appropriate
consequence for the activity for which sanctions were
imposed, and has credibly committed in the future to
not engage in such activity; or
(D) the termination of the sanctions is in the
national security interests of the United States.
(8) Sunset.--This section, and any sanctions imposed under
this section, shall terminate on the date that is five years
after the date of the enactment of this Act.
(9) Definitions of admission; admitted; alien.--In this
section, the terms ``admission'', ``admitted'', and ``alien''
have the meanings given those terms in section 101 of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101).
(g) Disclosures to the Securities and Exchange Commission of
Certain Activities Related to the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.--
(1) Policy statement.--It is the policy of the United
States to protect American investors, through stronger
disclosure requirements, alerting them to the presence of
Chinese and other companies complicit in gross violations of
human rights in United States capital markets, including
American and foreign companies listed on United States
exchanges that enable the mass internment and population
surveillance of Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and other Muslim
minorities and source products made with forced labor in the
XUAR. Such involvements represent clear, material risks to the
share values and corporate reputations of certain of these
companies and hence to prospective American investors,
particularly given that the United States Government has
employed sanctions and export restrictions to target
individuals and entities contributing to human rights abuses in
the People's Republic of China.
(2) Disclosure of certain activities relating to the
xinjiang uyghur autonomous region.--Section 13 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m) is amended by
adding at the end the following new subsection:
``(s) Disclosure of Certain Activities Relating to the Xinjiang
Uyghur Autonomous Region.--
``(1) In general.--Each issuer required to file an annual
or quarterly report under subsection (a) shall disclose in that
report the information required by paragraph (2) if, during the
period covered by the report, the issuer or any affiliate of
the issuer--
``(A) knowingly engaged in an activity with an
entity or the affiliate of an entity engaged in
creating or providing technology or other assistance to
create mass population surveillance systems in the
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (commonly referred to
as `Xinjiang' or `XUAR') of China, including any entity
included on the Department of Commerce's `Entity List'
in the XUAR;
``(B) knowingly engaged in an activity with an
entity or an affiliate of an entity building and
running detention facilities for Uyghurs, Kazakhs,
Kyrgyz, and other members of Muslim minority groups in
the XUAR;
``(C) knowingly engaged in an activity with an
entity or an affiliate of an entity described in
section 306(e)(3)(A)(i) of the Ensuring American Global
Leadership and Engagement Act, including--
``(i) any entity engaged in the `pairing-
assistance' program which subsidizes the
establishment of manufacturing facilities in
the XUAR; or
``(ii) any entity for which the Department
of Homeland Security has issued a `Withhold
Release Order' under section 307 of the Tariff
Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1307); or
``(D) knowingly conducted any transaction or had
dealings with--
``(i) any person the property and interests
in property of which were sanctioned by the
Secretary of State for the detention or abuse
of Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, or other members
of Muslim minority groups in the XUAR;
``(ii) any person the property and
interests in property of which are sanctioned
pursuant to the Global Magnitsky Human Rights
Accountability Act (22 U.S.C. 2656 note); or
``(iii) any person or entity responsible
for, or complicit in, committing atrocities in
the XUAR.
``(2) Information required.--
``(A) In general.--If an issuer described under
paragraph (1) or an affiliate of the issuer has engaged
in any activity described in paragraph (1), the
information required by this paragraph is a detailed
description of each such activity, including--
``(i) the nature and extent of the
activity;
``(ii) the gross revenues and net profits,
if any, attributable to the activity; and
``(iii) whether the issuer or the affiliate
of the issuer (as the case may be) intends to
continue the activity.
``(B) Exception.--The requirement to disclose
information under this paragraph shall not include
information on activities of the issuer or any
affiliate of the issuer activities relating to--
``(i) the import of manufactured goods,
including electronics, food products, textiles,
shoes, and teas, that originated in the XUAR;
or
``(ii) manufactured goods containing
materials that originated or are sourced in the
XUAR.
``(3) Notice of disclosures.--If an issuer reports under
paragraph (1) that the issuer or an affiliate of the issuer has
knowingly engaged in any activity described in that paragraph,
the issuer shall separately file with the Commission,
concurrently with the annual or quarterly report under
subsection (a), a notice that the disclosure of that activity
has been included in that annual or quarterly report that
identifies the issuer and contains the information required by
paragraph (2).
``(4) Public disclosure of information.--Upon receiving a
notice under paragraph (3) that an annual or quarterly report
includes a disclosure of an activity described in paragraph
(1), the Commission shall promptly--
``(A) transmit the report to--
``(i) the President;
``(ii) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and
the Committee on Financial Services of the
House of Representatives; and
``(iii) the Committee on Foreign Relations
and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs of the Senate; and
``(B) make the information provided in the
disclosure and the notice available to the public by
posting the information on the Internet website of the
Commission.
``(5) Investigations.--Upon receiving a report under
paragraph (4) that includes a disclosure of an activity
described in paragraph (1), the President shall--
``(A) make a determination with respect to whether
any investigation is needed into the possible
imposition of sanctions under the Global Magnitsky
Human Rights Accountability Act (22 U.S.C. 2656 note)
or section 306(f) of the Ensuring American Global
Leadership and Engagement Act or whether criminal
investigations are warranted under statutes intended to
hold accountable individuals or entities involved in
the importation of goods produced by forced labor,
including under section 545, 1589, or 1761 of title 18,
United States Code; and
``(B) not later than 180 days after initiating any
such investigation, make a determination with respect
to whether a sanction should be imposed or criminal
investigations initiated with respect to the issuer or
the affiliate of the issuer (as the case may be).
``(6) Atrocities defined.--In this subsection, the term
`atrocities' has the meaning given the term in section 6(2) of
the Elie Wiesel Genocide and Atrocities Prevention Act of 2018
(Public Law 115-441; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note).''.
(3) Sunset.--Section 13(s) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, as added by paragraph (2), is repealed on the earlier
of--
(A) the date that is eight years after the date of
the enactment of this Act; or
(B) the date on which the President submits to the
appropriate congressional committees a determination
that the Government of the People's Republic of China
has ended mass internment, forced labor, and any other
gross violations of human rights experienced by
Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and members of other Muslim
minority groups in the XUAR.
(4) Effective date.--The amendment made by paragraph (2)
shall take effect with respect to reports required to be filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission after the date that
is 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.
(h) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee
on Financial Services, and the Committee on Ways and
Means of the House of Representatives; and
(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, and
the Committee on Finance of the Senate.
(2) Atrocities.--The term ``atrocities'' has the meaning
given the term in section 6(2) of the Elie Wiesel Genocide and
Atrocities Prevention Act of 2018 (Public Law 115-441; 22
U.S.C. 2656 note).
(3) Crimes against humanity.--The term ``crimes against
humanity'' includes, when committed as part of a widespread or
systematic attack directed against any civilian population,
with knowledge of the attack--
(A) murder;
(B) deportation or forcible transfer of population;
(C) torture;
(D) extermination;
(E) enslavement;
(F) rape, sexual slavery, or any other form of
sexual violence of comparable severity;
(G) persecution against any identifiable group or
collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic,
cultural, religious, gender, or other grounds that are
universally recognized as impermissible under
international law; and
(H) enforced disappearance of persons.
(4) Forced labor.--The term ``forced labor'' has the
meaning given the term in section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930
(19 U.S.C. 1307).
(5) Foreign person.--The term ``foreign person'' means a
person that is not a United States person.
(6) Person.--The term ``person'' means an individual or
entity.
(7) Mass population surveillance system.--The term ``mass
population surveillance system'' means installation and
integration of facial recognition cameras, biometric data
collection, cell phone surveillance, and artificial
intelligence technology with the ``Sharp Eyes'' and
``Integrated Joint Operations Platform'' or other technologies
that are used by Chinese security forces for surveillance and
big-data predictive policing.
(8) United states person.--The term ``United States
person'' means--
(A) a United States citizen or an alien lawfully
admitted for permanent residence to the United States;
or
(B) an entity organized under the laws of the
United States or any jurisdiction within the United
States, including a foreign branch of such an entity.
SEC. 307. UYGHUR HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION.
(a) Short Title.--This section may be cited as the ``Uyghur Human
Rights Protection Act''.
(b) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The Government of the People's Republic of China (PRC)
has a long history of repressing Turkic Muslims and other
Muslim minority groups, particularly Uyghurs, in the Xinjiang
Uyghur Autonomous Region (commonly referred to as ``Xinjiang''
or ``XUAR''), also known as East Turkestan. Central and
regional PRC government policies have systematically
discriminated against these minority groups by denying them a
range of civil and political rights, particularly freedom of
religion. Senior Chinese Communist Party (CCP) officials bear
direct responsibility for these gross human rights violations.
(2) PRC government abuses include the arbitrary detention
of more than 1,000,000 Uyghurs, ethnic Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and
members of other Muslim minority groups, separation of working
age adults from their children and elderly parents, and the
integration of forced labor into supply chains. Those held in
detention facilities and internment camps in the XUAR have
described forced political indoctrination, torture, beatings,
food deprivation, sexual assault, coordinated campaigns to
reduce birth rates among Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims
through forced sterilization, and denial of religious,
cultural, and linguistic freedoms. Recent media reports
indicate that since 2019, the PRC government has newly
constructed, expanded, or fortified at least 60 detention
facilities with higher security or prison-like features in
Xinjiang.
(3) The PRC government's actions against Uyghurs, ethnic
Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and members of other Muslim minority groups in
the XUAR violate international human rights laws and norms,
including--
(A) the International Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, to which the PRC
has acceded;
(B) the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, which the
PRC has signed and ratified;
(C) The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide, which the PRC has signed and
ratified;
(D) the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, which the PRC has signed; and
(E) the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
the International Labor Organization's Force Labor
Convention (no. 29) and the Abolition of Forced Labor
Convention (no. 105).
(c) Refugee Protections for Certain Residents of the XUAR.--
(1) Populations of special humanitarian concern.--The
Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of
Homeland Security, shall designate, as Priority 2 refugees of
special humanitarian concern--
(A) aliens who were nationals of the PRC and
residents of the XUAR on January 1, 2021;
(B) aliens who fled the XUAR after June 30, 2009,
and reside in other provinces of the PRC or in a third
country where such alien is not firmly resettled; and
(C) the spouses, children, and parents (as such
terms are defined in subsections (a) and (b) of section
101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C.
1101)) of individuals described in subparagraphs (A)
and (B), except that a child shall be an unmarried
person under 27 years of age.
(2) Processing of xuar refugees.--The processing of
individuals described in paragraph (1) for classification as
refugees may occur in the PRC or a third country.
(3) Eligibility for admission as a refugee.--
(A) In general.--Aliens described in subparagraph
(B) may establish, for purposes of admission as a
refugee under section 207 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1157) or asylum under section
208 of such Act (8 U.S.C. 1158), that such alien has a
well-founded fear of persecution on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group, or political opinion by asserting such a
fear and asserting a credible basis for concern about
the possibility of such persecution.
(B) Aliens described.--An alien is described in
this subsection if such alien has been identified as a
person of special humanitarian concern pursuant to
paragraph (1) and--
(i) has experienced persecution in the XUAR
by the PRC government, including--
(I) forced and arbitrary detention
including in an internment or re-
education camp;
(II) forced political
indoctrination, torture, beatings, food
deprivation, and denial of religious,
cultural, and linguistic freedoms;
(III) forced labor;
(IV) forced separation from family
members;
(V) other forms of systemic
threats, harassment, and gross human
rights violations; or
(VI) has been formally charged,
detained, or convicted on account of
their peaceful actions as described in
the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act of
2020 (Public Law 116-145).
(ii) is currently a national of the PRC
whose residency in the XUAR, or any other area
within the jurisdiction of the PRC, was revoked
for having submitted to any United States
Government agency a nonfrivolous application
for refugee status, asylum, or any other
immigration benefit under United States law.
(C) Eligibility for admission under other
classification.--An alien may not be denied the
opportunity to apply for admission as a refugee or
asylum under this section solely because such alien
qualifies as an immediate relative of a national of the
United States or is eligible for admission to the
United States under any other immigrant classification.
(4) Priority.--The Secretary of State shall prioritize
bilateral diplomacy with third countries hosting former
residents of the XUAR and who face significant diplomatic
pressures from the PRC government.
(5) Reporting requirements.--
(A) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act and every 90 days
thereafter, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of
Homeland Security shall submit to the appropriate
congressional committees, the Committee on the
Judiciary of the House of Representatives, and the
Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate a report on
the matters described in subparagraph (B).
(B) Matters to be included.--Each report required
by subparagraph (A) shall include, with respect to
applications submitted under this section--
(i) the total number of applications that
are pending at the end of the reporting period;
(ii) the average wait-times and number of
applicants who are currently pending--
(I) a pre-screening interview with
a resettlement support center;
(II) an interview with United
States Citizenship and Immigration
Services;
(III) the completion of security
checks;
(IV) receipt of a final decision
after completion of an interview with
United States Citizenship and
Immigration Services; and
(iii) the number of denials of applications
for refugee status, disaggregated by the reason
for each such denial.
(C) Form.--Each report required by paragraph (1)
shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may
include a classified annex.
(D) Public reports.--The Secretary of State shall
make each report submitted under this subsection
available to the public on the internet website of the
Department of State.
(d) Statement of Policy on Encouraging Allies and Partners to Make
Similar Accommodations.--It is the policy of the United States to
encourage United States allies and partners to make accommodations
similar to the accommodations made in this section for residents of the
XUAR who are fleeing oppression by the PRC Government.
(e) Termination.--This section shall terminate on the date that is
ten years after the date of the enactment of this Act.
SEC. 308. REMOVAL OF MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL
THAT COMMIT HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES.
The President shall direct the Permanent Representative of the
United States to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, and
influence of the United States to--
(1) reform the process for removing Member States of the
United Nations Human Rights Council that commit gross and
systemic violations of human rights, including--
(A) lowering the threshold vote at the United
Nations General Assembly for removal to a simple
majority;
(B) ensuring information detailing the Member
State's human rights record is publicly available
before the vote on removal; and
(C) making the vote of each country on the removal
from the United Nations Human Rights Council publicly
available;
(2) reform the rules on electing members to the United
Nations Human Rights Council to ensure United Nations Member
States that have committed gross and systemic violations of
human rights are not elected to the Human Rights Council; and
(3) oppose the election to the United Nations Human Rights
Council of any United Nations Member State--
(A) currently designated as a country engaged in a
consistent pattern of gross violations of
internationally recognized human rights pursuant to
section 116 or section 502B of the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151n or 2304);
(B) the government of which the Secretary of State
currently determines has repeatedly provided support
for international terrorism pursuant to--
(i) section 1754(c) of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019;
(ii) section 620A of the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371);
(iii) section 40 of the Arms Export Control
Act (22 U.S.C. 2779A); or
(iv) any other provision of law;
(C) currently designated as a Tier 3 country under
the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (22
U.S.C. 7101 et seq.);
(D) the government of which is identified on the
list published by the Secretary of State pursuant to
section 404(b) of the Child Soldiers Prevention Act of
2008 (22 U.S.C. 2370c-1(b)) as a government that
recruits and uses child soldiers; or
(E) the government of which the United States
determines to have committed genocide or crimes against
humanity.
SEC. 309. POLICY WITH RESPECT TO TIBET.
(a) Rank of United States Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues.--
Section 621 of the Tibetan Policy Act of 2002 (22 U.S.C. 6901 note) is
amended--
(1) by redesignating subsections (b), (c), (d), and (e), as
subsections (c), (d), (e), and (f), respectively; and
(2) by inserting after subsection (a) the following new
subsection:
``(b) Rank.--The Special Coordinator shall either be appointed by
the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, or shall be
an individual holding the rank of Under Secretary of State or
higher.''.
(b) Tibet Unit at United States Embassy in Beijing.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary of State shall establish a
Tibet Unit in the Political Section of the United States
Embassy in Beijing, People's Republic of China (PRC).
(2) Operation.--The Tibet Unit established under paragraph
(1) shall operate until such time as the Government of the PRC
permits--
(A) the United States Consulate General in Chengdu,
PRC, to reopen; or
(B) a United States Consulate General in Lhasa,
Tibet, to open.
(3) Staff.--
(A) In general.--The Secretary shall--
(i) assign not fewer than two United States
direct-hire personnel to the Tibet Unit
established under paragraph (1); and
(ii) hire not fewer than one locally
engaged staff member for such unit.
(B) Language training.--The Secretary shall make
Tibetan language training available to the personnel
assigned under subparagraph (A), consistent with the
Tibetan Policy Act of 2002 (22 U.S.C. 6901 note).
SEC. 310. UNITED STATES POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL ENGAGEMENT ON THE
SUCCESSION OR REINCARNATION OF THE DALAI LAMA AND
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM OF TIBETAN BUDDHISTS.
(a) Reaffirmation of Policy.--It is the policy of the United
States, as provided under section 342(b) of division FF of the
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 (Public Law 116-260), that any
``interference by the Government of the People's Republic of China or
any other government in the process of recognizing a successor or
reincarnation of the 14th Dalai Lama and any future Dalai Lamas would
represent a clear abuse of the right to religious freedom of Tibetan
Buddhists and the Tibetan people''.
(b) International Efforts to Protect Religious Freedom of Tibetan
Buddhists.--The Secretary of State should engage with United States
allies and partners to--
(1) support Tibetan Buddhist religious leaders' sole
religious authority to identify and install the 15th Dalai
Lama;
(2) oppose claims by the Government of the People's
Republic of China (PRC) that the PRC has the authority to
decide for Tibetan Buddhists the 15th Dalai Lama; and
(3) reject interference by the Government of the PRC in the
religious freedom of Tibetan Buddhists.
SEC. 311. DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF INTERNET FREEDOM AND GREAT
FIREWALL CIRCUMVENTION TOOLS FOR THE PEOPLE OF HONG KONG.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The People's Republic of China (PRC) has repeatedly
violated its obligations under the Joint Declaration by
suppressing the basic rights and freedoms of the people of Hong
Kong.
(2) On June 30, 2020, the National People's Congress passed
a ``National Security Law'' that further erodes Hong Kong's
autonomy and enables authorities to suppress dissent.
(3) The Government of the PRC continues to utilize the
National Security Law to undermine the fundamental rights of
the Hong Kong people through suppression of the freedom of
speech, assembly, religion, and the press.
(4) Article 9 of the National Security Law authorizes
unprecedented regulation and supervision of internet activity
in Hong Kong, including expanded police powers to force
internet service providers to censor content, hand over user
information, and block access to platforms.
(5) On January 13, 2021, the Hong Kong Broadband Network
blocked public access to HK Chronicles, a website promoting
pro-democracy viewpoints, under the authorities of the National
Security Law.
(6) On February 12, 2021, internet service providers
blocked access to the Taiwan Transitional Justice Commission
website in Hong Kong.
(7) Major tech companies, including Facebook, Twitter,
WhatsApp and Google, have stopped reviewing requests for user
data from Hong Kong authorities.
(8) On February 28, 2021, 47 pro-democracy activists in
Hong Kong were arrested and charged under the National Security
Law on the charge of ``conspiracy to commit subversion''.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the United
States should--
(1) support the ability of the people of Hong Kong to
maintain their freedom to access information online; and
(2) focus on investments in technologies that facilitate
the unhindered exchange of information in Hong Kong in advance
of any future efforts by the Chinese Communist Party--
(A) to suppress internet access;
(B) to increase online censorship; or
(C) to inhibit online communication and content-
sharing by the people of Hong Kong.
(c) Hong Kong Internet Freedom Program.--
(1) Working group.--
(A) In general.--The Secretary of State is
authorized to establish a working group to develop a
strategy to bolster internet resiliency and online
access in Hong Kong.
(B) Membership.--The working group under
subparagraph (A) shall consist of--
(i) the Under Secretary of State for
Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights;
(ii) the Assistant Secretary of State for
East Asian and Pacific Affairs;
(iii) the Chief Executive Officer of the
United States Agency for Global Media and the
President of the Open Technology Fund of the
Agency; and
(iv) the Administrator of the United States
Agency for International Development.
(2) Hong kong internet freedom programs.--
(A) Department of state.--The Secretary of State
shall establish a Hong Kong Internet Freedom Program in
the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor in the
Department of State.
(B) Open technology fund.--The President of the
Open Technology Fund of the United States Agency for
Global Media is authorized to establish a Hong Kong
Internet Freedom Program.
(C) Operation.--The Programs referred to in
subparagraphs (A) and (B) shall operate independently,
but in strategic coordination with other entities in
the working group under paragraph (1). The Open
Technology Fund shall remain independent from
Department of State direction in its implementation of
the Program of such Fund, and any other internet
freedom programs.
(3) Independence.--During the period beginning on the date
of the enactment of this Act and ending on September 30, 2023,
the Hong Kong Internet Freedom Programs described in paragraph
(2) shall be carried out independently from any other internet
freedom programs relating to the People's Republic of China
carried out by the Department of State or the Open Technology
Fund of the United States Agency for Global Media, as the case
may be, in order that such Hong Kong Internet Freedom Programs
may focus on supporting liberties presently enjoyed by the
people of Hong Kong.
(4) Consolidation of department of state program.--
Beginning on October 1, 2023, the Secretary of State may--
(A) consolidate the Hong Kong Internet Freedom
Program of the Department of State with any other
internet freedom programs relating to the People's
Republic of China carried out by the Bureau of
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor; or
(B) continue to carry out the Program in accordance
with paragraph (3).
(5) Consolidation of open technology fund program.--
Beginning on October 1, 2023, the President of the Open
Technology Fund of the United States Agency for Global Media
may--
(A) consolidate the Hong Kong Internet Freedom
Program of the Fund with any other internet freedom
programs relating to the People's Republic of China
carried out by the Fund; or
(B) continue to carry out the Program in accordance
with paragraph (3).
(d) Support for Internet Freedom Technology Programs.--
(1) Grants authorized.--
(A) In general.--The Secretary of State, working
through the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and
Labor, and President of the Open Technology Fund of the
United States Agency for Global Media, are each
separately and independently authorized to award grants
and contracts to private organizations to support and
develop programs in Hong Kong that promote or expand--
(i) an open, interoperable, reliable and
secure internet; and
(ii) the online exercise of human rights
and fundamental freedoms of individual
citizens, activists, human rights defenders,
independent journalists, civil society
organizations, and marginalized populations in
Hong Kong.
(B) Goals.--The goals of the programs developed
pursuant to grants awarded pursuant to subparagraph (A)
should be--
(i) to make the internet available in Hong
Kong;
(ii) to increase the number of the tools in
the technology portfolio;
(iii) to promote the availability of such
technologies and tools in Hong Kong;
(iv) to encourage the adoption of such
technologies and tools by the people of Hong
Kong;
(v) to scale up the distribution of such
technologies and tools throughout Hong Kong;
(vi) to prioritize the development of
tools, components, code, and technologies that
are fully open-source, to the extent
practicable;
(vii) to conduct research on repressive
tactics that undermine internet freedom in Hong
Kong;
(viii) to ensure digital safety guidance
and support is available to repressed
individual citizens, human rights defenders,
independent journalists, civil society
organizations and marginalized populations in
Hong Kong; and
(ix) to engage United States private
industry, including e-commerce firms and social
networking companies, on the importance of
preserving internet access in Hong Kong.
