[Congressional Bills 116th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 8591 Introduced in House (IH)]
<DOC>
116th CONGRESS
2d Session
H. R. 8591
To provide for judicial security and privacy.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
October 13, 2020
Ms. Sherrill (for herself, Mr. Carter of Texas, and Ms. Norton)
introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on
the Judiciary
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To provide for judicial security and privacy.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Daniel Anderl Judicial Security and
Privacy Act of 2020''.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
Congress finds the following:
(1) Members of the Federal judiciary perform the important
function of interpreting our Constitution and administering
justice in a fair and impartial manner.
(2) Federal judges must be able to act without fear of
personal reprisal from individuals affected by the decisions
they make in the course of carrying out their public duties.
(3) In recent years, partially as a result of the rise in
the use of social media and online access to information,
members of the Federal judiciary have been exposed to an
increased number of personal threats in connection to their
role.
(4) Between 2015 and 2019, threats and other inappropriate
communications against Federal judges and other judiciary
personnel increased from 926 in 2015 to approximately 4,449 in
2019.
(5) Over the past decade, several members of the Federal
judiciary have experienced acts of violence against themselves
or a family member in connection to their Federal judiciary
role, including the murder of the family of United States
District Judge for the Northern District of Illinois Joan
Lefkow in 2005.
(6) On Sunday July 19, 2020, an assailant went to the home
of Esther Salas, a judge for the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey, impersonating a package
delivery driver, opening fire upon arrival, and killing Daniel
Anderl, the 20-year-old son of Judge Salas, and seriously
wounding Mark Anderl, her husband.
(7) In the aftermath of the recent tragedy that occurred to
Judge Salas and in response to the continuous rise of threats
against members of the Federal judiciary, there is an immediate
need for enhanced security procedures and increased
availability of tools to protect Federal judges and their
families.
SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) At-risk individual.--The term ``at-risk individual''
means--
(A) a Federal judge; or
(B) a senior, recalled, or retired Federal judge.
(2) Data broker.--The term ``data broker'' means a
commercial entity that collects, assembles, or maintains
personal information concerning an individual who is not a
customer or an employee of that entity in order to sell the
information or provide third party access to the information.
(3) Directions.--The term ``directions'' mean directions
for navigation of surface streets that will lead to the
specific covered address, even if the address is not published.
(4) Federal judge.--The term ``Federal judge'' means--
(A) a justice or judge of the United States, as
those terms are defined in section 451 of title 28,
United States Code;
(B) a bankruptcy judge appointed under section 152
of title 28, United States Code;
(C) a United States magistrate judge appointed
under section 631 of title 28, United States Code;
(D) a judge confirmed by the United States Senate
and empowered by statute in any commonwealth,
territory, or possession to perform the duties of a
Federal judge; and
(E) a judge of the United States Court of Federal
Claims appointed under section 171 of title 28, United
States Code.
(5) Government agency.--The term ``Government agency''
means any department enumerated in section 1 of title 5 of the
United States Code, independent establishment, commission,
administration, authority, board or bureau of the United States
or any corporation in which the United States has a proprietary
interest. The term includes all such institutions, offices, and
any other bodies politic and corporate of the United States
Government created by the constitution or statute, whether in
the executive, judicial, or legislative branch; all units and
corporate outgrowths created by Executive order of the
President or any constitutional officer, by the Supreme Court
of the United States, or by resolution of the United States
Congress.
(6) Immediate family.--The term ``immediate family'' means
a spouse, child, parent, or any other blood relative of an at-
risk individual who lives in the same residence as the at-risk
individual.
(7) Judges' personally identifiable information.--The term
``judges' personally identifiable information'' means--
(A) a home address, including primary residence or
vacation home address, of an at-risk individual;
(B) home, personal mobile, or the direct telephone
line to the private chambers of an at-risk individual;
(C) the personal email address of an at-risk
individual;
(D) the social security number, driver's license
number, or voter registration information that includes
a home address of an at-risk individual;
(E) a bank account or credit or debit card
information of an at-risk individual;
(F) property tax records or any property ownership
records of an at-risk individual, including a secondary
residence and any investment property of at which an
at-risk individual resides for part of a year;
(G) birth and marriage records of an at-risk
individual;
(H) vehicle registration information of an at-risk
individual;
(I) identification of children of an at-risk
individual under the age of 18;
(J) date of birth of an at-risk individual;
(K) directions to a home of an at-risk individual
or immediate family of an at-risk individual;
(L) a photograph of any vehicle including license
plate or home including address of an at-risk
individual or immediate family of an at-risk
individual;
(M) the name and location of a school or day care
facility attended by a child of an at-risk individual
or immediate family of an at-risk individual; or
(N) the name and location of an employer of an
immediate family member of an at-risk individual.
(8) Social media.--The term ``social media'' means any
online electronic medium, a live-chat system, or an electronic
dating service--
(A) that primarily serves as a medium for users to
interact with content generated by other third-party
users of the medium;
(B) that enables users to create accounts or
profiles specific to the medium or to import profiles
from another medium; and
(C) that enables one or more users to generate
content that can be viewed by other third-party users
of the medium.
