Russian-Venezuelan Threat Mitigation Act

#1102 | HR Congress #116

Last Action: Referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. (2/7/2019)

Bill Text Source: Congress.gov

Summary and Impacts
Original Text
[Congressional Bills 116th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1102 Introduced in House (IH)]

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116th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 1102

To assess and mitigate threats posed by Russian-Venezuelan cooperation, 
                        and for other purposes.


_______________________________________________________________________


                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            February 7, 2019

 Ms. Wasserman Schultz (for herself, Mr. Diaz-Balart, Ms. Shalala, and 
Ms. Mucarsel-Powell) introduced the following bill; which was referred 
                  to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL


 
To assess and mitigate threats posed by Russian-Venezuelan cooperation, 
                        and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Russian-Venezuelan Threat Mitigation 
Act''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    Congress finds the following:
            (1) The Russian Federation's increased presence in the 
        western hemisphere is of concern to the United States and our 
        allies in the region.
            (2) In December 2018, the Russian Federation sent two Tu-
        160 nuclear-capable bombers to Venezuela for joint exercises 
        with the Venezuelan military. The Tu-160 can carry conventional 
        or nuclear-tipped cruise missiles with an estimated maximum 
        range of around 3,000 miles.
            (3) Russian and Venezuelan forces took part in a joint 10-
        hour exercise across the Caribbean in December 2018 with the 
        Tu-160 nuclear-capable bombers.
            (4) The Maduro regime has turned to the Russian Federation, 
        one of its strongest political allies, for financial support 
        during its current economic crisis.
            (5) Nicolas Maduro secured loans from the Russian 
        Federation to be repaid through future oil exports, but fell 
        behind on those payments in 2017. News reports in December 2018 
        suggest that Russian State oil company Rosneft has lent 
        Venezuelan state oil company Petroleos de Venezuela (PdVSA) 
        $6.5 billion partly as prepayment for crude oil, $3.1 billion 
        of which remained outstanding as of the end of September 2018.
            (6) In 2016, PdVSA secured a $1.5 billion loan from 
        Rosneft, and PdVSA used 49.9 percent of its shares in United 
        States-based and Venezuelan-owned company CITGO as collateral. 
        A Venezuelan default could lead to potential Russian ownership 
        of United States energy infrastructure.
            (7) At the conclusion of a 3-day visit to Moscow in 
        December 2018, Maduro announced $6 billion worth of Russian 
        investment pledges focused on the oil and mining sectors as 
        well as the export of 600,000 tons of Russian wheat to 
        Venezuela to cover its 2019 needs.

SEC. 3. THREAT ASSESSMENT AND STRATEGY TO COUNTER RUSSIAN INFLUENCE IN 
              VENEZUELA.

    (a) Threat Assessment.--Not later than 120 days after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the 
appropriate congressional committees an assessment on Russian-
Venezuelan security cooperation and the potential threat such 
cooperation poses to the United States and countries in the Western 
Hemisphere.
    (b) Strategy.--Not later than 30 days after the submission of the 
threat assessment required under subsection (a), the Secretary of State 
shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a strategy to 
address Russian-Venezuelan cooperation.
    (c) Definition.--In this section, the term ``appropriate 
congressional committees'' means the Committee on Foreign Affairs of 
the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of 
the Senate.

SEC. 4. ASSESSMENT OF FOREIGN ACQUISITION OF CITGO ASSETS IN THE UNITED 
              STATES.

    (a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the President shall transmit to the appropriate 
congressional committees an assessment of the security risks posed by 
potential Russian acquisition of CITGO's United States energy 
infrastructure holdings.
    (b) Definition.--In this section, the term ``appropriate 
congressional committees'' means the Committee on Foreign Affairs and 
the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives and the 
Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of 
the Senate.
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