(C) Grant recipients.--Grants awarded pursuant to
subparagraph (A) shall be distributed to multiple
vendors and suppliers through an open, fair,
competitive, and evidence-based decision process--
(i) to diversify the technical base; and
(ii) to reduce the risk of misuse by bad
actors.
(D) Security audits.--New technologies developed
using grants awarded pursuant to subparagraph (A) shall
undergo comprehensive security audits to ensure such
technologies are secure and have not been compromised
in a manner detrimental to the interests of the United
States or to individuals or organizations benefitting
from programs supported by the Open Technology Fund.
(2) Funding source.--The Secretary of State is authorized
to expend funds made available to the Human Rights and
Democracy Fund of the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and
Labor of the Department of State for each of fiscal years 2022
and 2023 for grants authorized under paragraph (1) by any
entity in the working group established under subsection
(c)(1).
(3) Authorization of appropriations.--
(A) Open technology fund.--In addition to the funds
authorized to be expended pursuant to paragraph (2),
there are authorized to be appropriated to the Open
Technology Fund of the United States Agency for Global
Media $5,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2022 and 2023
for grants to carry out this subsection. Such amounts
are in addition to any amounts authorized to be
appropriated for the Open Technology Fund under section
1299P of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2021 (Public Law 116-283).
(B) Bureau of democracy, human rights, and labor.--
In addition to the funds authorized to be expended
pursuant to paragraph (2), there are authorized to be
appropriated to the Office of Internet Freedom Programs
of the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor of
the Department of State $10,000,000 for each of fiscal
years 2022 and 2023 to carry out this subsection.
(C) Availability.--Amounts authorized to be
appropriated pursuant to subparagraphs (A) and (B)
shall remain available until expended.
(e) Strategic Planning Report.--Not later than 120 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State and the
working group under subsection (c)(1) shall submit to the appropriate
congressional committees a classified report that--
(1) describes the Federal Government's plan to bolster and
increase the availability of Great Firewall circumvention and
internet freedom technology in Hong Kong during fiscal year
2022;
(2) outlines a plan for--
(A) supporting the preservation of an open,
interoperable, reliable, and secure internet in Hong
Kong;
(B) increasing the supply of the technology
referred to in paragraph (1);
(C) accelerating the dissemination of such
technology;
(D) promoting the availability of internet freedom
in Hong Kong;
(E) utilizing presently-available tools in the
existing relevant portfolios for further use in the
unique context of Hong Kong;
(F) expanding the portfolio of tools in order to
diversify and strengthen the effectiveness and
resiliency of the circumvention efforts;
(G) providing training for high-risk groups and
individuals in Hong Kong; and
(H) detecting analyzing, and responding to new and
evolving censorship threats;
(3) includes a detailed description of the technical and
fiscal steps necessary to safely implement the plans referred
to in paragraphs (1) and (2), including an analysis of the
market conditions in Hong Kong;
(4) describes the Federal Government's plans for awarding
grants to private organizations for the purposes described in
subsection (d)(1)(A);
(5) outlines the working group's consultations regarding
the implementation of this section to ensure that all Federal
efforts are aligned and well coordinated; and
(6) outlines the Department of State's strategy to
influence global internet legal standards at international
organizations and multilateral fora.
(f) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the
Committee on Appropriations, and the Select Committee
on Intelligence of the Senate; and
(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee
on Appropriations, and the Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
(2) Joint declaration.--The term ``Joint Declaration''
means the Joint Declaration of the Government of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the
Government of the People's Republic of China on the Question of
Hong Kong, done at Beijing on December 19, 1984.
SEC. 312. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS
IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.
(a) In General.--Amounts authorized to be appropriated or otherwise
made available to carry out section 409 of the Asia Reassurance
Initiative Act of 2019 (Public Law 115-409) should include programs
that prioritize the protection and advancement of the freedoms of
association, assembly, religion, and expression for women, human rights
activists, and ethnic and religious minorities in the People's Republic
of China (PRC).
(b) Use of Funds.--Amounts appropriated pursuant to section 409 of
the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2019 (Public Law 115-409) may be
used to fund nongovernmental agencies within the Indo-Pacific region
that are focused on the issues described in subsection (a).
(c) Consultation Requirement.--In carrying out this section, the
Assistant Secretary of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor shall consult
with the appropriate congressional committees and representatives of
civil society regarding--
(1) strengthening the capacity of the organizations
referred to in subsection (b);
(2) protecting members of the groups referred to in
subsection (a) who have been targeted for arrest, harassment,
forced sterilizations, coercive abortions, forced labor, or
intimidation, including members residing outside of the PRC;
and
(3) messaging efforts to reach the broadest possible
audiences within the PRC about United States Government efforts
to protect freedom of association, expression, assembly, and
the rights of ethnic minorities.
SEC. 313. MODIFICATIONS TO AND REAUTHORIZATION OF SANCTIONS WITH
RESPECT TO HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS.
(a) Definitions.--Section 1262 of the Global Magnitsky Human Rights
Accountability Act (Subtitle F of title XII of Public Law 114-328; 22
U.S.C. 2656 note) is amended by striking paragraph (2).
(b) Sense of Congress.--(1) The Global Magnitsky Human Rights
Accountability Act (Subtitle F of title XII of Public Law 114-328; 22
U.S.C. 2656 note) is amended by inserting after section 1262 the
following new section:
``SEC. 1262A. SENSE OF CONGRESS.
``It is the sense of Congress that the President should establish
and regularize information sharing and sanctions-related decision
making with like-minded governments possessing human rights and anti-
corruption sanctions programs similar in nature to those authorized
under this subtitle.''; and
(2) The table of contents in section 2(b) and in title XII of
division A of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2017 (Public Law 114-328) are each amended by inserting after the items
relating to section 1262 the following:
``Sec. 1262A. Sense of Congress.''.
(c) Imposition of Sanctions.--
(1) In general.--Subsection (a) of section 1263 of the
Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (Subtitle F of
title XII of Public Law 114-328; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note) is
amended to read as follows:
``(a) In General.--The President may impose the sanctions described
in subsection (b) with respect to any foreign person that the President
determines, based on credible information--
``(1) is responsible for or complicit in, or has directly
or indirectly engaged in, serious human rights abuse or any
violation of internationally recognized human rights;
``(2) is a current or former government official, or a
person acting for or on behalf of such an official, who is
responsible for or complicit in, or has directly or indirectly
engaged in--
``(A) corruption; or
``(B) the transfer or facilitation of the transfer
of the proceeds of corruption;
``(3) is or has been a leader or official of--
``(A) an entity, including a government entity,
that has engaged in, or whose members have engaged in,
any of the activities described in subparagraph (A) or
(B) related to the tenure of the leader or official; or
``(B) an entity whose property and interests in
property are blocked pursuant to this section as a
result of activities related to the tenure of the
leader or official;
``(4) has materially assisted, sponsored, or provided
financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or
services to or in support of--
``(A) an activity described in subparagraph (A) or
(B) that is conducted by a foreign person;
``(B) a person whose property and interests in
property are blocked pursuant to this section; or
``(C) an entity, including a government entity,
that has engaged in, or whose members have engaged in,
an activity described in subparagraph (A) or (B)
conducted by a foreign person; or
``(5) is owned or controlled by, or acts or is purported to
act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, a person whose
property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to this
section.''.
(2) Consideration of certain information.--Subsection
(c)(2) of such section is amended by inserting ``corruption
and'' after ``monitor''.
(3) Requests by congress.--Subsection (d) of such section
is amended--
(A) in paragraph (1), in the matter preceding
subparagraph (A), by striking ``subsection (a)'' and
inserting ``subsection (a)(1)'';
(B) in paragraph (2)--
(i) in subparagraph (A)--
(I) in the subparagraph heading, by
striking ``Human rights violations''
and inserting ``Serious human rights
abuse or violations of internationally
recognized human rights''; and
(II) by striking ``described in
paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection
(a)'' and inserting ``described in
subsection (a)(1) relating to serious
human rights abuse or any violation of
internationally recognized human
rights''; and
(ii) in subparagraph (B)--
(I) in the matter preceding clause
(i), by striking ``described in
paragraph (3) or (4) of subsection
(a)'' and inserting ``described in
subsection (a)(1) relating to
corruption or the transfer or
facilitation of the transfer of the
proceeds of corruption''; and
(II) by striking ``ranking member
of'' and all that follows through the
period at the end and inserting
``ranking member of one of the
appropriate congressional
committees.''.
(d) Reports to Congress.--Section 1264(a) of the Global Magnitsky
Human Rights Accountability Act (Subtitle F of title XII of Public Law
114-328; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note) is amended--
(1) in paragraph (5), by striking ``; and'' and inserting a
semicolon;
(2) in paragraph (6), by striking the period at the end and
inserting ``;''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following:
``(7) a description of additional steps taken by the
President through diplomacy, international engagement, and
assistance to foreign or security sectors to address persistent
underlying causes of serious human rights abuse, violations of
internationally recognized human rights, and corruption in each
country in which foreign persons with respect to which
sanctions have been imposed under section 1263 are located; and
``(8) a description of additional steps taken by the
President to ensure the pursuit of judicial accountability in
appropriate jurisdictions with respect to those foreign persons
subject to sanctions under section 1263 for serious human
rights abuse, violations of internationally recognized human
rights, and corruption.''.
(e) Repeal of Sunset.--(1) Section 1265 of the Global Magnitsky
Human Rights Accountability Act (Subtitle F of title XII of Public Law
114-328; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note) is repealed.
(2) The table of contents in section 2(b) and in title XII of
division A of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2017 (Public Law 114-328) are each amended by striking the items
relating to section 1265.
SEC. 314. SENSE OF CONGRESS CONDEMNING ANTI-ASIAN RACISM AND
DISCRIMINATION.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, crimes and
discrimination against Asians and those of Asian descent have
risen dramatically worldwide. In May 2020, United Nations
Secretary-General Antonio Guterres said ``the pandemic
continues to unleash a tsunami of hate and xenophobia,
scapegoating and scare-mongering'' and urged governments to
``act now to strengthen the immunity of our societies against
the virus of hate''.
(2) Asian American and Pacific Island (AAPI) workers make
up a large portion of the essential workers on the frontlines
of the COVID-19 pandemic, making up 8.5 percent of all
essential healthcare workers in the United States. AAPI workers
also make up a large share--between 6 percent and 12 percent
based on sector--of the biomedical field.
(3) The United States Census notes that Americans of Asian
descent alone made up nearly 5.9 percent of the United States
population in 2019, and that Asian Americans are the fastest-
growing racial group in the United States, projected to
represent 14 percent of the United States population by 2065.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the reprehensible attacks on people of Asian descent
and concerning increase in anti-Asian sentiment and racism in
the United States and around the world have no place in a
peaceful, civilized, and tolerant world;
(2) the United States is a diverse country with a proud
tradition of immigration, and the strength and vibrancy of the
United States is enhanced by the diverse ethnic backgrounds and
tolerance of its citizens, including Asian Americans and
Pacific Islanders;
(3) the United States Government should encourage foreign
governments to use the official and scientific names for the
COVID-19 pandemic, as recommended by the World Health
Organization and the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention; and
(4) the United States Government and other governments
around the world must actively oppose racism and intolerance,
and use all available and appropriate tools to combat the
spread of anti-Asian racism and discrimination.
SEC. 315. ANNUAL REPORTING ON CENSORSHIP OF FREE SPEECH WITH RESPECT TO
INTERNATIONAL ABUSES OF HUMAN RIGHTS.
Section 116(d) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (227 U.S.C.
2151n(d)) is amended--
(1) in paragraph (11)(C), by striking ``and'' at the end;
(2) in paragraph (12)(C)(ii), by striking the period at the
end and inserting a semicolon; and
(3) by adding at the end the following:
``(13) wherever applicable, instances in which the
government of each country has attempted to extraterritorially
intimidate or pressure a company or entity to censor or self-
censor the speech of its employees, contractors, customers, or
associated staff with regards to the abuse of human rights in
such country, or sought retaliation against such employees or
contractors for the same, including any instance in which the
Government of the People's Republic of China has sought to
extraterritorially censor or punish speech that is otherwise
legal in the United States on the topics of--
``(A) repression and violation of fundamental
freedoms in Hong Kong;
``(B) repression and persecution of religious and
ethnic minorities in China, including in the Xinjiang
Uyghur Autonomous Region and the Tibet Autonomous
Region;
``(C) efforts to proliferate and use surveillance
technologies to surveil activists, journalists,
opposition politicians, or to profile persons of
different ethnicities; and
``(D) other gross violations of human rights; and
``(14) wherever applicable, instances in which a company or
entity located in or based in a third country has censored or
self-censored the speech of its employees, contractors,
customers, or associated staff on the topic of abuse of human
rights in each country or sought to retaliate against such
employees for the same, due to intimidation or pressure from or
the fear of intimidation by the foreign government.''.
SEC. 316. POLICY TOWARD THE XXIV OLYMPIC WINTER GAMES AND THE XIII
PARALYMPIC WINTER GAMES.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
(1) In October 2020, 39 countries at the United Nations
Third Committee of the General Assembly appealed for action on
the mass arbitrary detentions and other crimes against the
Uyghur Muslim population of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous
Region.
(2) The 2018 concluding observations of the United Nations
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination decried
reports of mass arbitrary detention of Uyghurs.
(3) Over 400 international nongovernmental organizations
have joined together to decry the mass arbitrary detentions of
Uyghurs in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.
(4) The Olympic Charter states that the practice of sport
``is a human right'' that ``shall be secured without
discrimination of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, sexual
orientation, language, religion, political or other opinion,
national or social origin, property, birth or other status'', a
right that by definition cannot be secured in a country in
which over 1,000,000 people are imprisoned in camps because of
their race, language, and religion.
(5) The 2008 Olympics in Beijing were accompanied by
widespread tracking, arrest, and intimidation of foreign
journalists and bloggers, as well as restrictions on movement
of journalists, contrary to explicit commitments made by the
Government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) to the
International Olympic Committee.
(6) The Government of the PRC denied visas for some
journalists granted press accreditation for the 2008 Olympic
Games, and the Beijing Organising Committee of the Olympic
Games repeatedly refused to address incidents involving freedom
of expression.
(7) The International Olympic Committee faced broad
criticism for failing to adequately anticipate infringements by
the Government of the PRC's on freedom of expression and press
for international media and 2008 Olympics participants, and
failing to hold the Government of the PRC to their own
commitments to safeguard human rights during the 2008 games.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the
International Olympic Committee should--
(1) consider that the Olympic Charter's principles of
solidarity and nondiscrimination are hard to reconcile with
holding the 2022 Winter Games in a country the government of
which stands credibly accused of perpetrating crimes against
humanity and genocide against ethnic and religious minorities;
(2) take into account the recent precedent of the 2008
games, at which Olympic athletes, spectators, and international
media had their fundamental freedoms severely challenged, and
the likely limitations the Government of the PRC will seek to
enforce on participants speaking out about ongoing persecution
of the Uyghurs and other human rights abuses in the PRC,
despite repeated commitments by the Government of the PRC;
(3) emphasize that the International Olympic Committee is
not opposed to moving an Olympic competition in all
circumstances, and should immediately rebid the 2022 Winter
Olympic Games to be hosted by a country that recognizes and
respects human rights;
(4) affirm the International Olympic Committee's--
(A) desire to stay above politics does not permit
turning a blind eye to mass atrocity crimes, which
cannot and should not be dismissed as mere political
concerns; and
(B) commitment to the fundamental rights
instruments of the international system, which are
beyond partisan or domestic policy, and upon which the
success of the entire Olympic project depends;
(5) propose a set of clear, executable actions to be taken
by the International Olympic Committee upon infringement of
freedom of expression by a host country's government during any
Olympics event, including the 2022 Winter Olympics, against
athletes, participants, and international media; and
(6) rescind Rule 50 of the Olympic Charter, which restricts
the freedom of expression by athletes when competing during
Olympics events, and affirm the rights of athletes to political
and other speech during athletic competitions, including speech
that is critical of their host countries.
(c) Statement of Policy.--It shall be the policy of the United
States--
(1) to implement a presidential and cabinet level
diplomatic boycott of the XXIV Olympic Winter Games and the
XIII Paralympic Winter Games in the PRC;
(2) to encourage other nations, especially democratic
partners and allies, to do the same; and
(3) to call for an end to the Chinese Communist Party's
ongoing human rights abuses, including the Uyghur genocide.
SEC. 317. REVIEW AND CONTROLS ON EXPORT OF ITEMS WITH CRITICAL
CAPABILITIES TO ENABLE HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES.
(a) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States to
use export controls to the extent necessary to further the protection
of internationally recognized human rights.
(b) Review of Items With Critical Capabilities to Enable Human
Rights Abuses.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment
of this Act, and as appropriate thereafter, the Secretary, in
coordination with the Secretary of State, the Director of National
Intelligence, and the heads of other Federal agencies as appropriate,
shall conduct a review of items subject to controls for crime control
reasons pursuant to section 742.7 of the Export Administration
Regulations.
(c) Controls.--In furtherance of the policy set forth in subsection
(a), not later than 60 days after completing the review required by
subsection (b), the Secretary, in coordination with the heads of other
Federal agencies as appropriate, shall determine whether additional
export controls are needed to protect human rights, including whether--
(1) controls for crime control reasons pursuant to section
742.7 of the Export Administration Regulations should be
imposed on additional items, including items with critical
capabilities to enable human rights abuses involving--
(A) censorship or social control;
(B) surveillance, interception, or restriction of
communications;
(C) monitoring or restricting access to or use of
the internet;
(D) identification of individuals through facial or
voice recognition or biometric indicators; or
(E) DNA sequencing; or
(2) end-use and end-user controls should be imposed on the
export, reexport, or in-country transfer of certain items with
critical capabilities to enable human rights abuses that are
subject to the Export Administration Regulations if the person
seeking to export, reexport, or transfer the item has
knowledge, or the Secretary determines and so informs that
person, that the end-user or ultimate consignee will use the
item to enable human rights abuses.
(d) Cooperation of Other Agencies.--Upon request from the
Secretary, the head of a Federal agency shall provide full support and
cooperation to the Secretary in carrying out this section.
(e) International Coordination on Controls to Protect Human
Rights.--It shall be the policy of the United States to seek to secure
the cooperation of other governments to impose export controls that are
consistent, to the extent possible, with the controls imposed under
this section.
(f) Conforming Amendment.--Section 1752(2)(A) of the Export Control
Reform Act of 2018 (50 U.S.C. 20 4811(2)(A)) is amended--
(1) in clause (iv), by striking ``; or'' and inserting a
semicolon;
(2) in clause (v), by striking the period and inserting ``;
or''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following:
``(vi) serious human rights abuses.''.
(g) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) End-user; knowledge; ultimate consignee.--The terms
``end-user'', ``knowledge'', and ``ultimate consignee'' have
the meanings given those terms in section 772.1 of the Export
Administration Regulations.
(2) Export; export administration regulations; in-country
transfer; item; reexport.--The terms ``export'', ``Export
Administration Regulations'', ``in-country transfer'',
``item'', and ``reexport'' have the meanings given those terms
in section 1742 of the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (50
U.S.C. 4801).
(3) Secretary.--The term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary
of Commerce.
SEC. 318. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON COMMERCIAL EXPORT CONTROL POLICY.
It is the sense of Congress that the President should reexamine
United States commercial export control policy for any country,
including the People's Republic of China, that is known to supply arms
or dual use items to any country the government of which has been
designated pursuant to any applicable provision of law as a state
sponsor of terrorism or to any entity designated by the Secretary of
State as a foreign terrorist organization.
SEC. 319. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO SYSTEMATIC RAPE,
COERCIVE ABORTION, FORCED STERILIZATION, OR INVOLUNTARY
CONTRACEPTIVE IMPLANTATION IN THE XINJIANG UYGHUR
AUTONOMOUS REGION.
(a) In General.--Section 6(a)(1) of the Uyghur Human Rights Policy
Act of 2020 (Public Law 116-145; 22 U.S.C. 6901 note) is amended by
inserting after subparagraph (E) the following:
``(F) Systematic rape, coercive abortion, forced
sterilization, or involuntary contraceptive
implantation policies and practices.''.
(b) Effective Date; Applicability.--The amendment made by
subsection (a)--
(1) takes effect on the date of the enactment of this Act;
and
(2) applies with respect to the first report required by
section 6(a)(1) of the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act of 2020
submitted after such date of enactment.
SEC. 320. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING CENSORSHIP OF POLITICAL SPEECH.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
(1) The People's Republic of China censors political speech
of throughout the country through many means including through
mass censorship of the Internet, the Great Firewall, radical
curtailment of the freedom of the press.
(2) The PRC employs several other means to stifle dissent
including instigating private person to target dissenting
individuals and private companies to target offending
companies.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) censorship of political speech in China is contrary to
the human rights of the Chinese people;
(2) censorship of political speech, whether conducted by
the government, or private or quasi-private entities is
antithetical to United States values and interests; and
(3) the democratic way to conduct political disputes is
through argument and persuasion, not force or political speech.
SEC. 321. REPORT ON MANNER AND EXTENT TO WHICH THE GOVERNMENT OF CHINA
EXPLOITS HONG KONG TO CIRCUMVENT UNITED STATES LAWS AND
PROTECTIONS.
Title III of the United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992 (22
U.S.C. 5731 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following:
``SEC. 303. REPORT ON MANNER AND EXTENT TO WHICH THE GOVERNMENT OF
CHINA EXPLOITS HONG KONG TO CIRCUMVENT UNITED STATES LAWS
AND PROTECTIONS.
``(a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this section, the Secretary of State shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees a report on the manner and extent
to which the Government of China uses the status of Hong Kong to
circumvent the laws and protections of the United States.
``(b) Elements.--The report required by subsection (a) shall
include the following:
``(1) In consultation with the Secretary of Commerce, the
Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director of National
Intelligence--
``(A) an assessment of how the Government of China
uses Hong Kong to circumvent United States export
controls; and
``(B) a list of all significant incidents in which
the Government of China used Hong Kong to circumvent
such controls during the reporting period.
``(2) In consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury
and the Secretary of Commerce--
``(A) an assessment of how the Government of China
uses Hong Kong to circumvent duties on merchandise
exported to the United States from the People's
Republic of China; and
``(B) a list of all significant incidents in which
the Government of China used Hong Kong to circumvent
such duties during the reporting period.