SEC. 4. PROTECTING JUDGES' PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION IN
PUBLIC RECORDS.
(a) Government Agencies.--
(1) In general.--Each at-risk individual may--
(A) file written notice of the status of the
individual as an at-risk individual, for themselves and
immediate family of an at-risk individual, to each
Government agency; and
(B) ask each Government agency described in
subparagraph (A) to mark as confidential judges'
personally identifiable information.
(2) Government agencies shall not publicly post or display
publicly available content that includes judges' personally
identifiable information. Government agencies, upon receipt of
a written request in accordance with subsection (a)(1)(A) of
this section, shall remove the judges' personally identifiable
information from publicly available content within 72 hours.
(b) State and Local Governments.--
(1) Grant program to prevent disclosure of personal
information of judicial officers.--
(A) Authorization.--The Attorney General shall make
grants to prevent the release of personally
identifiable information of at-risk individuals to the
detriment of such individuals or their families to--
(i)(I) a State or unit of local government
(as such terms are defined in section 901 of
the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act
of 1968 (34 U.S.C. 10251); or
(II) an agency of a State or unit of local
government; or
(ii) that operates a State or local
database or registry that contains personally
identifying information.
(B) Application.--An eligible entity seeking a
grant under this section shall submit to the Attorney
General an application at such time, in such manner,
and containing such information as the Attorney General
may reasonably require.
(2) Authorization of appropriations.--There is authorized
to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary to provide
grants to entities described in paragraph (1) to create or
expand programs designed to protect judges' personally
identifiable information, including through--
(A) the creation of programs to redact or remove
judges' personally identifiable information, upon the
request of an at-risk individual, from public records
in State agencies; these efforts may include but are
not limited to hiring a third party to redact or remove
judges' personally identifiable information from public
records;
(B) the expansion of existing programs that the
State may have enacted in an effort to protect judges'
personally identifiable information;
(C) the development or improvement of protocols,
procedures, and policies to prevent the release of
judges' personally identifiable information;
(D) the defrayment of costs of modifying or
improving existing databases and registries to ensure
that judges' personally identifiable information is
protected from release; and
(E) the development of confidential opt out systems
that will enable at-risk individuals to make a single
request to keep judges' personally identifiable
information out of multiple databases or registries.
(3) Report.--
(A) In general.--Not later than 1 year after the
date of enactment of this Act, and biennially
thereafter, the Comptroller General of the United
States, shall submit to the Committee on the Judiciary
of the Senate and the Committee on the Judiciary of the
House of Representatives an annual report that
includes--
(i) a detailed amount spent by States and
local governments on protection of judges'
personally identifiable information; and
(ii) where the judges' personally
identifiable information was found.
(B) States and local governments.--States and local
governments that receive funds under this section shall
submit to the Comptroller General a report on data
described in clauses (i) and (ii) of subparagraph (A)
to be included in the report required under that
subparagraph.
(c) Data Brokers and Other Businesses.--
(1) Prohibition.--
(A) Data brokers.--It shall be unlawful for a data
broker to sell, license, trade, purchase, or otherwise
provide or make available for consideration judges'
personally identifiable information.
(B) Other businesses.--No person, business, or
association shall publicly post or publicly display on
the internet judges' personally identifiable
information if the at-risk individual has, either
directly or through an agent, made a written request of
that person, business, or association to not disclose
the judges' personally identifiable information of the
at-risk individual or that of the at-risk individual's
immediate family.
(C) List.--The Administrative Office of the United
States Courts may, upon request, act as an agent and
provide data brokers with a current list of Federal
judges and their immediate family for the purpose of
maintaining compliance with this section.
(2) Required conduct.--
(A) In general.--After a person, business, or
association has received a written request from an at-
risk individual to protect the judges' personally
identifiable information, that person, business, or
association shall have 72 hours to remove the judges'
personally identifiable information from the internet.
(B) Information protected.--After a person,
business, or association has received a written request
from an at-risk individual, that person, business, or
association shall ensure that the at-risk individual's
judges' personally identifiable information is not made
available on any website or subsidiary website
controlled by that person, business, or association.
(C) Transfer.--After receiving an at-risk
individual's written request, no person, business, or
association shall transfer the judges' personally
identifiable information to any other person, business,
or association through any medium.
(d) Redress and Penalties.--
(1) In general.--An at-risk individual whose judges'
personally identifiable information is made public as a result
of a violation of this Act may bring an action seeking
injunctive or declaratory relief in any court of competent
jurisdiction. If the court grants injunctive or declaratory
relief, the person, business, or association responsible for
the violation shall be required to pay the at-risk individual's
costs and reasonable attorney's fees.
(2) Private right of action.--
(A) In general.--An at-risk individual or immediate
family member who is aggrieved by a violation of
subsection (c) of this section may bring an action in
any court of competent jurisdiction.
