Summary and Impacts
Original Text
[Congressional Bills 116th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 9032 Introduced in House (IH)]

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116th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 9032

To direct the Sergeants at Arms of the House of Representatives and the 
Senate to develop an interagency plan to identify certain congressional 
employees with connections to the Chinese Communist Party and intent to 
     engage in certain unlawful activities, and for other purposes.


_______________________________________________________________________


                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           December 18, 2020

Mr. Murphy of North Carolina (for himself, Mr. Johnson of South Dakota, 
 Mr. Banks, and Mr. Abraham) introduced the following bill; which was 
           referred to the Committee on House Administration

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL


 
To direct the Sergeants at Arms of the House of Representatives and the 
Senate to develop an interagency plan to identify certain congressional 
employees with connections to the Chinese Communist Party and intent to 
     engage in certain unlawful activities, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Stop China's Heinous Exploitation 
and Malicious Espionage Against Congressional Access Act'' or the 
``SCHEME Against Congressional Access Act''.

SEC. 2. CONGRESSIONAL EMPLOYEES WITH CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY 
              CONNECTIONS AND INTENT TO ENGAGE IN UNLAWFUL ACTIVITIES.

    (a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
            (1) The Chinese Communist Party has an explicit and 
        subversive interest in gaining access to and influence over 
        U.S. political activity.
            (2) In a July 2020 speech, Director of the Federal Bureau 
        of Investigations Chris Wray said that ``Beijing is engaged in 
        a highly sophisticated malign foreign influence campaign'' with 
        efforts that involve ``subversive, undeclared, criminal, or 
        coercive attempts to sway our government's policies, distort 
        our country's public discourse, and undermine confidence in our 
        democratic processes and values''.
            (3) There have been several instances and investigations of 
        Chinese operatives developing extensive ties and employment 
        with U.S. elected officials, both senior and junior.
            (4) These same operatives, mostly Chinese nationals, have 
        been deployed to infiltrate political operations by the main 
        civilian spy agency of their home country as a means to gain 
        influence over decision-makers and gain access to classified 
        information.
            (5) These instances demonstrate a devoted strategy of China 
        that takes years, or sometimes decades, to knowingly gain 
        access, influence, or information.
            (6) To protect classified information and prevent seditious 
        influence over elected officials, Congress must act to develop 
        stronger oversight with respect to the foreign involvement of 
        covered individuals.
    (b) Plan for Background Assessments.--Not later than 90 days after 
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sergeant at Arms of the 
House of Representatives and the Sergeant at Arms of the Senate shall 
jointly--
            (1) consult with the Director of National Intelligence, the 
        Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the 
        Secretary of State regarding potential unlawful activity 
        engaged in by covered individuals to the advantage of the 
        Chinese Communist Party; and
            (2) in consultation with the Directors and Secretary 
        specified in paragraph (1), develop an interagency plan to 
        assess the background of each covered individual to determine 
        whether--
                    (A) the covered individual has a connection to the 
                Chinese Communist Party or any element thereof 
                (including connections resulting from citizenship, 
                military service, or personal travel); and
                    (B) the covered individual intends to engage in 
                unlawful activity to the advantage of the Chinese 
                Communist Party.
    (c) Assessment Outcomes.--
            (1) Notification.--If, as the result of an assessment 
        conducted pursuant to the plan developed under subsection 
        (b)(2), the Sergeant at Arms concerned determines that a 
        covered individual meets both of the criteria specified in such 
        subsection, the Sergeant at Arms concerned shall notify the 
        head of the employing office for the covered individual.
            (2) Outcome.--Upon receipt of a notification under 
        paragraph (1), the head of the employing office for the covered 
        individual shall--
                    (A) immediately terminate the employment of the 
                covered individual; and
                    (B) if the covered individual is not under 
                investigation by the Director of the Federal Bureau of 
                Investigation, refer the covered individual to such 
                Director for appropriate investigation.
    (d) Report.--Not later than one year after the date on which the 
plan under subsection (b)(2) is developed, and annually thereafter, the 
Sergeant at Arms of the House of Representatives and the Sergeant at 
Arms of the Senate shall jointly submit to the President and the 
congressional intelligence committees a report on any improvements to 
such plan made during the year covered by the report.
    (e) Definitions.--In this section:
            (1) Congressional intelligence committees.--The term 
        ``congressional intelligence committees'' has the meaning given 
        such term in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
        U.S.C. 3003).
            (2) Covered employee.--The term ``covered employee'' means 
        an employee of the House of Representatives or an employee of 
        the Senate, as such terms are defined in subsection (a) of 
        section 101 of the Congressional Accountability Act (2 U.S.C. 
        1301).
            (3) Employing office.--The term ``employing office'' has 
        the meaning given such term in subsection (a) of section 101 of 
        the Congressional Accountability Act (2 U.S.C. 1301), except 
        such term does not include the entities listed in subparagraphs 
        (D) or (E) of paragraph (9) of such subsection.
            (4) Sergeant at arms concerned.--The term ``Sergeant at 
        Arms concerned'' means--
                    (A) the Sergeant at Arms of the House of 
                Representatives, with respect to assessments concerning 
                an employee of the House of Representatives; and
                    (B) the Sergeant at Arms of the Senate, with 
                respect to assessments concerning an employee of the 
                Senate.
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