``(3) In consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury,
the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director of
National Intelligence--
``(A) an assessment of how the Government of China
uses Hong Kong to circumvent sanctions imposed by the
United States or pursuant to multilateral regimes; and
``(B) a list of all significant incidents in which
the Government of China used Hong Kong to circumvent
such sanctions during the reporting period.
``(4) In consultation with the Secretary of Homeland
Security and the Director of National Intelligence, an
assessment of how the Government of China uses formal or
informal means to extradite or coercively move individuals,
including United States persons, from Hong Kong to the People's
Republic of China.
``(5) In consultation with the Secretary of Defense, the
Director of National Intelligence, and the Director of Homeland
Security--
``(A) an assessment of how the intelligence,
security, and law enforcement agencies of the
Government of China, including the Ministry of State
Security, the Ministry of Public Security, and the
People's Armed Police, use the Hong Kong Security
Bureau and other security agencies in Hong Kong to
conduct espionage on foreign nationals, including
United States persons, conduct influence operations, or
violate civil liberties guaranteed under the laws of
Hong Kong; and
``(B) a list of all significant incidents of such
espionage, influence operations, or violations of civil
liberties during the reporting period.
``(c) Form of Report; Availability.--
``(1) Form.--The report required by subsection (a) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified
index.
``(2) Availability.--The unclassified portion of the report
required by subsection (a) shall be posted on a publicly
available internet website of the Department of State.
``(d) Definitions.--In this section:
``(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
`appropriate congressional committees' means--
``(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the
Committee on Finance, and the Select Committee on
Intelligence of the Senate; and
``(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the
Committee on Financial Services, the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, and the Committee on Ways
and Means of the House of Representatives.
``(2) Foreign national.--The term `foreign national' means
a person that is neither--
``(A) an individual who is a citizen or national of
the People's Republic of China; or
``(B) an entity organized under the laws of the
People's Republic of China or of a jurisdiction within
the People's Republic of China.
``(3) Reporting period.--The term `reporting period' means
the 5-year period preceding submission of the report required
by subsection (a).
``(4) United states person.--The term `United States
person' means--
``(A) a United States citizen or an alien lawfully
admitted for permanent residence to the United States;
or
``(B) an entity organized under the laws of the
United States or of any jurisdiction within the United
States, including a foreign branch of such an
entity.''.
SEC. 322. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING ANNUAL COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN
RIGHTS PRACTICES.
It is the sense of Congress that the Department of State's annual
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices should include relevant
information regarding whether a particular country has provided
assistance to the PRC or any entity under the influence of the Chinese
Communist Party in its genocide against the Uyghurs, including through
the forcible repatriation of Uyghurs to the PRC without reasonable
opportunity for them to be assessed and protected as refugees.
SEC. 323. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING PRESS FREEDOM IN THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds that the People's Republic of China
maintains one of the worst media environments in the world and seeks to
curtail political speech inside and outside the country, including by--
(1) targeting independent and foreign media in China
through systematic harassment including the denial of visas to
foreign journalists, imprisonment, the denial of medical care
to imprisoned journalists, and curtailing access to legal
representation;
(2) pervasively monitoring and censoring online and social
media content, including through the banning of virtual private
networks;
(3) using the full force of the State to stifle internal
dissent including dissent online, particularly dissent that
could lead to political change and content that criticizes
China's leaders, however trivial, reportedly even to the point
of censoring comparisons of Xi Jingping's looks with Winnie the
Pooh;
(4) spreading propaganda to foreign audiences through the
United Front Work Department and related activities;
(5) seeking to intimidate American-based journalists
working for Radio Free Asia and reporting on gross human rights
violations in China's Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region by
jailing or otherwise harassing members of their families; and
(6) championing a ``sovereign Internet'' model and
exporting technology to enhance the ability of like-minded
authoritarian regimes to suppress dissent online and monitor
the activity of their people.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the freedom of the press is an unalienable right that
is necessary for citizens to hold their government to account;
(2) the PRC should cease its repression of journalists,
citizen journalists, news organizations; and
(3) the PRC should cease the censorship of political
satire, including comparisons of Xi Jingping's looks with
Winnie the Pooh.
SEC. 324. UNITED STATES SPECIAL ENVOY FOR XINJIANG PROVINCE.
(a) In General.--The Secretary of State shall establish within the
Department of State the position of United States Special Envoy for
Xinjiang Province (in this section referred to as the ``Special
Envoy'').
(b) Appointment.--The Secretary may appoint an individual to the
position of Special Envoy from among officers and employees of the
Department of State. The Secretary may allow such officer or employee
to retain the position (and the responsibilities associated with such
position) held by such officer or employee prior to the appointment of
such officer or employee to the position of Special Envoy.
(c) Duties.--The Special Envoy shall coordinate diplomatic,
political, public diplomacy, financial assistance, sanctions,
counterterrorism, security resources, and congressional reporting
requirements within the United States Government to respond to the
gross violations of universally recognized human rights occurring in
Xinjiang Province of the People's Republic of China, including by
addressing--
(1) the mass detentions of Uyghurs and other predominantly
Muslim ethnic minorities;
(2) the deployment of technologically advanced surveillance
and police detection methods; and
(3) the counterterrorism and counter-radicalism claims used
to justify the policies of the Chinese Government in Xinjiang
Province.
SEC. 325. CHINA CENSORSHIP MONITOR AND ACTION GROUP.
(a) Report on Censorship and Intimidation of United States Persons
by the Government of the People's Republic of China.--
(1) Report.--
(A) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of
State shall select and seek to enter into an agreement
with a qualified research entity that is independent of
the Department of State to write a report on censorship
and intimidation in the United States and its
possessions and territories of United States persons,
including United States companies that conduct business
in the People's Republic of China, which is directed or
directly supported by the Government of the People's
Republic of China.
(B) Matters to be included.--The report required
under subparagraph (A) shall--
(i) assess major trends, patterns, and
methods of the Government of the People's
Republic of China's efforts to direct or
directly support censorship and intimidation of
United States persons, including United States
companies that conduct business in the People's
Republic of China, which are exercising their
right to freedom of speech;
(ii) assess, including through the use of
illustrative examples, as appropriate, the
impact on and consequences for United States
persons, including United States companies that
conduct business in the People's Republic of
China, that criticize--
(I) the Government of the People's
Republic of China;
(II) the Chinese Communist Party;
(III) the authoritarian model of
government of the People's Republic of
China; or
(IV) a particular policy advanced
by the Chinese Communist Party or the
Government of the People's Republic of
China;
(iii) identify the implications for the
United States of the matters described in
clauses (i) and (ii);
(iv) assess the methods and evaluate the
efficacy of the efforts by the Government of
the People's Republic of China to limit freedom
of expression in the private sector, including
with respect to media, social media, film,
education, travel, financial services, sports
and entertainment, technology,
telecommunication, and internet infrastructure
interests;
(v) include policy recommendations for the
United States Government, including
recommendations regarding collaboration with
United States allies and partners, to address
censorship and intimidation by the Government
of the People's Republic of China; and
(vi) include policy recommendations for
United States persons, including United States
companies that conduct business in China, to
address censorship and intimidation by the
Government of the People's Republic of China.
(C) Applicability to united states allies and
partners.--To the extent practicable, the report
required under subparagraph (A) should identify
implications and policy recommendations that are
relevant to United States allies and partners facing
censorship and intimidation directed or directly
supported by the Government of the People's Republic of
China.
(2) Submission of report.--
(A) In general.--Not later than one year after the
date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of
State shall submit the report written by the qualified
research entity selected pursuant to paragraph (1)(A)
to the appropriate congressional committees.
(B) Publication.--The report referred to in
subparagraph (A) shall be made accessible to the public
online through relevant United States Government
websites.
(3) Federal government support.--The Secretary of State and
other Federal agencies selected by the President shall provide
the qualified research entity selected pursuant to paragraph
(1)(A) with timely access to appropriate information, data,
resources, and analyses necessary for such entity to write the
report described in paragraph (1) in a thorough and independent
manner.
(b) China Censorship Monitor and Action Group.--
(1) Certification.--Upon receipt and review of the report
described in subsection (a), the President shall make a
determination on whether the Government of the People's
Republic of China engages in the censorship and intimidation of
United States persons, including United States companies that
conduct business in the People's Republic of China, which are
exercising their right to freedom of speech, taking into
account the contents of the report and other information
available to the government of the United States.
(2) In general.--If there is a determination under
paragraph (1) that the Government of the People's Republic of
China engages in the censorship and intimidation of United
States persons, including United States companies that conduct
business in the People's Republic of China, which are
exercising their right to freedom of speech, the President
shall establish an interagency task force, which shall be known
as the ``China Censorship Monitor and Action Group'' (referred
to in this section as the ``Task Force'').
(3) Membership.--If, upon receipt and review of the report
described in subsection (a), he deems it in the national
interest, the President shall--
(A) appoint the chair of the Task Force from among
the staff of the National Security Council;
(B) appoint the vice chair of the Task Force from
among the staff of the National Economic Council; and
(C) direct the head of each of the following
executive branch agencies to appoint personnel to
participate in the Task Force:
(i) The Department of State.
(ii) The Department of Commerce.
(iii) The Department of the Treasury.
(iv) The Department of Justice.
(v) The Office of the United States Trade
Representative.
(vi) The Office of the Director of National
Intelligence, and other appropriate elements of
the intelligence community (as defined in
section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947
(50 U.S.C. 3003)).
(vii) The Federal Communications
Commission.
(viii) The United States Agency for Global
Media.
(ix) Other agencies designated by the
President.
(4) Responsibilities.--The Task Force shall--
(A) oversee the development and execution of an
integrated Federal Government strategy to monitor and
address the impacts of efforts directed, or directly
supported, by the Government of the People's Republic
of China to censor or intimidate, in the United States
or in any of its possessions or territories, any United
States person, including United States companies that
conduct business in the People's Republic of China,
which are exercising their right to freedom of speech;
and
(B) submit the strategy developed pursuant to
subparagraph (A) to the appropriate congressional
committees not later than 120 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act.
(5) Meetings.--The Task Force shall meet not less
frequently than twice per year.
(6) Consultations.--The Task Force should regularly
consult, to the extent necessary and appropriate, with--
(A) Federal agencies that are not represented on
the Task Force;
(B) independent agencies of the United States
Government that are not represented on the Task Force;
(C) relevant stakeholders in the private sector and
the media; and
(D) relevant stakeholders among United States
allies and partners facing similar challenges related
to censorship or intimidation by the Government of the
People's Republic of China.
(7) Reporting requirements.--
(A) Annual report.--The Task Force shall submit an
annual report to the appropriate congressional
committees that describes, with respect to the
reporting period--
(i) the strategic objectives and policies
pursued by the Task Force to address the
challenges of censorship and intimidation of
United States persons while in the United
States or any of its possessions or
territories, which is directed or directly
supported by the Government of the People's
Republic of China;
(ii) the activities conducted by the Task
Force in support of the strategic objectives
and policies referred to in clause (i); and
(iii) the results of the activities
referred to in clause (ii) and the impact of
such activities on the national interests of
the United States.
(B) Form of report.--Each report submitted pursuant
to subparagraph (A) shall be unclassified, but may
include a classified annex.
(C) Congressional briefings.--Not later than 90
days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and
annually thereafter, the Task Force shall provide
briefings to the appropriate congressional committees
regarding the activities of the Task Force to execute
the strategy developed pursuant to paragraph (3)(A).
(c) Sunset.--This section shall terminate on the date that is five
years after the date of the enactment of this Act.
(d) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Qualified research entity.--The term ``qualified
research entity'' means an entity that--
(A) is a nonpartisan research organization or a
federally funded research and development center;
(B) has appropriate expertise and analytical
capability to write the report required under section
3; and
(C) is free from any financial, commercial, or
other entanglements, which could undermine the
independence of such report or create a conflict of
interest or the appearance of a conflict of interest,
with--
(i) the Government of the People's Republic
of China;
(ii) the Chinese Communist Party;
(iii) any company incorporated in the
People's Republic of China or a subsidiary of
such company; or
(iv) any company or entity incorporated
outside of the People's Republic of China that
is believed to have a substantial financial or
commercial interest in the People's Republic of
China.
(2) United states person.--The term ``United States
person'' means--
(A) a United States citizen or an alien lawfully
admitted for permanent residence to the United States;
or
(B) an entity organized under the laws of the
United States or any jurisdiction within the United
States, including a foreign branch of such an entity.
SEC. 326. PUBLIC DISCLOSURE ON BIS LICENSING INFORMATION.
The Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives
shall make aggregate statistics on licensing information, ensuring all
confidential business information is protected, for PRC companies on
the Entity List contained in the Export Administration Regulations
available to the public.
TITLE IV--INVESTING IN OUR ECONOMIC STATECRAFT
SEC. 401. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA'S
INDUSTRIAL POLICY.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the challenges presented by a nonmarket economy like
the economy of the People's Republic of China (PRC), which has
captured such a large share of global economic exchange, are in
many ways unprecedented and require sufficiently elevated and
sustained long-term focus and engagement;
(2) in order to truly address the most detrimental aspects
of Chinese Communist Party (CCP)-directed mercantilist economic
strategy, the United States must adopt policies that--
(A) expose the full scope and scale of intellectual
property theft and mass subsidization of Chinese firms,
and the resulting harm to the United States, foreign
markets, and the global economy;
(B) ensure that PRC companies face costs and
consequences for anticompetitive behavior;
(C) provide options for affected United States
persons to address and respond to unreasonable and
discriminatory CCP-directed industrial policies; and
(D) strengthen the protection of critical
technology and sensitive data, while still fostering an
environment that provides incentives for secure but
open investment, innovation, and competition;
(3) the United States must work with its allies and
partners and multilateral venues and fora--
(A) to reinforce long-standing generally accepted
principles of fair competition and market behavior and
address the PRC's anticompetitive economic and
industrial policies that undermine decades of global
growth and innovation;
(B) to ensure that the PRC is not granted the same
treatment as that of a free-market economy until it
ceases the implementation of laws, regulations,
policies, and practices that provide unfair advantage
to PRC firms in furtherance of national objectives and
impose unreasonable, discriminatory, and illegal
burdens on market-based international commerce; and
(C) to align policies with respect to curbing
state-directed subsidization of the private sector,
such as advocating for global rules related to
transparency and adherence to notification
requirements, including through the efforts currently
being advanced by the United States, Japan, and the
European Union;
(4) the United States and its allies and partners must
collaborate to provide incentives to their respective companies
to cooperate in areas such as--
(A) advocating for protection of intellectual
property rights in markets around the world;
(B) fostering open technical standards; and
(C) increasing joint investments in overseas
markets; and
(5) the United States should develop policies that--
(A) insulate United States entities from PRC
pressure against complying with United States laws;
(B) together with the work of allies and partners
and multilateral institutions, counter the potential
impact of the blocking regime of the PRC established by
the Ministry of Commerce of the PRC on January 9, 2021,
when it issued Order No. 1 of 2021, entitled ``Rules on
Counteracting Unjustified Extraterritorial Application
of Foreign Legislation and other Measures''; and
(C) plan for future actions that the Government of
the PRC may take to undermine the lawful application of
United States legal authorities, including with respect
to the use of sanctions.
SEC. 402. ECONOMIC DEFENSE RESPONSE TEAMS.
(a) Pilot Program.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the President shall develop and implement a
pilot program for the creation of deployable economic defense response
teams to help provide emergency technical assistance and support to a
country subjected to the threat or use of coercive economic measures
(in this section referred to as a ``partner country'') and to play a
liaison role between the legitimate government of that country and the
United States Government. Such assistance and support may include the
following activities:
(1) Reducing the partner country's vulnerability to
coercive economic measures.
(2) Minimizing the damage that such measures by an
adversary could cause to the partner country.
(3) Implementing any bilateral or multilateral contingency
plans that may exist for responding to the threat or use of
such measures.
(4) In coordination with the partner country, developing or
improving plans and strategies by the country for reducing
vulnerabilities and improving responses to such measures in the
future.
(5) Assisting the partner country in dealing with foreign
sovereign investment in infrastructure or related projects that
may undermine the partner country's sovereignty.
(6) Assisting the partner country in responding to specific
efforts from an adversary attempting to employ economic
coercion that undermines the partner country's sovereignty,
including efforts in the cyber domain, such as efforts that
undermine cybersecurity or digital security of the partner
country or initiatives that introduce digital technologies in a
manner that undermines freedom, security, and sovereignty of
the partner country.
(7) Otherwise providing direct and relevant short-to-medium
term economic or other assistance from the United States and
marshalling other resources in support of effective responses
to such measures.
(b) Reports Required.--
(1) Report on establishment.--Upon establishment of the
pilot program required by subsection (a), the Secretary of
State shall provide the appropriate congressional committees
with a detailed report and briefing describing the pilot
program, the major elements of the program, the personnel and
institutions involved, and the degree to which the program
incorporates the elements described in subsection (a).
(2) Follow-up report.--Not later than one year after the
date on which the report required by paragraph (1) is
submitted, the Secretary of State shall provide the appropriate
congressional committees with a detailed report and briefing
describing the operations over the previous year of the pilot
program established pursuant to subsection (a), as well as the
Secretary's assessment of its performance and suitability for
becoming a permanent program.
(3) Form.--Each report required under this subsection shall
be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified
annex.
(c) Declaration of an Economic Crisis Required.--
(1) Notification.--The President may activate an economic
defense response team for a period of 180 days under the
authorities of this section to assist a partner country in
responding to an unusual and extraordinary economic coercive
threat by an adversary of the United States upon the
declaration of a coercive economic emergency, together with
notification to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives.
(2) Extension authority.--The President may activate the
response team for an additional 180 days upon the submission of
a detailed analysis to the committees described in paragraph
(1) justifying why the continued deployment of the economic
defense response team in response to the economic emergency is
in the national security interest of the United States.
(d) Sunset.--The authorities provided under this section shall
expire on December 31, 2026.
(e) Rule of Construction.--Neither the authority to declare an
economic crisis provided for in subsection (d), nor the declaration of
an economic crisis pursuant to subsection (d), shall confer or be
construed to confer any authority, power, duty, or responsibility to
the President other than the authority to activate an economic defense
response team as described in this section.
(f) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section,
the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation, the Committee on Energy and
Natural Resources, the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and
Forestry, and the Committee on Finance of the Senate; and
(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on
Financial Services, the Committee on Energy and Commerce, the
Committee on Agriculture, and the Committee on Ways and Means
of the House of Representatives.
SEC. 403. COUNTERING OVERSEAS KLEPTOCRACY.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
(1) Authoritarian leaders in foreign countries abuse their
power to steal assets from state institutions, enrich
themselves at the expense of their countries' economic
development, and use corruption as a strategic tool both to
solidify their grip on power and to undermine democratic
institutions abroad.
(2) Global corruption harms the competitiveness of United
States businesses, weakens democratic governance, feeds
terrorist recruitment and transnational organized crime,
enables drug smuggling and human trafficking, and stymies
economic growth.
(3) Illicit financial flows often penetrate countries
through what appear to be legitimate financial transactions, as
kleptocrats launder money, use shell companies, amass offshore
wealth, and participate in a global shadow economy.
(4) The Government of the Russian Federation is a leading
model of this type of kleptocratic system, using state-
sanctioned corruption to both erode democratic governance from
within and discredit democracy abroad, thereby strengthening
the authoritarian rule of Vladimir Putin.
(5) Corrupt individuals and entities in the Russian
Federation, often with the backing and encouragement of
political leadership, use stolen money--
(A) to purchase key assets in other countries,
often with a goal of attaining monopolistic control of
a sector;
(B) to gain access to and influence the policies of
other countries; and
(C) to advance Russian interests in other
countries, particularly those that undermine confidence
and trust in democratic systems.
(6) Systemic corruption in the People's Republic of China
(PRC), often tied to, directed by, or backed by the leadership
of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Government of the
PRC is used--
(A) to provide unfair advantage to certain PRC
economic entities;
(B) to increase other countries' economic
dependence on the PRC to secure greater deference to
the PRC's diplomatic and strategic goals; and
(C) to exploit corruption in foreign governments
and among other political elites to enable PRC state-
backed firms to pursue predatory and exploitative
economic practices.
(7) Thwarting these tactics by Russian, Chinese, and other
kleptocratic actors requires the international community to
strengthen democratic governance and the rule of law.
International cooperation in combating corruption and illicit
finance is vital to such efforts, especially by empowering
reformers in foreign countries during historic political
openings for the establishment of the rule of law in those
countries.
(8) Technical assistance programs that combat corruption
and strengthen the rule of law, including through assistance
provided by the Department of State's Bureau of International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs and the United States
Agency for International Development, and through programs like
the Department of Justice's Office of Overseas Prosecutorial
Development, Assistance and Training and the International
Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program, can have
lasting and significant impacts for both foreign and United
States interests.
(9) There currently exist numerous international
instruments to combat corruption, kleptocracy, and illicit
finance, including--
(A) the Inter-American Convention against
Corruption of the Organization of American States, done
at Caracas March 29, 1996;
(B) the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign
Public Officials in International Business Transactions
of the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and
Development, done at Paris December 21, 1997 (commonly
referred to as the ``Anti-Bribery Convention'');
(C) the United Nations Convention against
Transnational Organized Crime, done at New York
November 15, 2000;
(D) the United Nations Convention against
Corruption, done at New York October 31, 2003;
(E) Recommendation of the Council for Further
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions, adopted November
26, 2009; and
(F) recommendations of the Financial Action Task
Force comprising the International Standards on
Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of
Terrorism and Proliferation.
(b) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the
Committee on Finance, and the Committee on the
Judiciary of the Senate;
(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee
on Financial Services, the Committee on Ways and Means,
and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of
Representatives.
(2) Foreign assistance.--The term ``foreign assistance''
means foreign assistance authorized under the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2251 et seq.).
(3) Foreign state.--The term ``foreign state'' has the
meaning given such term in section 1603(a) of title 28, United
States Code.
(4) Intelligence community.--The term ``intelligence
community'' has the meaning given such term in section 3(4) of
the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003(4)).
(5) Public corruption.--The term ``public corruption''
includes the unlawful exercise of entrusted public power for
private gain, such as through bribery, nepotism, fraud,
extortion, or embezzlement.
(6) Rule of law.--The term ``rule of law'' means the
principle of governance in which all persons, institutions, and
entities, whether public or private, including the state, are
accountable to laws that are--
(A) publicly promulgated;
(B) equally enforced;
(C) independently adjudicated; and
(D) consistent with international human rights
norms and standards.