(B) Damages.--A prevailing plaintiff in an action
described in subparagraph (A) shall be awarded damages
in an amount--
(i) not greater than 3 times the actual
damages to the plaintiff; and
(ii) not less than $10,000.
SEC. 5. HOME INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEM PROGRAM.
There is authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be
necessary to provide security monitoring services for active, senior,
recalled, or retired Federal judges, including any method or methods
designed to provide security through a system of interworking
components and devices such as integrated electronic devices working
together with a central control panel, including doorbell cameras,
outdoor cameras, and motion detection devices.
SEC. 6. TRAINING AND EDUCATION.
There is authorized to be appropriated to the Federal judiciary
such sums as may be necessary for biannual judicial security training
for active, senior, or recalled Federal judges and their immediate
family, including--
(1) best practices for using social media and other forms
of online engagement and for maintaining online privacy;
(2) home security program and maintenance;
(3) understanding removal programs and requirements for
judges' personally identifiable information; and
(4) any other judicial security training that the United
States Marshals Services and the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts determines is relevant.
SEC. 7. NEW THREAT MANAGEMENT CAPABILITY.
(a) Authorization of Appropriations.--
(1) New threat management capability.--There is authorized
to be appropriated to the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts such sums as may be necessary to establish, in
coordination with the U.S. Marshals Service and other relevant
Federal law enforcement and security agencies, a new threat
management capability for monitoring all-source information
which may:
(A) provide a threat monitoring and analysis
capability for the protection of at-risk individuals
and judiciary assets;
(B) coordinate social media monitoring and threat
assessments;
(C) proactively manage the monitoring of data
broker websites for judges' personally identifiable
information and report violations to the United States
Marshals Service, and other appropriate Federal and
local law enforcement authorities;
(D) maintain files of escalating behaviors and work
in conjunction with the United States Marshals Service,
and appropriate Federal and local law enforcement to
counteract overt acts of aggression;
(E) maintain a database of each active, senior,
recalled, or retired Federal judge to catalogue
complaints, including the name and other relevant
personal information of the individual or group of
individuals engaging in direct or indirect threatening
behavior; and
(F) coordinate complaints by active, senior,
recalled, or retired Federal judges of all sources and
other online threats, whether direct or indirect, with
law enforcement partners.
(b) Expansion of Capabilities of Office of Protective
Intelligence.--There is authorized to be appropriated such sums as may
be necessary to the United States Marshals Service to expand the
current capabilities of the Office of Protective Intelligence of the
Judicial Security Division to--
(1) increase the workforce of the Office of Protective
Intelligence to include additional intelligence analysts,
United States deputy marshals, and any other relevant personnel
to ensure that the Office of Protective Intelligence is ready
and able to anticipate and deter threats to the judiciary;
(2) provide a number of intelligence analysts of the United
States Marshals Service to assist the Administrative Office of
the U.S. Courts in establishing the threat monitoring
capability described in subsection (a); and
(3) develop a monitoring, collection, and analytical
capability to share relevant information leveraged from the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts and partnered
law enforcement and security agencies to protect judiciary
personnel and assets.
(c) Report.--
(1) In general.--Not later than one year after the date of
enactment of this Act, the Department of Justice, in
consultation with the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts, shall submit to the Committee on the Judiciary
of the Senate and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House
of Representatives a report on the security of Federal judges
arising from the Federal prosecutions and civil litigation.
(2) Description.--The report required under paragraph (1)
shall describe--
(A) the number and nature of threats and assaults
against at-risk individuals handling prosecutions and
other matters described in paragraph (1) and the
reporting requirements and methods;
(B) the security measures that are in place to
protect the at-risk individuals handling prosecutions
described in paragraph (1), including threat
assessments, response procedures, availability of
security systems and other devices, firearms licensing
such as deputations, and other measures designed to
protect the at-risk individuals and immediate family of
an at-risk individual; and
(C) for each requirement, measure, or policy
described in subparagraphs (A) and (B), when the
requirement, measure, or policy was developed and who
was responsible for developing and implementing the
requirement, measure, or policy.
SEC. 8. SEVERABILITY.
If any provision of this Act or the application of such provision
to any person or circumstance is held to be unconstitutional, the
remainder of this Act and the application of such provision to any
person or circumstance shall not be affected thereby.
SEC. 9. EFFECTIVE DATE.
This Act shall take effect on the date that is 120 days after the
date of enactment of this Act.
<all>
Daniel Anderl Judicial Security and Privacy Act of 2020
#8591 | HR Congress #116
Policy Area: Government Operations and Politics
Subjects: Civil actions and liabilityCongressional oversightCriminal justice information and recordsFamily relationshipsGovernment information and archivesInternet and video servicesInternet, web applications, social mediaJudgesPersonnel recordsProtection of officialsRight of privacyState and local government operations
Last Action: Referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary. (10/13/2020)
Bill Text Source: Congress.gov
Summary and Impacts
Original Text