(c) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States--
(1) to leverage United States diplomatic engagement and
foreign assistance to promote the rule of law;
(2)(A) to promote international instruments to combat
corruption, kleptocracy, and illicit finance, including
instruments referred to in subsection (a)(9), and other
relevant international standards and best practices, as such
standards and practices develop; and
(B) to promote the adoption and implementation of such
laws, standards, and practices by foreign states;
(3) to support foreign states in promoting good governance
and combating public corruption;
(4) to encourage and assist foreign partner countries to
identify and close loopholes in their legal and financial
architecture, including the misuse of anonymous shell
companies, free trade zones, and other legal structures, that
are enabling illicit finance to penetrate their financial
systems;
(5) to help foreign partner countries to investigate,
prosecute, adjudicate, and more generally combat the use of
corruption by malign actors, including authoritarian
governments, particularly the Government of the Russian
Federation and the Government of the People's Republic of
China, as a tool of malign influence worldwide;
(6) to assist in the recovery of kleptocracy-related stolen
assets for victims, including through the use of appropriate
bilateral arrangements and international agreements, such as
the United Nations Convention against Corruption, done at New
York October 31, 2003, and the United Nations Convention
against Transnational Organized Crime, done at New York
November 15, 2000;
(7) to use sanctions authorities, such as the Global
Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (subtitle F of title
XII of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2017 (Public Law 114-328; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note)) and section
7031(c) of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and
Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2020 (division G of Public
Law 116-94), to identify and take action against corrupt
foreign actors;
(8) to ensure coordination between relevant Federal
departments and agencies with jurisdiction over the advancement
of good governance in foreign states; and
(9) to lead the creation of a formal grouping of like-
minded states--
(A) to coordinate efforts to counter corruption,
kleptocracy, and illicit finance; and
(B) to strengthen collective financial defense.
(d) Anti-corruption Action Fund.--
(1) Establishment.--There is established in the United
States Treasury a fund, to be known as the ``Anti-Corruption
Action Fund'', only for the purposes of--
(A) strengthening the capacity of foreign states to
prevent and fight public corruption;
(B) assisting foreign states to develop rule of
law-based governance structures, including accountable
civilian police, prosecutorial, and judicial
institutions;
(C) supporting foreign states to strengthen
domestic legal and regulatory frameworks to combat
public corruption, including the adoption of best
practices under international law; and
(D) supplementing existing foreign assistance and
diplomacy with respect to efforts described in
subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C).
(2) Funding.--
(A) Transfers.--Beginning on or after the date of
the enactment of this Act, if total criminal fines and
penalties in excess of $50,000,000 are imposed against
a person under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of
1977 (Public Law 95-213) or section 13, 30A, or 32 of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m,
78dd-1, and 78ff), whether pursuant to a criminal
prosecution, enforcement proceeding, deferred
prosecution agreement, nonprosecution agreement, a
declination to prosecute or enforce, or any other
resolution, the court (in the case of a conviction) or
the Attorney General shall impose an additional
prevention payment equal to $5,000,000 against such
person, which shall be deposited in the Anti-Corruption
Action Fund established under paragraph (1).
(B) Availability of funds.--Amounts deposited into
the Anti-Corruption Action Fund pursuant to
subparagraph (A) shall be available to the Secretary of
State only for the purposes described in paragraph (1),
without fiscal year limitation or need for subsequent
appropriation.
(C) Limitation.--None of the amounts made available
to the Secretary of State from the Anti-Corruption
Action Fund may be used inside the United States,
except for administrative costs related to overseas
program implementation pursuant to paragraph (1).
(3) Support.--The Anti-Corruption Action Fund--
(A) may support governmental and nongovernmental
parties in advancing the purposes described in
paragraph (1); and
(B) shall be allocated in a manner complementary to
existing United States foreign assistance, diplomacy,
and anti-corruption activities.
(4) Allocation and prioritization.--In programming foreign
assistance made available through the Anti-Corruption Action
Fund, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Attorney
General, shall prioritize projects that--
(A) assist countries that are undergoing historic
opportunities for democratic transition, combating
corruption, and the establishment of the rule of law;
and
(B) are important to United States national
interests.
(5) Technical assistance providers.--For any technical
assistance to a foreign governmental party under this section,
the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Attorney
General, shall prioritize United States Government technical
assistance providers as implementers, in particular the Office
of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training
and the International Criminal Investigative Training
Assistance Program at the Department of Justice.
(6) Public diplomacy.--The Secretary of State shall
announce that funds deposited in the Anti-Corruption Action
Fund are derived from actions brought under the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act to demonstrate that the use of such funds are--
(A) contributing to international anti-corruption
work; and
(B) reducing the pressure that United States
businesses face to pay bribes overseas, thereby
contributing to greater competitiveness of United
States companies.
(7) Reporting.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the
enactment of this Act and not less frequently than annually
thereafter, the Secretary of State shall submit a report to the
appropriate congressional committees that contains--
(A) the balance of the funding remaining in the
Anti-Corruption Action Fund;
(B) the amount of funds that have been deposited
into the Anti-Corruption Action Fund; and
(C) a summary of the obligation and expenditure of
such funds.
(8) Notification requirements.--None of the amounts made
available to the Secretary of State from the Anti-Corruption
Action Fund pursuant to this section shall be available for
obligation, or for transfer to other departments, agencies, or
entities, unless the Secretary of State notifies the Committee
on Foreign Relations of the Senate, the Committee on
Appropriations of the Senate, the Committee on Foreign Affairs
of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives, not later than
15 days in advance of such obligation or transfer.
(e) Interagency Anti-corruption Task Force.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary of State, in cooperation
with the Interagency Anti-Corruption Task Force established
pursuant to paragraph (2), shall manage a whole-of-government
effort to improve coordination among Federal departments and
agencies and donor organizations with a role in--
(A) promoting good governance in foreign states;
and
(B) enhancing the ability of foreign states to
combat public corruption.
(2) Interagency anti-corruption task force.--Not later than
180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
Secretary of State shall establish and convene the Interagency
Anti-Corruption Task Force (referred to in this section as the
``Task Force''), which shall be composed of representatives
appointed by the President from appropriate departments and
agencies, including the Department of State, the United States
Agency for International Development, the Department of
Justice, the Department of the Treasury, the Department of
Homeland Security, the Department of Defense, the Department of
Commerce, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, and the
intelligence community.
(3) Additional meetings.--The Task Force shall meet not
less frequently than twice per year.
(4) Duties.--The Task Force shall--
(A) evaluate, on a general basis, the effectiveness
of existing foreign assistance programs, including
programs funded by the Anti-Corruption Action Fund,
that have an impact on--
(i) promoting good governance in foreign
states; and
(ii) enhancing the ability of foreign
states to combat public corruption;
(B) assist the Secretary of State in managing the
whole-of-government effort described in paragraph (1);
(C) identify general areas in which such whole-of-
government effort could be enhanced; and
(D) recommend specific programs for foreign states
that may be used to enhance such whole-of-government
effort.
(5) Briefing requirement.--Not later than 1 year after the
date of the enactment of this Act and not less frequently than
annually thereafter through the end of fiscal year 2026, the
Secretary of State shall provide a briefing to the appropriate
congressional committees regarding the ongoing work of the Task
Force. Each briefing shall include the participation of a
representative of each of the departments and agencies
described in paragraph (2), to the extent feasible.
(f) Designation of Embassy Anti-corruption Points of Contact.--
(1) Embassy anti-corruption point of contact.--The chief of
mission of each United States embassy shall designate an anti-
corruption point of contact for each such embassy.
(2) Duties.--The designated anti-corruption points of
contact designated pursuant to paragraph (1) shall--
(A) coordinate, in accordance with guidance from
the Interagency Anti-Corruption Task Force established
pursuant to subsection (e)(2), an interagency approach
within United States embassies to combat public
corruption in the foreign states in which such
embassies are located that is tailored to the needs of
such foreign states, including all relevant Federal
departments and agencies with a presence in such
foreign states, such as the Department of State, the
United States Agency for International Development, the
Department of Justice, the Department of the Treasury,
the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of
Defense, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, and the
intelligence community;
(B) make recommendations regarding the use of the
Anti-Corruption Action Fund and other foreign
assistance funding related to anti-corruption efforts
in their respective countries of responsibility that
aligns with United States diplomatic engagement; and
(C) ensure that anti-corruption activities carried
out within their respective countries of responsibility
are included in regular reporting to the Secretary of
State and the Interagency Anti-Corruption Task Force,
including United States embassy strategic planning
documents and foreign assistance-related reporting, as
appropriate.
(3) Training.--The Secretary of State shall develop and
implement appropriate training for the designated anti-
corruption points of contact.
(g) Reporting Requirements.--
(1) Report or briefing on progress toward implementation.--
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this
Act, and annually thereafter for the following 3 years, the
Secretary of State, in consultation with the Administrator of
the United States Agency for International Development, the
Attorney General, and the Secretary of the Treasury, shall
submit a report or provide a briefing to the appropriate
congressional committees that summarizes progress made in
combating public corruption and in implementing this Act,
including--
(A) identifying opportunities and priorities for
outreach with respect to promoting the adoption and
implementation of relevant international law and
standards in combating public corruption, kleptocracy,
and illicit finance;
(B) describing--
(i) the bureaucratic structure of the
offices within the Department of State and the
United States Agency for International
Development that are engaged in activities to
combat public corruption, kleptocracy, and
illicit finance; and
(ii) how such offices coordinate their
efforts with each other and with other relevant
Federal departments and agencies;
(C) providing a description of how the provisions
under paragraphs (4) and (5) of subsection (d) have
been applied to each project funded by the Anti-
Corruption Action Fund;
(D) providing an explanation as to why a United
States Government technical assistance provider was not
used if technical assistance to a foreign governmental
entity is not implemented by a United States Government
technical assistance provider;
(E) describing the activities of the Interagency
Anti-Corruption Task Force established pursuant to
subsection (e)(2);
(F) identifying--
(i) the designated anti-corruption points
of contact for foreign states; and
(ii) any training provided to such points
of contact; and
(G) recommending additional measures that would
enhance the ability of the United States Government to
combat public corruption, kleptocracy, and illicit
finance overseas.
(2) Online platform.--The Secretary of State, in
conjunction with the Administrator of the United States Agency
for International Development, should consolidate existing
reports with anti-corruption components into a single online,
public platform that includes--
(A) the Annual Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices required under section 116 of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151n);
(B) the Fiscal Transparency Report required under
section 7031(b) of the Department of State, Foreign
Operations and Related Programs Appropriations Act,
2019 (division F of Public Law 116-6);
(C) the Investment Climate Statement reports;
(D) the International Narcotics Control Strategy
Report;
(E) any other relevant public reports; and
(F) links to third-party indicators and compliance
mechanisms used by the United States Government to
inform policy and programming, as appropriate, such
as--
(i) the International Finance Corporation's
Doing Business surveys;
(ii) the International Budget Partnership's
Open Budget Index; and
(iii) multilateral peer review anti-
corruption compliance mechanisms, such as--
(I) the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development's Working
Group on Bribery in International
Business Transactions;
(II) the Follow-Up Mechanism for
the Inter-American Convention Against
Corruption; and
(III) the United Nations Convention
Against Corruption, done at New York
October 31, 2003.
SEC. 404. ANNUAL REPORT ON CHINESE SURVEILLANCE COMPANIES.
(a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter until 2040, the
Secretary of State, in coordination with the Director of National
Intelligence, shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives, and the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Select
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, a report with respect to
persons in China that the Secretary determines--
(1) have operated, sold, leased, or otherwise provided,
directly or indirectly, items or services related to targeted
digital surveillance to--
(A) a foreign government or entity located
primarily inside a foreign country where a reasonable
person would assess that such transfer could result in
a use of the items or services in a manner contrary to
human rights; or
(B) a country or any governmental unit thereof,
entity, or other person determined by the Secretary of
State, in a notice published in the Federal Register,
to have used items or services for targeted digital
surveillance in a manner contrary to human rights; or
(2) have materially assisted, sponsored, or provided
financial, material, or technological support for, or items or
services to or in support of, the activities described in
paragraph (1).
(b) Matters to Be Included.--The report required by subsection (a)
shall include the following:
(1) The name of each foreign person that the Secretary
determines--
(A) meets the requirements of subsection (a)(1);
and
(B) meets the requirements of subsection (a)(2).
(2) The name of each intended and actual recipient of items
or services described in subsection (a).
(3) A detailed description of such items or services.
(4) An analysis of the appropriateness of including the
persons listed in (b)(1) on the entity list maintained by the
Bureau of Industry and Security.
(c) Consultation.--In compiling data and making assessments for the
purposes of preparing the report required by subsection (a), the
Secretary of State shall consult with a wide range of organizations,
including with respect to--
(1) classified and unclassified information provided by the
Director of National Intelligence;
(2) information provided by the Bureau of Democracy, Human
Rights, and Labor's Internet Freedom, Business and Human Rights
section;
(3) information provided by the Department of Commerce,
including the Bureau of Industry and Security;
(4) information provided by the advisory committees
established by the Secretary to advise the Under Secretary of
Commerce for Industry and Security on controls under the Export
Administration Regulations, including the Emerging Technology
and Research Advisory Committee;
(5) information on human rights and technology matters, as
solicited from civil society and human rights organizations
through regular consultative processes; and
(6) information contained in the Country Reports on Human
Rights Practices published annually by the Department of State.
(d) Form and Public Availability of Report.--The report required by
subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form. The report
shall be posted by the President not later than 14 days after being
submitted to Congress on a text-based, searchable, and publicly
available internet website.
(e) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Targeted digital surveillance.--The term ``targeted
digital surveillance'' means the use of items or services that
enable an individual or entity to detect, monitor, intercept,
collect, exploit, preserve, protect, transmit, retain, or
otherwise gain access to the communications, protected
information, work product, browsing data, research, identifying
information, location history, or online and offline activities
of other individuals, organizations, or entities, with or
without the explicit authorization of such individuals,
organizations, or entities.
(2) Foreign person.--The term ``foreign person'' means an
individual or entity that is not a United States person.
(3) In a manner contrary to human rights.--The term ``in a
manner contrary to human rights'', with respect to targeted
digital surveillance, means engaging in targeted digital
surveillance--
(A) in violation of basic human rights, including
to silence dissent, sanction criticism, punish
independent reporting (and sources for that reporting),
manipulate or interfere with democratic or electoral
processes, persecute minorities or vulnerable groups,
or target advocates or practitioners of human rights
and democratic rights (including activists,
journalists, artists, minority communities, or
opposition politicians); or
(B) in a country in which there is lacking a
minimum legal framework governing its use, including
established--
(i) authorization under laws that are
accessible, precise, and available to the
public;
(ii) constraints limiting its use under
principles of necessity, proportionality, and
legitimacy;
(iii) oversight by bodies independent of
the government's executive agencies;
(iv) involvement of an independent and
impartial judiciary branch in authorizing its
use; or
(v) legal remedies in case of abuse.
TITLE V--ENSURING STRATEGIC SECURITY
SEC. 501. COOPERATION ON A STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DIALOGUE.
(a) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States--
(1) to pursue, in coordination with United States allies
and partners, arms control negotiations and sustained and
regular engagement with the People's Republic of China (PRC)--
(A) to enhance understanding of each other's
respective nuclear policies, doctrine, and
capabilities;
(B) to improve transparency; and
(C) to help manage the risks of miscalculation and
misperception;
(2) to formulate a strategy to engage the Government of the
PRC on relevant issues that lays the groundwork for a
constructive arms control framework, including--
(A) fostering dialogue on arms control leading to
the convening of strategic security talks;
(B) negotiating norms for outer space;
(C) developing pre-launch notification regimes
aimed at reducing nuclear miscalculation; and
(D) expanding lines of communication between both
governments for the purposes of reducing the risks of
conventional war and increasing transparency;
(3) to pursue relevant negotiations in coordination with
United States allies and partners to ensure the security of
United States and allied interests to slow the PRC's military
modernization and expansion, including on--
(A) ground-launched cruise and ballistic missiles;
(B) integrated air and missile defense;
(C) hypersonic missiles;
(D) intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance;
(E) space-based capabilities;
(F) cyber capabilities; and
(G) command, control, and communications; and
(4) to ensure that the United States policy continues to
reassure United States allies and partners.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) it is in the interest of the United States and China to
cooperate in reducing risks of conventional and nuclear
escalation;
(2) a physical, cyber, electronic, or any other People's
Liberation Army (PLA) attack on United States early warning
satellites, other portions of the nuclear command and control
enterprise, or critical infrastructure poses a high risk to
inadvertent but rapid escalation;
(3) the United States and its allies and partners should
promote international norms on military operations in space,
the employment of cyber capabilities, and the military use of
artificial intelligence, as an element of risk reduction
regarding nuclear command and control; and
(4) United States allies and partners should share the
burden of promoting and protecting norms regarding the
weaponization of space, highlighting unsafe behavior that
violates international norms, such as in rendezvous and
proximity operations, and promoting responsible behavior in
space and all other domains.
SEC. 502. REPORT ON UNITED STATES EFFORTS TO ENGAGE THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON NUCLEAR ISSUES AND BALLISTIC MISSILE
ISSUES.
(a) Report on the Future of United States-PRC Arms Control.--Not
later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense and
the Secretary of Energy, shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees a report, and if necessary a separate classified annex, that
outlines the approaches and strategies such Secretaries will pursue to
engage the Government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) on arms
control and risk reduction, including--
(1) areas of potential dialogue between the Governments of
the United States and the PRC, including on ballistic,
hypersonic glide, and cruise missiles, conventional forces,
nuclear, space, and cyberspace issues, as well as other new
strategic domains, which could reduce the likelihood of war,
limit escalation if a conflict were to occur, and constrain a
destabilizing arms race in the Indo-Pacific region;
(2) how the United States Government can engage the
Government of the PRC in a constructive arms control dialogue;
(3) identifying strategic military capabilities of the PRC
that the United States Government is most concerned about and
how limiting these capabilities may benefit United States and
allied security interests;
(4) mechanisms to avoid, manage, or control nuclear,
conventional, and unconventional military escalation between
the United States and the PRC;
(5) the personnel and expertise required to effectively
engage the PRC in strategic stability and arms control
dialogues; and
(6) opportunities and methods to encourage transparency
from the PRC.
(b) Report on Arms Control Talks With PRC.--Not later than 180 days
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in
consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy,
shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that
describes--
(1) a concrete plan for arms control talks with the PRC;
(2) if a bilateral arms control dialogue does not arise,
what alternative plans the Department of State envisages for
ensuring the security of the United States and its allies
through international arms control negotiations;
(3) effects on the credibility of United States extended
deterrence assurances to allies and partners if arms control
negotiations do not materialize and the implications for
regional security architectures;
(4) efforts at engaging the PRC to join arms control talks,
whether on a bilateral or international basis; and
(5) the interest level of the Government of PRC in joining
arms control talks, whether on a bilateral or international
basis, including through--
(A) a formal invitation to appropriate officials
from the PRC, and to each of the permanent members of
the United Nations Security Council, to observe a
United States-Russian Federation New START Treaty on-
site inspection to demonstrate the security benefits of
transparency into strategic nuclear forces;
(B) discussions on how to advance international
negotiations on the fissile material cut-off;
(C) an agreement with the PRC that allows for
advance notifications of ballistic missile launches,
through the Hague Code of Conduct or other data
exchanges or doctrine discussions related to strategic
nuclear forces;
(D) an agreement not to target or interfere in
nuclear command, control, and communications (commonly
referred to as ``NC3'') infrastructure; or
(E) any other cooperative measure that benefits
United States-PRC strategic stability.
(c) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this section,
the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on
Armed Services, and the Committee on Energy and Natural
Resources of the Senate; and
(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on
Armed Services, and the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the
House of Representatives.
SEC. 503. COUNTERING THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA'S PROLIFERATION OF
BALLISTIC MISSILES AND NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY TO THE MIDDLE
EAST.
(a) MTCR Transfers.--Not later than 30 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate
congressional committees a written determination, and any documentation
to support that determination detailing--
(1) whether any foreign person in the People's Republic of
China (PRC) knowingly exported, transferred, or engaged in
trade of any item designated under Category I of the MTCR Annex
to any foreign person in the previous three fiscal years; and
(2) the sanctions the President has imposed or intends to
impose pursuant to section 11B(b) of the Export Administration
Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. 4612(b)) against any foreign person who
knowingly engaged in the export, transfer, or trade of that
item or items.
(b) PRC's Nuclear Fuel Cycle Cooperation.--Not later than 30 days
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit
to the appropriate committees of Congress a report detailing--
(1) whether any foreign person in the PRC engaged in
cooperation with any other foreign person in the previous three
fiscal years in the construction of any nuclear-related fuel
cycle facility or activity that has not been notified to the
International Atomic Energy Agency and would be subject to
complementary access if an Additional Protocol was in force;
and
(2) the policy options required to prevent and respond to
any future effort by the PRC to export to any foreign person an
item classified as ``plants for the separation of isotopes of
uranium'' or ``plants for the reprocessing of irradiated
nuclear reactor fuel elements'' under Part 110 of the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission export licensing authority.
(c) Form of Report.--The determination required under subsection
(b) and the report required under subsection (c) shall be unclassified
with a classified annex.
(d) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) The term ``appropriate congressional committees''
means--
(A) the Select Committee on Intelligence and the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and
(B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives.
(2) Foreign person; person.--The terms ``foreign person''
and ``person'' mean--
(A) a natural person that is an alien;
(B) a corporation, business association,
partnership, society, trust, or any other
nongovernmental entity, organization, or group, that is
organized under the laws of a foreign country or has
its principal place of business in a foreign country;
(C) any foreign governmental entity operating as a
business enterprise; and
(D) any successor, subunit, or subsidiary of any
entity described in subparagraph (B) or (C).
TITLE VI--INVESTING IN A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE
SEC. 601. ENSURING NATIONAL SECURITY AND ECONOMIC PRIORITIES WITH THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND OTHER COUNTRIES ACCOUNT
FOR ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES AND CLIMATE CHANGE.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
(1) The Special Report: Global Warming of 1.5C, published
by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change on October 8,
2018, and the Fourth National Climate Assessment, first
published by the United States Global Change Research Program
in 2018, concluded that--
(A) the release of greenhouse gas emissions, most
notably the combustion of fossil fuels and the
degradation of natural resources that absorb
atmospheric carbon from human activity, are the
dominant causes of climate change during the past
century;
(B) changes in the Earth's climate are--
(i) causing sea levels to rise;
(ii) increasing the global average
temperature of the Earth;
(iii) increasing the incidence and severity
of wildfires; and
(iv) intensifying the severity of extreme
weather, including hurricanes, cyclones,
typhoons, flooding, droughts, and other
disasters that threaten human life, healthy
communities, and critical infrastructure.
(2) An increase in the global average temperature of 2
degrees Celsius compared to pre-industrialized levels would
cause--
(A) the displacement, and the forced internal
migration, of an estimated 143,000,000 people in Latin
America, South Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa by 2050 if
insufficient action is taken (according to the World
Bank);
(B) the displacement of an average of 17,800,000
people worldwide by floods every year (according to the
Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre) because of the
exacerbating effects of climate change;
(C) more than $500,000,000,000 in lost annual
economic output in the United States (a 10 percent
contraction from 2018 levels) by 2100 (according to the
Fourth National Climate Assessment);
(D) an additional 100,000,000 people worldwide to
be driven into poverty by 2030 (according to the World
Bank);
(E) greater food insecurity and decreased
agricultural production due to climate change's effects
on the increased frequency and intensity of extreme
weather events;
(F) the proliferation of agricultural pests and
crop diseases, loss of biodiversity, degrading
ecosystems, and water scarcity; and
(G) more than 350,000,000 additional people
worldwide to be exposed to deadly heat stress by 2050.
(3) According to the International Energy Agency, the
United States, China, India, and the European Union (including
the United Kingdom) account for more than 58 percent of global
greenhouse gas emissions. China, which is the world's top
greenhouse gases emitter and has an outsized impact on the
United States' core interest in climate stability--
(A) is likely to achieve its carbon emissions
mitigation pledge to the Paris Agreement, contained in
its 2015 nationally determined contribution, to
``peak'' emissions around 2030 ahead of schedule;
(B) announced, on September 22, 2020, and restated
on April 22, 2021, a pledge to achieve carbon
neutrality by 2060;
(C) announced on April 22, 2021, its intent to
strictly control coal fired power generation projects,
as well as strictly limit the increase in coal
consumption over the 14th five year plan period and
phase it down in the 15th five year plan period; and
(D) however, remains uncommitted to internationally
recognized metrics for achieving these goals.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) to address the climate crisis, the United States must
leverage the full weight of its diplomatic engagement and
foreign assistance to promote our national security and
economic interests related to climate change;
(2) in the absence of United States leadership on global
issues driving international climate-related policymaking, it
would lead to a substantial and harmful decline in the Nation's
global competitiveness;
(3) promoting international instruments on climate action
and other relevant international standards and best practices,
as such standards and practices develop, serve the interests of
the American people and protect United States environmental
resources and the planet;
(4) promoting the adoption and implementation of
international climate-related agreements, standards, and
practices by foreign states ensures a level playing field for
United States businesses and other stakeholders;
(5) working with international allies and partners to
promote environmental justice and climate justice serves the
American people's interests;
(6) finding common ground with the People's Republic of
China (PRC) on climate action where possible is important, but
the United States must also continue to hold the PRC
accountable where its actions undermine the interests of the
United States and its allies and partners;
(7) and in furtherance of the previous clauses, the United
States should--
(A) explore opportunities for constructive
cooperation on climate action initiatives with the PRC
and other countries while ensuring the United States
maintains its competitive advantage in climate-related
fields of expertise and industry, including--
(i) support for international cooperative
policies, measures, and technologies to
decarbonize industry and power, including
through circular economy, energy storage and
grid reliability, carbon capture, and green
hydrogen; and
(ii) increased deployment of clean energy,
including renewable and advanced nuclear power;
green and climate resilient agriculture; energy
efficient buildings; green, and low-carbon
transportation;
(B) cooperate on addressing emissions of methane
and other non-CO<INF>2</INF> greenhouse gases;
(C) cooperate on addressing emissions from
international civil aviation and maritime activities;
(D) reduce emissions from coal, oil, and gas;
(E) implement the Paris Agreement that
significantly advances global climate ambition on
mitigation, adaptation, and support;
(F) coordinate among relevant federal, state, and
local departments and agencies on climate action
related initiatives;
(G) provide resources, authorities and support for
enhancing United States ambition and commitment to
solving the climate crisis including climate action
specific assistance and multilateral fund
contributions; and
(H) integrate considerations for climate change
into broader United States foreign policy decision-
making and the United States national security
apparatus.
(c) Purpose.--The purpose of this section is to provide
authorities, resources, policies, and recommended administrative
actions--
(1) to restore United States global leadership on
addressing the climate crisis and make United States climate
action and climate diplomacy a more central tenet of United
States foreign policy;
(2) to improve the United States commitment to taking more
ambitious action to help mitigate global greenhouse gas
emission and improve developing countries' resilience and
adaptation capacities to the effects of climate change;
(3) to ensure the United States maintains competitive
advantage over global strategic competitors in diplomacy and
new technological development;
(4) to encourage the pursuit of new bilateral cooperation
agreements with other world powers on initiatives to advance
global clean energy innovation and other measures to mitigate
global greenhouse gas emissions and improve climate change
adaptation capacities;
(5) to ensure that the United States national security
apparatus integrates critically important data on the
compounding effects that climate change is having on global
security risks by enhancing our understanding of how, where,
and when such effects are destabilizing countries and regions
in ways that may motivate conflict, displacement, and other
drivers of insecurity; and
(6) to authorize funding and programs to support a
reaffirmation of the United States' commitments to
international cooperation and support for developing and
vulnerable countries to take climate action.
(d) Definitions.--In this title:
(1) Clean energy.--The term ``clean energy'' means--
(A) renewable energy and related systems;
(B) energy production processes that emit zero
greenhouse gas emissions, including nuclear power;
(C) systems and processes that capture and
permanently store greenhouse gas emissions from fossil
fuel production and electricity generation units; and
(D) products, processes, facilities, or systems
designed to retrofit and improve the energy efficiency
and electricity generated from electrical generation
units, while using less fuel, less or fewer power
production resources, or less feedstocks.
(2) Climate action.--The term ``climate action'' means
enhanced efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and
strengthen resilience and adaptive capacity to climate-induced
impacts, including--
(A) climate-related hazards in all countries;
(B) integrating climate change measures into
national policies, strategies and planning; and
(C) improving education, awareness-raising, and
human and institutional capacity with respect to
climate change mitigation, adaptation, impact
reduction, and early warning.
(3) Climate crisis.--The term ``climate crisis'' means the
social, economic, health, safety, and security impacts on
people, and the threats to biodiversity and natural ecosystem
health, which are attributable to the wide-variety of effects
on global environmental and atmospheric conditions as a result
of disruptions to the Earth's climate from anthropogenic
activities that generate greenhouse gas emissions or reduce
natural resource capacities to absorb and regulate atmospheric
carbon.
(4) Climate diplomacy.--The term ``climate diplomacy''
means methods of influencing the decisions and behavior of
foreign governments and peoples through dialogue, negotiation,
cooperation, and other peaceful measures on or about issues
related to addressing global climate change, including--
(A) the mitigation of global greenhouse gas
emissions;
(B) discussion, analysis, and sharing of scientific
data and information on the cause and effects of
climate change;
(C) the security, social, economic, and political
instability risks associated with the effects of
climate change;
(D) economic cooperation efforts and trade matters
that are related to or associated with climate change
and greenhouse gas mitigation from the global economy;
(E) building resilience capacities and adapting to
the effects of change;
(F) sustainable land use and natural resource
conservation;
(G) accounting for loss and damage attributed to
the effects of climate change;
(H) just transition of carbon intense economies to
low or zero carbon economies and accounting for
laborers within affected economies;
(I) technological innovations that reduce or
eliminate carbon emissions; and
(J) clean energy and energy systems.
(5) Climate financing.--The term ``climate financing''
means the transfer of new and additional public funds from
developed countries to developing countries for projects and
programs that--
(A) reduce or eliminate greenhouse gas emissions;
(B) enhance and restore natural carbon
sequestration; and
(C) promote adaptation to climate change.
(6) Climate security.--The term ``climate security'' means
the effects of climate change on--
(A) United States national security concerns and
subnational, national, and regional political
stability; and
(B) overseas security and conflict situations that
are potentially exacerbated by dynamic environmental
factors and events, including--
(i) the intensification and frequency of
droughts, floods, wildfires, tropical storms,
and other extreme weather events;
(ii) changes in historical severe weather,
drought, and wildfire patterns;
(iii) the expansion of geographical ranges
of droughts, floods, and wildfires into regions
that had not regularly experienced such
phenomena;
(iv) global sea level rise patterns and the
expansion of geographical ranges affected by
drought; and
(v) changes in marine environments that
effect critical geostrategic waterways, such as
the Arctic Ocean, the South China Sea, the
South Pacific Ocean, the Barents Sea, and the
Beaufort Sea.
(7) Green climate fund.--The term ``Green Climate Fund''
means the independent, multilateral fund--
(A) established by parties to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change; and
(B) adopted by decision as part of the financial
mechanism of the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change.
(8) Paris agreement.--The term ``Paris Agreement'' means
the annex to Decision 1/CP.21 adopted by the 21st Conference of
Parties of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change in Paris, France, on December 12, 2015.
(9) Resilience.--The term ``resilience'' means the ability
of human made and natural systems (including their component
parts) to anticipate, absorb, cope, accommodate, or recover
from the effects of a hazardous event in a timely and efficient
manner, including through ensuring the preservation,
restoration, or improvement of its essential basic structures
and functions. It is not preparedness or response.
SEC. 602. ENHANCING SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS FOR GLOBAL CLIMATE
DISRUPTIONS.
(a) In General.--The Secretary of State, in consultation with the
heads of other relevant Federal agencies, shall conduct biennial
comprehensive evaluations of present and ongoing disruptions to the
global climate system, including--
(1) the intensity, frequency, and range of natural
disasters;
(2) the scarcity of global natural resources, including
fresh water;
(3) global food, health, and energy insecurities;
(4) conditions that contribute to--
(A) intrastate and interstate conflicts;
(B) foreign political and economic instability;
(C) international migration of vulnerable and
underserved populations;
(D) the failure of national governments; and
(E) gender-based violence; and
(5) United States and allied military readiness,
operations, and strategy.
(b) Purposes.--The purposes of the evaluations conducted under
subsection (a) are--
(1) to support the practical application of scientific data
and research on climate change's dynamic effects around the
world to improve resilience, adaptability, security, and
stability despite growing global environmental risks and
changes;
(2) to ensure that the strategic planning and mission
execution of United States international development and
diplomatic missions adequately account for heightened and
dynamic risks and challenges associated with the effects of
climate change;
(3) to improve coordination between United States science
agencies conducting research and forecasts on the causes and
effects of climate change and United States national security
agencies;
(4) to better understand the disproportionate effects of
global climate disruptions on women, girls, indigenous
communities, and other historically marginalized populations;
and
(5) to inform the development of the climate security
strategy described in subsection (d).
(c) Scope.--The evaluations conducted under subsection (a) shall--
(1) examine developing countries' vulnerabilities and risks
associated with global, regional, and localized effects of
climate change; and
(2) assess and make recommendations on necessary measures
to mitigate risks and reduce vulnerabilities associated with
effects, including--
(A) sea level rise;
(B) freshwater resource scarcity;
(C) wildfires; and
(D) increased intensity and frequency of extreme
weather conditions and events, such as flooding,
drought, and extreme storm events, including tropical
cyclones.
(d) Climate Security Strategy.--The Secretary shall use the
evaluations required under subsection (a)--
(1) to inform the development and implementation of a
climate security strategy for the Bureau of Conflict and
Stabilization Operations, the Bureau of Political-Military
Affairs, embassies, consulates, regional bureaus, and other
offices and programs operating chief of mission authority,
including those with roles in conflict avoidance, prevention
and security assistance, or humanitarian disaster response,
prevention, and assistance; and
(2) in furtherance of such strategy, to assess, develop,
budget for, and (upon approval) implement plans, policies, and
actions--
(A) to account for the impacts of climate change to
global human health, safety, governance, oceans, food
production, fresh water and other critical natural
resources, settlements, infrastructure, marginalized
groups, and economic activity;
(B) to evaluate the climate change vulnerability,
security, susceptibility, and resiliency of United
States interests and non-defense assets abroad;
(C) to coordinate the integration of climate change
risk and vulnerability assessments into all foreign
policy and security decision-making processes,
including awarding foreign assistance;
(D) to evaluate specific risks to certain regions
and countries that are--
(i) vulnerable to the effects of climate
change; and
(ii) strategically significant to the
United States;
(E) to enhance the resilience capacities of foreign
countries to the effects of climate change as a means
of reducing the risks of conflict and instability;
(F) to advance principles of good governance by
encouraging foreign governments, particularly nations
that are least capable of coping with the effects of
climate change--
(i) to conduct climate security
evaluations; and
(ii) to facilitate the development of
climate security action plans to ensure
stability and public safety in disaster
situations in a humane and responsible fashion;
(G) to evaluate the vulnerability, security,
susceptibility, and resiliency of United States
interests and nondefense assets abroad;
(H) to build international institutional capacity
to address climate security implications and to advance
United States interests, regional stability, and global
security; and
(I) other activities that advance--
(i) the utilization and integration of
climate science in national security planning;
and
(ii) the clear understanding of how the
effects of climate change can exacerbate
security risks and threats.
(e) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act and every two years thereafter for the following
20 years, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the heads of
other relevant Federal departments and agencies shall submit to the
Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of
the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives an unclassified report,
with a classified annex if necessary, that includes--
(1) a review of the efforts, initiatives, and programs in
support of the strategy in subsection (c), as well as--
(A) an assessment of the funding expended by
relevant Federal departments and agencies on emerging
events exacerbated by climate change and the legal,
procedural, and resource constraints faced by the
Department of State and the United States Agency for
International Development throughout respective
budgeting, strategic planning, and management cycles to
support the prevention of and response to emerging
events exacerbated by climate change;
(B) current annual global assessments of emerging
events exacerbated by climate change;
(C) recommendations to further strengthen United
States capabilities described in this section; and
(D) consideration of analysis, reporting, and
policy recommendations by civil society, academic, and
nongovernmental organizations and institutions, and
partner countries to prevent and respond to emerging
events exacerbated by climate change;
(2) recommendations to ensure shared responsibility by--
(A) enhancing multilateral mechanisms for
preventing, mitigating, and responding to emerging
events exacerbated by climate change; and
(B) strengthening regional organizations; and
(3) the implementation status of the recommendations
included in the review under paragraph (1).
(f) Report by the Director of National Intelligence.--The Director
of National Intelligence is encouraged to include, in the Director's
annual (or more often as appropriate) unclassified testimony,
accompanied by a classified annex, if necessary, to Congress on threats
to United States national security--
(1) a review of countries and regions at risk of emerging
events exacerbated by climate change; and
(2) whenever possible, specific identification of countries
and regions at immediate risk of emerging events exacerbated by
climate change.
SEC. 603. BALANCING ACCOUNTABILITY AND COOPERATION WITH CHINA.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) successful mitigation of global greenhouse gas
emissions and changes to the environment require global
cooperation and coordination of efforts, as well as holding
other countries such as the People's Republic of China (PRC)
accountable for their actions and commitments to ensure a level
playing field with the United States and its allies and
partners;
(2) other countries look toward the United States and the
PRC, as the world's largest emitters and largest economies, for
leadership by example to effectively mitigate greenhouse gas
emissions, develop and deploy energy generation technologies,
and integrate sustainable adaptation solutions to the
inevitable effects of climate change;
(3) given the volume of the PRC's greenhouse gas emissions
and the scientific imperative to swiftly reduce global
greenhouse gas emissions to net-zero emissions around 2050,
China should--
(A) revise its long-term pledge;
(B) seek to immediately peak its emissions;
(C) begin reducing its greenhouse gas emissions
significantly to meet a more ambitious long-term 2050
reductions target; and
(D) update its nationally determined contribution
along a trajectory that aligns with achieving a more
ambitious net-zero by 2050 emissions target;
(4) it is in the United States national interest to
emphasize the environment and climate change in its bilateral
engagement with the PRC, as global climate risks cannot be
mitigated without a significant reduction in PRC domestic and
overseas emissions;
(5) the United States and the PRC, to the extent
practicable, should coordinate on making and delivering
ambitious pledges to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, with
aspirations towards achieving net zero greenhouse gas emissions
by 2050;
(6) the United States and its allies and partners should
work together, using diplomatic and economic tools, to hold the
PRC accountable for any failure by the PRC--
(A) to increase ambition in its 2030 nationally
determined contribution, in line with net zero
greenhouse gas emissions by 2050 before the 26th
Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC scheduled for
November 2021 and meeting a more ambitious nationally
determined contribution;
(B) to work faithfully to uphold the principles,
goals, and rules of the Paris Agreement;
(C) to avoid and prohibit efforts to undermine or
devolve the Paris Agreement's rule or underlying
framework, particularly within areas of accountability
transparency, and shared responsibility among all
parties;
(D) to eliminate greenhouse gas intensive projects
from the PRC's Belt and Road Initiative and other
overseas investments, including--
(i) working with United States allies and
partners to eliminate support for coal power
production projects in the Belt and Road
Initiative;
(ii) providing financing and project
support for cleaner and less risky
alternatives; and
(iii) undertaking ``parallel initiatives''
to enhance capacity building programs and
overseas sustainable investment criteria,
including in areas such as integrated energy
planning, power sector reform, just transition,
distributed generation, procurement,
transparency, and standards to support low-
emissions growth in developing countries; and
(E) to phase out existing coal power plants and
reduce net coal power production;
(7) the United States should pursue confidence-building
opportunities for the United States and the PRC to undertake
``parallel initiatives'' on clean energy research, development,
finance, and deployment, including through economic and
stimulus measures with clear, mutually agreed upon rules and
policies to protect intellectual property, ensure equitable,
nonpunitive provision of support, and verify implementation,
which would provide catalytic progress towards delivering a
global clean energy transformation that benefits all people;
(8) the United States should pursue cooperative initiatives
to reduce global deforestation, including efforts to shift
toward the import and consummation of forest and agricultural
commodities that are produced in a manner that does not
contribute to deforestation; and
(9) the United States should pursue appropriate scientific
cooperative exchanges and research that align with United
States interests and those of its international partners and
allies, provide reciprocity of access, protect intellectual
property rights, and preserve the values and human rights
interests of the American people.
SEC. 604. PROMOTING RESPONSIBLE DEVELOPMENT ALTERNATIVES TO THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA'S BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE.
(a) In General.--The President should seek opportunities to partner
with multilateral development finance institutions to develop financing
tools based on shared development finance criteria and mechanisms to
support investments in developing countries that--
(1) support low carbon economic development; and
(2) promote resiliency and adaptation to environmental
changes and natural disasters.
(b) Partnership Agreement.--The Chief Executive Officer of the
United States International Development Finance Corporation should seek
to partner with other multilateral development finance institutions and
development finance institutions to leverage the respective available
funds to support low carbon economic development, which may include
clean energy including renewable and nuclear energy projects,
environmental adaptation, and resilience activities in countries.
(c) Co-financing of Infrastructure Projects.--
(1) Authorization.--Subject to paragraph (2), the Secretary
of State, the Administrator of the United States Agency for
International Development, and the heads of other relevant
Federal agencies are authorized to co-finance infrastructure,
resilience, and environmental adaptation projects that advance
the development objectives of the United States overseas and
provide viable alternatives to projects that would otherwise be
included within the People's Republic of China's Belt and Road
Initiative.
(2) Conditions.--Co-financing arrangements authorized
pursuant to paragraph (1) may not be approved unless--
(A) the projects to be financed--
(i) promote the public good;
(ii) promote United States national
security or economic interests;
(iii) promote low carbon emissions,
including clean energy renewable and nuclear
energy projects; and
(iv) will have substantially lower
environmental impact than the proposed Belt and
Road Initiative alternative; and
(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
House of Representatives are notified not later than 15
days in advance of entering into such co-financing
arrangements.
SEC. 605. USING CLIMATE DIPLOMACY TO BETTER SERVE NATIONAL SECURITY AND
ECONOMIC INTERESTS.
(a) In General.--The President and the Secretary of State shall
prioritize climate action and climate diplomacy in United States
foreign policy by--
(1) ensuring diplomacy, support, and interagency
coordination for bilateral and multilateral actions to address
the climate crisis; and
(2) improving coordination and integration of climate
action across all bureaus and United States missions abroad.
(b) Climate Action Integration.--The Secretary of State shall--
(1) prioritize climate action and clean energy within the
bureaus and offices under the leadership of the Under Secretary
for Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment;
(2) ensure that such bureaus and offices are coordinating
with other bureaus of the Department of State regarding the
integration of climate action and climate diplomacy as a cross-
cutting imperative across the Department of State;
(3) encourage all Under Secretaries of State--
(A) to assess how issues related to climate change
and United States climate action are integrated into
their operations and programs;
(B) to coordinate crosscutting actions and
diplomatic efforts that relate to climate action; and
(C) to make available the technical assistance and
resources of the bureaus and offices with relevant
expertise to provide technical assistance and expert
support to other bureaus within the Department of State
regarding climate action, clean energy development, and
climate diplomacy;
(4) manage the integration of scientific data on the
current and anticipated effects of climate change into applied
strategies and diplomatic engagements across programmatic and
regional bureaus of the Department of State and into the
Department of State's decision making processes;
(5) ensure that the relevant bureaus and offices provide
appropriate technical support and resources--
(A) to the President, the Secretary of State, and
their respective designees charged with addressing
climate change and associated issues;
(B) to United States diplomats advancing United
States foreign policy related to climate action; and
(C) for the appropriate engagement and integration
of relevant domestic agencies in international climate
change affairs, including United States participation
in multilateral fora; and
(6) carry out other activities, as directed by the
Secretary of State, that advance United States climate-related
foreign policy objectives, including global greenhouse gas
mitigation, climate change adaptation activities, and global
climate security.
(c) Responsibilities of the Under Secretary of State for Political
Affairs.--The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs shall
ensure that all foreign missions are--
(1) advancing United States bilateral climate diplomacy;
(2) engaging strategically on opportunities for bilateral
climate action cooperation with foreign governments; and
(3) utilizing the technical resources and coordinating
adequately with the bureaus reporting to the Under Secretary of
State for Economic Growth, Energy and the Environment.
(d) Report.--Not later than 200 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Under Secretary of State for Economic
Growth, Energy, and the Environment, in cooperation with the Under
Secretary of State for Political Affairs, shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees a report that--
(1) assesses how climate action and United States climate
diplomacy is integrated across the Bureaus of the Department of
State; and
(2) includes recommendations on strategies to improve cross
bureau coordination and understanding of United States climate
action and climate diplomacy.
(e) Effect of Elimination of Positions.--If the positions of Under
Secretary of State for Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment and
the Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs are eliminated or
undergo name changes, the responsibilities of such Under Secretaries
under this section shall be reassigned to other Under Secretaries of
State, as appropriate.
(f) Climate Change Officers.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary of State shall establish and
staff Climate Change Officer positions. Such Officers shall
serve under the supervision of the appropriate chief of mission
or the Under Secretary for Economic Growth, Energy, and the
Environment of the Department of State, as the case may be. The
Secretary shall ensure each embassy, consulate, and diplomatic
mission to which such Officers are assigned pursuant to
paragraph (2) has sufficient additional and appropriate staff
to support such Officers.
(2) Assignment.--Climate Change Officers shall be assigned
to the following posts:
(A) United States embassies, or, if appropriate,
consulates.
(B) United States diplomatic missions to, or
liaisons with, regional and multilateral organizations,
including the United States diplomatic missions to the
European Union, African Union, Organization of American
States, Arctic Council, and any other appropriate
regional organization, and the United Nations and its
relevant specialized agencies.
(C) Other posts as designated by the Secretary.
(3) Responsibilities.--Each Climate Change Officer shall--
(A) provide expertise on effective approaches to--
(i) mitigate the emission of gases which
contribute to global climate change and
formulate national and global plans for
reducing such gross and net emissions; and
(ii) reduce the detrimental impacts
attributable to global climate change, and
adapt to such impacts;
(B) engage and convene, in a manner that is
equitable, inclusive, and just, with individuals and
organizations which represent a government office, a
nongovernmental organization, a social or political
movement, a private sector entity, an educational or
scientific institution, or any other entity concerned
with--
(i) global climate change; the emission of
gases which contribute to global climate
change; or
(ii) reducing the detrimental impacts
attributable to global climate change;
(C) facilitate engagement by United States entities
in bilateral and multilateral cooperation on climate
change; and
(D) carry out such other responsibilities as the
Secretary may assign.
(4) Responsibilities of under secretary.--The Under
Secretary for Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment of
the Department of State shall, including by acting through the
Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific
Affairs of the Department of State--
(A) provide policy guidance to Climate Change
Officers established under this subsection;
(B) develop relations with, consult with, and
provide assistance to relevant individuals and
organizations concerned with studying, mitigating, and
adapting to global climate change, or reducing the
emission of gases which contribute to global climate
change; and
(C) assist officers and employees of regional
bureaus of the Department of State to develop
strategies and programs to promote studying,
mitigating, and adapting to global climate change, or
reducing the emission of gases which contribute to
global climate change.
(g) Actions by Chiefs of Mission.--Each chief of mission in a
foreign country shall--
(1) develop, as part of annual joint strategic plans or
equivalent program and policy planning, a strategy to promote
actions to improve and increase studying, mitigating, and
adapting to global climate change, or reducing the emission of
gases which contribute to global climate change by--
(A) consulting and coordinating with and providing
support to relevant individuals and organizations,
including experts and other professionals and
stakeholders on issues related to climate change; and
(B) holding periodic meetings with such relevant
individuals and organizations relating to such
strategy; and
(2) hold ongoing discussions with the officials and leaders
of such country regarding progress to improve and increase
studying, mitigating, and adapting to global climate change, or
reducing the emission of gases which contribute to global
climate change in a manner that is equitable, inclusive, and
just in such country; and
(3) certify annually to the Secretary of State that to the
maximum extent practicable, considerations related to climate
change adaptation and mitigation, sustainability, and the
environment were incorporated in activities, management, and
operations of the United States embassy or other diplomatic
post under the director of the chief of mission.
(h) Training.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall establish
curriculum at the Department of State's Foreign Service Institute that
supplements political and economic reporting tradecraft courses in
order to provide employees of the Department with specialized training
with respect to studying, mitigating, and adapting to global climate
change, or reducing the emission of gases which contribute to global
climate change. Such training shall include the following:
(1) Awareness of the full range of national and subnational
agencies, offices, personnel, statutory authorities, funds, and
programs involved in the international commitments of the
United States regarding global climate change and the emission
of gases which contribute to global climate change, the science
of global climate change, and methods for mitigating and
adapting to global climate change.
(2) Awareness of methods for mitigating and adapting to
global climate change and reducing the emission of gases which
contribute to global climate change that are equitable,
inclusive, and just.
(3) Familiarity with United States agencies, multilateral
agencies, international financial institutions, and the network
of donors providing assistance to mitigate and adapt to global
climate change.
(4) Awareness of the most frequently announced goals and
methods of the entities specified in subsection (f)(3)(B).
(i) Contracting.--Contracting and agreements officers of the
Department of State, and other United States embassy personnel
responsible for contracts, grants, or acquisitions, shall receive
training on evaluating proposals, solicitations, and bids, for
considerations related to sustainability and adapting to or mitigating
impacts from climate change.
(j) Reporting.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act and biennially thereafter, the Secretary of State
shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that
includes a detailed breakdown of posts at which staff are assigned the
role of Climate Change Officer, the responsibilities to which they have
been assigned, and the strategies developed by the chief of mission, as
applicable.
(k) Climate Change Support and Financing.--The Secretary of State
shall facilitate the coordination among the Department of State and
other relevant Federal departments and agencies toward contributing
technical cooperation, engagement, development finance, or foreign
assistance relevant to United States international climate action and
in support of United States climate diplomacy.
(l) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that climate
diplomacy tools as described in this section are critical for
demonstrating the commitment to include climate changes issues as core
tenets of foreign policy priorities, as well as preserving the United
States' role as a global leader on climate change action.
SEC. 606. DRIVING A GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE RESILIENCE STRATEGY.
(a) Amendment.--Section 117 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
(22 U.S.C. 2151p) is amended--
(1) in subsection (b)--
(A) by inserting ``(1)'' after ``(b)''; and
(B) by adding at the end the following:
``(2)(A) The President is authorized to furnish assistance to
programs and initiatives that--
``(i) promote resilience among communities facing harmful
impacts from climate change; and
``(ii) reduce the vulnerability of persons affected by
climate change.
``(B) There shall be, in the Department of State, a Coordinator of
Climate Change Resilience.''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following:
``(d)(1) The Secretary of State, in coordination with the
Administrator of the United States Agency for International
Development, shall establish a comprehensive, integrated, 10-year
strategy, which shall be referred to as the `Global Climate Change
Resilience Strategy', to mitigate the impacts of climate change on
displacement and humanitarian emergencies.
``(2) The Global Climate Change Resilience Strategy shall--
``(A) focus on addressing slow-onset and rapid-onset
effects of events caused by climate change, consider the
effects of events caused by climate change, and describe the
key features of successful strategies to prevent such
conditions;
``(B) include specific objectives and multisectoral
approaches to the effects of events caused by climate change;
``(C) promote United States national security and economic
interests while leading international climate-related
policymaking efforts, on which the absence of United States
leadership would lead to a substantial and harmful decline in
the nation's global competitiveness;
``(D) promote international instruments on climate action
and other relevant international standards and best practices,
as such standards and practices develop, that serve the
interests of the American people and protect United States
environmental resources and the planet;
``(E) promote the adoption and implementation of such
international climate-related agreements, standards, and
practices by foreign states;
``(F) work with United States allies and partners to ensure
a level playing field exists when it comes to climate action
and to encourage and assist foreign countries to make similar
or even greater commitments than the United States;
``(G) describe approaches that ensure national leadership,
as appropriate, and substantively engage with civil society,
local partners, and the affected communities, including
marginalized populations and underserved populations, in the
design, implementation, and monitoring of climate change
programs to best safeguard the future of those subject to
displacement;
``(H) assign roles for relevant Federal agencies to avoid
duplication of efforts, while ensuring that--
``(i) the Department of State is responsible for--
``(I) leading the Global Climate Change
Resilience Strategy;
``(II) establishing United States foreign
policy;
``(III) advancing diplomatic and political
efforts; and
``(IV) guiding security assistance and
related civilian security efforts to mitigate
climate change threats;
``(ii) the United States Agency for International
Development is--
``(I) responsible for overseeing programs
to prevent the effects of events caused by
climate change;
``(II) the lead implementing agency for
development and related nonsecurity program
policy related to building resilience and
achieving recovery; and
``(III) responsible for providing overseas
humanitarian assistance to respond to
international and internal displacement caused
by climate change and to coordinate the pursuit
of durable solutions for climate-displaced
persons; and
``(iii) other Federal agencies support the
activities of the Department of State and the United
States Agency for International Development, as
appropriate, with the concurrence of the Secretary of
State and the Administrator of the United States Agency
for International Development;
``(I) describe programs that agencies will undertake to
achieve the stated objectives, including descriptions of
existing programs and funding by fiscal year and account;
``(J) identify mechanisms to improve coordination between
the United States, foreign governments, and international
organizations, including the World Bank, the United Nations,
regional organizations, and private sector organizations;
``(K) address efforts to expand public-private partnerships
and leverage private sector resources;
``(L) describe the criteria, metrics, and mechanisms for
monitoring and evaluation of programs and objectives in the
Global Climate Change Resilience Strategy;
``(M) describe how the Global Climate Change Resilience
Strategy will ensure that programs are country-led and context-
specific;
``(N) establish a program to monitor climate and social
conditions to anticipate and prevent climate and environmental
stressors from evolving into national security risks;
``(O) include an assessment of climate risks in the
Department of State's Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development
Review; and
``(P) prioritize foreign aid, to the extent practicable,
for international climate resilience in support of this Global
Climate Change Resilience Strategy.
``(3) Not later than 270 days after the date of the enactment of
this subsection, and annually thereafter, the President shall submit a
report to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the
Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, based in
part on the information collected pursuant to this section, that
details the Global Climate Change Resilience Strategy. The report shall
be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex,
if necessary.
``(4) Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of
this subsection, the Secretary of State and the Coordinator of Global
Climate Change Resilience shall brief the Committee on Foreign
Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
House of Representatives regarding the progress made by the Federal
Government in implementing the Global Climate Change Resilience
Strategy.
``(5)(A) Not later than 270 days after the date of the enactment of
this subsection, and annually thereafter, the Comptroller General of
the United States, in cooperation and consultation with the Secretary
of State, shall produce a report evaluating the progress that the
Federal Government has made toward incorporating climate change into
department and agency policies, including the resources that have been
allocated for such purpose.
``(B) The report required under subparagraph (A) shall assess--
``(i) the degree to which the Department of State and the
United States Agency for International Development (USAID)
are--
``(I) developing climate change risk assessments;
and
``(II) providing guidance to missions on how to
include climate change risks in their integrated
country strategies;
``(ii) whether the Department of State and USAID have
sufficient resources to fulfill the requirements described in
paragraph (2); and
``(iii) any areas in which the Department of State and
USAID may lack sufficient resources to fulfill such
requirements.''.
(b) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be
appropriated such sums as may be necessary to carry out this Global
Climate Change Resilience Strategy.
SEC. 607. ADDRESSING INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION,
ADAPTATION, AND SECURITY.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Convention.--The term ``Convention'' means the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, done at New
York May 9, 1992, and entered into force March 21, 1994.
(2) Most vulnerable communities and populations.--The term
``most vulnerable communities and populations'' means
communities and populations that are at risk of substantial
adverse effects of climate change and have limited capacity to
respond to such effects, including women, impoverished
communities, children, indigenous peoples, and informal
workers.
(3) Most vulnerable developing countries.--The term ``most
vulnerable developing countries'' means, as determined by the
Administrator of the United States Agency for International
Development, developing countries that are at risk of
substantial adverse effects of climate change and have limited
capacity to respond to such effects, considering the approaches
included in any international treaties and agreements.
(4) Program.--The term ``Program'' means the International
Climate Change Adaptation, Mitigation, and Security Program
established pursuant to subsection (c).
(b) Purpose.--The purpose of this section is to provide authorities
for additional, new, current, and ongoing bilateral and regional
international development assistance, and, as appropriate, to leverage
private resources, in support of host country driven projects,
planning, policies, and initiatives designed to improve the ability of
host countries--
(1) to primarily produce reliable renewable energy and
reduce or mitigate carbon emissions from the power sector while
facilitating the transition in key global markets from
electricity generated from fossil fuel power to low-cost clean
energy sources, in a manner that is equitable for workers and
communities;
(2) to adapt and become more resilient to current and
forecasted effects of climate change; and
(3) to employ--
(A) sustainable land use practices that mitigate
desertification and reduce greenhouse gas emissions
from deforestation and forest degradation; and
(B) agricultural production practices that reduce
poverty while improving soil health, protecting water
quality, and increasing food security and nutrition.
(c) Establishment of Program.--The Secretary of State, in
coordination with the Secretary of the Treasury and the Administrator
of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID),
shall establish a program, to be known as the ``International Climate
Change Adaptation, Mitigation, and Security Program'', to provide
bilateral and regional assistance to developing countries for programs,
projects, and activities described in subsection (e).
(d) Supplement Not Supplant.--Assistance provided under this
section shall be used to supplement, and not to supplant, any other
Federal, State, or local resources available to carry out activities
that fit the characteristics of the Program.
(e) Policy.--It shall be the policy of the United States to ensure
that the Program provides resources to developing countries,
particularly the most vulnerable communities and populations in such
countries, to support the development and implementation of programs,
projects, and activities that--
(1) reduce greenhouse gas emissions through the integration
and deployment of clean energy, including transmission,
distribution, and interconnections to renewable energy, while
facilitating the transition from electricity generated from
fossil fuel power to low-cost renewable energy sources, in a
manner that is equitable for workers and communities;
(2) address financial or other barriers to the widespread
deployment of clean energy technologies that reduce, sequester,
or avoid greenhouse gas emissions;
(3) improve the availability, viability, and accessibility
of zero emission vehicles, including support for design and
development of transportation networks and land use practices
that mitigate carbon emissions in the transportation sector;
(4) support building capacities that may include--
(A) developing and implementing methodologies and
programs for measuring greenhouse gas emissions and
verifying emissions mitigation, including building
capacities to conduct emissions inventories and meet
reporting requirements under the Paris Agreement;
(B) assessing, developing, and implementing
technology and policy options for greenhouse gas
emissions mitigation and avoidance of future emissions,
including sector-based and cross-sector mitigation
strategies;
(C) enhancing the technical capacity of regulatory
authorities, planning agencies, and related
institutions in developing countries to improve the
deployment of clean energy technologies and practices,
including through increased transparency;
(D) training and instruction regarding the
installation and maintenance of renewable energy
technologies; and
(E) activities that support the development and
implementation of frameworks for intellectual property
rights in developing countries;
(5) improve resilience, sustainable economic growth, and
adaptation capacities in response to the effects of climate
change;
(6) promote appropriate job training and access to new job
opportunities in new economic sectors and industries that
emerge due to the transition from fossil fuel energy to clean
energy;
(7) reduce the vulnerability and increase the resilience
capacities of communities to the effects of climate change,
including effects on--
(A) water availability;
(B) agricultural productivity and food security;
(C) flood risk;
(D) coastal resources;
(E) biodiversity;
(F) economic livelihoods;
(G) health and diseases;
(H) housing and shelter; and
(I) human migration;
(8) help countries and communities adapt to changes in the
environment through enhanced community planning, preparedness,
and growth strategies that take into account current and
forecasted regional and localized effects of climate change;
(9) conserve and restore natural resources, ecosystems, and
biodiversity threatened by the effects of climate change to
ensure such resources, ecosystems, and biodiversity are healthy
and continue to provide natural protections from the effects of
climate change such as extreme weather;
(10) provide resources, information, scientific data and
modeling, innovative best practices, and technical assistance
to support vulnerable developing countries to adapt to the
effects of climate change;
(11) promote sustainable and climate-resilient societies,
including through improvements to make critical infrastructure
less vulnerable to the effects of climate change;
(12) encourage the adoption of policies and measures,
including sector-based and cross-sector policies and measures,
that substantially reduce, sequester, or avoid greenhouse gas
emissions from the domestic energy and transportation sectors
of developing countries;
(13) reduce deforestation and land degradation to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions and implement sustainable forestry
practices;
(14) promote sustainable land use activities, including
supporting development planning, design, and construction with
respect to transportation systems and land use;
(15) promote sustainable agricultural practices that
mitigate carbon emissions, conserve soil, and improve food and
water security of communities;
(16) foster partnerships with private sector entities and
nongovernmental international development organizations to
assist with developing solutions and economic opportunities
that support projects, planning, policies, and initiatives
described in subsection (b);
(17) provide technical assistance and strengthen capacities
of developing countries to meet the goals of the conditional
nationally determined contributions of those countries;
(18) establish investment channels designed to leverage
private sector financing in--
(A) clean energy;
(B) sustainable agriculture and natural resource
management; and
(C) the transportation sector as described in
paragraph (3); and
(19) provide technical assistance and support for non-
extractive activities that provide alternative economic growth
opportunities while preserving critical habitats and natural
carbon sinks.
(f) Provision of Assistance.--
(1) In general.--The Administrator of USAID, in
consultation with other Federal departments and agencies, shall
provide assistance under the Program--
(A) in the form of bilateral assistance pursuant to
the requirements under subsection (g);
(B) to multilateral funds or international
institutions with programs for climate mitigation or
adaptation in developing countries consistent with the
policy described in subsection (e); or
(C) through a combination of the mechanisms
specified in subparagraphs (A) and (B).
(2) Limitation.--
(A) Conditional distribution to multilateral funds
or international institutions.--In any fiscal year, the
Administrator of USAID may provide up to 40 percent of
the assistance available to carry out the Program to 1
or more multilateral funds or international
institutions that meet the requirements of subparagraph
(B).
(B) Multilateral fund or international institution
eligibility.--A multilateral fund or international
institution is eligible to receive assistance under
subparagraph (A)--
(i) if--
(I) such fund or institution is
established pursuant to--
(aa) the Convention; or
(bb) an agreement
negotiated under the
Convention; or
(II) the assistance is directed to
1 or more multilateral funds or
international development institutions,
pursuant to an agreement negotiated
under the Convention; and
(ii) if such fund or institution--
(I) specifies the terms and
conditions under which the United
States is to provide assistance to the
fund or institution, and under which
the fund or institution is to provide
assistance to recipient countries;
(II) ensures that assistance from
the United States to the fund or
institution and the principal and
income of the fund or institution are
disbursed only--
(aa) to support projects,
planning, policies, and
initiatives described in
subsection (b);
(bb) consistent with the
policy described in subsection
(e); and
(cc) in regular
consultation with relevant
governing bodies of the fund or
institution that--
(AA) include
representation from
countries among the
most vulnerable
developing countries;
and
(BB) provide public
access.
(C) Congressional notification.--The Secretary of
State, the Administrator of USAID, or the Secretary of
the Treasury shall notify the appropriate congressional
committees not later than 15 days before providing
assistance to a multilateral fund or international
institution under this subsection.
(3) Local consultations.--Programs, projects, and
activities supported by assistance provided under this
subsection shall require consultations with local communities,
particularly the most vulnerable communities and populations in
such communities, and indigenous peoples in areas in which any
programs, projects, or activities are planned to engage such
communities and peoples through adequate disclosure of
information, public participation, and consultation, including
full consideration of the interdependence of vulnerable
communities and ecosystems to promote the resilience of local
communities.
(g) Bilateral Assistance.--
(1) In general.--Except to the extent inconsistent with
this subsection, the administrative authorities under the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.) shall
apply to the implementation of this subsection to the same
extent and in the same manner as such authorities apply to the
implementation of such Act in order to provide the
Administrator of USAID with the authority to provide assistance
to countries, including the most vulnerable developing
countries, for programs, projects, and activities consistent
with the purposes described in subsection (b) and the policy
described in subsection (e).
(2) Considerations.--In carrying out this subsection, the
Administrator shall ensure that--
(A) the environmental impact of proposed programs,
projects, and activities is considered through adequate
consultation, public participation, and public
disclosure of relevant information; and
(B) programs, projects, and activities under this
subsection--
(i) avoid environmental degradation, to the
maximum extent practicable; and
(ii) are aligned, to the maximum extent
practicable, with broader development, poverty
alleviation, or natural resource management
objectives and initiatives in the recipient
country.
(3) Community engagement.--The Administrator shall seek to
ensure that--
(A) local communities, particularly the most
vulnerable communities and populations in areas in
which any programs, projects, or activities are carried
out under this subsection, are engaged in the design,
implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of such
programs, projects, and activities through disclosure
of information, public participation, and consultation;
and
(B) the needs and interests of the most vulnerable
communities and populations are addressed in national
or regional climate change adaptation plans developed
with USAID support.
(4) Consultation and disclosure.--For each country
receiving assistance under this subsection, the Administrator
shall establish a process for consultation with, and disclosure
of information to, local, national, and international
stakeholders regarding any programs, projects, or activities
carried out under this subsection.
(h) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be
appropriated to carry out this section $2,000,000,000 for fiscal year
2022 and each fiscal year thereafter.
SEC. 608. REDUCING THE NEGATIVE IMPACTS FROM BLACK CARBON, METHANE, AND
HIGH-GWP HYDROFLUOROCARBONS.
(a) Definition.--In this section, the term ``high-GWP HFC'' means
newly manufactured hydrofluorocarbons with a global warming potential
calculated over a 100-year period of greater than 150, as described in
the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change.
(b) In General.--The President shall direct the United States
representatives to appropriate international bodies and conferences to
use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States, consistent
with the broad foreign policy goals of the United States, to advocate
that each such body or conference--
(1) commit to significantly increasing efforts to reduce
black carbon, methane, and high-GWP HFC;
(2) invest in and develop alternative energy sources,
industrial and agricultural processes, appliances, and products
to replace sources of black carbon, methane, and high-GWP HFC;
(3) enhance coordination with the private sector--
(A) to increase production and distribution of
clean energy alternatives, industrial processes, and
products that will replace sources of black carbon,
methane, and high-GWP HFC;
(B) to develop action plans to mitigate black
carbon, methane, and high-GWP HFC from various private
sector operations;
(C) to encourage best technology, methods, and
management practices for reducing black carbon,
methane, and high-GWP HFC;
(D) to craft specific financing mechanisms for the
incremental costs associated with mitigating black
carbon, methane, and high-GWP HFC pollutants; and
(E) to grow economic opportunities and develop
markets, as appropriate, for reducing black carbon,
methane, tropospheric ozone, and hydrofluorocarbons;
(4) provide technical assistance to foreign regulatory
authorities and governments to remove unnecessary barriers to
investment in short-lived climate mitigation solutions,
including--
(A) the use of safe and affordable clean energy;
(B) the implementation of policies requiring
industrial and agricultural best practices for
capturing or mitigating the release of methane from
extractive, agricultural, and industrial processes; and
(C) climate assessment, scientific research,
monitoring, and technological development activities;
(5) develop and implement clear, accountable, and metric-
based targets to measure the effectiveness of projects
described in paragraph (4); and
(6) engage international partners in an existing
multilateral forum (or, if necessary, establish through an
international agreement a new multilateral forum) to improve
global cooperation for--
(A) creating tangible metrics for evaluating
efforts to reduce black carbon, methane, and high-GWP
HFC;
(B) developing and implementing best practices for
phasing out sources of black carbon, methane, and high-
GWP HFC, including expanding capacity for innovative
instruments to mitigate black carbon, methane, and
high-GWP HFC at the national and subnational levels of
foreign countries, particularly countries with little
capacity to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and deploy
clean energy facilities, and countries that lack
sufficient policies to advance such development;
(C) encouraging the development of standards and
practices, and increasing transparency and
accountability efforts for the reduction of black
carbon, methane, and high-GWP HFC;
(D) integrating tracking and monitoring systems
into industrial processes;
(E) fostering research to improve scientific
understanding of--
(i) how high concentrations of black
carbon, methane, and high-GWP HFC affect human
health, safety, and our environment;
(ii) changes in the amount and regional
concentrations of black carbon and methane
emissions, based on scientific modeling and
forecasting;
(iii) effective means to sequester black
carbon, methane, and high-GWP HFC; and
(iv) other related areas of research the
United States representatives deem necessary;
(F) encouraging the World Bank, the International
Monetary Fund, and other international finance
organizations--
(i) to prioritize efforts to combat black
carbon, methane, and high-GWP HFC; and
(ii) to enhance transparency by providing
sufficient and adequate information to
facilitate independent verification of their
climate finance reporting;
(G) encouraging observers of the Arctic Council
(including India and China) to adopt mitigation plans
consistent with the findings and recommendations of the
Arctic Council's Framework for Action on Black Carbon
and Methane;
(H) collaborating on technological advances in
black carbon, methane, and high-GWP HFC pollutant
mitigation, sequestration and reduction technologies;
and
(I) advising foreign countries, at both the
national and subnational levels, regarding the
development and execution of regulatory policies,
services, and laws pertaining to reducing the creation
and the collection and safe management of black carbon,
methane, and high-GWP HFC.
(c) Enhancing International Outreach and Partnership of United
States Agencies Involved in Greenhouse Gas Reductions.--
(1) Finding.--Congress recognizes the success of the United
States Climate Alliance and the greenhouse gas reduction
programs and strategies established by the Environmental
Protection Agency's Center for Corporate Climate Leadership.
(2) Authorization of efforts to build foreign
partnerships.--The Secretary of State shall work with the
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency to build
partnerships, as appropriate, with the governments of foreign
countries and to support international efforts to reduce black
carbon, methane, and high-GWP HFC.
(d) Negotiation of New International Agreements and Reassertion of
Targets in Existing Agreements.--Not later than 1 year after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit a
report to Congress that--
(1) assesses the potential for negotiating new
international agreements, new targets within existing
international agreements or cooperative bodies, and the
creation of a new international forum to mitigate globally
black carbon, methane, and high-GWP HFC to support the efforts
described in subsection (b);
(2) describes the provisions that could be included in such
agreements;
(3) assesses potential parties to such agreements;
(4) describes a process for reengaging with Canada and
Mexico regarding the methane targets agreed to at the 2016
North American Leaders' Summit; and
(5) describes a process for reengaging with the countries
of the Arctic Council regarding the methane and black carbon
targets that were negotiated in 2015 through the Framework for
Action.
(e) Consideration of Black Carbon, Methane, and High-gwp Hfc in
Negotiating International Agreements.--In negotiating any relevant
international agreement with any country or countries after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the President shall--
(1) consider the impact black carbon, methane, and high-GWP
HFC are having on the increase in global average temperatures
and the resulting global climate change;
(2) consider the effects that climate change is having on
the environment; and
(3) ensure that the agreement strengthens efforts to
eliminate black carbon, methane, and high-GWP HFC from such
country or countries.
(f) Plan to Reduce Black Carbon Emissions From Ships.--Consistent
with strategies adopted by the International Maritime Organization to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions from ships, the Secretary of State, in
consultation with the Secretary of Transportation, the Secretary of
Commerce, the Administrator, and the Commandant of the Coast Guard,
shall develop a comprehensive plan to reduce black carbon emissions
from ships based on appropriate emissions data from oceangoing vessels.
The plan shall provide for such reduction through--
(1) a clean freight partnership;
(2) limits on black carbon emissions; and
(3) efforts that include protection of access to critical
fuel shipments and emergency needs of coastal communities.
(g) Establishment of Interagency Working Group on Black Carbon,
Methane, and High-GWP HFC Pollutant Mitigation.--
(1) Establishment.--Not later than 90 days after the date
of enactment of this Act, the President shall establish a task
force, to be known as the Interagency Working Group on Black
Carbon, Methane, and High-GWP HFC Pollutant Mitigation.
(2) Membership.--The members of the Working Group shall
include the head (or a designee thereof) of each relevant
Federal agency.
(3) Duties.--The Working Group shall--
(A) not later than 180 days after the date of
enactment of this Act, submit to the appropriate
congressional committees a report that includes
specific plans of each relevant Federal agency--
(B) look for opportunities with other countries to
promote alternatives to high-GWP HFC, and transition
over time to equipment that uses safer and more
sustainable alternatives to high-GWP HFC;
(C) review the policy recommendations made by--
(i) the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change;
(ii) the United States Climate Alliance;
(iii) the Interagency Strategy to Reduce
Methane Emissions;
(iv) the Council on Climate Preparedness
and Resilience;
(v) the Clean Cooking Alliance;
(vi) the International Maritime
Organization; and
(vii) other relevant organizations and
institutions; and
(D) develop an action plan to reduce black carbon,
methane, and high-GWP HFC pollutants that incorporates
any appropriate proposals or recommendations made by
the entities referred to in subparagraph (C).
SEC. 609. BUILDING UNITED STATES ECONOMIC GROWTH AND TECHNOLOGICAL
INNOVATION THROUGH THE GREEN CLIMATE FUND.
(a) Green Climate Fund.--
(1) Findings.--Congress finds that--
(A) climate change most severely impacts vulnerable
and disadvantaged communities in the United States and
around the world;
(B) it is the responsibility of the United States
Government to work with and press other countries to
address environmental justice and climate justice;
(C) the report of the United Nations Environment
Programme entitled ``Climate Change and the Cost of
Capital in Developing Countries'', dated May 2018,
found that, in the 10 years prior to the publication of
the report, climate vulnerability has cost the 20
nations most affected by catastrophes rooted in climate
change an additional $62,000,000,000 in interest
payments alone;
(D) individuals and families, particularly
communities of color, indigenous communities, and low-
income communities, that are on the frontlines of
climate change across the globe are often in close
proximity to environmental stressors or sources of
pollution;
(E) the communities described in subparagraph (D)--
(i) are often the first exposed to the
causes and impacts of climate change; and
(ii) have the fewest resources with which
to mitigate those impacts or to relocate;
(F) all efforts to adapt to and mitigate climate
change must include specific protections for and
acknowledgment of the harm of climate change to
communities of color, indigenous peoples, women, and
other frontline communities and marginalized peoples
around the world;
(G) in Paris, on December 12, 2015, the parties to
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change adopted the Paris Agreement, a benchmark
agreement--
(i) to combat climate change;
(ii) to accelerate and intensify the
actions and investments needed for a
sustainable low carbon future; and
(iii) that acknowledges, ``Parties should,
when taking action to address climate change,
respect, promote and consider their respective
obligations on human rights, the right to
health, the rights of indigenous peoples, local
communities, migrants, children, persons with
disabilities and people in vulnerable
situations and the right to development, as
well as gender equality, empowerment of women
and intergenerational equity'';
(H) the Paris Agreement--
(i) notes the importance of ``climate
justice'' when mitigating and adapting to
climate change; and
(ii) recognizes ``the need for an effective
and progressive response to the urgent threat
of climate change'';
(I) it is imperative for all countries to undertake
mitigation activities to rapidly meet the goal of
limiting global warming to not more than 1.5 degrees
Celsius;
(J) developed countries have the greatest capacity
to mitigate their greenhouse gas emissions, while--
(i) developing countries have the least
capacity to engage in mitigation activities;
and
(ii) the capacity of developing countries
to engage in mitigation activities is less than
the national mitigation potential of those
developing countries;
(K) the determination for the fair share of
mitigation and adaptation activities for each country
must take into account--
(i) the historic greenhouse gas emissions
of each country; and
(ii) the current capacity of each country
to both mitigate greenhouse gas emissions and
adapt to climate impacts;
(L) developed countries that have historically
emitted a disproportionately high share of greenhouse
gas emissions, and reaped the economic benefits of
those polluting activities, have a corresponding
disproportionately greater responsibility to engage in
global mitigation and adaptation activities, as
compared to less industrialized countries that have
historically polluted far less;
(M) the only realistic way for less industrialized
countries to meet their full mitigation potential is
through international climate financing by more
developed countries;
(N) in the 2009 Copenhagen Accord, developed
countries committed to jointly mobilize, starting in
2020, $100,000,000,000 per year in public climate
financing (as well as private investment and other
alternative forms of finance), for developing
countries, a commitment reaffirmed in 2015 in Decision
1/CP.21 of the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change, Adoption of the Paris Agreement;
(O) the $100,000,000,000 commitment described in
subparagraph (N) was a political compromise that falls
short of the actual financing needs for climate action
in developing countries;
(P) Bloomberg New Energy Finance has estimated that
the transition to renewable energy sources in
developing countries will require hundreds of billions
of dollars annually;
(Q) the United Nations Environment Programme has
estimated that adaptation needs relating to climate
change in developing countries may be as much as
$300,000,000,000 annually by 2030;
(R) the Green Climate Fund was created in 2010 by
194 countries to serve as a crucial financing mechanism
to help developing countries limit or reduce greenhouse
gas emissions and adapt to climate change;
(S) in 2015, the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change agreed that the Green
Climate Fund should serve the goals of the Paris
Agreement, which states that ``developed country
Parties shall provide financial resources to assist
developing country Parties with respect to both
mitigation and adaptation in continuation of their
existing obligations under the Convention'';
(T) the Green Climate Fund is an essential
institution for climate financing, as the Green Climate
Fund ensures--
(i) balanced governance between developed
and developing countries;
(ii) stakeholder engagement and discourse;
(iii) a balanced approach between
mitigation and adaptation;
(iv) fair and equal labor and working
conditions;
(v) conservation of biodiversity and
critical habitats; and
(vi) strong environmental, social, and
gender protections;
(U) the Green Climate Fund--
(i) promotes and protects human rights and
the rights of marginalized groups, including
indigenous peoples, women, children, and people
with disabilities; and
(ii) continues to take steps to strengthen
protection for marginalized groups;
(iii) the United States committed
$3,000,000,000 of the first $10,000,000,000
raised for the initial resource mobilization
period of the Green Climate Fund, though only
\1/3\ of this pledge was fulfilled, leaving the
United States the only country to fall
substantially short of a commitment of a
country to the Green Climate Fund; and
(V) the Green Climate Fund is a fully operational
and proven institution supporting well over 100
projects and programs in developing countries around
the world.
(2) Statement of policy.--It is the policy of the United
States to provide climate financing--
(A) as an essential part of the global effort to
combat climate change; and
(B) that--
(i) upholds the principles of environmental
justice and climate justice;
(ii) supports programs and projects
developed by recipient countries and
communities;
(iii) is designed and implemented with the
free, prior, and informed consent of indigenous
peoples and other impacted communities;
(iv) promotes gender equality as essential
in all of the projects and programs supported
by climate financing;
(v) includes best practices for
environmental and social safeguards to ensure
that projects and programs supported by climate
financing respect fundamental human rights; and
(vi) addresses both mitigation and
adaptation as essential aspects of responding
to climate change.
(b) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be
appropriated for contributions to the Green Climate Fund $4,000,000,000
for each of the fiscal years 2022 and 2023.
(c) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the
climate financing needs to achieve the greenhouse gas emissions
reductions required to keep the planet at or below 1.5 degrees Celsius
of global warming are significantly greater than the amount of funds
authorized to be appropriated under subsection (a).
SEC. 610. ENSURING A WHOLE-OF-GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO CLIMATE ACTION.
(a) Establishment.--The Secretary of State shall establish a
Climate Impacts Task Force (referred to in this section as the ``Task
Force'') with the mandate to--
(1) monitor climate and related impacted social conditions
to anticipate and prevent climate and environmental stressors
from evolving into national security risks;
(2) monitor and assess climate action undertaken by other
countries in response to national strategies and international
commitments, and coordinate closely with allies and partners to
ensure a coordinated response against any state or non-state
actors, including the People's Republic of China (PRC) and PRC
companies, undermining global climate objectives, norms, and
practices;
(3) strengthen the efforts of the Department of State and
the United States Government to act proactively to mitigate the
human harms and potential for national security risks resulting
from emerging events exacerbated by climate change; and
(4) assist other Federal departments and agencies, foreign
partners, and multilateral organizations in their efforts to do
the same.
(b) Leadership.--The Secretary of State shall designate a senior
career official, as appropriate, of the Department of State to serve as
the Chair of the Task Force. Such official shall report to the
Secretary of State.
(c) Responsibilities.--Under the direction of the Chair, the Task
Force shall--
(1) meet regularly to ensure that events exacerbated by
climate change and the risk of emerging events exacerbated by
climate change throughout the world are adequately considered
and addressed;
(2) facilitate the development and execution of policies
and tools to enhance the capacity of the United States to
prevent and respond to emerging events exacerbated by climate
change worldwide;
(3) monitor developments throughout the world that heighten
the risk of emerging events exacerbated by climate change;
(4) identify gaps in United States foreign policy related
to the prevention of and response to emerging events
exacerbated by climate change with respect to certain regions
or particular countries;
(5) incorporate lessons learned from past United States
efforts to prevent and respond to emerging events exacerbated
by climate change and other impacts that are comparable in
scope or severity;
(6) provide the Secretary of State with recommendations and
potential improvements to policies, programs, resources, and
tools related to the prevention of and response to emerging
events exacerbated by climate change;
(7) coordinate the Department of State's engagement in
interagency processes led by the National Security Council that
share the Task Force's objectives;
(8) conduct outreach not less frequently than biannually,
with representatives of nongovernmental organizations dedicated
to the prevention of and response to emerging events
exacerbated by climate change and other appropriate parties,
to--
(A) receive assistance relating to the Task Force's
efforts to address emerging events exacerbated by
climate change and develop new or improved policies,
programs, resources, and tools; and
(B) provide a public understanding of the work of
the Task Force;
(9) in carrying out paragraphs (1) through (9), focus on
particular ways for the United States to develop, strengthen,
and enhance its capabilities to--
(A) monitor, receive early warning of, and
coordinate responses to potential emerging events
exacerbated by climate change;
(B) engage allies and partners, including
multilateral and regional institutions, to build
capacities and mobilize action for preventing and
responding to emerging events exacerbated by climate
change;
(C) encourage the deployment of civilian advisors
to prevent and respond to emerging events exacerbated
by climate change;
(D) increase the capacity of and develop doctrine
for the United States Foreign Service, civil service,
Armed Forces, development professionals, and other
actors to engage in the full spectrum of activities to
prevent and respond to emerging events exacerbated by
climate change;
(E) develop and implement tailored foreign
assistance programs that address and mitigate the risks
of emerging events exacerbated by climate change;
(F) ensure intelligence collection, analysis, and
sharing of appropriate information; and
(G) address any other issues that the Task Force
determines appropriate;
(10) in carrying out paragraphs (1) through (9), receive
support from bureaus and offices of the Department of State, as
the Secretary of State determines appropriate; and
(11) facilitate annual coordination between the Department
of State and other appropriate departments and agencies to
ensure international and domestic climate change objectives are
aligned.
(d) Composition.--The Task Force shall--
(1) seek to ensure that its efforts complement and support
interagency processes led by the National Security Council that
share the Task Force's objectives; and
(2) operate with regular consultation and participation of
designated representatives, at the Assistant Secretary level or
higher, from all such executive departments, agencies, or
offices as the Chair may designate.
(e) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act and every 2 years thereafter for the following 10
years, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Task Force,
shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on
Appropriations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs and
the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives an
unclassified report, with a classified annex if necessary, that
includes--
(1) a review, in consultation with the designated
representatives specified in subsection (d), consisting of--
(A) an evaluation of the efficacy of current
efforts based on United States and locally identified
indicators, including capacities and constraints for
United States Government-wide detection, early warning
and response, information-sharing, contingency
planning, and coordination of efforts to prevent and
respond to emerging events exacerbated by climate
change;
(B) an assessment of the funding expended by
relevant Federal departments and agencies on emerging
events exacerbated by climate change and the legal,
procedural, and resource constraints faced by the
Department of State and the United States Agency for
International Development throughout respective
budgeting, strategic planning, and management cycles to
support the prevention of and response to emerging
events exacerbated by climate change;
(C) current annual global assessments of emerging
events exacerbated by climate change;
(D) recommendations to further strengthen United
States capabilities described in subparagraph (A); and
(E) consideration of analysis, reporting, and
policy recommendations by civil society, academic, and
other nongovernmental organizations and institutions to
prevent and respond to emerging events exacerbated by
climate change;
(2) recommendations to ensure shared responsibility by--
(A) enhancing multilateral mechanisms for
preventing, mitigating, and responding to emerging
events exacerbated by climate change; and
(B) strengthening regional organizations; and
(3) the implementation status of the recommendations
included in the review under paragraph (1).
(f) Briefings and Materials.--The Chair and members of the Task
Force shall, not less frequently than annually, provide briefings and
materials to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the
Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.
(g) Report by the Director of National Intelligence.--The Director
of National Intelligence is encouraged to include, in his or her annual
(or more often as appropriate) unclassified testimony, accompanied by a
classified annex, if necessary, to Congress on threats to United States
national security--
(1) a review of countries and regions at risk of emerging
events exacerbated by climate change; and
(2) whenever possible, specific identification of countries
and regions at immediate risk of emerging events exacerbated by
climate change.
(h) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that rapid and
robust climate change response mechanisms, including the establishment
of the Task Force, are critical for ensuring other countries remain
accountable to their climate action commitments as well as preserving
the national security and economic interests of the United States.
SEC. 611. WORKING WITH INTERNATIONAL PARTNERS TO REDUCE DEFORESTATION.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
(1) The People's Republic of China (PRC) is having a
substantial impact on the most important forest ecosystems in
the world, and illegal logging and agricultural expansion have
caused the massive forest loss. According to the World
Resources Institute, the PRC has become the world's leading
importer and consumer of timber products, soybeans, and palm
oil, as well as the largest manufacturing and export country of
forest products.
(2) In 2016, the PRC imported logs from more than 100
countries in the world. According to a Global Witness report,
between January 2013 and April 2020, Chinese financial
institutions provided more than $22.5 billion to major
companies that produce and trade commodities at high risk of
driving deforestation. These commodities include beef, soy,
palm oil, paper, pulp, rubber, and timber.
(3) Further, the growing international demand for such
agricultural commodities causes the majority of deforestation
emissions globally, and most of the associated land-clearing
violates applicable national or local laws. According to a 2021
Forest Trends report, at least 69 percent of forest land
converted to pasture or cropland was cleared illegally.
(4) The growing demand for timber and agricultural
commodities has accelerated unsustainable--and often illegal--
logging and the trade of timber products, which harms the
countries in which it takes place by siphoning away government
tax revenue, transforming the livelihoods of communities
dependent on forests, and hurting legal businesses'
competitiveness. Further, illegal logging and illegal
conversion of forest to agricultural land threatens
biodiversity and accelerates deforestation and forest
degradation in key timber supply countries, undermining United
States and global climate goals.
(5) The United States should work with international
partners to ensure that Chinese and other banks factor into
lending practices the environmental and social impact of the
companies they finance. This should include pressuring the PRC
and other countries to revise regulations to require the
banking sector not to finance companies linked to deforestation
and include rigorous checks on the companies operating in
sectors or regions where there is a high risk of deforestation
to ensure they are not associated with deforestation.
(b) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Administrator.--Except as otherwise expressly provided,
the term ``Administrator'' means the Administrator of the
United States Agency for International Development.
(2) Deforestation.--The term ``deforestation'' means a
change in land use from a forest (including peatlands) to any
other land use.
(3) Developing country.--The term ``developing country''
means a country eligible to receive official development
assistance according to the income guidelines of the
Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development.
(4) Emissions reductions.--The term ``emissions
reductions'' means greenhouse gas emissions reductions achieved
from reduced or avoided deforestation under this section.
(5) Forest.--
(A) In general.--The term ``forest'' means a
terrestrial ecosystem, including wetland forests,
comprised of native tree species generated and
maintained primarily through natural ecological and
evolutionary processes.
(B) Exclusion.--The term ``forest'' does not
include plantations, such as crops of trees planted by
humans primarily for the purposes of harvesting.
(6) Forest degradation.--The term ``forest degradation'' is
any reduction in the carbon stock of a forest due to the
effects of human land-use activities, including such land-use
activities on peatlands.
(7) Intact forest.--The term ``intact forest'' means an
unbroken expanse of natural ecosystems within the global extent
of forest cover that--
(A) covers an area of at least 500 square
kilometers and is at least 10 kilometers in each
direction; and
(B) contains forest and non-forest ecosystems
minimally influenced by human economic activity and
large enough that all native biodiversity, including
viable populations of wide-ranging species, could be
maintained.
(9) Leakage.--The term ``leakage'' means the unexpected
loss of anticipated carbon benefits due to the displacement of
activities in a project area to areas outside the project,
resulting in carbon emissions.
(10) Leakage prevention activities.--The term ``leakage
prevention activities'' means activities in developing
countries that are directed at preserving existing forest
carbon stocks, including forested wetlands and peatlands that
might, absent such activities, be lost through leakage.
(11) National deforestation reduction activities.--The term
``national deforestation reduction activities'' means
activities in developing countries that reduce a quantity of
greenhouse gas emissions from deforestation that is calculated
by measuring actual emissions against a national deforestation
baseline established pursuant to subparagraphs (B) and (C) of
subsection (d)(4).
(12) Subnational deforestation and forest degradation
reduction activities.--The term ``subnational deforestation and
forest degradation reduction activities'' means activities in
developing countries that reduce a quantity of greenhouse gas
emissions from deforestation and forest degradation that is
calculated by measuring actual emissions using an appropriate
baseline, or an alternative determined under subsection
(d)(4)(B)(ii), established by the Administrator at the State or
provincial level.
(c) Purposes.--The purposes of this section are to provide United
States assistance to developing countries to develop, implement, and
improve actions that reduce deforestation and forest degradation or
conserve or restore forest ecosystems--
(1) to protect the value of forest ecosystems with respect
to permanent carbon capture and sequestration in a manner in
which such value is measurable, reportable, and verifiable; and
(2) in a manner that--
(A) is consistent with and enhances the
implementation of complementary United States policies
that support the good governance of forests,
biodiversity conservation, and environmentally
sustainable development;
(B) takes into consideration the views and
participation of local communities and most vulnerable
communities and populations, particularly forest-
dependent communities; and
(C) incorporates the right to free prior and
informed consent of indigenous peoples.
(d) Emissions Reductions Through Reduced Deforestation.--
(1) Establishment of program.--Not later than 1 year after
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Administrator, in
consultation with other appropriate agencies, shall establish a
program to provide assistance to reduce deforestation in
developing countries and its impacts, in accordance with this
section.
(2) Objectives.--The objectives of the program established
under paragraph (1) shall be--
(A) to achieve--
(i) emissions reductions of at least
7,000,000,000 tons of carbon dioxide equivalent
in 2025;
(ii) cumulative emissions reductions of at
least 11,000,000,000 tons of carbon dioxide
equivalent by December 31, 2030; and
(iii) additional emissions reductions in
subsequent years;
(B) to build capacity to reduce deforestation at a
national level in developing countries experiencing
deforestation, which may include--
(i) preparing developing countries to
participate in international markets for
international offset credits for reduced
emissions from deforestation;
(ii) supporting the development of overseas
domestic policy frameworks to ensure effective,
efficient, and equitable benefit-sharing of the
proceeds of such credits issued by national and
subnational governments; and
(iii) promoting and expanding land titling
initiatives and programs in other countries;
(C) to preserve forest carbon stocks in countries
where such forest carbon may be vulnerable to leakage,
particularly in developing countries with largely
intact native forests;
(D) to build the scientific knowledge and
institutional capacity to help developing countries--
(i) monitor the effects of climate change
on their forests;
(ii) develop and implement strategies to
conserve their forests; and
(iii) support forest-dependent communities
adapt to climate change;
(E) to the extent practicable, to reduce
deforestation in ways that reduce the vulnerability and
increase the resilience to climate effects for forests
and forest-dependent communities;
(F) to prevent degradation and fragmentation of
forests and other intact ecosystems, particularly in
tropical countries, including by providing assistance
or supporting policies to--
(i) conserve, protect, and restore the
integrity of such ecosystems; and
(ii) support the rights of Indigenous
People and local communities and their ability
to continue their effective stewardship of
their intact traditional lands and territories;
(G) to build capacity to address illegal
deforestation for agricultural commodities; and
(H) to remove subsidies that favor deforestation;
(e) Requirements for International Deforestation Reduction
Program.--
(1) Eligible countries.--
(A) In general.--Except as provided in subparagraph
(B), the Administrator may provide assistance under
this section only with respect to a developing country
that--
(i) the Administrator, in consultation with
other appropriate agencies, determines--
(I) is experiencing deforestation
or forest degradation; or
(II) has standing forest carbon
stocks that may be at risk of
deforestation or degradation;
(ii) has the legal regimes, standards, and
safeguards to ensure that the rights and
interests of indigenous peoples and forest-
dependent communities are protected in
accordance with the standards established under
paragraph (4); and
(iii) has entered into a bilateral or
multilateral agreement or arrangement with the
United States, or is part of an international
program supported by the United States to
prevent deforestation, that establishes the
conditions of participation by the country in
the program established under this section,
which shall include an agreement to meet the
standards established under paragraph (4) for
the activities to which such standards apply.
(B) Exception.--A developing country that does not
meet the requirement described in paragraph (1)(A)(ii)
may receive assistance under this section for the
purpose of building capacity to meet such requirement.
(2) Authorized activities.--Subject to the requirements of
this section, in providing assistance under this section, the
Administrator may support activities to achieve the objectives
described in subsection (c)(2), such as--
(A) national deforestation reduction activities;
(B) subnational deforestation and forest
degradation reduction activities, including pilot
activities, policies, and measures that reduce
greenhouse gas emissions and are subject to significant
uncertainty;
(C) activities to measure, monitor, and verify
deforestation, avoided deforestation, and rates of
deforestation, including, if applicable, spatially
explicit land use plans that identify intact and
primary forest areas and managed forest areas;
(D) leakage prevention activities;
(E) the development and implementation of
measurement, monitoring, reporting, and verification
capacities and governance structures, including legal
regimes, standards, processes, and safeguards, as
established under paragraph (4), to enable a country to
quantify emissions reductions for purposes of
purchasing or trading subnational emissions reduction
credits in carbon markets;
(F) the identification of, and actions to address,
the drivers of land use emissions;
(G) programs that would exclude from the United
States illegally harvested timber or products made from
illegally harvested timber, in accordance with and
consistent with the objectives of the Lacey Act
Amendments of 1981 (16 U.S.C. 3371 et seq.);
(H) the development and strengthening of governance
capacities to reduce deforestation and other land use
emissions and to combat illegal logging and associated
trade, including the development of systems for
independent monitoring of the efficacy of forest law
enforcement and increased enforcement cooperation,
including joint efforts with Federal agencies, to
enforce the Lacey Act Amendments of 1981 (16 U.S.C.
3371 et seq.);
(I) programs to help countries strengthen the
necessary governance and technological capacity to
trace and make publicly available the origin of
agricultural commodities associated with tropical
deforestation, such as beef, soy, palm oil, paper,
pulp, cocoa, and rubber;
(J) the development and strengthening of governance
capacities and associated implementation activities to
combat illegal deforestation related to the production
of agricultural commodities, such as those described in
subparagraph (I);
(K) the provision of incentives for policy reforms
to achieve the objectives described in subsection
(c)(2);
(L) the development of pilot projects--
(i) to examine where mitigation and
adaptation activities in forest ecosystems
coincide; and
(ii) to explore means for enhancing the
resilience of forest ecosystems and forest-
dependent communities;
(M) the promotion of mechanisms to deliver
resources for local action and to address the needs,
rights, interests, and participation of local and
indigenous communities;
(N) the promotion of land tenure and titling
programs, including legal recognition and effective
protection of the land tenure, access and use rights of
Indigenous People and local communities; and
(O) the monitoring and evaluation of the results of
the activities conducted under this section.
(3) Mechanisms.--The Administrator shall apply the
administrative authorities under the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.), except to the extent
inconsistent with the provisions of this section, to the same
extent and in the same manner as such authorities apply to the
implementation of such Act in order to support activities to
achieve the objectives described in subsection (c)(2) by--
(A) developing and implementing programs and
project-level activities that achieve such objectives;
(B) to the extent practicable, giving priority in
any review process to activities under paragraph
(2)(A); and
(C) as appropriate, considering multi-year funding
arrangements in carrying out the purposes of this
section.
(4) Standards.--The Administrator, in consultation with
other appropriate agencies, shall establish program standards
that--
(A) ensure that emissions reductions achieved
through supported activities--
(i) are additional, measurable, verifiable,
and monitored;
(ii) account for leakage, uncertainty, and
permanence; and
(iii) at a minimum, meet the standards
established under the emissions unit criteria
of the Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme
for International Aviation (CORSIA) developed
by the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO);
(B) require--
(i) the establishment of a national
deforestation baseline for each country with
national deforestation reduction activities
that is used to account for reductions achieved
from such activities; or
(ii) if a developing country has
established policies and taken measures to
reduce emissions from disturbed peatlands,
deforestation, or forest degradation, but has
not established a national baseline, the
provision of a credible, transparent, accurate,
and conservative alternative for quantifying
emissions;
(C) provide that each national deforestation
baseline established under subparagraph (B)(i)--
(i) is national, or subnational on an
interim basis, in scope; and
(ii) is consistent with nationally
appropriate mitigation commitments or actions
with respect to deforestation, taking into
consideration--
(I) the average annual historical
deforestation rates of the country
during a period of at least 5 years;
and
(II) the applicable drivers of
deforestation and other factors to
ensure additionality;
(iii) establishes a trajectory that would
result in zero net deforestation by not later
than 20 years after the date on which the
baseline is established;
(iv) is adjusted over time to account for
changing national circumstances; and
(v) is designed to account for all
significant sources of greenhouse gas emissions
from deforestation in the country;
(D) with respect to assistance provided for
activities described in subparagraph (A) or (B) of
paragraph (2), require emissions reductions to be
achieved and verified before the provision of any
assistance under this section;
(E) with respect to accounting for subnational
deforestation and forest degradation reduction
activities that lack the standardized or precise
measurement and monitoring techniques needed for a full
accounting of changes in emissions or baselines, or are
subject to other sources of uncertainty, apply a
conservative discount factor to reflect the uncertainty
regarding the levels of reductions achieved;
(F) ensure that activities under this section are
designed, carried out, and managed--
(i) using forest management practices that,
in an open and transparent process--
(I) improve the livelihoods of
forest communities in a manner that
promotes the maintenance of intact
forests, protects associated
biodiversity, and restores native
forest species and ecosystems while
avoiding the introduction of invasive
nonnative species;
(II) maintain natural biodiversity,
resilience, and carbon storage capacity
of forests;
(III) to the extent practicable, do
not adversely affect the permanence of
forest carbon stocks or emissions
reductions;
(IV) include broad stakeholder
participation and the free prior and
informed consent of affected indigenous
peoples; and
(V) take into account the needs and
interests of local communities, forest-
dependent communities, indigenous
peoples, and vulnerable social groups;
(ii) in consultation with, and with the
full and effective participation of, local
communities, indigenous peoples, and forest-
dependent communities in affected areas, as
partners and primary stakeholders, before and
during the design, planning, implementation,
monitoring, and evaluation of activities; and
(iii) with equitable sharing of profits and
benefits derived from the activities with local
communities, indigenous peoples, and forest-
dependent communities; and
(G) with respect to assistance for all activities
under this section, seek to ensure the establishment
and enforcement of legal regimes, standards, processes,
and safeguards by the country in which the activities
are conducted, as a condition of such assistance or as
a proposed activity for which such assistance may be
provided, which--
(i) protect the rights and interests of
local communities, indigenous peoples, forest-
dependent communities, human rights defenders,
and vulnerable social groups; and
(ii) promote consultations with local
communities, indigenous peoples, and forest-
dependent communities in affected areas, as
partners and primary stakeholders, before and
during the design, planning, implementation,
monitoring, and evaluation of activities under
this section; and
(iii) ensure equitable sharing of profits
and benefits from incentives for emissions
reductions or leakage prevention with local
communities, indigenous peoples, and forest-
dependent communities.
(5) Scope.--
(A) Reduced emissions.--The Administrator shall
include reduced emissions from forest degradation and
disturbance of peatlands within the scope of activities
under this section.
(B) Expansion of authorized activities.--If the
Administrator determines, in consultation with other
appropriate agencies, that sufficient methodologies and
technical capacities exist to measure, monitor, and
account for the emissions referred to in subparagraph
(A), the Administrator may expand the authorized
activities under this section, as appropriate, to
include reduced soil carbon-derived emissions
associated with deforestation and degradation of
forested wetlands and peatlands, consistent with a
comprehensive approach to maintaining and enhancing
forests, increasing climate resiliency, reducing
emissions, and increasing removals of greenhouse gases.
(6) Accounting.--The Administrator shall use a publicly
accessible registry to account for and register the emissions
reductions achieved through assistance provided under this
section each year, after appropriately discounting for
uncertainty and other relevant factors as required by the
standards established under paragraph (4).
(7) International deforestation reduction program insurance
account for noncompletion or reversal.--In furtherance of the
objectives described in subsection (c)(2), the Administrator
shall develop and implement a program that--
(A) addresses noncompletion or reversal with
respect to any greenhouse gas emissions that were not,
or are no longer, sequestered; and
(B) may include a mechanism to hold in reserve a
portion of the amount allocated for projects to support
the program.
(8) Extension of assistance.--
(A) In general.--The Administrator may extend, for
an additional 5 years, the period during which
assistance is authorized for activities supported by
assistance under this section, if the Administrator
determines that--
(i) the country in which the activities are
conducted is making substantial progress toward
adopting and implementing a program to achieve
reductions in deforestation measured against a
national baseline;
(ii) the greenhouse gas emissions
reductions achieved as a result of the
activities are not resulting in significant
leakage;
(iii) such greenhouse gas emissions
reductions are being appropriately discounted
to account for any leakage that is occurring;
and
(iv) such extension would further advance
or ensure achievement of the objectives of the
activities.
(B) Assistance for subnational deforestation and
forest degradation reduction activities.--
(i) In general.--If the Administrator
extends the period during which assistance is
authorized for activities under subparagraph
(A), the Administrator shall determine, based
on the criteria specified that subparagraph,
whether such assistance should include
assistance for subnational deforestation and
forest degradation reduction activities.
(ii) Continued assistance.--The
Administrator may extend the period during
which assistance is authorized for subnational
deforestation and forest degradation reduction
activities beyond the 5-year period described
in subparagraph (A) in order to further the
objectives described in subparagraph (B) or (C)
of subsection (c)(2).
(9) Coordination with foreign assistance.--Subject to the
direction of the President, the Administrator shall, to the
extent practicable and consistent with the objectives described
in subsection (c)(2), seek to align activities under this
section with broader development, poverty alleviation, or
natural resource management objectives and initiatives in
countries receiving assistance under this section.
(10) Assistance as supplement.--The provision of assistance
for activities under this section shall be used to supplement,
and not to supplant, any other Federal, State, or local support
available to carry out activities under this section.
(11) Funding limitation.--Of the funds made available to
carry out this section in any fiscal year, not more than 7
percent may be used for the administrative expenses of the
United States Agency for International Development in support
of activities described in paragraph (2). Such amount shall be
in addition to other amounts otherwise available for such
purposes.
(f) Legal Effect.--
(1) In general.--Nothing in this section may be construed
to supersede, limit, or otherwise affect any restriction
imposed by Federal law (including regulations) on any
interaction between an entity located in the United States and
an entity located in a foreign country.
(2) Role of the secretary of state.--Nothing in this
section may be construed to affect the role of the Secretary of
State or the responsibilities of the Secretary under section
622(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C.
2382(c)).
(g) International Financial Institutions.--The President shall
direct the United States representatives to the World Bank, the
International Monetary Fund, and other international financial
institutions (as defined in section 1701(c) of the International
Financial Institutions Act (22 U.S.C. 262r(c)) to prioritize efforts to
combat deforestation.
SEC. 612. CONTROLLING THE EXPORT OF ELECTRONIC WASTE TO PROTECT UNITED
STATES SUPPLY CHAINS.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
(1) It is in the national security interests of the United
States to ensure that the export of electronic waste does not
become the source of counterfeit goods that may reenter
electronics supply chains in the United States, and for other
purposes.
(2) A 2012 Senate Armed Services Committee Report
``discovered counterfeit electronic parts from China in the Air
Force's largest cargo plane, in assemblies intended for Special
Operations helicopters, and in a Navy surveillance plane among
1,800 cases of bogus parts''.
(3) Further, exporting such material has often resulted in
environmental damage because of illegal dumping or inadequate
environmental regulations in other countries for ensuring their
safe and secure disposal.
(4) China, the single largest producer of electronic waste,
is on track for its e-waste industry to total $23,800,000,000
by 2030, given its high supply of used products, demand for
recycled materials, and capacity to transport these materials.
(5) As the second largest producer of electronic waste, the
United States has a strong economic and national security
incentive to enhance domestic e-waste recycling capacity rather
than exporting to China and other countries.
(6) Given China's lack of regulations and worker
protections, workers in the e-waste industry have been exposed
to over 1,000 harmful substances, including lead and mercury,
endangering the health and wellbeing of workers.
(b) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Electronic waste.--
(A) In general.--The term ``electronic waste''
means any of the following used items containing
electronic components, or fragments thereof, including
parts or subcomponents of such items:
(i) Computers and related equipment.
(ii) Data center equipment (including
servers, network equipment, firewalls, battery
backup systems, and power distribution units).
(iii) Mobile computers (including
notebooks, netbooks, tablets, and e-book
readers).
(iv) Televisions (including portable
televisions and portable DVD players).
(v) Video display devices (including
monitors, digital picture frames, and portable
video devices).
(vi) Digital imaging devices (including
printers, copiers, facsimile machines, image
scanners, and multifunction machines).
(vii) Consumer electronics--
(I) including digital cameras,
projectors, digital audio players,
cellular phones and wireless internet
communication devices, audio equipment,
video cassette recorders, DVD players,
video game systems (including portable
systems), video game controllers,
signal converter boxes, and cable and
satellite receivers; and
(II) not including appliances that
have electronic features.
(viii) Portable global positioning system
navigation devices.
(ix) Other used electronic items that the
Secretary determines to be necessary to carry
out this section.
(B) Exempt items.--The term ``electronic waste''
does not include--
(i) exempted electronic waste items;
(ii) electronic parts of a motor vehicle;
or
(iii) electronic components, or items
containing electronic components, that are
exported or reexported to an entity under the
ownership or control of the person exporting or
reexporting the components or items, with the
intent that the components or items be used for
the purpose for which the components or items
were used in the United States.
(2) Exempted electronic waste items.--
(A) In general.--The term ``exempted electronic
waste items'' means the following:
(i) Tested, working used electronics.
(ii) Low-risk counterfeit electronics.
(iii) Recalled electronics.
(B) Definitions.--In this paragraph:
(i) Tested, working used electronics.--The
term ``tested, working used electronics'' means
any used electronic items that--
(I) are determined, through testing
methodologies established by the
Secretary, to be--
(aa) fully functional for
the purpose for which the items
were designed; or
(bb) in the case of
multifunction devices, fully
functional for at least one of
the primary purposes for which
the items were designed;
(II) are exported with the intent
to reuse the products as functional
products; and
(III) are appropriately packaged
for shipment to prevent the items from
losing functionality as a result of
damage during shipment.
(ii) Low-risk counterfeit electronics.--The
term ``low-risk counterfeit electronics'' means
any electronic components or items that--
(I) have been subjected to
destruction processes that render the
items unusable for their original
purpose; and
(II) are exported as a feedstock,
with no additional mechanical or hand
separation required, in a reclamation
process to render the electronic
components or items recycled consistent
with the laws of the foreign country
performing the reclamation process.
(iii) Recalled electronics.--The term
``recalled electronics'' means any electronic
items that--
(I) because of a defect in the
design or manufacture of the items--
(aa) are subject to a
recall notice issued by the
Consumer Product Safety
Commission or other pertinent
Federal authority and have been
received by the manufacturer or
its agent and repaired by the
manufacturer or its agent to
cure the defect; or
(bb) have been recalled by
the manufacturer as a condition
of the validity of the warranty
on the items and have been
repaired by the manufacturer or
its agent to cure the defect;
and
(II) are exported by the
manufacturer of the items.
(iv) Feedstock.--The term ``feedstock''
means any raw material constituting the
principal input for an industrial process.
(3) Counterfeit good.--The term ``counterfeit good'' means
any good on which, or in connection with which, a counterfeit
mark is used.
(4) Counterfeit military good.--The term ``counterfeit
military good'' means a counterfeit good that--
(A) is falsely identified or labeled as meeting
military specifications; or
(B) is intended for use in a military or national
security application.
(5) Counterfeit mark.--The term ``counterfeit mark'' has
the meaning given that term in section 2320 of title 18, United
States Code.
(6) Export administration regulations.--The term ``Export
Administration Regulations'' means the regulations set forth in
subchapter C of chapter VII of title 15, Code of Federal
Regulations, or successor regulations.
(7) Export; reexport.--The terms ``export'' and
``reexport'' have the meanings given such terms in section 1742
of the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (50 U.S.C. 4801).
(8) Secretary.--The term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary
of Commerce.
(9) Used.--The term ``used'', with respect to an item,
means the item has been operated or employed.
(c) Prohibition.--Except as provided in subsections (c) and (d), no
person or entity may export or reexport electronic waste or exempted
electronic waste items.
(d) Export Prohibition Exemptions.--A person or entity may export
or reexport exempted electronic waste items, but only if the following
requirements are met:
(1) Registration.--The person or entity is listed on a
publicly available registry maintained by the Secretary.
(2) Filing of export information.--For each export
transaction, the person or entity files in the Automated Export
System, in accordance with part 758 of the Export
Administration Regulations (or any corresponding similar
regulation or ruling), electronic export information that
contains at least the following information:
(A) A description of the type and total quantity of
exempted electronic waste items exported.
(B) The name of each country that received the
exempted electronic waste items for reuse or recycling.
(C)(i) The name of the ultimate consignee to which
the exempted electronic waste items were received for
reclamation, recall, or reuse; and
(ii) documentation and a declaration that such
consignee has the necessary permits, resources, and
competence to manage the exempted electronic waste
items as reusable products or recyclable feedstock and
prevent its release as a counterfeit good or
counterfeit military good.
(3) Compliance with existing laws.--The export or reexport
of exempted electronic waste items otherwise comply with
applicable international agreements to which the United States
is a party and with other trade and export control laws of the
United States.
(4) Export declarations and requirements.--The exempted
electronic waste items are accompanied by--
(A) documentation of the registration of the
exporter required under paragraph (1);
(B) a declaration signed by an officer or
designated representative of the exporter asserting
that the exempted electronic waste items meet the
applicable requirements for exempted electronic waste
items under this section;
(C) a description of the contents and condition of
the exempted electronic waste items in the shipment;
(D) for tested, working electronics, a description
of the testing methodologies and test results for each
item;
(E) the name of the ultimate consignee and
declaration of the consignee's applicable permits,
resources, and competence to process or use the items
as intended; and
(F) with respect to low-risk counterfeit
electronics only and when required by the importing
country, the written consent of the competent authority
of the receiving country to allow the products in such
country.
(e) Exception for Personal Use.--The Secretary may provide for an
exception to the requirements of this section, subject to such
recordkeeping requirements as the Secretary may impose, for the export
or reexport of 5 or fewer items that are or contain electronic
components intended for personal use.
(f) Effective Date.--
(1) In general.--Subject to paragraph (2), this section
shall take effect upon the expiration of the 1-year period
beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act.
(2) Modification of ear.--The Secretary shall, not later
than the effective date under paragraph (1), ensure that the
Export Administration Regulations are modified to carry out
this section.
(g) Penalties for Violations.--Any person who violates this section
or the regulations issued under subsection (e)(2) shall be subject to
the same penalties as those that apply to any person violating any
other provision of the Export Administration Regulations.
Union Calendar No. 486
117th CONGRESS
2d Session
H. R. 3524
[Report No. 117-667, Part I]
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To revitalize and reassert United States leadership, investment, and
engagement in the Indo-Pacific region and globally.
_______________________________________________________________________
December 30, 2022
Reported from the Committee on Foreign Affairs with an amendment
December 30, 2022
Committees on Financial Services, Ways and Means, the Judiciary, and
Intelligence (Permanent Select) discharged; committed to the Committee
of the Whole House on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed
Ensuring American Global Leadership and Engagement Act
#3524 | HR Congress #117
Policy Area: International Affairs
Subjects: Advanced technology and technological innovationsAdvisory bodiesAfricaAgricultural conservation and pollutionAgricultural practices and innovationsAir qualityAlliancesAlternative and renewable resourcesArctic and polar regionsArms control and nonproliferationAsiaAustraliaBusiness ethicsCanadaCardiovascular and respiratory healthCaribbean areaChileChinaClimate change and greenhouse gases
Last Action: Placed on the Union Calendar, Calendar No. 486. (12/30/2022)
Bill Text Source: Congress.gov
Summary and Impacts
Original Text